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ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session 
Paris, 19th-22nd June 1978 
MONDAY, 19th JUNE 
Morning 9.15 a.m. 
Meeting of Chairmen of National Delegations. 
10 a.m. 
Meeting of the Federated Christian Democrat Group and British Conservatives. 
10.30 a.m. 
Meeting of the Liberal Group. 
Meeting of the Socialist Group. 
Alternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Opening of the Session by the Provisional President. 
2. Examination of credentials - Ratification of the decision of the Presidential Committee. 
3. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
4. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
5. Adoption of the draft Order Business of the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Ses-
sion. 
6. Twenty-third annual report of the Council : 
presentation by Mr. Forlani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council. 
7. Address by Mr. Stim, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic. 
8. Vote on the draft recommendation postponed from the last session : 
Strategic mobility : 
Vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 758 as amended presented by Mr. 
Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
9. (a) Political activities of the Council - reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Coun-
cil - and the future of the WEU Assembly: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Treu on behalf of the General Affairs Committee; 
(b) Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments ; 
(c) Scientific, technological and aerospace questions- reply to the twenty-third annual report of 
the Council : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ; 
Debate on the annual report of the Council and replies of the Committees. 
Votes on the draft recommendations. 
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TUESDAY, 20th JUNE 
Moraine 8.30 a.m. 
Meeting of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
9 a.m. 
Meeting of the General Affairs Committee. 
10 a.m. 
I. Security in the Mediterranean : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Grant on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
2. Address by Mr. Mulley, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
AfterDOOD 2.30 p,m, 
Meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
3 p.m. 
I. China and European security : 
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs 
Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Relations with Parliaments : 
presentation of the information report tabled by Mr. Reid on behalf of the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments. 
At the cloae of the aittia1 
Meeting of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. 
Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
WEDNESDAY, 2bt JUNE 
Morniac 8.30 a.m. 
Meeting of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
9 a.m. 
I. International terrorism : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Miiller on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. European security and African problems: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Muller on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
I2 
DOCUMENT 764 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. United Sta.tes-Europea.n co-operation and competition in advanced technology : 
presentation of the report tabled by MM. Konings, Treu, Dr. Phipps and Mr. Jessel on behalf 
of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Application satellites : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Scheffler on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
At the close of the sitting 
Meeting of the Presidential Committee. 
THURSDAY, 22ncl JUNE 
Morning 9 a.m. 
10 a.m. 
Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
Disarmament. 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH ORDINARY SESSION 
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Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly 
of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period 
1st January to 31st December 1977 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Council of Western European Union tra.nsmit to the Assembly the Twenty-Third Annual Report 
on their activities, covering the period 1st January to 31st December 1977. 
2. The main questions considered by the Council are dealt with in the following chapters : 
I. Relations between the Council and the Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
IT. Activities of the Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
Ill. Armaments Control Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
IV. Standing Armaments Committee.................................................. 31 
V. Public Administration Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
VI. Budgetary and administrative questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 
14. 
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CHAPTER I 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY 
A. The Council, who fully appreciate the 
importance of the Assembly's responsibilities in 
the matter of European security and policy, 
endeavoured to maintain close and co-operative 
relations with the Assembly during 1977. 
1. The twenty-second annual report, giving an 
account of the activities of the Council and its 
subsidiary bodies during 1976, was transmitted 
to the Assembly at the earliest possible date. 
Certain further details relating to the control of 
armaments were also included, in accordance with 
the procedure applied by the Council since their 
reply to Written Question 123 in 1971. 
2. The Council not~d, with interest, the reports 
presented by Assembly Committees during the 
two parts of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session, 
and followed the subsequent debates with atten-
tion. They regret, however, that some of these 
reports were very late in arriving. 
3. As in previous years, Ministers attended the 
Assembly's plenary sessions. 
The Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
Mrs. Hamm-Briicher, addressed the Assembly in 
June, when she introduced the twenty-second 
annual report, and in November. On the first 
occasion, after recalling the context of the 
dialogue between the two organs of WEU, she 
expressed the Council's continuing interest in the 
work of the Assembly, which is the only parlia-
mentary body concerned with both the security 
and unity of Europe and the only European 
assembly responsible for defence questions. 
Speaking as Minister of State at the Foreign 
Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Mrs. Hamm-Briicher devoted part of her remarks 
to a statement of her government's views on the 
development of East-West relations and on 
progress with the construction of Europe. The 
follow-up to the Helsinki conference, which the 
Minister dealt with when addressing the 
Assembly on these occasions, was also the subject 
of speeches by Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Com-
monwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, in 
June, and by Mr. Deniau, Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, in 
November. 
Ministers also answered a number of ques-
tions put to them on various other subjects 
discussed by the Assembly. 
4. The Council gave careful consideration to 
the sixteen recommendations 1 adopted by the 
1. Nos. 291 to 306. 
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Assembly during the Second Part of the Twenty-
Second Ordinary Session and the First Part of 
the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session, together 
with the six written questions 1 put by members 
of the Assembly during 1977. 
The Council made every effort to reply in 
as detailed a manner as possible to all these 
recommendations and questions, which covered 
a wide range of subjects relating to European 
unity and security. 
As requested by the Assembly, the Council's 
replies included information, where appropriate, 
on consultations in which member governments 
had taken part in bodies other than WEU. 
The Council appreciated the satisfaction 
expressed by the Assembly, at its June session, 
concerning replies of special interest to the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments and 
the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions. 
5. The Council held two informal meetings with 
Assembly bodies. 
On 26th April in Strasbourg, the Council 
met the Presidential Committee after the minis-
terial meeting, at a working dinner arranged in 
accordance with the 1968 agreement and presided 
over by Mr. Taittinger, Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the French Republic. The 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council also met the 
Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, in 
accordance with established practice. On these 
occasions, the Assembly representatives were 
given an account of the Ministers' consultations, 
with particular reference to the mandate of the 
Standing Armaments Committee. 
On 3rd November, a meeting was held in 
Bonn between the Council and the General 
Affairs Committee, under the chairmanship of 
Mrs. Hamm-Briicher. The talks were directed 
mainly to two subjects: the role of WEU in the 
building of Europe, and East-West relations. On 
this occasion, the Committee was given some 
details of the work put in hand by the Standing 
Armaments Committee in implementation of its 
mandate. 
In these various ways, the Council supplied 
the Assembly, over the year, with a great deal 
of information on questions relating to the 
application of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
B. The Council also gave close attention to the 
points raised by the Assembly and indicated that 
1. Nos. 173 to 178. 
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they would play their full part in joint efforts 
which can be taken by the two organs of WEU 
in present circumstances to increase the effect-
iveness of their dialogue. 
1. It was agreed that the Assembly should 
receive all appropriate information on the study 
by the Standing Armaments Committee -
particularly in relation to the work of the IEPG 
- and would be informed of the conclusions 
reached; in this context, the Council agreed to 
a meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on Joint 
Production of Armaments. 
2. In their reply to Recommendation 299, the 
Council said that, when answering recommenda-
tions, they would continue to take account of 
work in progress in other international organisa-
tions to which the member states of WEU belong 
and would ensure that the information given to 
the Assembly was as accurate as possible. 
3. The Council appreciated the interest shown 
by the Assembly in 1977, as in previous years, 
in speeches made by Ministers at plenary sessions. 
They consider that the participation of Ministers 
in these debates meets the Assembly's wish to be 
better informed of member governments' positions 
on the subjects on its agenda. 
4. The Council understand, however, that the 
Assembly wishes to have a fuller political 
16 
dialogue with all members of the Council than is 
possible through public contacts. 
Since the agreement reached in 1968, 
informal meetings have therefore been held each 
year, after ministerial sessions of WEU, between 
the Council and the Presidential Committee of 
the Assembly. This arrangement has given satis-
faction to both sides. 
Furthermore, two informal joint meetings 
were held in 1976 with the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, and in 1977, with the 
General Affairs Committee. The Council continue 
to favour such contacts with these Committees. 
They would be willing to organise them on a 
regular baBis and will seek, with the co-operation 
of the Assembly, to make them as fruitful as 
possible. It is in this spirit that they are con-
sidering the request for a joint meeting made 
by the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments at the end of the year. 
C. As regards budgetary questions, it is recalled 
that in response to a request from the Assembly, 
the Council agreed to change the existing time-
table for the submission of Assembly budgets. 
Finally in December, the Council approved 
the Assembly budget for 1978, aB adopted during 
the November session. 
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CHAPTER II 
ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL 
The Council met at ministerial level in 
Strasbourg on 26th April 1977, under the 
chairmanship of Mr. Pierre-Christian Taittinger, 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the 
French Republic. 
The permanent representatives met fourteen 
times and there were thirty-seven meetings of 
the working group. 
* 
** 
On various occasions during the year under 
review, the Council and, in particular, the 
Chairman-in-Office as their spokesman, reaf-
firmed the importance which they attach to the 
modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols, and 
restated the determination of the governments 
of the member states of WEU to fulfil the obliga-
tions entered into for a term of fifty years. They 
recalled that the clause in Article V providing 
for automatic mutual assistance made the treaty 
a vital element in the security of WEU member 
countries. 
The Council continued to pay close attention 
to the implementation of the modified Brussels 
Treaty and its protocols. They were also con-
cerned to avoid any duplication between their 
activities and those in which the governments of 
WEU member countries participate elsewhere. In 
this context, they took particular account of 
work in the framework of political co-operation 
between the Nine and within the independent 
European programme group. 
* 
** 
The different aspects and stages of imple-
mentation of the Paris Agreements appeared on 
the agenda for Council meetings thirty-one times. 
At Strasbourg, as on all previous occasions, 
Ministers devoted a large part of their discus-
sions to East-West relations. 
As regards armaments production in Europe, 
the Council, after careful study of the detailed 
outline programme prepared by the Standing 
Armaments Committee in implementation of the 
mandate adopted on 31st May 1976, instructed 
the Committee to undertake a study of the situa-
tion of the armaments industry in the member 
countries of WEU. An account of work on this 
question during the year is given in Part B of 
this Chapter 1• 
1. See also Chapter IV, A. 1. 
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In addition, the dialogue was continued with 
the Assembly on all questions which it studies 
relating to the implementation of the modified 
Brussels Treaty. In this context, they noted with 
interest the views expressed by the Assembly 
particularly on various aspects of European 
defence. In their replies to Assembly recom-
mendations or questions, they stated the position 
of the member countries of WEU on several 
major subjects affecting their foreign and 
defence policies or their policies on scientific, 
technical and space questions. 
A. Political questions 
1. East- West relations 
On 26th April 1977, Ministers discussed 
East-West relations in depth. 
Statements were presented on the develop-
ment of bilateral relations between the member 
countries of WEU and the eastern countries 
since the previous ministerial meeting. 
Information was given on the many contacts 
between governments, with particular reference 
to a number of high-level visits including: visits 
late in 1976 by the King of the Belgians to 
Romania, by the Grand Duke of Luxembourg to 
the same country, by the Chairman of the Polish 
Council of Ministers and the Czechoslovak 
Foreign Minister to the United Kingdom, and by 
the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Trade 
and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to 
Yugoslavia; visits in January 1977 by the Italian 
Foreign Minister to the Soviet Union, and the 
Prime Minister of the German Democratic 
Republic to the Netherlands; in February and 
March by the First Deputy Prime Minister of 
Hungary to Italy, the United Kingdom Secretary 
of State for Trade to the GDR, the Netherlands 
Foreign Minister to Czechoslovakia, the Polish 
Prime Minister to the Netherlands, and the 
Hungarian Foreign Minister to the United King-
dom; in April by the United Kingdom Foreign 
and Commonwealth Secretary to Poland and the 
GDR, and by the United Kingdom Defence 
Secretary to Yugoslavia. A number of visits were 
also exchanged between France and a number of 
eastern countries. 
The German Delegation reported on the state 
of relations between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the member countries of the 
Warsaw Pact, with particular reference to the 
USSR and the German Democratic Republic. 
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Ministers discussed the development of multi-
lateral East-West relations, particularly in view 
of the meeting due to be held in Belgrade in 
implementation of the final act of the Helsinki 
conference on security and co-operation in 
Europe. 
They stressed the importance attached by the 
member countries of WEU to the implementation 
of all the provisions of the Helsinki final act by 
the signatory powers, which they looked to for 
an improvement both in relations between states 
and in the well-being of individuals. In their 
reply to Assembly Recommendation 292, the 
Council reaffirmed the importance of the final 
act of the CSCE as regards the respect for human 
rights. 
The governments of the WEU member 
countries co-ordinated their position closely, in 
the framework of nine-power political co-opera-
tion, in advance of the Belgrade meeting. They 
played an active part in the work of the North 
Atlantic Council which prepared for this meeting 
very thoroughly. 
An extensive record of implementation was 
compiled concerning all the elements of the final 
act of Helsinki, especially "co-operation in 
humanitarian and other fields" and "confidence-
building measures and certain aspects of security 
and disarmament". The Council referred to this 
in their reply to Assembly Recommendation 301. 
They also noted the results of the preparatory 
meeting for the Belgrade meeting which opened 
on 4th October 1977. Answering the points raised 
by the Assembly on this subject, they made the 
following comments : 
The western allies had been careful to ensure 
that no new proposal which might weaken the 
position of the Alliance was added to the agenda; 
the western states had won agreement for an 
exchange of views in Belgrade, both on the 
implementation of the provisions of the final act 
and of the tasks defined by the Helsinki con-
ference and in the context of the questions dealt 
with by the latter, on the deepening of mutual 
relations, the improvement of security and the 
development of co-operation in Europe, and the 
development of the process of detente in the 
future; some member countries of the Atlantic 
Alliance had tabled a new proposal at the Bel-
grade meeting to strengthen and extend the 
provisions for confidence-building 1neasures. 
Finally, the Council wish to remind the 
Assembly that, during the ministerial meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council on 8th and 9th 
December 1977, representatives of the member 
countries of WEU and of their partners in the 
Atlantic Alliance analysed progress at the 
meeting then taking place in Belgrade. Point 4 
of the communique issued after that meeting 
contained the following passage : 
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"The exchange of views in Belgrade so far 
has confirmed that while some progress has 
been achieved in certain fields much remains 
to be done in improving relations between 
states and in ensuring the rights and well-
being of individuals. Ministers, recalling the 
importance of the commitment of all signa-
tory governments to respect fundamental 
freedoms and human rights, including that 
of the individual to know and act upon his 
rights and duties in this field, affirmed their 
determination to pursue a dialogue on these 
matters. In addition to measures to improve 
implementation in other fields, Ministers 
considered that the scope of confidence-
building measures should be broadened in 
accordance with the provisions of the final 
act. Recognising the long-term nature of the 
CSCE process, the allies will continue their 
efforts both during the Belgrade meeting 
and afterwards, to ensure that a stronger 
impetus is given to full implementation of 
all provisions of the final act by all parti-
cipating states." 
2. Relations of WEU member countries with 
Greece and Turkey 
As they stated in their reply to Assembly 
Recommendation 296, the Council welcome the 
fact that Greece and Turkey wish to be more 
closely associated with the construction of 
Europe. They reminded the Assembly that the 
member countries of WEU intend to encourage 
the increasing development of relations between 
the EEC on the one hand and Greece and Turkey 
on the other. They recalled, however, that this 
was a matter for the Council of the European 
Communities. 
The Council indicated that they felt it was 
too soon to consider the possibility of associating 
the Greek and Turkish Governments with the 
work of the WEU Standing Armaments Com-
mittee. At the same time, they pointed out that 
under paragraph 10 of the decision of 7th May 
1955 setting up the SAC, agreements or arrange-
ments concluded within the framework of the 
SAC remain open to participation by other allied 
countries. 
The Council, who are concerned at the 
disputes between Greece and Turkey, reminded 
the Assembly of the action taken by the WEU 
member states individually, within the Com-
munity or within the Atlantic Alliance, to 
encourage the two countries to resolve the issues 
between them peacefully, by direct negotiation. 
3. Relations of WEU member countries with Spain 
In their reply to Recommendation 304, the 
Council stated that they fully shared the 
Assembly's satisfaction at the rapid advance 
towards a liberal regime in Spain. They welcomed 
the massive endorsement by the Spanish people, 
on 15th June 1977, of the moves towards demo-
cracy in their country. They welcomed the 
reforms introduced and the fact that universal 
suffrage had been applied and public freedom 
guaranteed. 
The Council noted that, having returned to 
the concert of democratic European nations, 
Spain could now play her full part on the inter-
national scene and move closer to her European 
partners, in accordance with both her traditions 
and her interests. In line with the wish expressed 
by the .Assembly, the Council said they viewed 
with favour the development of close co-operation 
between Spain and the member countries of 
Western European Union. 
4. Situation in the Middle East 
Being convinced that a continuation of the 
Lebanese conflict would have had serious con-
sequences for security in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean, the Council welcomed the fact that the 
fighting had been stopped. In their reply to 
Recommendation 296, they drew attention to the 
efforts made by the WEU member states both 
individually and within the Community to fur-
ther the settlement of this conflict, adding that 
it must, however, be resolved primarily by the 
parties involved. 
In the same reply, the Council noted that 
the WEU member countries were anxious that 
machinery for settling the Israeli/ Arab conflict 
should be rapidly set in motion. They hope that 
the events of the closing months of 1977 will lead 
to developments which will make possible a just 
and lasting peace established with the agreement 
of all the parties concerned. 
B. Defence questions 
The Council have continued, during 1977, 
to carry out the same functions as in previous 
years in this field. They take every suitable 
opportunity to emphasise to the Assembly that 
their competence in respect of the modified 
Brussels Treaty remains unaltered. 
The Council remain ready to play a full part 
in any developments likely to assist member 
stat~ in maintaining international peace and 
security. In this task, the contribution made by 
the Assembly is of great value. 
On European armaments co-operation, 
progress with the study of the armaments indus-
tries in member countries, now being undertaken 
by the Standing Armaments Committee, is 
reviewed under B. 3 below and Chapter IV. 
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1. Level of forces of member States 
In application of the modified Brussels 
Treaty and its attendant agreements and resolu-
tions, the Council have carried out, during 1977, 
all the prescribed procedures. As in former years, 
they have been assisted in this task by the Arma-
ments Control Agency and also by NATO and 
SHAPE. 
(a) Forces under NATO command 
The maximum levels of ground, air and naval 
forces which member states of WEU place under 
NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II 
of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels 
Treaty. Article Ill of the protocol provides for 
a special procedure, if necessary, to enable these 
levels to be increased above the limits specified 
in Articles I and II. 
So that they may satisfy themselves that the 
limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol 
No. II are not exceeded, the Council receive 
information every year concerning the levels in 
question, in accordance with Article IV of that 
protocol. This information is obtained in the 
course of inspections carried out by the Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe, and is transmitted to 
the Council by a high-ranking officer designated 
by him to that end. 
The information, as at the end of 1976, which 
was conveyed by this officer at the appropriate 
time, was considered by the Council on 18th May. 
Information indicating the status as at the end 
of 1977 was requested in December. 
Furthermore, the Council have taken the 
necessary steps to implement the procedure laid 
down in their resolution of 15th September 1956, 
whereby the levels of forces under NATO com-
mand are examined in the light of the annual 
review. 
For the year 1976, at a meeting on 27th 
January 1977 in Brussels, the permanent repre-
sentatives (or their substitutes) to the North 
Atlantic Council of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom examined 
the levels of forces of WEU member states and 
reported to the Council. At their meeting on 
24th February 1977, the latter noted that the 
level of these forces, as set out in the NATO force 
plan, fell within the limits specified in Articles 
I and II of Protocol No. II. At the same meeting, 
the Council took note of a declaration on French 
forces by the permanent representative of France. 
The same procedure is under way for 1977. 
(b) Forces under national command 
The strength and armaments of forces of 
member states on the mainland of Europe 
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remaining under national command - internal 
defence and police forces, forces for the defence 
of overseas territories, and common defence forces 
- are fixed in accordance with the procedure 
laid down in the agreement signed in Paris on 
14th December 1957, implementing .Article V of 
Protocol No. 11 of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
..... 
By means of the methods set out in para-
graphs (a) and (b) above, the Council have been 
able, in 1977, to carry out their obligations under 
Protocol No. 11 to the modified Brussels Treaty 
concerning levels of forces. 
2. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent 
of Europe 
In accordance with the undertaking given 
in paragraph 2 of the Council's reply to Recom-
mendation 213, the United Kingdom Government 
declares that the total level of British forces on 
the continent of Europe at 31st December 1977 
amounted to 61,474 men plus the Second Tactical 
.Air Force. 
The continued need for the presence of 
troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for 
units of the British .Army of the Rhine to be 
redeployed for short tours of duty there. .At 
31st December 1977 there were some 4,096 men 
from B.A.OR in Northern Ireland . .As has been 
previously stated, these units could be speedily 
returned to their duty stations in an emergency 
affecting NATO. 
3. Study of the armaments industries in member 
countries 1 
It will be recalled that, in 1976, the Council 
instructed the Standing .Armaments Committee 
to submit to them a detailed outline programme 
for a study of the armaments industries in 
member countries, and that the text of the 
mandate for the S.A.C was conveyed to the 
Assembly. 
.At their meeting on 9th February 1977, the 
Head of the International Secretariat of the 
S.A.C presented to the Council the draft outline 
programme for the study, on behalf of the Com-
mittee. 
.After discussing this draft at several ses-
sions, the Council, at their meeting on 20th .April, 
decided to authorise the S.A.C to proceed with 
the proposed study; they also laid down a number 
of principles and gave separate instructions in 
response to specific questions put by the Com-
mittee. .At their meeting on 26th .April, the 
Council of Ministers unanimously adopted the 
1. See also Chapters I and IV. 
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report prepared for them by the permanent 
representatives, and its conclusions. 
With regard to progress being made with 
the study, an interim report was presented to the 
Council by the Head of the International Secre-
tariat of the S.A.C on 7th July; and a second 
interim report was addressed to the Council at 
the end of November . 
.At their last meeting of the year, the Council, 
in conducting their customary review of the 
autumn part-session of the .Assembly, examined 
inter alia certain points relating to the S.A.C. For 
example, further to the undertaking given at the 
meeting with the General .Affairs Committee on 
3rd November in Bonn, the Council requested 
the Head of the International Secretariat to 
draft a note, for later transmission to the 
.Assembly, on the division of work between the 
independent European programme group and the 
S.A.C on studies relating to European armaments 
co-operation. In addition, the Council noted that, 
if it were held in time, the forthcoming meeting 
of the Liaison Sub-Committee on joint production 
of armaments would provide a suitable oppor-
tunity for informing the .Assembly on the progress 
of this study of the armaments industries in 
member countries. 
4. Assembly recommendations and written questions 
(a) During the year, the Council replied to four 
recommendations based on reports tabled on 
behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and .Armaments. 
On the subject of armaments co-operation, 
the Council took the opportunity afforded by 
their replies to Recommendations 297 and 299 
to state that the maintenance of a viable Euro-
pean armaments industry was essential for the 
common defence of the countries of Western 
Europe and that effective co-operation between 
these countries was the way to safeguard this 
industrial and technological potential. It is in 
this context that the study being carried out by 
the S.A.C is relevant . 
In answer to Recommendation 301 on Euro-
pean security and East-West relations, the 
Council were able to give the .Assembly some 
information on progress at the CSCE review 
conference being held in Belgrade, on the MBFR 
negotiations and on the SALT talks . 
The situation regarding anti-submarine 
warfare was reviewed in the reply to Recom-
mendation 303, where the role of the independent 
European programme group in the defence equip-
ment field was examined. 
(b) In the year under review, of the six written 
questions put by the .Assembly, four dealt with 
defence matters. No. 174 concerned the strategic 
equilibrium in Europe and in the world and 
No. 177 agreed control measures. In their reply 
to No. 175 on the defensive military forces of 
member states, the Council revealed measures 
being taken by countries participating in the 
NATO integrated defence programme to imple-
ment the decisions taken by ministers at meetings 
of the North Atlantic Council and Defence Plan-
ning Committee in December 1976 and May 1977 
in Brussels. No. 176 provided the Council with 
a further occasion, in their reply, to reassert the 
binding character of the automatic mutual assist-
ance clause in Article V of the modified Brussels 
Treaty. 
(c) At the end of the year, the Council began 
their study of the recommendations transmitted 
to them following the November part-session of 
the Assembly. 
5. Symposium on a European armaments policy 
The Council were represented at, and fol-
lowed with interest, this symposium organised by 
the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments on 3rd and 4th March in Paris. 
6. Liaison Sub-Committee on the joint production of 
armaments 
The Council were able to agree in principle, 
at the request of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, to holding a meeting 
of this Sub-Committee at an appropriate time. 
C. Scientific, technical and space questions 
The dialogue with the Assembly was con-
tinued on three subjects whieh it has been study-
ing regularly for a number of years: Europe's 
energy supplies, European aviation and space 
questions. 
The Council noted with interest the reports 
submitted to the Assembly by its Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 
and gave careful consideration to Assembly 
Recommendations 295, 300 and 305 and to 
Written Question 178. 
1. Europe's energy supplies 
The 1973-74 oil embargo and the increases 
in the price of oil since 1973 have highlighted 
Europe's dependence on imported energy sources, 
especially oil. The Council observed that this 
dependence is not only of great significance from 
the point of view of the security of Western 
European countries, but, because of the high 
price of oil, it also has important consequences 
for their economic and social development. 
Furthermore, various international studies 
as well as the estimates of the EEC Commission 
point to a serious risk that, as early as in the 
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1980s, world-wide demand for oil will no longer 
be met. 
It is therefore necessary that the world 
community should gradually reduce the propor-
tion of hydrocarbon fuels in their energy sup-
plies. This applies particularly to the countries 
of the western world as the largest consumers of 
oil. 
Existing sources of energy need to be used 
in a more economical and efficient way and 
alternative sources of energy must be developed 
vigorously. 
However, it must also be recognised that the 
initial expectation that a solution to the problem 
of a future energy shortage can be found in the 
more rapid development of coal power or nuclear 
power has declined somewhat because of the 
problem of safety and environmental and infra-
structural difficulties. In other words, Western 
Europe will continue to depend on imported oil 
for a very large part of its energy requirements 
for the foreseeable future. 
The Council declared that they shared the 
Assembly's opinion regarding the urgent need 
for a common energy policy. 
They recalled that the Council of the Euro-
pean Community, which was competent in this 
matter, had agreed on the need to co-ordinate 
national policies and develop common instruments 
as regards energy conservation, better use of 
more plentiful and, in particular, indigenous 
fuels and development of new technologies and 
sources of energy. 
The Council referred to action taken to this 
end within the EEC and added the view that 
these efforts should be vigorously pursued and 
extended. 
With particular regard to the question of 
the development of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes, which has been under consideration 
by the Assembly for several years, the Council 
recalled the co-operative action undertaken by 
Euratom and the projects jointly developed by 
a number of Community countries in the field 
of European fast-breeder reactors (in particular, 
the Superphenix fast-breeder jointly developed 
by France, Italy and the Federal Republic of 
Germany) and in the field of uranium enrich-
ment (Eurodif or Urenco). 
It was also noted that the Council of the 
European Communities had authorised the Com-
mission to float a number of Euratom loans and 
that European standards had been laid down, 
particularly on protection against radioactivity. 
Nevertheless, the Council considered that 
much still remained to be done, both in defining 
a common European supplies policy and in devel-
oping a nuclear industry with mastery of the 
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fusion cycle. Finally, in the longer term, Europe's 
nuclear fusion potential must be developed so 
that a prototype controlled fusion plant will be 
available by the end of this century. The Joint 
European Torus is directed to this end, as are 
a number of national projects. The Council there-
fore welcomed the decision taken on 25th October, 
fixing a site for the JET. They expressed the 
view that European nuclear fusion research must 
be pursued so that Europe can achieve a techno-
logical level comparable with that of the United 
States and the Soviet Union. 
2. European aviation 
As stated in the reply to Recommendation 
300, the Council share the Assembly's view that 
Europe needs to develop and apply an overall 
aeronautical policy. 
BeLieving that the countries of Western 
Europe, acting both through bilateral agreements 
and within the Community, should concert their 
efforts and co-operate to maintain the European 
industry's capacity and technical level, the 
Council noted with satisfaction the progress 
achieved by the European partners in working 
out a concerted approach. 
They noted, for example, that in the case 
of both civil and military aircraft, a substantial 
degree of co-operation had been established 
between European manufacturers; moreover, 
repeated appeals had been made for closer co-
operation with regard to the construction of a 
civil transport aircraft. 
The Council stated that they shared the 
Assembly's wish for the development of a Euro-
pean civil and military aeronautical industry 
capable of co-operating, on an equal footing, with 
the United States. 
3. Space questions 
The Council gave the Assembly the details 
requested in Written Question 178, put to them 
after the failure of the attempt to launch the 
European OTS satellite in September. They wish 
to recall that the European Space Agency 
selected the Thor-Delta rocket because of its 
launching capacity, which allowed the construc-
tion of a satellite designed, inter alia, to meet 
probable world market requirements more ade-
quately. Furthermore, it was easy to calculate 
the reliability of the launcher chosen which had 
been used successfully on two previous occasions. 
The Council pointed out that the OTS failure 
would not entail any appreciable direct financial 
loss for the ESA, because the launching had been 
underwritten and the project included a reserve 
satellite. A repeat launching was scheduled for 
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the end of April 1978. The Council recognised 
that the delay would, of course, have certain 
negative psychological effects on the users of a 
subsequent operational system and possible 
economic consequences as well for the industries 
concerned aiming to sell such systems on the 
world market. However, the Council pointed out 
that all users of space are exposed to the risk 
of failure, as the case of Intelsat at the end of 
September had shown. 
Finally, the Council recalled that, leaving 
aside the failure of the American launching 
systems, co-operation between Europe and the 
United States of America had so far been good. 
Moreover, NASA's meticulous investigation of 
the causes indicated the likelihood of improve-
ments which would also benefit its European 
customers. 
* 
** 
In their replies to Recommendations 294 and 
306, the Council gave their views on two other 
subjects studied by the Assembly: European 
oceanographic activities and co-operation between 
European countries and Israel in the field of 
advanced technology. 
D. Secretariat-General 
The Council appointed Mr. Edouard Longer-
staey, Ambassador, to be Secretary-General of 
Western European Union. Mr. Longerstaey took 
up his duties on 1st March 1977. 
The Council appreciated the welcome 
extended by the Assembly to the new Secretary-
General of the organisation. They also appre-
ciated the tribute paid to the Deputy Secretary-
General, Mr. Friedrich-Karl von Plehwe, who had 
been serving as Acting Secretary-General. 
The Council regretted the departure of 
Ambassador von Plehwe from the organisation 
at the end of the year, when he left the diplo-
matic service. Ambassador J oachim Schlaich was 
appointed by the Council to succeed Mr. von 
Plehwe as Deputy Secretary-General of WEU. 
* 
** 
During the year, the Secretary-General and 
his principal officers, representing Western 
European Union, attended a number of meetings 
of other international organisations as observers, 
when questions of concern to WEU were under 
consideration. As in previous years, the most 
frequent of these contacts were made with autho-
rities of the Atlantic Alliance and the Council 
of Europe. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
ARMAMENTS CONTROL AGENCY 
A. Introduction 
Under the terms of Article VII of Protocol 
No. IV, the Agency is required: 
- firstly, to control the level of stocks of 
armaments held by member countries on 
the mainland of Europe, this control 
extending to production and imports to 
the extent required to make the control 
of stocks effective ; 
- secondly, to satisfy itself that the under-
takings given by the Federal Republic 
of Germany not to manufacture certain 
types of armaments on its territory are 
being observed. 
In 1977, the Agency's activities continued 
very much along the same lines and at the same 
rate as in previous years. 
Subject to the comments made under point 
B.2. below, the programme drawn up by the 
Agency for 1977, the twenty-second year of con-
trol, was carried out satisfactorily. 
B. General problems 
1. General operating methods 
Within the Agency's terms of reference, 
controls from documentary sources serve mainly 
for checking levels of armaments as a whole. 
They also contribute to the preparation of field 
measures for the control of levels and of the 
non-production of certain categories of arma-
ments. This aspect covers all activities concerned 
with processing, for the purposes defined above, 
any useful documentary material including, in 
particular, countries' replies to the Agency 
questionnaire, and the results of field control 
measures carried out earlier. 
The execution of test checks, visits and 
inspections, and all that is linked with these 
functions, constitutes that part of control carried 
out physically wherever there are activities and 
stocks subject to control and, more generally, 
wherever this is necessary to ensure that the 
information supplied is correct and that under-
takings are observed. 
The control system is based primarily on 
controls from documentary sources, the purpose 
of field control measures being to verify, 
physically, the accuracy of all the information 
collected in implementation of Part Ill of 
Protocol No. IV. 
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Documentary and field control measures are 
complementary, and equally essential for the 
accomplishment of the Agency's task. 
Traditionally, the annual report has always 
presented documentary and field control 
measures separately, in the interests of both 
convenience and clarity. However, it must not 
be forgotten that these measures together make 
up a single control function. 
The Agency's operating methods, the main 
lines of which are set out above, did not change 
during the year under review. 
Although the principles of the present 
methods, which have proved their worth, remain 
unchanged, their application is under constant 
examination with a view to improvement. 
The Agency draws great benefit from the 
continuity of its methods ; by its steadily-
growing knowledge of the organisation of the 
forces of each member state, of the progress of 
armaments production or procurement pro-
grammes, the Agency develops its control 
activity efficiently and logically, both in the 
fixing of levels and quantities of armaments and 
in the choice and assessment of its control 
measures. 
2. Fields where the Agency is or is not authorised to 
exercise ita mandate 
The situation described in previous annual 
reports, regarding certain armaments, remained 
unchanged in 1977. 
In present circumstances, the Agency's activ-
ities do not extend to atomic weapons or, in one 
member state, to what that state calls "strategic 
forces". 
Nor does the Agency apply any controls to 
biological weapons. 
The control activities dealt with in this 
chapter do not, therefore, concern these categories 
of armaments. 
In the case of chemi.cal weapons, only non-
production controls take place ; no quantitative 
controls are made since none of the member states 
have declared possessing such armaments. 
C. Controls from documentary sources 
In this field of control, the Agency studies 
the relevant documents with the main purpose 
of comparing the quantities of armaments held 
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by the member states with the levels fixed by the 
Council and thus establishing whether these 
constitute appropriate levels within the terms of 
the modified Brussels Treaty. 
1. Information processed by the Agency 
(a) Annual Agency questionnaire and replies 
by member states 
The questionnaire sent to member states for 
1977 was broadly the same as those of previous 
years. 
As in all previous years, follow-up action on 
the replies was twofold. It is recalled that some of 
the facts reported are checked physically by 
means of field control measures. In addition, all 
the replies are studied by the Agency experts 
and compared with the other sources of informa~ 
tion available, including member countries' 
earlier replies to Agency or NATO questionnaires 
and budgetary documents. 
(b) Request for annual information 
Control of undertakings by one of the 
member states regarding the non-production of 
certain types of armaments takes the form of 
field control measures. 
These measures are partly prepared from a 
study of documents which, in 1977 as in the past 
was based, in particular, on the replies of th~ 
country concerned to the Agency's request for 
annual information. 
(c) Information provided by NATO 
See point 2 (a) below. 
(d) Information provided by the United States 
of America and Canada 
(Article XXIII of Protocol No. IV) 
The Agency received, through the Council 
information supplied by the Governments of th~ 
United States and Canada concerning their pro-
grammes of external aid in military equipment 
to the forces of member states stationed on the 
mainland of Europe. Since l 966, these countries 
have provided no aid to the forces concerned. 
(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information 
(Article VII, 2 (a) of Protocol No. IV) 
The Agency studied the defence budgets of 
the member states as well as the budget section 
of their replies to its questionnaire. In addition, 
there were consultations between the specialised 
experts of the Agency and the national author-
ities to complement this information and to 
obtain further details. 
Thus, it was possible to check expenditure 
of credits assigned for the production of arma-
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ments subject to control and in this way to verify 
the quantities of material produced. 
The conclusions of these budgetary studies 
confirmed the results obtained from other studies 
carried out by the experts to determine quantities 
of armaments. 
2. Verification of appropriate levels of armaments 
(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces 
placed under NATO command 
After receiving and processing the member 
states' replies to the annual questionnaire and 
studying the statistical reports furnished by the 
authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
isation (Article VII, 2 (a) of Protocol No. IV) 
and, in particular, by the NATO International 
Staff, the Agency arranged, as each year, for the 
annual consultations with the NATO military 
authorities called for by Article XIV of Protocol 
No. IV. 
As in previous years, these consultations 
included a joint study session at Casteau, on 
25th November 1977, attended by Agency experts 
and the appropriate officers of SHAPE, and 
concluded with a meeting in Paris on 8th 
December 1977, under the chairmanship of the 
Deputy Director of the Agency ; this meeting 
was attended by the representatives of the 
Director of the International Military Staff of 
the NATO Military Committee, and of the 
Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics, Armaments and 
Administration, SHAPE, as well as by the 
Agency experts. There were no comments on the 
total quantities of armaments declared as held 
by the member states (Article XIII of Protocol 
No. IV), and presented by the Agency for study 
by these authorities. 
In consequence, the total quantities of 
armaments declared to the Agency by the 
member states for forces placed under NATO 
authority and stationed on the mainland of 
Europe can be considered as appropriate levels 
for the control year 1977 within the terms of 
Article XIX of Protocol No. IV. 
(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces 
maintained under national command on the 
mainland of Europe 
The quantities of armaments declared to the 
Agency by the member states as being required 
on 31st December 1977 for their forces main-
tained under national command on the mainland 
of Eu~ope have been accepted or approved by the 
Co~c1l, who have taken note of these figures of 
maximum levels of armaments for these forces in 
1977. The quantities notified to the Agency can 
thus be considered as appropriate levels of 
armaments for the current control year within 
the terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV. 
D. Field control measures 
1. Principles governing the application of field control 
measures and general methods of execution 
(a) As recalled in the introduction to this 
chapter, the treaty requires the Agency: 
- to satisfy itself that the undertakings not 
to manufacture certain types of arma-
ments are being observed; 
- to control the level of stocks of certain 
armaments. 
Field control measures continued during 
1977 on the same basis as during previous years, 
a.s an essential part of the Agency's work, in 
accordance with Article VII of Protocol No. IV. 
The Agency again worked on the basic 
assumption, which is supported by the observa-
tions of previous years, that the undertakings 
and declarations of member countries are being 
honoured. 
These circumstances enabled the Agency to 
draw up a programme of field control measures 
for 1977 on a similar scale and with similar safe-
guards as in previous years, regarding both non-
production field control measures in respect of 
specified armaments and verifications in respect 
of levels of armament stocks. 
In planning its non-production field control 
measures, the Agency, as usual, began by 
reviewing all the information available to it, 
including that obtained from the 1976 and 
earlier inspection programmes, its progressive 
analysis of budgetary and other data and 
particularly the replies of the country concerned 
to the Agency's requests for information. At the 
conclusion of this review, it drew up a pro-
gramme for a limited number of control measures 
on a similar scale to those of recent years. 
With regard to the control of levels of 
stocks of armaments declared by member states, 
sampling techniques on the lines of the previous 
years were again judged as adequate for verify-
ing these declarations with the requisite level of 
confidence. The general balances of control 
measures between member states, or in respect 
of the different types of establishments (e.g. 
units, depots and factories) continued virtually 
unchanged. 
(b) With the general scale of the control 
measure programme so determined, the Agency 
proceeded to more detailed studies. Attention 
was, as usual, given to current special factors, 
such as new logistic organisations, the running 
down of certain depot complexes, the extension 
of others. The agency paid particular attention 
to actual and proposed factory production pro-
grammes and the repair programmes undertaken 
both in private and state establishments. Pro-
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duction, repair depot and non-production control 
measures in factories are quite distinct measures. 
Nevertheless, wherever possible, the Agency 
combined two or more of these activities at a 
factory, in order to cause the least disturbance to 
the establishment visited. 
(c) To avoid duplication of activities, Article 
VIII of Protocol No. IV provides that control 
measures relating to the forces under NATO 
authority shall be carried out by the appro-
priate NATO authorities. The forces subject 
to the Agency's control measures therefore 
vary in percentage and type from country to 
country, and this is an important factor in the 
Agency's programme considerations. Article VIII 
also affects depot inspections, but in a different 
manner. Since the logistic support of forces 
under NATO authority remains a wholly national 
responsibility in peacetime, difficulties can 
occur in defining which materiel and munitions 
in depots are, or will be, assigned to forces und~r 
national command. Such problems were agam 
avoided in 1977 by the renewed approval of the 
system of joint Agency /SHAPE inspections 
introduced in 1957. 
(d) As the Convention for the due process of 
law '1 has not yet entered into force, the control 
measures carried out by the Agency at private 
concerns had, in 1977, as in previous years, to 
take the form of "agreed control measures". 
One consequence of this situation is that, in 
order to obtain the agreement of the firms 
concerned the Agency must give some six weeks' 
notice. This agreement has never been withheld. 
2. Type and extent of field control measurn 
In 1977, the programme drawn up by the 
Agency was carried out in accordance with the 
well-tried procedure of previous years. 
The total number of control measures was 
seventy. It should be noted, in this connection, 
that this pattern of control activities carried out 
by the Agency is entirely satisfactory: it enables 
some 80% of existing armaments to be checked 
in four years for the air force, five years for the 
navy and six to seven years for army munitions. 
These measures fall broadly into the follow-
ing categories : 
(a) quantitative control measures at depots ; 
1. Convention concerning me&sures to be taken by 
member states of Western European Union in order to 
enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to 
carry out its control effectively and making provision 
for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol 
No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the 
Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed 
in Paris on 14th December 1957). 
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(b) quantitative control measures at units 
for forces under national command; 
(c) control measures at production plants : 
( i) quantitative control measures : 
In 1977, these control measures 
were carried out at plants manu-
facturing armoured equipment, at 
plants manufacturing missiles and 
ammunition, and at shipyards. 
(ii) non-production control measures: 
These control measures related to 
chemicals and missiles. 
3. Conclusions 
(a) In the fields where it is authorised to 
exercise its mandate, the Agency was able 
effectively to carry out its task of applying 
control measures. Such problems as arose in this 
very complex field of iDBpections were dealt with 
satisfactorily through good relatioDB with the 
national authorities. 
(b) On the basis of all the field control measures 
carried out in 1977, the Agency was able to 
report to the Council : 
- the measures taken for the control of the 
stocks of armaments at depots, units 
under national command and production 
plants confirmed the data obtained from 
documentary control measures; 
- the measures taken for the control of 
non-production revealed no production 
contrary to undertakings. 
E. State and problems of control in certain 
particular fields 
1. Armaments for land forces 
(a) Current production and purchases 
Land forces armaments modernisation 
schemes and reorganisation programmes are in 
hand in all member countries. 
With regard to armoured material, battle 
tank derivatives are still being built and, in par-
ticular, recovery vehicles, bridge layers and 
engineer vehicles. The major French and Italian 
battle tank acquisition programmes are nearing 
completion; the Federal Republic of Germany has 
launched a new programme for Leopard 2 battle 
tanks; series production is due to begin in 1980. 
The .AMX-10 and M-113 armoured vehicle 
production programmes are continuing normally; 
the Netherlands and Italy have started pro-
duction of the VTT YPR 765 and the M-548 
respectively. 
26 
Production of the Luchs armoured recon-
naissance vehicle in the Federal Republic of 
Germany was completed during 1977; production 
of the different CVRT types such as Scorpion 
is continuing in Belgium in eo-production with 
the United Kingdom. 
The Federal Republic of Germany has 
launched two major modernisation programmes, 
namely, the 90 mm. gun mounted on 600 M-48 
tanks is being replaced by a 105 mm. gun; the 
missile tank destroyers are being equipped with 
Hot missiles in place of SS-11. 
As regards anti-aircraft equipment, the 
most important programme is for the acquisition 
of the Guepard anti-aircraft tank (Leopard deri-
vative) by Belgium, the Netherlands and the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
The Roland anti-aircraft missile launcher 
programme, involving Franco-German eo-produc-
tion, is being prepared. 
In the case of artillery, nearly all the 
member countries equipped with Sergeant and 
Honest John missile systems are replacing these 
by the Lance system. This system was already 
operational in Italy in 1977 and will become 
operational in the armed forces of Belgium, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom in 1978. 
Production of the Pluton missile system is 
continuing in France. 
The FH-70 155 mm. towed howitzer is being 
manfactured in eo-production by the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy and the United King-
dom. 
(b) Control activity in 1977 
Control measures were carried out at several 
depots, at several units under national command, 
and at plants manufacturing armaments for land 
forces. 
2. Guided miasiles and other self-propelled miasiles 
(a) Current production 
Recent advances in all aspects of technology 
have improved the performance of guided mis-
siles being produced by the member states of 
WEU. These improvements include solid-state 
guidance, wide-angled infra-red seekers, larger 
and/or more effective warheads, stronger air-
frames and improved motors. 
1977 saw the emergence, in the point and 
area air defence fields, of the first tank-mounted 
surface-to-air missiles Roland which will provide 
the army with a formidable defence agaiDBt low-
flying aircraft, and of a very much improved 
Hawk which will replace the majority of the old 
Hawk missiles and speed up the standardisation 
of NATO Hawk units throughout Western 
Europe. In the anti-ship role, another sea-skimmer 
Otomat has joined Exocet to provide surface 
warships, including fast patrol boats and hydro-
foils, with an all-weather attack capability 
against other surface vessels. All of the foregoing 
guided missiles are eo-produced by certain 
member states of WEU. 
The following modern guided missiles are 
currently in production in member states: Milan 
and Hot (jointly produced by France and the 
Federal Republic of Germany), Mamba, Swing-
fire and Cobra anti-tank missiles; Crotale, Hawk 
XM-123B (as part of the Hawk Helip European 
improvement programme), Roland (jointly pro-
duced by France and the Federal Republic of 
Germany), Blowpipe and Rapier surface-to-air 
missiles; Martel AS-37 (jointly produced by 
France and the United Kingdom) air-to-surface 
anti-radar missiles; Matra Magic, Matra R-530 
and Skyflash air-to-air missiles; Exocet MM-38 
(jointly produced by France and the United 
Kingdom), Otomat (jointly produced by France 
and Italy) and Sea Killer MK-2 ship-to-ship 
missiles; Exocet AM-39 and Kormoran air-to-sea 
missiles; Masurea and Sea Dart surface-to-air 
missiles and the Malafon anti-submarine missile. 
A number of missiles of the previous genera-
tion are still being produced: Cobra anti-tank 
missiles; SS-11 surface-to-surface missiles; AS-12 
and AS-30 air-to-surface missiles. 
Production of 100 mm. air-to-ground rockets 
continued in France, and of 105 mm. surface-
to-surface rockets in Italy. 
(b) Future outlook 
Other guided missiles have reached an 
advanced stage of development or are awaiting 
series production: Seawolf surface-to-air missiles, 
Indigo-Mei surface-to-air missiles, Marte air-to-
surface missiles, and the Matra Super 530. 
The Governments of France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, in conjunction with Norway 
and the United States, have signed a memor-
andum of agreement authorising a feasibility 
study of a second-generation supersonic anti-ship 
missile, to replace by 1985-90 the present genera-
tion subsonic anti-ship missiles developed in 
Europe and the United States. The project, 
known as ASSM (Anti-Ship Supersonic Missile), 
will be led by the ASEM (Anti-Ship Euromissile) 
group which was formed in December 1976 by 
Aerospatiale (France), Messerschmitt-Bolkow-
Blohm GmbH (Federal Republic of Germany) 
and Hawker Siddeley Dynamics (British Aero-
space Corporation) (United Kingdom). 
In addition, the British Aircraft Corpora-
tion (British Aerospace Corporation) (United 
Kingdom), Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm GmbH 
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(Federal Republic of Germany) and Aerospatiale 
(France) have signed an agreement which will 
permit the production of the Milan anti-tank 
missile in the United Kingdom under licence. 
(c) Control activity in 1977 
Quantitative control measures were carried 
out at a number of depots containing guided and 
other self-propelled missiles or launchers, at units 
under national command equipped with these 
weapons and at plants manufacturing guided 
missiles. Some of these measures were combined 
with non-production control measures. 
3. Military aircraft 
(a) Production and purchases 
Most combat aircraft now under production 
or being purchased by the member countries of 
WEU belong to a new generation which offers 
appreciably improved performance as compared 
with aircraft of the previous generation. 
Work continued in 1977 on two construction 
programmes referred to in the previous annual 
report: joint production of the Jaguar A/E by 
France and the United Kingdom, and the Mirage 
F-1 programme in France. 
The two other major programmes referred 
to in the same report, namely the Alpha-Jet and 
the MRCA, have reached the following stage : 
Production of the Alpha-Jet by France and 
the Federal Republic of Germany jointly began 
towards the end of the year under review, when 
the first pre-series aircraft in the trainer version 
was rolled out. 
Deliveries of pre-series models of the MRCA 
have begun and a few have been delivered to the 
flight trials centres of the three countries -
Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
United Kingdom- which are jointly producing 
the MRCA. The future of this programme has 
been assured by the launching of a second instal-
ment of series production. 
A new French programme began in 1977 
with the start of work on the Mirage 2000. 
In addition, the Italian programme for pur-
chases of G-91 Y aircraft was nearing completion 
at the end of the year; the programme for F-104S 
aircraft should be completed in 1978. 
The F-16 purchase programme to replace the 
F-104G has started in Belgium and the Nether-
lands. 
(b) Control activity in 1977 
Control measures were carried out at depots 
holding aircraft or aircraft engines and at units 
under national command. 
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4. Warships 
(a) Current construction 
Work was continued in 1977 on the moderni-
sation and new construction programmes in 
progress in member countries on the mainland of 
Europe. 
(b) Control activity in 1977 
Quantitative control measures were carried 
out at naval shipyards. 
5. Chemical weapons 
(a) liist of chemical weapons subject to control 
As in previous years, the Agency asked 
member countries whether they wished to renew 
in 1977 the list of chemical weapons subject to 
control. 
The member c:mntries agreed to this renewal. 
This was reported to the Council, who noted the 
fact. 
(b) Control activity in 1977 
As in previous years, the Agency addressed 
to the appropriate authorities of the state 
concerned a "request for annual information to 
facilitate the non-production control of chemical 
weapons". The reply received to this request was, 
as in the past, of great assistance to the Agency 
in selecting chemical plants at which to carry 
out agreed control measures in 1977. 
The supplementary procedure designed to 
increase the effectiveness of the Agency's action, 
which has been tried out since 1973, was again 
applied successfully in 1977. 
For each control measure carried out, a 
delegation from the national authorities was 
present. 
None of these measures revealed any indica-
tion of production of chemical weapons within 
the terms of Annex II to Protocol No. III. 
In application of .Article Ill of Protocol 
No. Ill, which lays down conditions to enable the 
Council to fix the levels of chemical weapons 
that may be held on the mainland of Europe by 
those countries which have not given up the right 
to produce them, the Agency, as in previous 
years, asked the following question in its 
questionnaire: "Has the production of chemical 
weapons on the mainland territory of... (member 
state) passed the experimental stage and entered 
the effective production stage ?" 
In 1977, as in the past, the states concerned 
replied in the negative. 
Any of the member states could, whilst not 
actually manufacturing chemical weapons on its 
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mainland territory, have obtained such weapons 
by other means such as importation. For this 
reason, as it does every year, the Agency 
requested the member states in the corresponding 
sections of its annual questionnaire to report any 
quantities of chemical weapons they may hold, 
whatever their origin. In the reply to this 
questionnaire, no member country declared 
holding any chemical weapons. 
6. Biological weapons 
All member countries reported their agree-
ment to renew in 1977 the list of biological 
weapons subject to control. The Council noted the 
fact. 
However, it will be recalled (see point B.2 
of the present chapter) that the Agency exercises 
no control in the field of biological weapons. 
7. Atomic weapons 
Since the situation remained the same as in 
previous years, the Agency is unable, as stated 
in point B.2 of this chapter, to exercice any 
control in the atomic field. 
F. Technical information visits and other 
means of improving the efficiency of the 
experts 
1. The value of TIV s to the Agency staff in 
supplementing and up-dating their knowledge 
was again clearly demonstrated by those carried 
out in 1977, which covered army equipment 
proving grounds, missile testing ranges and an 
aeronautical research and development establish-
ment, as well as chemical and biological labo-
ratories and factories. 
As in other years, visits were made to army, 
naval and air shows, which provide information 
of direct interest to the Agency on a wide range 
of military equipment. They included: the 
thirty-second Paris air show at Le Bourget 
(France) ; the sixth exhibition of army weapons 
and equipment at Satory (France) ; the fourth 
Royal Nary equipment exhibition at Greenwich 
and Chatliam (United Kingdom); and the royal 
ordnance factories' exhibition and open day at 
Patricroft (United Kingdom). 
Also, as in previous years, visits were 
arranged for the Agency: 
In France, to the Centre d'Essais des Landes 
at Biscarrosse, which is the only missile testing 
establishment in Europe where strategic as well 
as tactical missiles can be fully proven; 
In the Federal Republic of Germany to 
Erprobungsstelle 51 at Koblenz, which is concer-
ned with the testing of engineering and adminis-
trative support equipment - and to Erprobungs-
stelle 41 at Trier where armoured and logistic 
vehicles are automotively proven; 
In the United Kingdom, to RAE Farnbor-
ough, last visited in 1970, where the Agency 
team were able to appreciate the significant 
technical advances which have been made during 
this period in, for example, the use of miniatur-
ised computers and night flying aids, and to the 
RAE missile range Aberporth, thus complement-
ing TIVs to similar test ranges in France and 
Italy. 
Chemical or biological TIV s were made to 
research centres and industrial establishments in 
France and Italy. 
During the four visits to plants in France, 
much useful information was obtained, in 
particular concerning the chemistry of phos-
phorus and its derivatives. 
In Italy, experts from the Agency visited 
the Italian army's new Centro Tecnico Chimico-
Fisico-Biologico which was opened in April1977; 
they also visited the Italian army's veterinary 
bacteriological laboratory and a specialised 
civilian establishment preparing vaccines against 
various cattle diseases. 
Finally, Establishment No. 2 (NBC) of the 
Defence Research Centre in Belgium was visited 
by an expert from the Agency. 
Discussions with the experts met in the 
course of the visits referred to above contributed 
significantly towards keeping the Agency's 
experts informed of the latest scientific and tech-
nical developments. 
2. The Documentation Office continued to 
collect and collate, for the benefit of the experts, 
both specialised and other published documents 
on military subjects (research and development, 
introduction of new weapons, reorganisation of 
the armed forces, etc.), as well as on financial 
and economic subjects (budgetary decisions of 
member governments, general economic trends, 
the growth of certain specific sectors of the eco-
nomy and of certain firms working on defence, 
imports and exports of armaments). 
Liaison was maintained with other technical 
documentation establishments. 
G. Miscellaneous contacts 
1. In the conduct of its mission, the Agency 
must and does maintain frequent contacts with 
the national authorities, as well as with the 
authorities of SHAPE and NATO. 
They may take place occasionally or periodi-
cally, involving one or several experts, but in 
every case, the personal links forged facilitate the 
task of the Agency and help resolve, in a spirit 
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of broad co-operation, any problems that may 
arise. The Agency thus considers them essential 
for the satisfactory execution of its mission and 
does everything in its power to further these 
activities. 
It was in this spirit that General Leonelli, 
the new Director of the Agency, who took up his 
duties on 1st February 1977, visited the Foreign 
Affairs and Defence Ministries of the member 
countries and the members of the Permanent 
Council. 
The Agency also maintained close contacts 
with the appropriate NATO authorities in 
accordance with the provisions of the revised 
Brussels Treaty. In this connection, mention 
should be made, in particular, of the two meetings 
held to fix the level of armaments of the forces 
under NATO command, already referred to in 
point C.2 (a) of this chapter. 
2. The Agency is also anxious to participate in 
conferences and study sessions arranged by 
various international organisations on subjects of 
interest to it. Thus, the Director and members of 
his staff attended as observers the symposium 
organised by the WEU Assembly on an arma-
ments policy for Europe, and the meeting of the 
North Atlantic Assembly in Paris. 
3. Finally, the Agency was visited by two 
groups of young European officials on a study 
tour. 
H. General conclusions 
In accordance with Article XIX of Protocol 
No. IV, the Agency was able to report to the 
Council that, as a result of the control exercised 
in 1977, the figures obtained in accordance with 
Article XIII of Protocol No. IV: 
-for armaments of forces under NATO 
command under the terms of Article XIV 
of Protocol No. IV ; and 
- for armaments of forces maintained 
under national command under the terms 
of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of 
Protocol No. IV and the Agreement of 
14th December 1957, concluded in exe-
cution of Article V of Protocol No. 11, 
represented for the control year 1977 and for 
each of the member states, the appropriate levels 
of armaments subject to control for those 
categories of armaments over which the Agency 
has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate. 
As required by Article XX of Protocol 
No. IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course 
of field control measures at production plants, it 
did not detect for the categories of armaments 
which it controls : 
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- either the manufacture in these estab-
lishments on the territory of the Federal 
Republic of Germany of a category of 
armaments that the government of this 
member state has undertaken not to 
manufacture; 
- or the existence, on the mainland of 
Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess 
of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of 
Protocol No. IV) or not justified by 
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export requirements (Article XXII of 
Protocol No. IV). 
In 1977, the Agency again applied controls 
effectively in those fields which are open to it. 
As in the past, the atmosphere of eo-opera-
tion prevailing in relations between the Agency 
and the authorities of the member countries and 
of NATO, as well as those with members of 
private firms, played an important part. 
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CHAPTER IV 
STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE 
A. Activities of the Standing Armaments 
Committee 
The Standing Armaments Committee met 
five times in normal session. The main topics of 
discussion were : the study of the situation in the 
armaments sector of industry in member 
countries ; the up-dating of WEU Agreement 
4.FT.6 and its possible release to industrial firms 
in member countries ; supervision of the work of 
Working Group No. 8 on operational research 
and methods for evaluating military equipment. 
The SAC also met five times as an ad hoc 
group to deal more specifically with the study of 
the armaments sector of industry in member 
countries, in implementation of the mandate 
adopted by the Council. 
1. Study of the armaments sector of industry in 
member countries 
The detailed outline programme and working 
method proposed by the SAC were presented to 
the Council on 9th February 1977. They were 
approved by the Council in a decision taken on 
20th April, on the understanding that there 
would be no duplication with the work of Sub-
Group 4 of Panel Ill of the independent Euro-
pean programme group. The SAC therefore 
began work on the study at once, making the 
fullest possible use of the facilities of its Inter-
national Secretariat and taking account of the 
detailed instructions received in reply to the 
questions it had put to the Council. 
The SAC then made contact with the IEPG 
through France, the pilot country for Sub-Group 
4 of Panel Ill. As this Sub-Group had started 
work on a definition of the armaments sector and 
on the questionnaire to be sent to industrial 
firms, the SAC decided to start its own work 
with the legal aspect of the study. With regard 
to the remainder of the report, the SAC took note 
of the IEPG's time-table. 
2. WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 
WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 which relates to a 
technical trials programme for wheeled vehicles 
for the period 1970-80, is being up-dated under 
a procedure carried out by a group of national 
experts, with the United Kingdom acting as pilot 
country. The annual revision report for 1976-77 
was approved by the SAC in July 1977. 
The SAC had occasion to consider whether 
this agreement should be released to industrial 
firms in member countries. It was agreed that 
reproduction of volume I of the agreement (with 
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the exception of the technical information sheets) 
and its release to firms would, in the first 
instance, be the responsibility of the national 
authorities concemed, who would inform the 
International Secretariat. 
B. Activities of the working groups 
1. Working Group No. 8 
During 1977, Working Group No. 8 on 
operational research met twice, in March and 
October. The first meeting, held in Paris, was 
coupled with a symposium on methods of terrain 
representation, and the second, held in The 
Hague, was combined with a visit to the opera-
tional research section of the Netherlands Physics 
Laboratory. 
Details of subjects under study in various 
countries were again supplied on special forms. 
During the year, 111 forms, of which 75 were 
new and 36 up-dated earlier forms, were pre-
sented by the five delegations belonging to the 
group. These forms dealt with subjects relating 
to all three services. 
Several new contributions were added to the 
WEU library of operational research reports, 
bringing the total number up to 65. Delegations 
concerned continued their work on the five-
language WEU glossary of operational research 
terms which will be completed in 1978. 
2. Evaluation of military equipment 
In accordance with its terms of reference 
from the SAC, the group of experts on the 
evaluation of military equipment continued its 
critical, comparative study of a report on the 
evaluation of a recovery vehicle, under the 
auspices of Working Group No. 8. It held two 
meetings in 1977, in January and October. 
At the first, the group noted that the 
evaluation of the vehicle by the French method 
Electre had been completed and that all possible 
criticisms regarding this method and the German 
"weighted sums" method had been studied. The 
group therefore decided to draft its report to the 
SAC on the first stage of the work. 
At the second meeting, it was decided that 
delegations' contributions to this report required 
editing and that the study would probably have 
to include the application of two new methods 
presented by the French and German Delegations 
respectively. 
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It was therefore proposed that the group 
should hold one or two additional meetings 
during the first half of 1978 to complete its 
report on the first stage of the work. 
C. International Secretariat 
1. RelatiotuJ with the Council and member countries 
On 9th February, the Assistant Secretary-
General presented an oral report to the Council 
on the draft outline programme for a study on 
the armaments sector of industry in member 
countries, which had been drawn up by the SAC 
in implementation of the mandate adopted by 
the Council meeting at ministerial level on 31st 
May 1976. 
Later, on 7th July, he gave his usual annual 
verbal report to the Council, and outlined the 
progress of the early stages of the study. 
During 1977, the Assistant Secretary-
General visited a number of member countries for 
talks with the appropriate authorities on the 
study. 
2. WEU Aasembly 
The Assistant Secretary-General gave the 
SAC an account of the Assembly's debates on 
armaments questions during the two parts of its 
Twenty-Third Ordinary Session. Two documents 
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containing extracts from speeches, reports, 
debates and recommendations relating to these 
questions were circulated to members of the 
Committee. 
In addition, the SAC and the International 
Secretariat were represented at the symposium 
organised by the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments, held in Paris on 3rd and 4th 
March 1977. 
3. RelatiotuJ with NATO 
The International Secretariat of the SAC 
was represented, as observer, at the two meetings 
of the Conference of National Armaments 
Directors held at NATO headquarters in Brussels 
in April and October. 
As in previous years, a representative of the 
International Secretariat attended the two 
meetings of the NATO Naval Armaments Group. 
4. Liaison with FINABEL 
In the context of the regular contacts bet-
ween the Secretariats of the SAC and FINABEL, 
liaison missions were carried out during the first 
and second halves of 1977. The second coincided 
with the meeting of the FINABEL Co-ordinating 
Committee, to which an observer from the Inter-
national Secretariat was invited. In turn, the 
Secretary of FINABEL attended the SAC's last 
meeting of the year. 
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CHAPTER V 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
A. Meetings of the Committee 
In 1977, the Public Administration Commit-
tee, which meets in the member countries in turn, 
held its two sessions in Venice, from 27th to 29th 
April, and in Brussels, from 28th to 30th Septem-
ber. 
These meetings are devoted mainly to an 
exchange of views on major administrative 
developments in member states during the 
preceding six months and to preparation of the 
multilateral course for government officials due 
to take place the following year under the 
responsibility of a member of the Committee, who 
acts as director. 
During the year under review, the Com-
mittee considered a number of administrative 
problems common to most member countries. As 
in 1976, some of these problems stemmed directly 
from the effects of a difficult economic and 
financial situation on administrations; they 
included the position of civil servants and their 
staff associations in relation to salary restric-
tions ; measures taken within the civil service to 
deal with unemployment ; the effects of the 
economic situation on initial and further training 
activities, etc. Several of the other subjects 
discussed, such as exercise of the right to strike 
in the civil service, assessment systems (con-
ventional and new methods), the problems of 
local authorities, etc., showed that because of 
general social changes, many old problems have 
to be approached from a new angle. 
The members of the Committee also ex-
changed information on changes in the consti-
tutional and administrative structure of their 
countries as a result of changes of government or 
cabinet reshuffles. The main new legislation with 
significant administrative consequences was 
reported and copies of texts were supplied in 
some cases. 
When considering arrangements for the 1978 
course for government officials, the Committee 
decided to break away temporarily from the 
recent pattern of training courses for young offi-
cials, and to return to the previous formula. 
This other type of course takes the form of a 
study of a specific theme by a group of fairly 
senior civil servants. The subject approved in 
principle is, "procedures for public enquiries 
prior to the undertaking of certain projects at 
national, regional or local level". 
An account of this course will be given in 
the Council's next annual report. 
2 
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B. 1977 course for government officials 
The twenty-sixth multilateral course for 
government officials, organised by the Public 
Administration Committee, took place in Belgium 
from lOth to 21st October. 
It was designed for young officials holding 
responsible posts in central government depart-
ments, with duties involving, or likely to involve, 
international aspects. The aim was to enable 
participants to exchange information on the 
main characteristic features of their national 
administrations, and then to apply what they 
learned to a negotiating exercise. 
There are normally twenty-one participants 
in such courses : four each for Germany, France, 
Italy and the United Kingdom, two each for 
Belgium and the Netherlands, and one for 
Luxembourg. As a result of a number of 
absences (including one at the last minute for 
health reasons), the 1977 course was attended by 
only sixteen participants, but their quality and 
enthusiasm fully satisfied the organisers' hopes. 
In accordance with its aim, the course was 
divided into two parts. 
During the first few days, each national 
delegation presented a report on the character-
istic features of their administration. This was 
followed by exchanges of view and a general 
discussion which added to participants' know-
ledge on such subjects as the role of political 
cabinets, the position of trade unions and the 
civil servants, the role of specialists, etc. 
The second and more important part of the 
course was devoted to the preparation and 
negotiation of a scheme for the training of 
national officials for duties with international 
aspects. Very little emphasis has so far been laid 
on this kind of training, but the need for it is 
becoming increasingly obvious. Growing numbers 
of national civil servants have duties which 
require them to contact their counterparts in 
other countries, or, at least, to take account of 
the international "dimension" of problems in the 
course of their work. Furthermore, it is difficult 
to provide such training in a wholly convincing 
manner on a purely national basis (if only 
because in most countries there is no language 
problem of the kind which quickly assumes great 
importance at international level). 
After first discussing whether such training 
would be of value, delegates considered the main 
questions which would have to be decided during 
the negotiation exercise : for how many civil 
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servants would such training be of benefit for 
their existing or future duties 1 What should be 
the content and duration of the training, and 
what methods should be used ? At what point in 
an official's career should it be given 1 Should 
participation be compulsory or optional and, if 
the latter, should it be an entitlement for appli-
cants Y What body should organise and adminis-
ter instruction, etc. ? 
One day during the course was spent in 
visiting the offices of the Council and Commis-
sion of the European Communities in Brussels. 
Views were exchanged at round table meetings 
with Community officials. 
C. Study visits 
During 1977, the circumstances and condi-
tions of study visits arranged under the auspices 
of the PUJblic .Administration Committee were the 
same as those described in the twenty-second 
annual report, with administrations showing 
some tendency to restrict or, at least, not to 
expand activities of this kind because funds were 
limited. 
The Committee noted, however, that the 
extent to which study visits attracted civil ser-
vants depended largely on how well they were 
publicised. Details of the many facilities available 
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for bilateral exchanges are not given the same 
publicity in all departments and the need for a 
wide diffusion of information on the subject was 
recognised. It was noted that more information 
was given in some member countries than in 
others, and that some action might therefore be 
taken in the matter. 
The following examples of study visits made 
in 1977 show the wide variety of the subjects 
covered : the role of federal and Land agencies 
in the matter of outdoor recreational facilities ; 
measures to stimulate regional development, 
particularly in maritime, peripheral and moun-
tain areas ; system for monitoring and control of 
prescribing by general practitioners ; siting of 
nuclear power and related industrial plants : 
administrative control and public participation ; 
administrative measures taken or planned to 
implement EEC directives on equal opportunities 
for men and women ; assistance to small 
manufacturing firms and particularly the effects 
of development and planning controls, and 
specific schemes of aid ; administration of rural 
deveil.opment, particularly the process of identify-
ing and monitoring rural development projects, 
etc. 
It will be recalled that civil servants 
returning from visits to a foreign government 
department prepare a report which is commu-
nicated to the Committee. 
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fJHAPTER VI 
BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS 
A. Budget 
Summaries of the main budgets for 1977 and 
1978 are shown in the Appendix to this report. 
Until the option period for the pension 
scheme terminates in 1978, the budgetary conse-
quences of the scheme cannot be finally deter-
mined. 
The budget has been compiled on the 
assumption that 50% of the staff will join the 
pension scheme, and the organisation contribu-
tions to the provident fund have been reduced 
accordingly in 1978. 
It will be necessary to introduce a revised 
budget for 1978 once the final situation is known 
after the closing date of the option period (30th 
April1978). 
The problem raised by the introduction of a 
new social security scheme in the United King-
dom is being studied. 
B. WEU administrative meetings 
The practice was continued of bringing 
together periodically the officials of the Secre-
tariat-General, the Armaments Control Agency, 
the Standing Armaments Committee and the 
Office of the Clerk responsible for administrative 
questions. As was already foreseen in the twenty-
second annual report there was an increase in 
the frequency of these meetings, mainly due to 
the complicated and new problems arising froro 
the introduction of the pension scheme. 
C. WEU provident fund 
This year brought some reduction in the 
fluctuations in currency parities and there was 
a more stable climate for investment. However, 
the option period of one year for the pension 
scheme, starting 1st March 1977, introduced an 
element of complete uncertainty as to the future 
level of the provident fund and inhibited long-
term investment. 
The advisory panel therefore considered that 
the interests of staff and governments were best 
served by maintaining the existing policy of 
short-term investment in currencies. 
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D. Activities within the framework of the 
co-ordinated organisations 
1. Committee of Secretaries-General 
The Secretaries-General of the :five co-
ordinated organisations met three times this year 
to discuss administrative problems. These were 
chiefly concerned with : 
- the introduction of the pension scheme 
and the first practical experiences of the 
implementation of the pension rules ; 
- means of improving the machinery of 
co-ordination ; 
- the introduction of the salary review 
procedure as embodied in the 133rd 
report; 
- the setting-up of a joint administrative 
pension unit. 
In order to obtain expert advice on the 
problems associated with the desirable aim of 
centralising and co-ordinating the management 
of pensions, the Secretaries-GeneraJJ ~onsulted an 
internationally recognised expert, Mr. Schuler of 
Switzerland. He has submitted two reports and 
these :form the basis :for the discussions now 
proceeding between the organisations and in the 
Co-ordinating Committee. 
The instructions implementing the pension 
scheme rules, to be applied in the five co-ordinated 
organisations, and prepared in accordance with 
Article 52 of the pension scheme rules them-
selves, were approved by the Secretariat-General 
on 29th June 1977. 
On the instructions of the Secretaries-
General, the Standing Committee of Secretaries-
General and the Committee of Heads of Admin-
istration met on numerous occasions to prepare 
proposals on a series of administrative problems 
for submission to the Co-ordinating Committee. 
The Standing Committee of Secretaries-
General held a number of joint meetings with the 
Standing Committee of Staff Associations ; these 
meetings are now held monthly in conjunction 
with the meetings of the Co-ordinating Commit-
tee. 
The Standing Committee of Staff Associa-
tions are now also invited to attend all meetings 
of the Co-ordinating Committee and to partici-
pate in its official working groups. 
DOCUMENT 765 
2. Co-ordinating Committee of Gouernment Budget 
Experts 
The Co-ordinating Committee, which met 
thirteen times in 1977, issued eleven reports, 
Nos. 136-146, in the course of the year. 
The reports were the following : 
136th report : Special transitional arrange-
ments, applicable to staff members of the 
Council of Europe, affiliated to the existing 
pension scheme of the Council of Europe, follow-
ing the introduction of the co-ordinated organisa-
tions pension scheme. Approved by the WEU 
Council on 20th April1977. 
137th report : Regarding the application of 
Article 53 of the pension scheme rules, concerned 
NATO only and was sent to the Council for 
information. 
138th report : The entitlement to the 
expatriation allowance (and related education 
allowance and home leave) of staff members who 
commute daily between home and office, when 
these are situated in two different countries. 
This report does not directly affect WEU either. 
139th report : The annual review of the 
daily rates of subsistence allowances for staff 
travelling on duty in member countries, effective 
from 1st May 1977. Approved by the Council on 
1st June 1977. 
140th report : The 1976 general review of 
the remunerations of staff members of the co-
ordinated organisations, effective from 1st July 
1976. Approved by the Council on 13th June 
1977. 
141st report : Payment of a,n oovance to all 
staff members of 80% of the increase in cost of 
living over the second half of 1976, effective 
from 1st January 1977. Approved by the 
Council on 13th June 1977. 
142nd report : The recommended compromise 
solution to the problems raised by national social 
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security legislation in the host countries where 
headquarters and agencies of the co-ordinated 
organisations are located. This report is stiH 
under review by the Council. 
143rd report: The 1977 general review of 
remuneration of B and C grade staff members 
of the co-ordinated organisations, effective from 
1st July 1977. Approved by the Council on 14th 
December 1977. 
144th report : Scales for calculating the 
pensions for four countries, as oodendum to the 
1976 general review of remunerations. Approved 
by the Council on 14th December 1977. 
145th report : Interim measure for the appli-
cation of Article 36 of the pension scheme rules 
to the 1976 general review, and the re-convening 
of the working group on pensions to advise on the 
future application of that article and its com-
patibility with salary reviews. Approved by the 
Council on 14th December 1977. 
146th report : Extension of the period of 
option for the pension scheme, so that it shall 
terminate on 30th April 1978 for all five 
co-ordinated organisations. This report resulted 
from difficulties in applying Article 36 of the 
pension scheme rules. Approved by the Council 
on 14th December 1977. 
E. Staff Association 
The co-operation with the WEU Staff Asso-
ciation has been, as in previous years, excellent. 
Although there have again been long delays in 
effecting salary reviews and the granting of 
intermediate advances on cost-of-living increases, 
as in 1976, meetings between the Secretary-
General, the Association and officials dealing 
with budgetary questions have offered opportun-
ities to exchange information and views with 
staff members regarding present problems of 
administration in the co-ordinated organisations. 
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APPENDIX 
Summary of revised WEU main budget for 1977 
A* B* c• Total B + C 
£ Frs. Frs. Frs. 
Salaries and allowances ............ 757,810 6,028,224 13,026,605 19,054,829 
Pensions .......................... 14,420 954,500 2,287,100 3,241,600 
Travel ........................... 22,795 86,000 350,300 436,300 
Other operating costs ............. 80,865 370,500 449,800 820,300 
Purchase of furniture, etc. . ........ 3,395 10,500 19,400 29,900 
Buildings .............•........... - - - -
ToTAL ExPENDITURE .............. 879,285 7,449,724 16,133,205 23,582,929 
WEU tax ........................ 250,025 2,087,275 4,447,778 6,535,053 
Other receipts .................... 5,800 31,200 54,960 86,160 
Pension receipts ................... 14,420 954,500 2,287,100 3,241,600 
TOTAL INCOME .................... 270,245 3,072,975 6,789,838 9,862,813 
NET ToTAL ....................... 609,040 4,376,749 9,343,367 13,720,ll6 
National contributions called for under the revised WEU main budget for 1911 
600ths 
Belgium I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I .. 59 
France I I I I I I It I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 120 
Germany I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 120 
Italy I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I. t t t t 120 
Luxembourg I et t tIt t t t I I et e et et tIt t t t 2 
Netherlands t I It t I It tIt I It t t t t tIt t tIt t 59 
United Kingdom t t t t t t t t t t I It It tIt t t I 120 
ToTAL t t et I I et tIt tIt t tIt tIt t t tIt t t 600 
*A Secretariat·General. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C Armaments Control Agency. 
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£ F. frs. 
59,888.94 1,349,144.74 
121,808.00 2, 744,023.20 
121,808.00 2,744,023.20 
121,808.00 2,744,023.20 
2,030.12 45,733.72 
59,888.94 1,349,144.74 
121,808.00 2,744,023.20 
609,040.00 13,720,ll6.00 
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Summary of WEU main budget for 1918 
A* B* c• Total B + C 
£ Frs. Frs. Frs. 
Salaries and allowances ............ 814,120 6,240,350 13,501,600 19,741,950 
Pensions .......................... 27,425 365,000 704,300 1,069,300 
Travel ........................... 26,685 81,000 387,450 468,450 
Other operating costs .............. 87,740 352,475 491,505 843,980 
Purchase of furniture, etc. . ........ 3,495 5,500 43,700 49,200 
Buildings ....•.................... - - - -
TOTAL EXPENDITURE .............. 959,465 7,044,325 15,128,555 22,172,880 
WEU tax ........................ 270,050 2,140,100 4,590,150 6,730,250 
Other receipts .................... 9,600 39,500 83,500 123,000 
Pension receipts ................... 13,IIO ll7,100 247,250 364,350 
TOTAL INCOME ............••...... 292,760 2,296,700 4,920,900 7,217,600 
NET TOTAL .............••........ 666,705 4,747,625 10,207,655 14,955,280 
National contrlbutiomr called for under the WBU main budget for 1918 
600tbs 
Belgium ............................. 59 
France .............................. 120 
Germany ............................ 120 
Italy ................................ 120 
Luxembourg ......................... 2 
Netherlands .......................... 59 
United Kingdom ..................... 120 
TOTAL .........................•.• 600 
• A Secretariat-General. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C Armaments Control Agency. 
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£ F. frs. 
65,559.33 1,470,602.53 
133,341.00 2,991,056.00 
133,341.00 2,991,056.00 
133,341.00 2,991,056.00 
2,222.34 49,850.94 
65,559.33 I ,4 70,602.53 
133,341.00 2,991,056.00 
666,705.00 14,955,280.00 
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APPENDIX 
Written Question 178 put by Mr. Valleix and reply of the Council 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Warren (Chair-
man) ; MM. Valleix, Le'M1er (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. 
Adriaensens, Bernini, Boulloche, Cavaliere, Cornelissen, 
Hawkins, Konings, Lewis, Mart, MUller, P6ronnet, Dr. 
I. I. I 
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Phipps, MM. Pinto, Sehweneke (Alternate : Bohe!fler), 
Talon (Alternate : La Combe), Treu, Ueberhorst, Van 
Waterschoot. 
N.B. The raames of those ta'IMg pan m the flote are 
printed m italics. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on application satellites 
Welcoming the Council's statement that Europe needs to develop and apply overall aeronautical, 
space and energy policies and that European industry's capacity and technical level should be maintained; 
Considering that the ESA convention was signed on 30th May 1975 but that of the original ten 
members of the former ESRO only the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Italy, Sweden and 
Switzerland have ratified it; 
Regretting the unwillingness of several member countries' governments to adopt and finance an 
extended overall communications satellite programme as well as the Ariane launcher programme; 
Aware of the need to enable the European aerospace industry to supply a satisfactory share of 
satellite systems intended for European countries, international organisations and domestic and regional 
systems in third world countries ; 
Noting the lack of a. long-range European meteorological sate1lite programme and an earth resources 
programme apart from ESA's ea.rthnet programme; 
Considering that, although some member countries support their military forces, or realise the 
need to do so, through military application satellites, there are no plans for a proper European programme 
to terminate Europe's total dependence on United States satellites in spite of the fact that many Euro-
pean satellites are, technically speaking, on a par with American satellites ; 
Considering further that the European aerospace industry should be given a fair share of orders 
for military application satellites from NATO countries and the Alliance as a whole, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Urge the governments of Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to accelerate 
ratification of the ESA convention and address a similar request to the Spanish Government ; 
11. Invite the governments of the member states of the European Space Agency to take appropriate 
steps to assure a substantive European presence in the exploitation of space and in particular: 
(a) to adopt a three-year ceiling for compulsory expenditure; 
(b) to adopt and finance an extended overall communications satellite programme; 
(c) to decide on the production of a first series of five Aria.ne launchers; 
(d) to make sure that Europe will be associated with future development of the United States 
space transport system as it has been associated with its present development in financing 
the spa.celab; 
(e) to ensure the pursuit and development of European activities in earth observation including 
meteorology and remote sensing by satellites ; 
(/) to promote the Europea.nisa.tion of the French project Spot (sateUite probatoire d'observation 
de la terre) ; 
(g) to offer European industry a fair share of NATO orders for military application satellites, 
with a view to further strengthening Europe's industrial potential in aerospace matters and, in the light 
of the early prospect of world markets being opened, thus promoting Europe's position in application 
satellites which is of major importance for employment in this industry. 
40 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. In its reply of 25th November 1977 to Recom-
mendation 300 on scientific and technological co-
operation in Europe -reply to the twenty-second 
annual report of the Council, the WEU Council 
of Ministers stated that it shared the Assembly's 
view that Europe needed to develop and apply 
overall aeronautical, space and energy policies 
and that the European industry's capacity and 
technical level should be maintained. 
2. In 1977, the Council of the European Space 
Agency met at ministerial level on 14th and 15th 
February and at delegate level every two or three 
months, the last meeting being from 12th to 14th 
December. 
3. The ministerial meeting was devoted to 
reviewing the agency's programmes and preparing 
its new activities. The Council adopted some 
declarations and resolutions which had to be 
implemented by precise commitments taken in 
the course of the year. However, the Council was 
unable to decide on three of the most important 
points on its agenda, i.e. the production of a 
series of five Ariane launchers, the extension of 
a European regional communications satellite 
system and, thirdly, the agency's ceiling of com-
pulsory expenditure for its general and science 
activities for the next three years and conse-
quently a firm breakdown of general and scien-
tific expenditure in 1978. The specialised acti-
vities have their own budgetary appropriations 
which have already been approved. 
4. As was pointed out in the report by 
Mr. Lenzer \ a definite decision on the production 
phase of the Ariane launcher was essential if 
operational launches were to take place in 1981. 
5. Failure to reach decisions on the extended 
telecommunications satellite system is the more 
serious since a European communications satellite 
organisation called Interim Eutelsat has been 
set up by the European .Conference of Postal and 
Telecommunications Administrations {CEPT). 
CEPT has to decide whether to rent part of the 
European communications satellite system, for 
instance, for relaying Eurovision television pro-
grammes; however, this project has had to be 
postponed and the European post office author-
ities will also have to hold in abeyance any final 
decisions on the commercial use of the satellite 
network. Further studies of a heavy telecom-
munications satellite platform might also have 
to be postponed. 
6. Notwithstanding numerous meetings during 
the months which had elapsed since the Ministe-
1. Document 736, paragraph 33. 
2* 
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rial Council's meeting on 15th February 1977, 
no overall space policy has yet been formulated. 
7. A positive decision taken at the December 
Council meeting was the approval of credits for 
launching the European scientific satellite Geos-2 
at the end of June 1978. This satellite will replace 
the Geos magnetospheric research satellite which 
failed to reach the required orbit in 1977. 
8. Another important decision taken by the 
Council was on the spacelab utilisation pro-
gramme for 12 million accounting units. A space-
lab will be launched in December 1980 - a com-
bined European-American mission with sixty 
European and fifteen American experiments ; one 
Japanese experiment will also be included in the 
mission. The main purpose of the first spacelab 
flight will be to verify the performance of space-
lab systems and sub-systems and to measure the 
environment surrounding the shuttle. 
9. All in all the results of the ESA Council 
meetings in 1977 were not as substantial as was 
hoped. 
10. ESA has still not started on definite future 
developments which are vital if Europe is to 
pierce the world market with proven application 
satellites. 
I. General remarks on application satellites 
11. Addressing the Committee in Bonn on 4th 
November 1977, Mr. Haunschild, Secretary of 
State at the Federal German Ministry for 
Research and Technology, said that all the parti-
cipating countries had a part in the European 
Space Agency's programme, depending on their 
specialisation. He considered the result of this 
·co-operation satisfactory. A serious difficulty was 
that al1 ESA's major plans were now reaching 
a point at which heavy investment would be 
needed at the same time. This was one of the 
reasons why European development in the field of 
applications satellites was not problem-free. The 
1977 meetings of the ESA Council had shown that 
the problems were political, commercial and 
technical. 
12. Long-term planning on communications satel-
lites had been inadequate as, on the one hand, 
the governments of the ESA member countries 
had not yet adopted the package deal in tele-
communications and, on the other hand, the 
competence of the European space industry was 
not yet sufficiently recognised to permit direct 
fruitful contacts with future users of European 
communications satellites. To prepare a market 
for European application satellites ESA had to 
convince future buyers of the quality of its pro-
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ducts, which it had not been able to do as its 
programmes were not yet advanced enough to 
show results, the only exception being the suc-
cessful but experimental Franco-German Sym-
phonie satellite. 
(i) Orbital test satellite (OTS) programme 
13. European point-to-point satellite communica-
tions activities began in 1971 with the evaluation 
of a European regional system. The development 
of an orbital test programme was started in 1972 
based on needs defined in consultation with the 
European Conference of Postal and Telecom-
munications Administrations and the European 
Broadcasting Union. The orbital test satellite was 
to be a forerunner of future European commu-
nications satellites. It was to demonstrate the 
performance and reliability in orbit of its equip-
ment and provide experimental communications 
systems including telephone circuits and television 
channels. Originally it was thought that it would 
be used for relatively simple transmission tests 
but it was subsequently decided that it should 
be used for full-scale routing of telephone and 
television traffic. Finally, experiments relating 
to new applications were also included in the 
orbital test programme. It is ESA's task to inves-
tigate possible new uses of communications satel-
lites and this programme provides the opportunity 
to assess the feasibility of proposals by means of 
practical experiments. 
14. The OTS will be used for experiments 
requiring large earth stations with antennas of 
fifteen to nineteen metres in diameter of the type 
needed by post office administrations for the 
European communications satellite system. One 
large station is ready for service and three more 
are under construction. The other types of experi-
ments require small stations of which thirty-
three are under construction or have already been 
completed. The total cost of this infrastructure 
is 40 million accounting units 1 • This is roughly' 
half the cost of the main development contract 
of the orbital test satellites. If the postal admin-
istrations increase their interest in such means 
of communication additional large investments 
will have to be made. 
15. The first orbital test satellite should have 
been launched on 14th September 1977 by the 
American Thor-Delta rocket type 3914. It was 
destroyed shortly after launching, thus leading 
to the loss of the first European satellite of this 
type, which induced Mr. Valleix to put Written 
Question 178 2 to the Council on 15th September 
1977. The Council replied 2 on 14th December 
1977 that the OTS failure would not entail any 
1. One accounting unit on 1st January 1978 = US$ 1.1. 
2. The full text of the question and reply is given at 
Appendix. 
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great financial loss for ESA and that a repeat 
launching was scheduled for the end of April 
1978. 
(ii) Communications satellite programme 
16. An overall communications satellite pro-
gramme based on the extension of existing pro-
grammes is composed of four elements : the exten-
sion of the Marots programme, proposed by the 
United Kingdom in 1973 and since increased to 
two experimental maritime orbital satellites ; a 
European regional communications satellite sys-
tem, capable of relaying either telephony or tele-
vision signals as well as specialised communica-
tions services, data and telex transmissions ; a 
programme for the development of a heavy plat-
form with a payload primarily devoted to the 
development of direct television broadcasting, a 
satellite of 900 kg ; an advanced systems and 
technology programme, which is in fact a research 
and development programme preparing the next 
stage in space application technology. The cost of 
the overall communications satellite programme is 
estimated at 280 million accounting units ($308 
million) at 1977 prices. 
17. The general objective of the European space 
effort in the field of satellite communications is 
to meet European domestic requirements with 
systems supplied by European industry and to 
enable European industry to supply a satisfactory 
share of systems intended for international organ-
isations such as Intelsat and for the regional 
and domestic systems of third world countries 
which constitute a market in full expansion. 
18. This overall communications satellite pro-
gramme interested all ESA member countries. All 
indicated their willingness to participate in some 
or all elements but it is still subject to further 
discussion as for instance Germany did not under-
write the declaration of intent. It was of the 
opinion that future users and the aerospace 
industry should now come to the fore and that 
ESA's r8le should be restricted to the research 
and development phase. Contributions to the pro-
gramme have not therefore been definitely 
defined, nor has the industrial breakdown of 
work been calculated since this depends on the 
financial contributions of the States concerned. 
The Director-General of ESA is to take appro-
priate measures with the States wishing to parti-
cipate in the various elements of the overall com-
munications satellite programme. 
19. Several international and national telecom-
munications systems exist, the most important 
being Intelsat in which some hundred countries 
participate to the tune of some $750 million in 
investments. Nine satellites are operational : five 
over the Atlantic, two over the Pacific and two 
over the Indian Ocean, but only six are in actual 
use, the other three being held in reserve. The 
annual growth in Intelsat communications is some 
15-18%. 
20. National communications satellite systems 
exist in the United States where private carriers 
such as Western Union, RCA and AT&T have 
or are planning to use their own communications 
satellites. This movement started in 1974 and will 
continue to develop. Nearly all the fifty States of 
America are now covered by communications 
satellites. In Canada a national communications 
system began in 1972 with the Anik system of 
Telesat Canada. 
21. In Indonesia, the Palapa system, based on 
the American-Canadian system, is operational. 
The first operation was in 1976. 
22. The Soviet Union has the Molnya system 
which has also used geostationary satellites since 
1975. 
23. The Indian Government plans to have the 
Indian national satellite system operational by 
the early 1980s. 
24. Simultaneously, twenty Arab countries are 
planning to start their Arabcom satellite system. 
25. Other countries planning to have such a 
system are Brazil, China, Australia, the Philip-
pines, Argentina, Chile, Zaire, Nigeria, the Scan-
dinavian countries and the member countries of 
the Andean Pacl. 
26. In Europe the earliest communications satel-
lite was the Franco-German Symphonie satellite, 
the first one of which was launched in 1974 and 
the second in August 1975. These satellites are 
used for experimental communications links 
between Europe and Africa, within India, Iran 
and Indonesia and between France and its over-
seas departments. 
27. In August 1977, Italy launched the Sirio 
satellite (Satellite ltaliano Ricerca lndustriale 
Orientata) the main purpose of which is to study 
the characteristics of certain types of signals in 
communications between Europe and the United 
States in bad weather conditions. The experi-
mental satellite is run by Telespazio ; postal 
authorities from Germany, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom, Finland and Italy are 
participating in this study. 
28. In December 1975, the Nordic CounciL of 
Ministers of the Scandinavian countries, consist-
ing of the Ministers of Education and Culture, 
instigated a study of the technical, administrative, 
political, legal and financial aspects of direct 
inter-Nordic broadcasting via satellite. This study 
concluded that a total Nordic programme supply 
via satellite would be possible by the beginning 
of 1980. For receiving programmes from a direct 
transmission satellite a field receiver would be 
needed to supplement the present television 
aerials and receivers. Mass production of such 
receivers at low prices would be possible by 1980. 
The satellites would be placed in a geostationary 
orbit which as is known is about 35,000 km above 
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the equator. The purpose would be to strengthen 
Scandinavian cultural unity and increase freedom 
of choice for viewers who would gain access to 
programmes from neighbouring countries. The 
second goal would be to afford Scandinavian emi-
grants an opportunity of viewing their home pro-
grammes. 
29. During the symposium organised by ESA 
and the European Broadcasting Union in Dublin 
in May 1977, an economical survey of a broad-
casting satellite and a comparison with terrestrial 
television systems was made by Mr. Terzani, 
Chairman of the EBU Technical Committee. He 
came to the conclusion that, except for countries 
of limited geographical area, a ground-based tele-
vision network is much more expensive than a 
satellite television system. It will not be possible 
to confirm this view before the 1980s when experi-
mental and later operational satellites will have 
replaced or will be integrated in the existing 
ground network and meet the same standards. 
(iii) Meteosat programme 
30. The Meteosat programme is ESA's first 
meteorological satellite programme and represents 
the agency's entry into the field of earth observa-
tion. This programme started in 1972 and in 1973 
the design and development of the Meteosat sys-
tem was placed in the hands of the European 
industry, and especially Aerospatiale. It acquires 
data on the earth's atmosphere for weather fore-
casting. The programme is integrated into a 
world-wide meteorological programme of the 
World Meteorological Organisation, a specialised 
agency of the United Nations, which will employ 
at least five geostationary satellites - two from 
the United States, one from Europe, one from the 
Soviet Union and one from Japan. These satel-
lites, placed at equal distances around the globe, 
will transmit cloud cover images to ground sta-
tions and then, after processing by the main 
station, will relay them to the users. 
31. Meteorological data collected from platforms, 
buoys, or in the case of Meteosat from satellites 
on low polar orbits, are also being relayed. The 
system is an important element of the world 
weather watch and of the global atmospheric 
research programme. For the future the respec-
tive roles of geostationary and low orbit weather 
satellites in a global system must be examined, 
as must the possible role of specialised modular 
low-cost satellites in space-to-space links with 
geostationary satellites and the possibility of 
developing a common platform for meteorological 
and remote sensing satellites. 
32. The first meteorological satellite was laun-
ched by a NASA Thor-Delta rocket on 23rd 
November 1977. In early 1977 the programme 
board approved the launch of the second meteo-
rological satellite by the Ariane launcher in May 
1980. Images are taken every thirty minutes by 
DOCUMENT 766 
optical and by infrared means and transferred to 
the European control centre, ESOC, in Darm-
stadt. The satellite will be declared fully opera-
tional in mid-1978 which will mean the start of 
a European programme using geostationary satel-
lites for the benefit of meteorology and related 
disciplines. 
33. To date the member States of ESA have not 
been able to agree on a long-range European 
meteorological satellite programme which would 
be based on a combination of goostationary and 
low altitude missions. The data acquired and 
transmitted by Meteosat and other spacecraft 
making up the global network would be available 
to meteorologists, oceanographers, hydrologists 
and other earth scientists and would thus con-
tribute to significant improvement in weather 
forecasting. The system's most obvious and specta-
cular potential is that of saving human lives and 
limiting property damage by early warning of 
hurricanes or severe storms, but in fact it will 
also benefit agriculture, fishing, and all weather-
and climate-related industries. The meteorological 
information concerns wind fields, sea surface 
temperatures, cloud cover, cloud-top altitude, 
radiative exchange balances and measurements 
of the water vapour content of the upper tropo-
sphere. 
(iv) Earth resources programme 
34. Remote sensing techniques and especially 
remote sensing by satellite increase our know-
ledge of the earth's resources, the environment 
and man's action on both of them. They permit a 
better global management of our natural 
resources. All analyses from experimental projects 
in this field indicate that remote sensing from 
space is potentially of exceptional economic and 
political importance. 
35. ESA is therefore deeply interested in the 
establishment of a European network to receive, 
reprocess, store and distribute data from remote 
sensing satellites. It has set up a European net-
work called Earthnet to provide European users 
with data from NASA's remote sensing satellites 
in the earth resources observation system. This 
system could be of great interest fur offshore oil 
and gas exploration and development, shipping, 
fishing, maritime safety and in general for fur-
ther study of such satellites in operational 
systems. 
36. Earthnet is considered a necessary activity 
preparatory to the definition of a coherent remote 
sensing programme of European origin. NASA 
has launched or will launch several satellites 
called Landsat, Nimbus and Seasat. The main 
objective of Earthnet is to provide European 
users with access to NASA data. Experience thus 
gained will enable European users to define their 
requirements for future remote sensing satellite 
programmes. 
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37. The first two elements of Earthnet are : (i) 
integration into the new network of existing data 
reception and system reprocessing facilities at 
Fucino, near Rome, run by the Italian firm Tele-
spazio, with which ESA has concluded an agree-
ment in order to integrate this station into the 
European earth resources network; (ii) use of 
ESA's computerised data centre at Frascati, near 
Rome. 
38. ESA has also concluded an agreement with 
the Swedish space corporation for the establish-
ment of a station which is now being built at 
Kiruna for receiving data from the NASA 
satellites. 
39. Within the framework of earth resources 
detection satellites, your Rapporteur wishes to 
mention the French project Spot (satellite pro-
batoire d'observation de la terre). This satellite of 
some 700 kg will be launched at the end of 1983 
or the beginning of 1984 by the Ariane launcher. 
Its mission will be to detect resources and observe 
l!"'rench territory and developing countries where 
France has an interest in mining and other opera-
tions, and finally global observation in order to 
give the French Government an instrument for its 
political and economic strategy at wt~rld level. 
The satellite will be equipped with two main 
optical systems in order to acquire the necessary 
images. This decision on its equipment was one of 
the reasons why the other ESA countries were not 
willing to include this French project in the 
general ESA framework. Germany especially was 
of the opinion that infrared instruments should 
be used in addition to optical ones. The 
French were reluctant about this since optical 
instruments exist and infrared scanning appa-
ratus is still in the development stage. Another 
difficulty was the fact that a satellite of this 
type can easily be converted into a military recon-
naissance satellite which is preferably equipped 
with optical instruments. 
40. In the absence of a positive decision by the 
ESA Council, the CNES (Centre national d'etu-
des spatiales) has taken up contact with NASA 
and an agreement has been concluded by which 
the future French satellite would use the same 
type of images as NASA's Landsat D. It is to be 
hoped that a European programme will finally 
emerge from this national activity following the 
terms of the ESA convention under which 
national programmes are to be Europeanised 
progressively to the greatest possible extent. 
U. Military application satellites 
41. Both the United States and the Soviet Union 
maintain space programmes with major emphasis 
on the support of military operations. The sup-
port by space systems is related to both tactical 
and strategic forces. The main purpose is to 
achieve an improved military capability. The 
United States authorities believe that it is diffi-
cult to make numerical comparisons between the 
United States and Soviet expenditure but the 
resources which the Soviets allocated to their 
military space programme over the past years are 
much larger than is the case in the United States. 
42. On 24th January 1978, one of the most 
spectacular accidents of the space age occurred. 
A five-ton Soviet surveillance satellite with an 
atomic power plant aboard burnt up in the atmo-
sphere over the remote reaches of Canada's North-
West territories. The Soviet satellite was prob-
ably an ocean surveillance satellite using radar 
to locate United States naval vessels in all the 
major oceans of the world. Of sixteen satellites of 
this type launched by the Soviet Union, this is 
the first time such an accident has occurred ; the 
Soviet Union has had satellites of this type in 
space for six years. There are always two on 
patrol at the same time. 
43. As can be seen from this example, the main 
military interest in space is the global nature of 
space systems. They are far cheaper than any 
other means of communication and space tech-
nology, like all advanced technology, has spin-off 
in many fields. At the same time many people 
were made aware of an aspect of space flight 
that had hitherto escaped them : the danger of 
nuclear fallout from damaged vehicles. The pro-
per place for taking it up might be in the United 
Nations Committee on the peaceful use of outer 
space which has now been responsible for four 
international agreements on different aspects of 
the use of space from liability for damage to the 
registration of objects launched. It will not be 
easy to reach agreement, not least because of the 
sensitivity that the Soviet Union is bound to show 
over satellites for military use. The United 
Nations Committee has to decide whether it wants 
to continue to run the risks revealed by this 
incident 1 • After discussing this paragraph the 
Committee expressed the view that the United 
Nations Committee should take appropriate action 
as quickly as possible. 
(i) Navstar global positioning system 
44. One of the most important present-day 
developments is the Navstar global positioning 
system which makes it possible for the military 
commands using satellites to have direct commu-
nication with the smallest units through mobile 
terminals which consist of square black boxes 
which can be carried in jeeps, other vehicles, 
planes and ships. A capability for accurate all-
weather positioning and navigation could also 
prove useful to the civil community. This new 
system could have a revolutionary impact on both 
strategic and tactical warfare. The system is 
expected to achieve full operational status in the 
mid-1980s. The naval navigation satellite system 
1. See Documents 388 and 444. 
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(Transit) will continue as a major system for 
providing position-fixing information to strategic 
submarine forces until the Navstar global posi-
tioning system becomes operational. 
(ii) Communications satellite systems 
45. Communications satellite systems have been 
established by several NATO countries but the 
most elaborate is that of the United States which 
acquired these systems for three fundamental 
reasons: (a) communications, command and con-
trol of nuclear forces for which such a system 
is a military necessity ; (b) liaison between major 
bases overseas, command centres, large naval 
ships, and advanced airborne command posts in 
the framework of the military command control 
system; (c) beyond-the-horizon communications 
with and amongst ships in the framework of the 
fleet communications system. The changing global 
communications needs of the United States 
Defence Department can best be served by satellite 
communications which allow great capacity and 
flexibility in their geographic coverage. Signifi-
cant progress has also been made towards estab-
lishing the United States-USSR direct communi-
cations link via communications satellites. 
46. The United States started its defence satel-
lite communications system in the beginning of 
the 1960s with its initial defence satellite com-
munications project. Tactical communications 
satellites - the Lincoln experimental satellites -
were then built. The NATO satellite system has 
been based on this system. New types of satellites 
are now being built by TRW and General 
Electric. 
47. The Skynet system of communications satel-
lites was built for the British forces. 
48. With its Cosmos series the Soviet Union 
already has more communications satellites in 
orbit for military than for civil purposes. More 
than one hundred and eighty of these satellites 
have been launched. 
(iii) Geodetic satellite programme 
49. The basic purpose of such a programme is 
to map the surface of the earth more accurately 
and, wherever necessary, to obtain accurate data 
and variations on the field of gravity. This is of 
great importance for guiding missiles. 
(iv) Early warning satellites 
50. Both superpowers have early warning satel-
lites which are operational in geostationary orbit 
and which can provide warning of launches of 
intercontinental or submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles. 
(v) Meteorological satellites 
51. Several NATO countries have meteorological 
satellite programmes under the aegis of defence 
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departments providing special weather data of 
importance for military requirements which are 
often quite different from civilian requirements ; 
they are a most important source of data for 
weather analysis required by the general staff. 
The relationship between military and civil 
meteorological satellite systems has been estab-
lished everywhere and once the data have been 
declassified they are passed on to the civil insti-
tutes. 
52. In the United States the defence meteorolo-
gical satellite programme (DMSP) continues to 
provide high quality visual and infrared imagery 
and other specialised meteorological data to sup-
port military operations. The DMSP provides 
weather data for the entire earth four times a day 
using two satellites in polar orbit. One collects 
early morning and evening data and the other 
collects noon and midnight data. These weather 
data are stored aboard the satellites and later 
transmitted to Air Force Global Weather Central 
in Nebraska and the Fleet Numerical Weather 
Central in California. The imagery is also trans-
mitted in real-time to transportable read-out 
stations at key locations world-wide to support 
tactical operations. During 1976, a new tempera-
ture sensor and other specialised meteorological 
sensors were developed. Satellite reliability and 
life have also been improved. 
53. The Department of Defence continues to 
co-operate with NASA and the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration in development 
of the Tiros-N domestic weather satellite. 
(vi) Ocean surveillance satellites 
54. In ocean surveillance special attention is 
being given to naval forces. The positions of fleets 
all over the world are now being monitored and 
it is considered that no surface ships can go unde-
tected. 
55. Space systems are providing increasing sup-
port for the forces and national security is becom-
ing more and more dependent on military space 
programmes. There is no doubt that satellites, and 
in later years the space shuttle, will have an 
increasingly important role in the military field. 
ID. Spacelab 
56. The development of application satellites 
induced the Americans to seek a new system of 
transportation. With the orbiting of the first 
satellite it became clear that its operation and 
viability depended on the performance which 
could be expected of it. In 1965 the weight of the 
first Intelsat communications satellite was only 
39 kg ; in 1979 Intelsat V will weigh 975 kg. The 
weight increase is directly related to the thrust 
of the launcher. 
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57. If the space shuttle is operational by the 
beginning of the 1980s, the weight of the satellite 
might be even more than 2,300 kg and it is quite 
possible that with the space shuttle system and 
the possibilities of extra-vehicular activities satel-
lites might be built of 3,000 to 10,000 kg and 
placed in geostationary orbit. A modular space-
craft could be assembled in the vicinity of the 
shuttle before it is sent into final orbit. The 
capability of building a communications satellite 
in a variety of pieces which can be assembled in 
the shuttle bay or outside in space is of great 
importance. 
58. The Department of Defence maintained close 
liaison with NASA on the space shuttle pro-
gramme during 1976. The space shuttle holds 
great promise for reducing the cost of future 
space operations and Department of Defence 
requirements have been incorporated in the 
shuttle design. A solid-fuelled interim upper stage 
was chosen by the air force because of its relia-
bility, safety and lower cost for development and 
use with the shuttle. The interim upper stage 
will be used beginning in 1980 for Department of 
Defence and civil payloads from Kennedy Space 
Centre which require low-inclination or high-
aJ!titude orbits. The space shuttle launch and 
landing capability at Vandenberg Air Force Base 
will be ready for operational use in December 
1982. A contract was awarded in July 1976 to 
define shuttle ground support systems at Van-
denberg. 
59. The space shuttle era is to begin some twenty-
five years after the first space probe and the 
technological and operational experience since 
acquired is now being applied in developing the 
space shuttle. This vehicle will be the basic 
element in a space transportation system that will 
start a new era of routine operations in space. 
The primary mission for the space shuttle is the 
delivery of payloads to earth orbit and especially 
the placing of satellites in this orbit. The space 
shuttle also makes it possible to retrieve a satellite 
launched on a previous mission and return it to 
earth to be refurbished for a future mission. 
60. The advantages of a shuttle launch are many. 
Its large bay, capable of housing two Intelsat V 
satellites or three satellites of the Anik type, has 
practically abolished the constraints of a normal 
launch missile. Also, the personnel on the shuttle 
can accurately control the spacecraft and the 
orbiter when it leaves the shuttle. 
61. In the late 1980s, when shuttle launches have 
become normal practice and extra-vehicular activ-
ity has been developed it will be possible to orbit 
complex satellite systems in space. However, it 
must be realised that progress in this field as in 
many others will have to be gradual, but it may 
safely be predicted that large satellite complexes 
will be assembled in space and provide a system 
equivalent to six present satellites. Such a satel-
lite would be able to provide meteorological, earth 
resources, communications and broadcasting 
services. The system might replace many existing 
satellites thus relieving orbital congestion and 
using modularity techniques for economically 
viable repair in orbit. Such a development will of 
course be possible only if shuttle launches are 
successful. The first manned orbital flights are 
scheduled for 1979. The launch and the return 
flight will be at the Kennedy Space Centre. 
62. An integrated equipment of the space shuttle 
is spacelab of which several configurations will be 
flown in the future. Spacelab will provide an 
extension of the ground-based laboratories with 
additional qualities such as a long-term gravity-
free environment. The first spacelab will be pro-
vided by ESA which has instructed ERNO to 
develop and build the spacecraft. ERNO is a fully 
subsidiary company of the VFW-Fokker group 
which began its activities in June 197 4. The 
memorandum of understanding signed by ESA 
and NASA in August 1973 covers the delivery 
to NASA of one spacelab engineering model and 
one flight unit. NASA has undertaken to buy 
additional spacelabs from Europe subject to 
certain conditions being met. The engineering 
model is scheduled for delivery in the second 
half of this year and the first flight unit one year 
later. The tasks so far envisaged for the research 
and application models are related to the follow-
ing disciplines : astronomy, physics, earth obser-
vation, material science - manufacturing in 
space, technology and biology. 
63. ERNO is especially concerned with experi-
ments in the material sciences field such as crystal 
growth, pure metals and alloys, composite mate-
rials and fluid physics. One application might be 
the manufacture of high-purity vaccines. 
64. In the field of earth observation, experiments 
will be made through remote earth sensing in 
meteorology, land use planning through mapping 
and charting, pollution control of either water or 
air pollution, the monitoring of water resources, 
as well as mineral resources. There will be a total 
of seventy-six experiments in the first spacela;b 
mission. The great advantage of spacelab is the 
greatly increased weight and volume available for 
experimentation at relatively low cost. 
65. The first mission will be in the second half 
of 1980. Spacelab may stay in orbit for a week 
to a month at a time and will be reusable. 
66. The primary purpose of the first mission 
is to verify the performance of the spacelab 
systems and sub-systems and to measure the 
environment surrounding the shuttle. The second 
aim is to obtain valuable scientific applications 
and technological data and to demonstrate the 
capability of spacelab for space research. Space-
lab comprises two main units : the actual module 
in which scientists can work under normal atmos-
pheric conditions and the pallet which they may 
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enter in pressure suits only. The latter will mainly 
carry astronomical and earth observation instru-
ments needing direct exposure to space and which 
will be controLled from inside the laboratory or 
the ground. The module accommodates the sub-
systems required for operation, data acquisition 
devices, together with the equipment for these 
experiments which require a normal or special 
atmosphere. 
67. If the spacelab experiment succeeds it will 
mark a new low-cost concept of space exploration 
and exploitation. A permanent relationship 
between Western Europe and the United States 
in the space field will then prove essential. 
68. Europe will have invested some 500 million 
accounting units ($550 million) in the space 
transportation system which will be the basis of 
all great space ventures by the year 2000. It is 
therefore logical and necessary that Europe 
should be intimately associated with the space 
transportation system and its further development 
from the very outset. Europe should avoid the 
situation which arose with the post-Apollo pro-
gramme when political decisions were postponed 
for so long that European participation came too 
late. In order to take appropriate decisions in time 
a sufficient research and development programme 
should be established to provide the decision-
making authorities with all the required data. 
IV. Ariane launcher 
69. Although not coming directly within the 
framework of his report, your Rapporteur never-
theless considers it useful to mention the problems 
concerning the Ariane launcher as they are signi-
ficant for European space policy developments. 
70. In July 1973, countries now members of ESA 
adopted the Ariane heavy launcher development 
programme in order to give Europe an indepen-
dent launching capability for its own satellites. 
They aJlso hoped that in the 1980s there would 
be a market for European satellites. Many studies 
have been undertaken to assess the size of the 
world satellite market and the general conclusion 
is that it will be worth $10-12,000 million, the 
European share of which might be some 15 %. 
71. The Ariane launch vehicle, designed in parti-
cular to place satellites of up to 970 kg in geosta-
tionary orbit, will be operational at the end of 
1980. The four development launches in the 
qualification programme are scheduled for June 
and December 1979 and May and October 1980. 
Aerospatiale is the design leader and responsible 
for assembling the launch vehicle. 
72. Ariane will be launched from the Guiana 
space centre at Kourou. The operational launches, 
five or six of which are presently planned, should 
take place between 1981 and 1983. The cost of the 
production will be 185 million accounting units 
most of which will be borne by Ariane users. It 
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is therefore indispensable to guarantee a loan 
for financing this operation if the six operational 
launchers are to be built. Most of the ESA coun-
tries which have participated in the development 
programme recognise the need to pre-finance this 
operation. Nevertheless, the German Delegation 
has refused to contribute to the pre-financing 
although it accepts the idea of using Ariane for 
ESA's programme and its promotion on the world 
market. The ESA convention requires the elabora-
tion of a European space policy which is not 
limited to the agency's programmes but covers 
also objectives in space matters which the member 
States think useful. 
73. The' convention also provides for an indus-
trial policy at European level in order to allow 
for the necessary specialisation and access to 
external markets through better competitiveness. 
Here of course lies the origin of the difficulty 
as several member countries of ESA would agree 
to subsidise the Ariane launcher in order to corn-
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pete effectively with the NASA launch services. 
NASA is required by law to recuperate the full 
cost of its launch services from foreign countries. 
Unless your Rapporteur is mistaken, a NASA 
launch would cost some ·$30 million, whereas ESA 
is thinking in terms of $20 million for its launch 
services. The situation will of course change when 
the shuttle becomes operational. It remains impor-
tant for Europe to have its own launchers in 
order to be independent and, for the United 
States, competition in this field can only be 
called sound. 
74. However this may be, a decision on the 
operational series of Ariane will have to be taken 
and arrangements will have to be made to pre-
finance this series. If no decision can be reached 
a contradictory situation will arise in which the 
development of the launcher is agreed but its 
economic utilisation for European programmes 
jeopardised since it will not be promoted on the 
world market. 
APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 
Written Question 178 1 
put by Mr. Valleix 
DOCUMENT 766 
I. On 14th September 1977, the American Thor-Delta rocket carrying the European Space Agency's 
OTS sate1lite was destroyed a few seconds after launching, thus leading to the loss of the first European 
satellite of this type. Was this type of rocket also used for launching the European scientific satellite 
Geos on 20th April 1977 which failed to achieve the expected results 1 
2. Why did the American authorities use a type of rocket which had not yet proved its reliability for 
this launching 1 Why did the European authorities concerned agree to this choice 1 
3. What is the Council's assessment of the financial, technical and commercial consequences of the 
failure on 14th September 1 In particular, does it consider that the Ma.rots programme can be carried 
out in the conditions planned 1 Is it not urgent to review the terms of the contract with NASA, under 
which all the risks and costs are borne by the customer alone, i.e. ESA 1 
4. Does the Council consider that co-operation between Europe and the United States in space 
matters has proved to be satisfactory enough to justify its being pursued 1 
Reply of the Council 2 
1. Two different versions of the Delta vehicle produced by the McDonnell Douglas Corporation were 
used for launching the OTS and the Geos: type 3914 for the OTS, type 2914 for the Geos. The difference 
between the 3914 and the 2914 lies in the former's greater booster strength on the periphery of the first 
stage. There were different reasons for the two abortive launchings. 
2. The choice of the TD-3914 for the OTS was made not by NASA but by the European Space 
Organisation. Because its capacity was greater than that of the TD-2914 it was possible to give the 
OTS a larger volume, which in turn meant that the satellite could be designed, inter alia, to meet probable 
world market requirements more adequately. It cannot be asserted that the reliability of the 3914 had 
not been proved. The only distinction between the 2914 and the 3914 is that the latter has Castor IV 
boosters which have been used successfully for many years as the second stage of the American Scout 
launcher vehicle. The 2914 itself is, on the statistical average, one of the most reliable launchers. Thus it 
was easy to calculate the reliability of the combination 2914 plus Castor IV boosters. The OTS launch-
ing was the third using the 3914, both previous ones having been successful. 
3. The OTS failure will not entail any appreciable direct financial loss for ESA because the launching 
was underwritten and the project included a reserve model. A repeat launching is scheduled for the 
end of April 1978. The delay will of course have certain negative psychological effects on the users of a 
subsequent operational system and, possibly, economic consequences as well for the industries concerned 
aiming to sell such systems on the world market.-
Furthermore, all users of space are exposed to the risk of failure, as the case of lntelsa.t shows. 
It is not felt that the Marots programme will be seriously impaired. 
4. Leaving aside the failure of the American launcher systems, co-operation between Europe and the 
United States of America has so far been good. Moreover, NASA's meticulous investigation of the causes 
shows that it is endeavouring to make improvements which wi11 also benefit its European customers. 
1. Transmitted to the Council on 15th September 1977. 
2. Communicated to the Assembly on 19th December 1977. 
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Document 767 28th March 1978 
Replies of the Council to Recommendations 301 to 311 
RECOMMENDATION 307 1 
on the application of the final act of the CSCE 2 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe held 
in Helsinki together with earlier treaties between eastern and western countries opened the way for 
a. process which ought to lead towards international peace, freedom of peoples and the fulfilment of 
human rights ; 
Considering that the development of this process will inevitably be by successive steps ; 
Considering that jointly-planned developments must be achieved by all; 
Considering that further steps towards detente at the Belgrade meeting and in other nego-
tiations, particularly in the field of arms control and mutual and balanced reduction of forces in 
Europe, are essential for the pursuit of the process of detente ; 
Considering that such a. stage cannot be completed unless all the participants are firmly deter-
mined to achieve positive results, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Continue to examine the conduct of the Belgrade meeting in parallel with governments and 
relevant European and Atlantic organisations ; 
2. As a. priority, endeavour to promote the process of detente through arms control agreements 
with a. view to improving understanding and co-operation between all the signatory States and affirm-
ing human rights and fundamental freedoms ; 
3. Ensure that all signatory countries apply the proVlBIOns of the Helsinki final act, recogrusmg 
that a reminder of the need to respect all the provisions of the final act in full does not constitute 
interference in the internal affairs of the signatory States. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1977 during the Second Part of the Twenty.Third Ordinary 
Session (9th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Segre on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 
(Document 753). 
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DOCUMENT 767 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 801 
l. The Council have repeatedly reviewed the conduct of the Belgrade meeting. 
2. The Council attach great importance to the furthering of the process of detente. The affirma-
tion of human rights and fundamental freedoms is of primary significance for the improvement of 
understanding and co-operation between all the signatory states. Member governments approached the 
Belgrade meeting with the hope that it would be possible to achieve a better implementation of all 
the provisions of the final act and that concrete measures to this effect would be adopted. Although 
this goal was not realised the meeting was not without value. It was one more stage in the long 
process of detente. It is to be hoped that the conference in Madrid in 1980 will inject a new momen-
tum into that process. 
3. It was the Belgrade meeting's main objective to discuss the thorough implementation of the 
provisions of the final act by signatory countries. The sixth principle does not exclude dealing with 
topics which touch upon the international obligations or responsibilities of states. A reminder of the 
need to respect all the provisions of the final act in full cannot be considered as an intervention in 
internal affairs because the participating states, by adopting them, have accepted that there should 
be a thorough exchange of views on their implementation. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th March 1978. 
51 
DOCUMENT 767 
RECOMMENDATION 308 1 
on communications and crisis management in the Alliance 2 
The Assembly, 
Stressing that the Allia.nce's first purpose of preventing and deterring war, without prejudice 
to its vital interests, requires a system of crisis management to ensure that the Alliance and its 
members, acting in concert, take timely measures to prevent a crisis developing or to defend its 
interests; 
Calling for measures of crisis prevention to be strengthened and increased ; 
Welcoming the development of the crisis management system centred on NATO headquarters 
and believing the loyal participation of all countries of the Alliance to be essential ; 
Calling on the member governments never to shirk the burden of responsibility for the timely 
implementation of readiness measures whenever warning time is available, 
RECOMMENDS TO THE CoUNCIL 
That it urge member governments : 
I. To promote crisis prevention measures designed to improve stability and increase warning time 
of any real threat : 
(a) in the CSCE negotiations by calling for the confidence-building measures agreed at Helsinki 
to be strengthened and augmented ; 
(b) in the MBFR negotiations, by calling for progress to be made on NATO proposals for the 
reduction of forces and for associated measures ; 
(c) by ensuring that the arms control negotiations in which members of WEU could partici-
pate cover all categories of weapons (including the so-called grey-area weapons) which have 
an immediate impact on European security ; 
2. To seek to improve arrangements for NATO crisis management : 
(a) by calling on all NATO countries to participate fully: 
(i) in the early completion of the NATO Integrated Communications System; 
(ii) at an appropriate high official and, from time to time, at political level, with all relevant 
government departments, in crisis management exercises based on likely and realistic 
scenarios; 
(iii) in the provision and evaluation of information, and in consultation, on a world-wide 
immediate and continuous basis, covering any events that may involve allied interests 
with a view to developing a collectively-agreed assessment of a crisis situation; 
(iv) in subsequent crisis management decisions as often as may be necessary, including the 
implementation of diplomatic and economic measures ; 
(v) in assigning more elements of existing national forces to the NATO mobile, standing 
and on-call forces to provide a greater range of deterrent options in periods of tension ; 
(vi) in ensuring that full use is made of military warning time by making timely prepara-
tion through the implementation of the agreed alert measures ; 
(b) by calling on the North Atlantic Council to establish an ad hoc group to review and make 
recommendations for the improvement of the existing NATO crisis management machinery 
and procedures ; 
(c) by calling on the North Atlantic Council to study the possibility of establishing a permanent 
teleprinter link between NATO headquarters and the Government of the Soviet Union and 
of designating an authorised NATO spokesman to use the link on appropriate occasions. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1977 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary 
Session (lOth Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Watkinson on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments (Document 757). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 308 
1. The Council welcome Recommendation 308. Like the Assembly, the Council recognise that the 
continuing increase in the strength of Warsaw Pact forces during recent years has, inter alia, focus-
sed allied attention on the need for adequate warning time and a more stable military balance. The 
Council endorse the call to improve arrangements for crisis management and for full participation by 
the member countries concerned. 
2. In particular, the need for confidence-building measures to be strengthened and augmented is 
recognised by member countries of the Atlantic Alliance who have put forward a constructive and 
even-handed package of proposals to improve the implementation of the final act's confidence-build-
ing measures at the meet~ng in Belgrade. 
Before extending current negotiations to cover all categories of weapons, WEU nations would 
need to assure themselves that their involvement in such negotiations would indeed offer the prospect 
of redressing the force imbalance and of improving stability. Members of WEU would also need to 
give very careful consideration to the many complex issues involved. 
3. The Council have taken note of all the proposals for improving the existing NATO crisis man-
agement machinery and procedures, and will accordingly forward the text of the recommendation 
and this reply to the NATO authorities. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th March 1978. 
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RECOMMENDATION 309 1 
on WEU's contribution to the deuelopment of European union 8 
The Assembly, 
Considering that Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty contains a. binding commitment to 
automatic military assistance ; 
Convinced that application of this provision, as of Article VIII, calls for close and continuing 
consultations between its signatories on external policy and defence questions ; 
Further convinced that only full application of the treaty can maintain mutual confidence, which 
gives full deterrent value to Article V ; 
Considering that neither the North Atlantic Council nor, in present circumstances, the political 
consultations organised between members of the EEC are able to replace entirely the consultations provided 
for in the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly under Article VIII; 
Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty has introduced a. new ethical dimension into relations 
between signatory States ; 
Considering that the mandate given to the Standing Armaments Committee by the Council on 31st 
May 1976 should make a. substantial contribution to: 
(a) paving the way towards a harmonisation of armaments with a. view to protecting the production 
capability of industries which are essential for maintaining employment and safeguarding the 
independence of member countries ; 
(b) preparing a. joint policy for member countries in respect of sales of arms, which might lead to 
disarmament ; 
Deploring the fact that in practice the Council fails to take adequate account of these considerations ; 
Convinced that a future European union can be based only on treaties and institutions associating 
member countries, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Examine to what extent the modified Brussels Treaty is really applied by organisations other than 
WEU; 
2. Implement Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty whenever the international situation so 
requires, i.e. consult with regard to any situation which ma.y constitute a. threat to peace or to economic 
stability; 
3. Examine the implications of Article V for all member States, with the a.im inter alia of harmonising 
strategic concepts a.nd strengthening procedure for consultation ; 
4. In the context of the search for universal, progressive a.nd controlled disarmament, consider how 
WEU can contribute to the establishment of lasting peace ; 
5. Ensure that the task given to the Standing Armaments Committee is pursued promptly and 
efficiently and is extended to cover the sale of arms with a view to making meaningful progress towards 
general and complete disarmament ; 
6. Meet the wish regularly expressed by the Assembly to hold a true dialogue on the various aspects 
of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1977 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary 
Session (lOth Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Forni on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 
(Document 756). 
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to Recommendation 309 
The Council have very carefully considered Recommendation 309 and the accompanying expla-
natory memorandum. 
Before dealing with the various points in the main body of the recommendation, the Council 
feel they cannot leave unanswered certain passages of the preamble and explanatory memorandum 
which seem to imply that the Assembly has doubts as to the Council's willingness to apply the 
whole of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
Indeed, in this preamble, the Assembly refers to certain features of the treaty, in particular 
those which arise out of Articles V and VIII and then deplores the fact that "in practice the Coun-
cil fails to take adequate account of these considerations". 
Likewise, in paragraph 16 of the explanatory memorandum, it is stated that "the WEU Coun-
cil as it now operates does not appear to be taking its tasks seriously". Further on, in paragraphs 
55 and 56 dealing with relations between the Council and the Assembly, it is stated inter alia that 
the work of the Assembly is hindered first and foremost by "the fact that its partner, the Council, 
is constantly evading its responsibilities, carefully providing only a strict minimum of information, 
etc.". 
The Council wish to point out that the member governments of WEU share the Assembly's 
convictions regarding the need to uphold and apply the modified Brussels Treaty and that they 
therefore feel the Assembly's concern is unjustified. 
Nor do the Council agree with the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the recommendation, 
according to which neither political co-operation between the Nine, nor consultations within the 
North Atlantic Council can constitute the consultations provided for in Article VIII of the modified 
Brussels Treaty. Indeed, they find that the consultations which take place within these bodies are 
complete and thorough and have sufficient continuity to make it unnecessary, in present circumstan-
ces, to repeat such contacts in the more limited framework of WEU. Nevertheless, the provisions of 
Article VIII remain in force. The Council can be called upon by one of their members to consult on 
any situation which may constitute a threat to peace or endanger economic stability. 
As regards the automatic implementation of Article V, the Council stated recently, as is indeed 
mentioned in the rest of the explanatory memorandum, that there could be no doubt as to the 
binding character of this provision. The Council are fully aware of the consequences of this fact. 
The peaceful aims of Western European Union are expressed in the preamble to the treaty. 
Measures taken by the member governments towards disarmament, particularly within the United 
Nations, follow naturally from these aims. The Council consider that in this context, the member 
governments are pursuing policies which correspond to the wish expressed by the Assembly. 
The sole purpose of the study at present being carried out by the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee is to describe the economic and legal position of armaments industries in member countries. 
It is not required to include any political assessments or conclusions leading to the regulation of the 
sale of arms. Hence there is no connection between this study and action by the member states in 
the field of disarmament. 
The Council make every effort to have as thorough-going and fruitful a dialogue as possible 
with the Assembly. At the present time, various requests made recently by the Assembly have been 
or are being complied with. On 3rd November 1977 at the General Affairs Committee and on 28th 
November, at the plenary session of the Assembly, the Chairman-in-Office announced that the Coun-
cil would try to have more regular contacts with the Assembly. On those same occasions, the Chair-
man-in-Office promised the Assembly detailed information on the tasks handed down to the SAC. 
This information has been transmitted. 
Finally, mention should be made of the efforts both of the Council as such and of the govern-
ments of the member states to provide the Assembly with the information it calls for. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th Maroh 1978. 
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RECOMMENDATION 310 1 
on the spread of nuclear energy and defence problems 11 
The Assembly, 
Considering that nuclear energy is a. fact of international life which will provide a. high percentage 
of the world's electricity by the end of the century, that several other energy options might eventually 
be available and that decisions regarding nuclear energy should take account of the major concern to 
avoid further proliferation of nuclear weapons capability; 
Aware that at present the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna exercises safeguard 
and control measures only with regard to certain specific nuclear equipment and material imported 
under bilateral agreements, and nuclear material in or under the control of non-nuclear weapon parties 
to the non-proliferation treaty; 
Welcoming the agreement reached by the fifteen nuclear exporting countries in London in Sep-
tember 1977 to prevent further sales of nuclear material, equipment and technology without adequate 
safeguards and controls ; 
Stressing the need to avoid any form of safeguard and control measures which would undermine 
the existing non-proliferation treaty, which guarantees countries non-discriminatory access to nuclear 
technology for peaceful purposes, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Urge member governments : 
I. To promote world-wide co-operation in monitoring all the various activities in the field of nuclear 
energy; 
2. To make full use of diplomatic channels in order to strengthen world-wide international safeguards 
and controls, increase the responsibilities of the IAEA and establish multinational nuclear fuel centres ; 
3. To concert their policies with other supplying countries to make the supply of civil nuclear 
assistance of any sort to third countries dependent on the latter's acceptance of full IAEA safeguards 
on all nuclear installations and materials on their territory or under their control ; 
4. To give impetus to the development and international application of procedures and stringent 
measures to protect nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, in storage or in transit, from terrorist seizure 
or diversion. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1977 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary 
Session (11th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Jessel on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 760). 
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1. The member governments of the Council have already acted to promote co-operation between 
supplier countries for the purpose of safeguarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy by appropriate 
controls. 
The guidelines which were adopted by the fifteen countries composing the London group, and 
were communicated to the IAEA on 11th January, provide that this Agency shall control the peace-
ful use of all sensitive exports to non-nuclear weapon states. 
2. The IAEA is the controlling body for the peaceful use of nuclear materials. Its responsibilities 
are set out in its statute and it was also empowered under the terms of the NPT to control all the 
peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT. The Board of Governors 
of this Agency, on which a number of member states are represented, is the appropriate body to 
improve the terms of these controls, in compliance with the agreements concluded by the Agency, 
e.g. the IAEA /Euratom agreement. 
The subject of multinational centres for the nuclear fuel cycle industry, with which the IAEA 
has already been concerned for a number of years, will be considered by the experts taking part in 
the INFCE study. 
3. Those members of the Council who participated in the London meetings did find common 
ground for their policies on civil nuclear assistance to third countries. The result of this action is 
made clear in the guidelines referred to above, which contain no ban on nuclear exports to states 
which have not made all nuclear installations and materials on their territory or under their control 
subject to IAEA control. 
The Council believe that, while taking account of the London guidelines, it is the responsibility 
of each state to define its own export policy and express the hope that the guidelines referred to 
above will receive wide international support. 
4. Measures to protect nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, in storage or in transit, from illicit 
use by individuals are police measures for the implementation of which each state is responsible 
Within its own territory. Whilst there is an agreement on the level of physical protection necessary 
(London guidelines), the details and implementation of this protection are the exclusive responsibility 
of the sovereign states. 
Studies on the various measures possible are also carried out within the IAEA ; they include, 
in particular, consideration of a draft international agreement for the physical protection of nuclear 
materials during transfer. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th March 1978. 
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RECOMMENDATION 311 1 
on progress in aerospace 2 
The .Assembly, 
Considering its original aim of promoting a European aircraft industry to be ambitious in present 
circumstances but essential if the industry is to survive ; 
Believing that the present national concentrations and nationalisations in Europe's airframe industries 
have not strengthened Europe's position vis-a-vis the United States aircraft manufacturing industries; 
Aware of the vast differences between the airframe industries in the various countries of the Common 
Market and considering that in the military field only those of the United Kingdom and France are econo-
mically, commercially and politically comparable since both countries have: 
(a) a large military production; 
(b) a wide military export market; 
(c) a comparable approach on several matters relating to defence policy; 
(d) well-established helicopter and aero-engine industries; 
but aware also of the will of all member countries to widen their share of the civil market for medium-range 
aircraft at world level ; 
Noting with regret that apart from some common research, development and finance activities the 
governments of member countries will not : 
(a) agree on a common aeronautical policy; 
(b) promote a unified civil and military aircraft manufacturing and user market; 
(c) set up a European military aircraft procurement agency; 
(d) form a European aeronautical council; 
Convinced however of the need to sustain a European aircraft industry, but recognising that this 
calls for solidarity between participating industries and governments which are now omnipresent in elabo-
rating aeronautical policy ; 
Underlining that output for military purposes, which partly offsets a low level of civil production, 
involves a permanent risk since military orders depend largely on political factors, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Urge all member governments: 
I. To establish a long-term relationship between their national airframe industries- alternating design 
leadership - in order to promote families of aircraft based for example on the Airbus and aircraft equip-
ped with C]'M-56 engines ; 
2. To agree on a form of specialisation and rationalisation based on these types of medium-range aircraft ; 
3. To open discussions on a permanent relationship for the construction of military aircraft and heli-
copters; 
4. To examine the advisability or otherwise and the possibility of a concerted military aircraft export 
policy to countries considered acceptable by WEU member countries and to seek this concertation in the 
framework of the Standing Armaments Committee ; 
5. To seek a co-ordinated approach with a view to collaboration with American aircraft manufacturers 
on long-range civil aircraft. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1977 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary 
Session (11th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 755). 
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I. The Council recognise that the competitiveness of the European aircraft industry needs to be 
increased by long-term co-operation between European airframe manufacturers. They start from the 
assumption that the governments will do all they can to ensure that the on-going negotiations bet-
ween European airframe industries will soon produce a satisfactory result. 
Whilst appreciating the primary responsibility of the industry for organisation and programme 
implementation, the Council deem it important that within the framework of a common industrial 
organisational structure design leadership should, where possible, be delegated with due regard to the 
potential of all countries, without the introduction of strict rules. 
The Airbus has developed into a major programme of integration for long-term co-operation. 
The development within "Airbus Industria" of a commercially promising European aircraft family 
should be a priority objective, especially as more recent market trends also give rise to optimism. 
The Council would point out in this connection that, proceeding on the basis of the Airbus 
A-300, several countries are at present jointly defining the new B-10 project and preliminary studies 
are in progress for an aircraft with 130-160 seats which will have, initially, two CFM-56 engines. 
2. The Council share the view that new European civil aviation programmes cannot become com-
petitive without specialisation and rationalisation. 
Governments should support plans to be prepared by the industry for burden-sharing in the 
case of new programmes making allowance for economic requirements. 
3. The Council agree that there should be close and permanent consultation between the Euro-
pean states with a view to finding European solutions for the development of military aircraft and 
helicopters. Possibilities of co-operation in these fields are being intensively studied, both at govern-
ment level and within the framework of the independent European programme group, including co-
operation on a European helicopter. In this connection governments start from the assumption that 
there is adequate European demand for the independent development of helicopters and military air-
craft provided the states concerned can agree on types of aircraft and can commit themselves to 
purchases which would guarantee an adequate market for co-operative programmes. The Council are 
aware of the importance of these programmes to the aircraft and space industry in Europe and the 
strengthening of European competitiveness in relation to the United States of America. 
4. The EPG has set up a working group on armaments exports. Thus matters concerning a con-
certed military aircraft export policy will be studied by that group and there would appear to be 
no need to envisage a study of the same subject by the SAC. 
5. The Council are of the opinion that the establishment of long-term co-operation between the 
European aircraft industries should be combined with a co-ordinated approach vis-a-vis non-European 
manufacturers. 
European partnership for an extended Airbus programme does not rule out a dialogue with 
American manufacturers. Co-operation with these manufacturers could be envisaged in the long term, 
and the industry should therefore determine the category of aircraft which should have priority in 
the negotiations ; but, in order to offer potential American partners a counterbalance, Europe needs 
first of all consolidated co-operation among its own manufacturers. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th March 1978. 
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DOCUMENT 768 
Draft Recommendation 
on the political activities of the Council- reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
Gratified that in the presentation of its annual report for 1977 the Council has in many respects reverted 
to the practice it followed prior to 1976; 
Noting with satisfaction that the Council has met most of the commitments made on its behalf for 
improving its relations with the Assembly ; 
Regretting that there is still much ambiguity about the nature of the "informal meeting" with the 
General Affairs Committee in November 1977; 
Noting that in several respects the Council falls far short of giving the Assembly sufficient information 
on the political aspects of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty by member countries; 
Recalling that the Council's responsibilities are defined in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Examine regularly, at whatever level it may be meeting, the questions connected with the application 
of the modified Brussels Treaty by other organisations ; 
2. Provide more extensive information on consultations between member countries on matters relating 
to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
3. Organise a joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee during the second half of 1978; 
4. Improve participation by Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of member countries in plenary 
sessions of the Assembly. 
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on the appointment of members of the WEU Assembly 
The Assembly, 
Considering that Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty confers a. very heavy burden on parlia-
mentarians already exercising duties in their national parliaments ; 
Noting that the future election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage will lead parliaments 
of member countries to re-examine their participation in the European parliamentary assemblies ; 
Considering it desirable for the largest possible number of parliamentarians interested in defence 
matters to take part in the activities of the WEU Assembly ; 
Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty as a whole forms an irreplaceable basis for any European 
secmity and defence policy ; 
Considering it highly desirable for work to be shared out between the European parliamentary assem-
blies on the basis of the responsibilities conferred on them by treaty or by statute, 
REQuEsTs THE PREsiDENT oF THE AssEMBLY 
To ask the authorities concerned to ensure that in the future an appropriate number of parliament-
arians interested in defence matters can be appointed to the delegations of WEU member countries to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Treu, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. Your Rapporteur has been asked to deal 
with two quite separate questions : 
(i) the political activities of the WEU 
Council in 1977 and its relations with 
the Assembly ; 
(ii) the decision taken by the Committee on 
4th November to examine, in the present 
report, the appointment of members of 
the Assembly. 
2. It was seen at the meeting of the General 
Affairs Committee in Paris on 27th February 
1978 that it would be difficult to embrace both 
these matters in a single recommendation, parti-
cularly since the examination of the second 
question is liable to stretch beyond the June 1978 
session during which the Assembly has to reply 
to the Council's report on its activities in 1977. 
Consequently, your Rapporteur has separated the 
question of the Council's political activities from 
matters relating to the appointment of members 
of the Assembly. 
3. Where the annual report proper is concerned, 
your Rapporteur must first underline that 
although the Assembly finds it far from satis-
factory, it is a definite improvement on the 
report on the Council's activities in 1976 and 
meets fairly adequately a number of grievances 
expressed to the Council in this respect. 
CHAPTER I 
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL 
I. Relations between the Council and the 
Assembly 
1. Chapter I of the report 
4. Relations between the Council and the 
Assembly certainly improved considerably in 
1977 thanks to the Council's efforts to which 
tribute should be paid. There can be no doubt 
that the new Secretary-General, Mr. Longerstaey, 
was very largely responsible for this, but the 
governments should also be congratulated for 
having in several respects acceded to the requests 
made by the Assembly, inter alia at the joint 
meeting between the General Affairs Committee 
and the Council held in Bonn in November 1977. 
5. First and foremost, special mention should 
be made of the position adopted by the Council 
on an essential question, as set out in paragraph 
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3 of Chapter I A of the annual report, where 
the Council confirms that it considers the 
Assembly to be "the only parliamentary body 
concerned with both the security and unity of 
Europe" and "the only European assembly 
responsible for defence questions". In these words 
the Council in fact confirms the view constantly 
expressed by the Assembly that the Assembly of 
Western European Union is destined to handle 
the defence aspects of the European Community. 
This deserves particular emphasis in view of steps 
being taken by the European Parliament which 
tend to create ambiguity about the respective 
responsibilities of the European parliamentary 
assemblies in that its aim seems to be to extend 
its activities to fields which are clearly the 
responsibility of WEU. 
6. This responsibility is also confirmed by the 
Council in paragraph 2 of Chapter I B, which 
recalls that: 
"In their reply to Recommendation 299, the 
Council said that, when answering recom-
mendations, they would continue to take 
account of work in progress in other inter-
national organisations to which the member 
states of WEU belong and would ensure 
that the information given to the Assembly 
was as accurate as possible." 
Here too it is evident that the Council is formally 
acceding to a request frequently made by the 
Assembly. 
7. But the Council's concessions to the Assembly 
do not stop short with these two points. They 
also concern budgetary matters, as underlined 
in section C of Chapter I. They relate to the 
information given on the co-ordination of work 
between the IEPG and the SAC and their extent 
should therefore be emphasised. 
8. It should be added that in paragraph 4 of 
Chapter I A the Council indicates that it 
"appreciated the satisfaction expressed by the 
Assembly, at its June session, concerning replies 
of special interest to the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments and the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions". If your Rapporteur understands diplo-
matic language correctly, the Council thus 
recognises that it has noted the discontent voiced 
by the General Affairs Committee last year in 
its reply to the annual report and he hastens to 
add that the Council appears to have taken 
account of this discontent. 
9. The Council has a grievance to make in 
paragraph 2 of Chapter I A of the annual report. 
Referring to reports by Assembly Committees, 
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the Council says "they regret, however, that some 
of these reports were very late in arriving". This 
is a warning to the Assembly which seems 
perfectly justified in view of Article V (d) of the 
Charter of the Assembly, which specifies that : 
"The Clerk shall communicate the reports 
mentioned in paragraph (b) above, together 
with the necessary documentation relating 
to the detailed subjects with which they deal, 
to all representatives at least six weeks before 
the opening of the session at which they are 
to be considered." 
Since the Council receives Assembly reports at 
the same time as representatives, following the 
adoption of these reports by the Committees, the 
Council is entitled to complain that too many 
reports are late in being sent. In a few cases, this 
delay may be perfectly justified when current 
events force Committees to postpone considera-
tion of certain reports, and there may also be 
justification when political difficulties prevent 
reports being adopted on the date planned. But 
Assembly Committees should make a serious 
effort to conform to the Charter and adopt the 
reports they are to submit within the prescribed 
time limits. 
10. This said, it would be desirable for the 
Council, in drafting its report, not to go beyond 
its purview and freedom to express its opinion. 
When, referring to its meetings with the Presi-
dential Committee at the close of its ministerial 
meetings, the Council states that "this arrange-
ment has given satisfaction to both sides" it is 
clearly impinging upon the freedom of judgment 
of members of the Presidential Committee. Your 
Rapporteur can attest that some of them are far 
from sharing the views expressed by the Council. 
11. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to point out 
that although the Council appreciated the interest 
shown by the Assembly in speeches made by 
Ministers at its sessions, this appreciation should 
be shown in the more frequent presence of those 
members of governments most qualified to address 
the WEU Assembly. It is highly regrettable that 
the Assembly has not yet had an opportunity of 
hearing in plenary session either the present 
Ministers of Defence or the Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs of the Federal Republic, the United 
Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, or 
Italy. 
2. Joint meetings 
12. The joint meeting held in Bonn on 3rd 
November did little to clear up the ambiguities 
underlined by your Rapporteur in the reply to 
the annual report of the Council for 1976, nor 
did it meet the requirement for a real dialogue 
between the Council and the Assembly. The 
meeting was indeed an informal one, but even so 
the Committee's request that several Ministers be 
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present was not met : the only two participants 
of ministerial rank were Mrs. Hamm-Briicher, 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, and Mr. Tomlinson, Parlia-
mentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, of the United Kingdom. 
Mrs. Hamm-Briicher chaired the meeting with 
considerable understanding and authority, thanks 
to which the meeting was particularly pleasant 
and cordial. 
13. The situation was spoilt, however, by the 
fact that several countries were not represented 
by their Ambassadors in London, i.e. by those 
who normally attend meetings of the Permanent 
Council, since some of them had commitments in 
London on the date fixed for the joint meeting ; 
they were represented by lower-ranking officials, 
although Italy's Ambassador in Bonn attended. 
14. It is evident that the rank of these repre-
sentatives or the fact that they had never 
attended a meeting of the WEU Council did not 
prepare them for taking an active part in such 
a meeting. Moreover, it is to be feared from this 
composition of the Council that the governments, 
despite their soothing statements, will, in future, 
pay far less attention to the activities of WEU. 
15. Hence there is some doubt about the value 
of the replies given to the Committee by Mrs. 
Hamm-Briicher, who chaired the meeting in the 
name of the Council, or by those she asked to 
speak. It may in fact be wondered to what extent 
Mrs. Hamm-Briicher or Mr. van Well really 
replied on behalf of the Council. 
16. To the best of your Rapporteur's knowledge, 
Mr. van Well, Permanent Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic, had 
never attended a meeting of the WEU Council, 
yet it was he who replied most often and in most 
detail to the questions put by parliamentarians. 
Was he able to answer on behalf of the WEU 
Council or did his opinions represent only those 
of the German Government ? It is difficult to 
know but it may be wondered whether the views 
he advanced, on disarmament for instance, would 
have secured the unanimous assent of the Council 
and in particular whether the French Govern-
ment would have endorsed them. 
17. Referring to this meeting during the eighth 
sitting at the second part of the twenty-third 
session of the Assembly on 29th November 1977, 
Mrs. Hamm-Briicher merely spoke of an 
"informal meeting in Bonn", which seems to 
indicate that she was not quite clear whether 
it was a joint meeting with the Council or merely 
a meeting with the Government of the Federal 
Republic such as the General Affairs Committee 
has often held in the past with representatives 
of governments of all the member countries. 
Moreover, when referring to this meeting, the 
annual report uses the same particularly ambi-
guous words. 
18. If therefore the Federal Government is to 
be thanked and congratulated for the part it 
played in this informal meeting and for the inte-
, resting remarks made outside the framework of 
the meeting by Mr. Genscher, Federal Vice-
Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs, and 
by Mrs. Hamm-Briicher and Mr. van Well at the 
meeting itself, the Committee must ask the 
Council with particular emphasis to explain what 
it means by an informal meeting, i.e. how far the 
remarks made by the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council express the unanimous opinion of the 
WEU member countries. If this is not so it is 
impossible to speak of a joint meeting with the 
' Council since the latter, apart from the few cases 
specified in the modified Brussels Treaty, can 
only act unanimously. 
19. In any event, the Committee will be able 
to judge how far the Council feels bound by the 
remarks made at such a meeting by the manner 
in which the four promises made there in its name 
are carried into effect. These promises were : 
3 
(i) that joint meetings between the Council 
and the General Affairs Committee 
would be held annually (a promise 
made by Mrs. Hamm-Briicher herself) ; 
(ii) that the Assembly would be given 
detailed written information on the 
division of work on European arma-
ments co-operation between the Euro-
pean programme group and the 
Standing Armaments Committee - a 
promise made by Mr. Plantey, Assistant 
Secretary-General of WEU, Head of 
the International Secretariat of the 
SAC, at the joint meeting and con-
firmed by Mrs. Hamm-Briicher in her 
address to the Assembly on 29th Nov-
ember. The Council kept this promise 
in February 1978, for which it is to 
be thanked; 
(iii) that the Assembly would be allowed 
greater freedom to manage its budget, 
a promise which was repeated, though 
admittedly with some reservations, by 
Mrs. Hamm-Briicher on 29th November; 
(iv) that the utmost would be done to meet 
the Assembly's wishes by reverting to 
practice followed prior to the 1976 
report when preparing the Council's 
annual report (a promise made by 
Mr. Longerstaey, Secretary-General of 
WEU). This constituted the reply 
which the Council had not felt able to 
give in writing to the reply of the 
General Affairs Committee to the 
annual report for 1976. In fact, the 
1977 report largely meets this promise. 
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20. The Committee has been able to note that 
the Council has fulfilled at least some of these 
undertakings. But it would also be desirable for 
the General Affairs Committee to ask for a joint 
meeting to be held during the second half of 
1978. Such a meeting would allow the dialogue 
which the Chairman-in-Office of the Council had 
to interrupt prematurely in Bonn, for reasons 
quite unconnected with WEU, to be resumed, 
extended to include matters which could not be 
tackled last November, pursued further in regard 
to matters of more particular concern to WEU 
and its work and, finally, it would test the 
promise made by Mrs. Hamm-Briicher. The 
Chairman-in-Office will then probably be an 
Italian Minister, which would mean meeting in 
Rome. 
3. Questions put in national parliaments 
21. In his reply to the Council's report for 1976, 
your Rapporteur pointed out that the govern-
ments appeared to have agreed to adopt restric-
tive practices in replying to questions put in 
national parliaments on recommendations adopted 
by the WEU Assembly. In 1977, this spread to 
at least one other country, the United Kingdom. 
Conversely, the Italian Government appears to 
have continued replying correctly to questions 
put by Italian parliamentarians, and the French 
and Belgian Governments, which in 1976 were 
extremely reticent in their replies, proved far 
more co-operative in 1977. 
22. Replying to questions put by Mr. Reid on 
Recommendations 299, 301, 302, 304 and 305, 
Mr. Judd, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs 
of the United Kingdom and former member of 
the General Affairs Committee, gave the same 
reply to all the questions : 
"Recommendations of the Assembly of 
Western European Union are addressed to 
the Permanent Council who consider them 
and forward replies to the Assembly. A 
reply to the recommendation to which the 
hon. Gentleman refers will be put before the 
Assembly when it meets in Paris at the end 
of this month. The United Kingdom will 
have a shared responsibility for this reply 
and I am sorry therefore that I cannot make 
any advance statement." 
23. On the other hand, Mr. Vanden Boeynants, 
Belgian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defence, replying to a question put by Mr. De-
jardin on strategic mobility, Mr. Bourges, French 
Minister of Defence, replying to a question put 
by Mr. Debre on Recommendation 309, Mr. Lat-
tanzio, then Italian Minister of Defence, replying 
to a question put by your Rapporteur on Recom-
mendation 290, and Mr. Lattanzio, now Minister 
of Transport, replying to questions put by 
Mr. Minnocci on Recommendations 293 and 296, 
made no attempt to use the pretext that these 
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questions had been or were to be considered by 
the WEU Council but gave replies which were 
often clear, specific and detailed in their respec-
tive parliaments. 
24. The Council's reply to Recommendation 298 
could obviously not be considered at all satis-
factory by the .Assembly since it left the govern-
ments free to reply or not, according to the time 
or the case, to questions put to them by parlia-
mentarians in their own countries on matters 
relating to recommendations adopted by the WEU 
Assembly. 
25. One solution naturally comes to mind : quite 
simply to put the same questions with no specific 
reference to WEU Assembly recommendations. 
Your Rapporteur feels that no government would 
be able to decide which of the written questions 
put by their parliamentarians related to matters 
also raised in recommendations of the WEU 
Assembly. Your Rapporteur might therefore 
advise members of the Assembly to put their 
questions, simply omitting to refer to Assembly 
recommendations. 
26. However, there is no real justification for 
a government refusing to reply to a question on 
the pretext that it corresponds to a subject dealt 
with by the WEU Council when that government 
would reply to the same question in other cir-
cumstances. Your Rapporteur therefore asks the 
Council to revert to earlier practice and not insist 
on defending a position which he considers point-
less. The Council has no way of preventing 
parliamentarians putting any questions they wish 
to their governments. 
U. Activities of the Council 
27. The chapter of the report on the Council's 
political activities may be considered from two 
standpoints. From the formal standpoint, it shows 
that the Council is clearly anxious to meet the 
wishes expressed by the Committee last year, 
although basically no marked change can be 
discerned in its action. Thus, in its presentation 
the Council has in many respects reverted to 
practice followed before 1977 in accordance with 
the Committee's request and as promised by 
Mrs. Hamm-Briicher at the joint meeting with 
the General Affairs Committee. For instance, the 
number of meetings of the working group is again 
included in the report, together with several 
other details, of little importance in themselves 
but which as a whole allow the Council to give 
the Assembly an effective account of its work. 
28. There is also a definition of the .Assembly's 
responsibilities which seems satisfactory and 
contrasts with the definition of the Council's 
responsibilities set out in the annual report on 
the Council's activities in 1976. Your Rapporteur 
wishes to emphasise the importance of this defini-
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tion, which corresponds to the view which the 
Assembly has always held of its responsibilities. 
However, it must be recalled that Article IX of 
the Brussels Treaty, which embodies the 
Assembly's responsibilities, is meaningless without 
Article VIII which enacts the Council's respons-
ibilities. This means that its responsibilities and 
activities must remain parallel with those which 
it concedes to the Assembly. 
29. Yet the Council's report is far from adequate 
on matters relating to the application of the 
modified Brussels Treaty in organisations other 
than WEU which are quite obviously the most 
important and most numerous of all, and it is 
-necessary to recall the undertakings in this sense 
entered into on several occasions by the Council, _ 
which appear ,to be only very partially respected. • 
30. Thus, as usual the annual report for 1977 
devotes considerable space to East-West relations 
which are discussed at the Council's ministerial 
meetings. There is a list of bilateral contacts, as 
was the case until1976 but not in 1977. However, 
it would be desirable for the Council not merely 
to list its bilateral relations but to inform the 
Assembly of their content, insofar as this is not 
secret of course. Otherwise, what is the meaning 
of such a list ? That the Council has confined 
itself to noting intergovernmental East-West 
contacts, or that it has examined the matters 
dealt with during these contacts but has not 
bothered to inform the .Assembly about them Y 
31. Where multilateral relations are concerned, 
the information supplied by the Council on 
developments leading from the Helsinki con-
ference to the Belgrade conference demonstrates 
the concerns which are common to the WEU 
member countries and the measures they have 
taken in the framework of WEU or in other 
organisations to work out a joint policy in this 
field. This is in fact the only really interesting 
paragraph in the chapter on the Council's 
political activities. It might provide a model for 
drafting this whole chapter in future years. 
32. Note will also be taken of the paragraphs 
on WEU's relations with Greece, Turkey and 
Spain. While the General Affairs Committee took 
a favourable view of Greece and Turkey joining 
WEU, it must be noted that the Council still 
approaches this question in terms connected with 
the decision of 7th May 1955 which leaves the 
agreements or arrangements established in the 
framework of the SAC open to participation by 
non-member countries of WEU. One may wonder 
what is the significance of these words. Have 
Greece and Turkey shown no interest in acceding 
to the modified Brussels Treaty or does the 
Council not consider this possibility desirable ? 
It would be useful for the Assembly to know 
the Council's views on this matter and particu-
larly important at a time when relations between 
Greece on the one hand, Turkey on the other 
and the EEC are developing and when there is 
a likelihood of Greece acceding to the EEC in 
the near future. 
33. The Council is even more vague about rela-
tions with Spain. In this connection, it refers 
' only to "relations of WEU member countries 
with Spain", which it considers should be devel-
oped. Does this mean that Spain's attitude 
towards WEU is different from that of Greece 
and Turkey or that the Council's attitude towards 
Spain is not the same as towards Greece and 
Turkey 1 Why does it not even consider this 
country taking part in the agreements or arrange-
ments established in the framework of the SAC T 
In view of the magnitude of its industry and 
defence effort, Spain, henceforth resolutely 
turned towards democracy, would be a most 
important partner in a policy of European co-
operation in armaments matters. Your Rap-
porteur suggests that the Assembly turn its 
thoughts to this matter in coming months. 
34. Members of the Assembly will learn little 
from the section of the Council's annual report 
on the situation in the Middle East, but they 
will note that the Council did not think fit to 
reintroduce, in its report for 1977, the paragraph 
on relations with the United States which was a 
regular feature in previous reports. Here, the 
Council has failed to give the Assembly satisfac-
tion in its wish that it revert to former practice. 
35. From all these remarks it emerges that there 
has been a real improvement in the annual report, 
i.e. in the Council's presentation of its activities 
to the Assembly, but that this improvement does 
not reflect a real improvement in the Council's 
activities. It still seems that the Council takes 
refuge behind other organisations in order not 
to fulfil its obligations under Article VIII of 
the modified Brussels Treaty. The Council has 
often said that it was glad to see the Assembly 
play an active and dynamic role in its considera-
tion of all matters raised by the application of 
the modified Brussels Treaty. The Assembly for 
its part would wish the Council to act in like 
manner, not by encroaching upon the work of 
other organisations, but by examining, for each 
one of them, to what extent these activities con-
tribute to the application of the treaty. 
36. In fact, despite an evident desire to meet the 
Assembly's wishes, the Council's attitude con-
tinues to be a passive and routine one and it acts 
only insofar as the Assembly rouses it from its 
apathy. It may be wondered whether this reflects 
a deliberate decision by the governments. The 
very positive and encouraging remarks made by 
Mrs. Hamm-Briicher at the joint meeting in Bonn 
would imply that this is not so. Similarly, the 
attitude adopted by the new Secretary-General 
in relations between the Council and the Assembly 
and the initiatives he has taken give grounds for 
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believing that the Council's passiveness cannot 
be attributed to him either. 
37. Has not the Council rather been guided in 
this unfortunate direction by the Permanent 
Council and its members, who now form the WEU 
Council apart from the brief annual ministerial 
meeting Y It may be assumed that the govern-
ments expect those who represent them on the 
WEU Council to have a more active and positive 
concept of the treaty and of the role of the 
organisation. This at least is what might be 
inferred from remarks made by Ministers to 
Assembly bodies. 
38. Your Rapporteur can but emphasise what 
the Assembly has already proclaimed on many 
occasions, i.e. that all efforts to improve relations 
between the Council and the Assembly will be 
in vain if the Council is not determined, of its 
own accord, to tackle the application of the 
modified Brussels Treaty more dynamically than 
heretofore. 
CHAPTER 11 
APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS 
OF THE WEU ASSEMBLY 
39. According to Article IX of the modified 
Brussels Treaty: 
"The Council of Western European Union 
shall make an annual report on its activities 
and in particular concerning the control of 
armaments to an Assembly composed of 
representatives of the Brussels Treaty 
Powers .to the Consultative Assembly of the 
Council of Europe." 
40. For a long time parliamentarians have been 
aware that having the same delegation to the 
Consultative (now Parliamentary) Assembly of 
the Council of Europe and the WEU Assembly 
raised a number of difficulties, the main one 
being that parliamentarians who also have major 
commitments in their own countries have to take 
part in the work of two international assemblies 
which, in view of the number of sessions and 
committee meetings, means a considerable amount 
of travelling. 
41. Consequently, thought has often been given 
to two separate delegations being formed, one 
for each assembly. The wish has sometimes been 
expressed that the parliamentarians elected to the 
European Parliament by direct universal suf-
frage as from 1979 should constitute their 
countries' delegations to the WEU Assembly. 
42. It should be noted, however, that if at least 
part of the delegations to the European Parlia-
ment is to be elected from among members of 
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national parliaments, as many seem to wish, those 
who would thus have a dual mandate would 
already have very heavy commitments and it is 
hard to see how they could also be members of 
the WEU Assembly, whose responsibilities are so 
very different from those of the European Parlia-
ment. The situation might of course be different 
if the European Communities were at some time 
given defence responsibilities, but such a prospect 
seems unlikely in the near future. 
43. Further, in each of the WEU parliaments 
some members have specialised in the study of 
defence matters, but they are not always 
members of their country's delegation to the 
Council of Europe since the Parliamentary 
Assembly's responsibilities have absolutely 
nothing to do with defence matters. Moreover, 
since many of them are already members of the 
North Atlantic Assembly they have no reason 
to seek appointment to the Council of Europe. 
Hence, the WEU Assembly, which deals first 
and foremost with defence matters, is deprived 
of the participation of several who would be best 
able to make a useful contribution to its work. 
44. At its meeting on 4th November 1977, the 
General Affairs Committee, when considering 
Mr. Forni's report on WEU's contribution to the 
development of European union, decided to add 
the following paragraph to the draft recom-
mendation urging the Council to : 
"Give favourable consideration to the possi. 
bility of revising Article IX of the treaty 
so as to allow better participation by 
members of parliament in the work of the 
Assembly." 
45. During the plenary session, Mr. Forni sug-
gested to the Assembly that this paragraph be 
withdrawn, not because it did not meet his wishes 
but on the one hand because the explanatory 
memorandum which he had prepared did not 
refer to this matter which would be mentioned 
only in the recommendation, thus depriving it 
of much of its impact, and on the other hand 
because the Committee had agreed to ask a Rap-
porteur to study this matter for the June 1978 
session. The Assembly should not therefore vote 
on it until a substantive report had been sub-
mitted to it by the General Affairs Committee. 
46. For these reasons the Committee, at its 
meeting on 30th November 1977, instructed your 
Rapporteur to examine this matter. 
47. In point of fact, the paragraph hastily 
included by the Committee in the draft recom-
mendation in Mr. Forni's report raised difficult 
problems since it would imply a revision of the 
modified Brussels Treaty. The Assembly has 
always feared that the governments might apply 
the treaty insufficiently or not at all. Might the 
risk not be greater if it now asked for the treaty 
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to be revised which would, in any event, be a 
long-term undertaking? 
48. The governments for their part have on 
several occasions - most recently on 29th Nov-
ember 1977 in Mrs. Hamm-Briicher's address -
expressed their determination to maintain the 
commitments stemming from the modified 
Brussels Treaty. Although the treaty imposes 
considerable burdens or restrictions on the free-
dom of action of at least some of them, they all 
feel that the benefits which the WEU countries 
as a whole draw from it far surpass the burden 
of the responsibilities incumbent on each one. 
49. But the problems raised by the modified 
Brussels Treaty are considerable and it is to be 
feared that to open negotiations for its revision 
might bring out such differences between govern-
ments or even within certain member countries 
that the Assembly would be taking a great risk 
in adopting this proposal because each State 
would then be tempted to abandon a treaty and 
organisation from which the whole of Europe 
benefits, in pursuit of immediate and often 
vaguely-defined interests. Your Rapporteur 
therefore feels it far more realistic to consider 
how far it is possible to arrange the representa-
tion of the various countries to the Assembly 
on the basis of present regulations and without 
affecting the treaty. 
50. One possibility is offered by the vagueness 
of the texts, particularly as regards substitutes. 
Article 25 (c) of the Statute of the Council of 
Europe stipulates that : 
"Each representative may have a substitute 
who may, in the absence of the representa-
tive, sit, speak and vote in his place. The 
provisions of paragraph (a) above apply to 
the appointment of substitutes." 
[Paragraph (a) sets out the method of 
appointment of full representatives.] 
But .Auticle IX of the modified Brussels Treaty 
does not mention substitutes. There are thus two 
possible courses : 
51. (a) First, it might be arranged for substi-
tutes of the delegations to the Council of Europe 
to be appointed with a view to their serving as 
representatives to the WEU Assembly and, con-
versely, the representatives to the Council of 
Europe would serve as substitutes in the WEU 
Assembly. This resolution would be based on the 
idea that the word "representative" used in 
Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty is a 
global term covering all members of the delega-
tions of the signatories to the treaty to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe. This interpretation seems particularly 
justified since the Brussels Treaty makes abso-
lutely no mention of substitutes who are quite 
obviously assimilated to titular members. 
52. Moreover, Article 25 of the Statute of the 
Council of Europe, which is referred to indirectly 
in Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty 
since it defines the conditions for forming delega-
tions to the Parliamentary Assembly, clearly 
'states that the same provisions apply to repre-
sentatives proper and to substitutes. 
53. Moreover, this interpretation concords with 
regular practice in the Assembly which, except in 
cases specifically provided for in the Rules of 
Procedure, has always treated full members and 
substitutes in the same manner, particularly for 
the appointment of Rapporteurs, just as the 
national parliaments follow the same procedure 
for appointing their representations. It seems 
too difficult now to go back on practices which 
for more than twenty years have been generally 
accepted as being in conformity with the treaty. 
54. The question therefore would be how to 
achieve this result. The fact that each country 
has its own procedure for appointing its delega-
tion adds further complication, particularly as 
it is not for the .Assembly to interfere in matters 
which are the sole responsibility of national 
authorities. 
55. Your Rapporteur considers that the most 
reasonable step would be to draw the attention 
of member countries to the problem arising and 
to possible remedial measures. This should be 
done through the national delegations themselves 
since they are the natural and compulsory inter-
mediary between the Assembly and the national 
parliaments. The Assembly's Presidential Com-
mittee was aware of this since it decided that 
the General Affairs Committee's decisions on 
this subject should be discussed in the Committee 
on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and the 
Presidential Committee before the next session. 
Insofar as these suggestions imply no change in 
the Assembly's Rules of Procedure, it is perhaps 
not essential to consult the Committee on Rules 
of Procedure, but it is particularly important 
for the Presidential Committee to be consulted 
since it includes the Vice-Presidents of the 
Assembly from each of the delegations. In the 
circumstances, the Presidential Committee might 
eo-opt the Chairmen of Delegations who are not 
also Vice-Presidents of the Assembly in order to 
examine how the delegations could bring this 
question to the attention of those responsible for 
their appointment. Your Rapporteur believes that 
only if an approach by the delegations fails to 
achieve the expected result should more formal 
steps be envisaged. 
56. (b) Some members of the Assembly propose 
to interpret the two abovementioned texts -
from the modified Brussels Treaty and the 
Statute of the Council of Europe - as applying 
only to representatives in the strict sense of the 
term and consider that the question of substitutes 
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is left open. This would allow governments or 
parliaments to be asked to appoint different 
substitutes for the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe and for the WEU 
Assembly. 
57. Such a solution would have the advantage 
of allowing substitutes to be chosen from among 
parliamentarians having no other international 
commitments, thus enabling those who are parti-
cularly interested in the matters with which it 
deals to become members of the WEU Assembly. 
58. However, your Rapporteur must admit that 
he finds such an interpretation of Article IX 
of the Brussels Treaty and Article 25 of the 
Statute of the Council of Europe extremely 
tendentious since for him it is clear that these 
texts assimilate substitutes and representatives 
proper under the global term of representatives. 
He believes the Assembly would have nothing 
to gain by interpreting an article of the Brussels 
Treaty in such a way when it is always asking 
the Council to apply the treaty loyally. Finally, 
he does not believe that the parliaments of 
member countries would be prepared to separate 
the appointment of substitutes from that of 
titular representatives. 
59. Your Rapporteur therefore prefers the first 
proposal because he finds it the least questionable 
and closest to the letter and the spirit of the 
modified Brussels Treaty. 
* 
** 
60. At the meeting of the General Affairs Com-
mittee on 27th February 1978, there was a very 
lively and wide-ranging discussion on this 
chapter. Several Committee members felt that 
Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty should 
be revised without delay. They considered that 
the coming election of the European Parliament 
by universal suffrage would lead to vast changes 
in the composition of delegations to the various 
European parliamentary assemblies and would 
provide a particularly suitable opportunity for 
cutting the link between the WEU Assembly 
and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe. 
61. Some members even felt that it was with 
the deliberate intention of limiting the activities 
and responsibilities of WEU that the governments 
decided in 1954 that the Assembly should be com-
posed of representatives of member countries to 
the Council of Europe so that they would not be 
tempted to spend too much time supervising the 
application of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
62. However, the members of the General Affairs 
Committee who proposed taking steps to revise 
the modified Brussels Treaty were adamant about 
limiting a revision to Article IX and not allowing 
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other articles of the treaty to be called in ques-
tion. Some specified that they believed any step 
in this sense should depend on the seven member 
governments first being approached to ensure 
that they would all be prepared to subscribe to a 
revision strictly limited to Article IX. 
63. Finally, with a view to effectively organising 
co-operation between the European assemblies, 
certain <Committee members insisted that the 
WEU .Assembly for its part should ensure that 
it kept strictly to the study of matters relating 
to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty 
and not encroach on the responsibilities of other 
European assemblies. Such a limitation could but 
strengthen the positions of the .Assembly in view 
of the recently-expressed claims by other Euro-
pean assemblies to handle questions relating to 
European co-operation in defence matters which 
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are quite evidently the strict responsibility of 
the WEU .Assembly. 
64. Personally, your Rapporteur is prepared to 
subscribe to the latter position. But he fears that 
it might be hardly realistic and most dangerous · 
at the present juncture to refer publicly to a 
revision of the modified Brussels Treaty. Of the 
views of those in favour of such a revision he 
therefore included in the draft order which 
he proposed to the Committee only the proposal 
that more detailed enquiries be made among 
member governments to ensure that they would 
be prepared to consider a revision strictly limited 
to Article IX. If full guarantees could not be 
obtained, he considered it would be preferable to 
avoid taking any steps to revise the treaty. 
Finally, the Committee decided to remove any 
reference to a possible revision of the treaty. 
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Amendment No. 1 
Political activities of the Council -
Reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council 
and the future of the WEU Assembly 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Voogd 
Leave out the operative text of the draft order and insert : 
19th June 1978 
"To ask the authorities concerned to promote the appointment of an appropriate number of 
parliamentarians interested in defence matters to the delegations of WEU member countries 
to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. " 
Signed : V oogd 
1. See 5th Sitting, 21st Jnne 1978 (Amendment amended and agreed to). 
Document 768 
Amendment No. 2 
Political activities of the Council -
Reply to the ffDenty-third annual report of the Council 
and the future of the WEU Assembly 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Roper and others 
19th June 1978 
In the draft order proper, leave out "the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe" , 
and insert "its Assembly". 
Signed: Roper, Gessner, van den Bergh 
1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment withdrawn). 
72 
Document 769 28th February 1978 
Division of work between the Standing Armaments Committee 
and the independent European programme group 
NOTE FROM THE COUNCIL 
Letter from Mr. E. Longerstaey, Secretary-General of WEU, 
to Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel, President of the Assembly 
23rd February 1978 
Sir, 
The Council has instructed me to send you the enclosed note, prepared at its request by the 
Head of the International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee, on the division of 
work between the SAC and the independent European programme group. 
As you will recall, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council had agreed to have such a note 
prepared in reply to a request made at the meeting with the General Affairs Committee held in 
Bonn on 3rd November 1977. 
I have the honour to be, 
Sir, 
Your obedient Servant, 
(Signed) E. LONGERSTAEY 
Division of work between the Standing Armaments Committee 
and the independent European programme group 
In her address to the Assembly on 28th 
November 1977, the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council, referring to the joint meeting with the 
General Affairs Committee held in Bonn on 3rd 
November, stated that the Assembly would, as 
had been requested, be given details of the divi-
sion of work between the SAC and the IEPG 
for the studies of European co-operation in the 
armaments field. 
The Council circulate herewith a note on this 
subject. 
By a decision taken by the WEU Council 
of Ministers on 31st May 1976, the Standing 
Armaments Committee was instructed to prepare 
a detailed outline programme for a study of the 
situation in the armaments sector of industry in 
a· 
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the member countries, together with a description 
of a working method suitable for such a study. 
In complying with this instruction, the SAC 
took account of the fact that a body bringing 
together all the European members of the Atlantic 
Alliance had been set up in February 1976 for 
the purpose of harmonising their armaments pro-
grammes (the independent European programme 
group). Consequently, in its proposals, the SAC 
pointed out that the IEPG intended to start 
work forthwith, by drafting a definition of the 
armaments sector of industry. 
In the course of 1976, the IEPG set up a 
number of panels, each dealing with a specific 
subject. Panel Ill, under the chairmanship of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, is responsible for 
studying economic questions and procedures, with 
a view to working out guidelines for European 
co-operation in the field of armaments. This panel 
DOCUMENT 769 
has five sub-groups ; of these, No. 4, for which 
the pilot country is France, is to prepare a study 
on industrial co-operation and the rationalisation 
of the European defence industry, and will be 
able to use any available findings of studies now 
in progress in the SAC on the subject; and Sub-
Group 5, which is headed by Italy, is beginning 
by collecting details of legislation, regulations 
and agreements relating to the export of arma-
ments. 
On 20th April 1977, after considering the 
detailed outline programme submitted by the 
SAC, the Council decided to authorise the Com-
mittee to proceed with the proposed study, with 
the reminder that governments were anxious to 
avoid any overlapping with the work of other 
bodies, particularly the IEPG. The Council there-
fore requested that the SAC should be kept suffi-
ciently closely informed of progress of the work 
of the IEPG. These decisions were confirmed by 
the WEU Council of Ministers at their meeting 
in Strasbourg on 26th April. 
In accordance with the principles so laid 
down for sharing the work between the two 
bodies, the SAC adopted a flexible and prag-
matic approach, taking particular care to co-
ordinate with Sub-Group 4 of Panel Ill of the 
IEPG. It was mainly this concern which led to 
modification of the programme and method 
originally worked out. 
As a first stage, the SAC received from the 
IEPG a draft definition of armaments and the 
industrial sector which produces them. In order 
to make the list of equipments annexed to the 
document easier to use, the SAC made a few 
changes to the layout, which were incorporated 
in the final text by the IEPG. Thus, the two 
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bodies are now working on the basis of a com-
mon definition. 
Noting subsequently that the IEPG had 
begun work on an economic survey of the 
armaments industries, the SAC decided to study 
the legal status of firms and domestic legislation 
as the next step in implementing its mandate. 
This study does not figure in the IEPG's plans, 
but could be of interest to it. This part of the 
final report is now being prepared. 
With regard to the compilation of economic 
data, the SAC has decided to wait until the data 
produced by the questionnaire prepared by the 
IEPG for circulation to national industries are 
available, so that there will be no overlapping or 
omissions in current or planned activities. How-
ever, in order to minimise the delay resulting 
from this decision, the Committee is beginning at 
once to study this questionnaire in relation to its 
duties under its own mandate. 
Thanks to information received from the 
Federal Republic of Germany and from France 
as pilot countries, the SAC remains in contact 
with Panel Ill of the IEPG and in particular 
with its Sub-Group 4. Furthermore, the reports 
adopted by the Committee are sent to the Chair-
man of the IEPG for information. In this way, 
the method and programme of work of the SAC 
ensure efficient liaison and work-sharing between 
the two bodies, which are kept regularly 
informed of the progress of each other's studies, 
on the understanding that the IEPG has priority 
in carrying out its own mandate. 
Each of the governments of the member 
countries of WEU is, moreover, in a position to 
ensure that the work and results of all bodies 
on which they are represented do not conflict 
with each other. 
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China and European security 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur 
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1. Adopted in Committee by 14 votes to 0 with 
3 abstentions. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mrs. von Bothmer 
(Chairman) ; Sir John Bodgers, Mr. Sarti (Vice-
Chairmen) ; MM . ..J.bens, Ariosto, Beith (Alternate : 
Page), Sir Frederi,c Bennett, MM. Berrier, Bizet, 
Brugnon, Cermolacce, Faulds, Gessner, Gonella, Hanin 
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(Alternate : Van ..J.al), Mrs. van den Heuvel-de-Blank 
(Alternate : Voogd), MM. Mangelschots (Alternate : Van 
Watersohoot), Mende, Minnocei, Mommersteeg, MUller, 
Peridier, Perin, Portheine, Beddemann, Segre, Urwin. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on China and European security 
The Assembly, 
Noting China's continuing determination to safeguard its own security and ensure respect for its 
fully independent nationhood and its frontiers ; 
Considering that total resistance to external aggression from any source is a fundamental element 
in Chinese political thinking as it is in Western Europe ; 
Noting that the Chinese Government continues to express the wish to develop good relations with 
Europe, particularly in economic matters ; 
Considering that China is now a significant factor in the maintenance of global peace and security, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Examine attentively the role China may play in regard to European and global security and study 
carefully the views expressed by the Chinese Government on matters relating to threats to international 
peace; 
2. Encourage member governments both to develop their bilateral trade relations with China and 
continue to concert their approach especially within the framework of the EEC with a view to increasing 
trade between Europe and China ; 
3. Favourably consider China's requests for increased industrial technology. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. Supposedly every country's basic attitudes in 
foreign policy are derived to a considerable 
extent from history and not just from prag-
matism in regard to the current realities of any 
particular era. This is particularly true in the 
case of China, partly because of its centuries-
long seclusion from the rest of the world arising 
from its geographical position and its natural 
topographical barriers that have so long cut it 
off from the main stream of developments in 
other parts of the world where no similar 
obstacles to access exist. 
2. It was for this reason that Napoleon Bona-
parte was reported to have said, when looking at 
the globe for fresh fields to conquer, "Ah, China 
- she is a sleeping giant - let her sleep ; for 
when she wakes she will shake the world". 
3. Fortunately or unfortunately, according to 
one's point of view, no one heeded his warning 
and the nineteenth century witnessed the pillage 
and exploitation of the sleeping giant from many 
quarters and in many different forms. For their 
part the western powers concentrated their ener-
gies not to any extent on direct colonisation 
through annexation, but rather by obtaining 
through duress privileged commercial positions 
and economic dominance along China's eastern 
seaboard. Technically, of course, Hong Kong 
and Macao are exceptions to this generalisation ; 
but even these two territorial acquisitions were 
not really in pursuit of land, but to ensure privi-
leged access to the hinterland for trading pur-
poses. 
4. France, of course, through its South-East 
Asian conquests cut across a Chinese historic 
concept of a special sphere of interest in that 
part of the world. Britain too in its delineation of 
India's northern frontier with Tibet, also 
regarded by China as part of its natural domain, 
caused resentment in Peking which has never 
fully abated : but is now vented on India, not 
Britain. 
5. But it was of course along China's north 
and west frontiers that the only substantial direct 
annexation of huge areas of traditional Chinese 
suzerainty occurred at the hands of Tsarist 
Russia. The first example of such aggression, as 
seen through Chinese eyes, occurred in the seven-
teenth century, when tens of thousands of square 
miles of desolate Siberia, hitherto regarded by 
the Chinese as forming part of their empire, were 
transferred to Russia, as laid down in the 1689 
Treaty of Nerchinsk. 
6. After that there was a long period of calm 
before the storms to come until in the nineteenth 
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century one act after another of further aggres-
sion and annexation took place, each one accepted 
reluctantly de facto by a crumbling Chinese 
dynasty powerless to call a halt, in the Treaties 
of Aigun, Tientsin, Peking and Livadia. All of 
these are still referred to now by Chinese as 
"unequal", to use their terminology - and hence 
invalid. Not unnaturally China's entry onto the 
world stage at that time, marked as it was chiefly 
by acts of exploitation or expropriation by 
foreign powers, led to a historic sense of seclu-
sion from the rest of the world gradually chang-
ing into a frenetic but understandable xenophobia 
-a dislike of all foreigners. When Japan joined 
in the despoliation of the enfeebled empire, the 
sense of outrage by a people proud of the fact 
that they were civilised when most of the rest 
of the world was barbarian became even more 
marked, added to by feelings of frustration at 
their inability to resist materially stronger and 
better organised external forces, albeit often 
culturally inferior to themselves. 
7. Fortunately for the West the Chinese -
when redress is made - are a forgiving people 
and the exodus from South-East Asia firstly of 
France and later of the United States, the 
departure of the British from direct involvement 
in Indian affairs and the Japanese expulsion 
from Manchuria led to a general xenophobia, still 
apparent during the cultural revolution, soon 
waning in favour of a wary readiness to develop 
ties on a basis of real equality, later developing 
into growing cordiality with those countries, 
irrespective of ideological differences, with whom 
no conflict of interest exists. Even Hong Kong 
and Macao do not obstruct this trend since China 
is well aware firstly that the present form of 
government of these two enclaves presents no 
threat to it in any way ; secondly, if and when 
it no longer suits its interest to accept their 
presence, their status can be altered almost at 
will. 
8. In the case of the United States, American 
support of Taiwan remains of course a constant 
irritant but the Chinese are not only forgiving 
but are also very patient, and are well aware that 
it can only be a question of time before some 
accommodation is reached between the two 
Chinas with the mainland obviously emerging as 
the dominant factor in any such accommodation. 
9. However, there is one great power, the 
USSR, where no attempt has been made by the 
Kremlin to erase deep and enduring resentment 
at what is still regarded at all ages and levels 
in China as continuing, unacceptable occupation 
of large parts of the old Chinese Empire. 
10. These feelings were just as strong at the 
time of as before the first republican government 
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of China under Sun Yat-sen ; as they were under 
Chiang Kai-shek and the nationalists ; and as 
they are today under a communist government. 
11. This fact is one that has to be faced and 
accepted as real by anyone who seeks to under-
stand, let alone explain China's attitude towards 
its powerful neighbour, dominating both its 
northern and western flanks. When Mao Tse-tung 
first came to power he had no alternative other 
than temporarily to appear to abandon historic 
claims because he himself and his government, 
disliked by and estranged from the western 
world, had no other help on which to rely other 
than his ideologically affiliated neighbour ; but 
this period of friendship, enforced by then una-
voidable realities, was soon eroded because China 
was not prepared to become just another Russian 
satellite as the Kremlin wished, along similar 
lines to Russia's enslaved East European neigh-
bours. It was then that the Kremlin made its 
biggest mistake in thinking that cutting off 
supplies of technical, material help at a critical 
time in China's determination to become an indus-
trialised nation in its own right would soon 
bring Peking to heel, especially because the 
Soviet rulers felt that the ties of a common ideo-
logy would prove stronger than national pride. 
Instead, as more subtle men would probably have 
realised, the opposite proved to be the case : and 
feelings of subdued, historic hostility about the 
past combined with a new sense of resentment 
about being let down by their then one and only 
ally. In the result, suspicion about the USSR's 
whole global strategy became an overriding 
feature in all Chinese thinking about interna-
tional affairs. 
12. So, as the Soviet Union has, irrespective of 
its reLationship with China, continued to show 
more and more its imperialist intentions through-
out the whole world - at least in Chinese eyes 
- these flames have been fanned ; and their 
sense of insecurity has increased as Peking has 
gained an impression that, temporarily at least, 
the western world including even the United 
States has lost the will to resist Russia's expan-
sionist aims. Under these circumstances China 
is determined at all costs to look after itself 
rather than rely on anyone else. It is for this 
reason that, within the limit of its resources, 
wherever a new exampLe of Russian expansionism 
occurs, Peking tries to put a spanner in the 
works, irrespective of what the reaction of other 
powers may be. 
CHAPTER I 
Relations between China and 
the western powers 
13. Two factors are constantly intertwined in 
Peking's relations with the outside world : a 
national aspiration which aims at restoring China 
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on the same lines as before the nineteenth century 
"unequal peace treaties" and an ideological factor 
according to which countries with communist 
regimes should help to "free" nations with non-
communist regimes. As long as the colonial 
system prevailed in Asia, China, with these two 
aims in parallel, gave priority to the fight against 
the West. Subsequently, relations between com-
munist China and the United States and Western 
European countries were influenced on the one 
hand by the general trend in eastern Asia, parti-
cularly decolonisation, and on the other hand 
by the deterioration of relations between China 
and the Soviet Union. Whereas 1949 witnessed 
the start of a period of co-operation between the 
two great communist countries and ideological 
wars were still being fought in IndQ-China and 
Malaysia, soon to be followed by Korea, relations 
between communist China and the West were 
then practically non-existent. 
(i) 1949 to 1968 
14. While the Eastern European countries 
immediately recognised the new regime set up 
in China, in Western Europe the United King-
dom did so on 6th January 1950, followed by 
the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and 
Switzerland. But the United States and other 
Atlantic Pact countries were discouraged from 
following their example by a number of attitudes 
adopted and actions taken contrary to the normal 
pattern of friendly relations between countries 
even of differing political outlooks, and of course, 
too, sympathy still felt for Chiang Kai-shek in 
the United States had its impact in Washington. 
15. Relations between China and the West 
further deteriorated with the Korean war. Infor-
mation now available indicates that the attack 
on 25th June 1950 which triggered off the 
Korean war was made on the sole initiative of 
the North Korean G<lvernment. The defeat of 
the North Koreans appears to have surprised the 
Chinese, who first hesitated about intervening, 
probably with thoughts in mind that the war 
might spread to their own territory, that their 
industry, which was still concentrated in Manchu-
ria, might be dislocated if not destroyed, and that 
civil war might even break out again, spreading 
from Taiwan with American support. 
16. Nevertheless, China had reason to fear thai 
a permanent American and Japanese base might 
be set up on its north-eastern frontiers. To have 
done nothing might have demonstrated the weak-
ness of the new regime and thus allowed the 
Soviet Union to gain a dominating position in 
eastern Asia since it alone might then have acted 
to save North Korea. 
17. A solution was found: a Chinese military 
intervention involving the government as little 
as possible through the use of "volunteers", China 
at the same time indicating that its sole aim 
was to revert to the situation prior to 25th June 
1950. The first Chinese troops entered Korea on 
16th October, and on 23rd June 1951 the Soviet 
Union proposed holding armistice negotiations 
. which continued until 27th July 1953. 
18. The Korean war was a milestone for China 
since, for the first time since the "unequal peace 
treaties", it showed its might outside its frontiers 
and held the world's leading military power at 
bay and even, through the fiction of a "United 
Nations", the whole world. 
19. Nevertheless, this war interrupted a trend 
which would almost inevitably have brought 
Formosa back under Chinese domination because 
it caused an international security system to be 
set up in the Western Pacific with the conclusion 
of a peace treaty and a security pact between the 
United States and .Japan on 8th September 1951. 
This resulted in the United States opposing all 
Chinese moves, guaranteeing the security of 
Formosa and also becoming involved in Vietnam, 
while at the same time preventing China from 
becoming a member of the United Nations until 
1971. 
20. The Geneva conference on Korea was termi-
nated on 15th June 1954 without having brought 
about either the withdrawal of foreign forces or 
the country's reunification. 
21. Yet, at the Geneva conference on Vietnam 
being held at the same time, China played a 
positive role in the re-establishment of peace. 
Peking appears to have feared the international-
isation of the Indo-Chinese war through American 
intervention in the area and the possibility of a 
number of new Asian states rallying to the 
western side. Indeed, the United States' policy of 
encouraging the formation of national states and 
seeking bilateral alliances or regional security 
pacts with such states meant that an anti-com-
munist, anti-Chinese system might develop south 
of China which would form an effective barrier 
to revolutionary expansion for a long time to 
come. 
22. The most striking Chinese diplomatic success 
was at the Bandung conference (18th-24th April 
1955), where it was the only large power taking 
part. Chou En-lai embarked on a course of poli-
tical neutrality and called for Asian solidarity 
against colonialism, the nuclear bomb and the 
United States. 
23. However, since there were a number of 
bilateral problems between China and the United 
States, relations were established between the 
two countries through the intermediary of their 
respective ambassadors in ·w arsaw, starting on 
1st August 1955. The ambassadors met seventy-
three times in 1955, 1956 and 1957, but these 
talks never reached a higher level because of a 
continuing disagreement about Taiwan. China 
refused to comply with the United States' request 
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that it undertake not to resort to force in 
exchange for the withdrawal of United States' 
guarantees for Taiwan, insisting that the return 
of Taiwan is a domestic problem which could 
be settled only between the two Chinese parties 
and refusing to discuss the matter with an out-
side power. 
(ii) 1968 to 1968 
24. As from 1958, China's main aim appears to 
have been further to isolate the United States 
as a reactionary, imperialist, capitalist super-
power, while Japan, Western Europe and Canada 
were considered to represent progressive capi-
talist countries. Discontent in Latin America and 
even the problem of coloured people in the 
United States were used as means of fighting 
the United States. But after 1963 disputes with 
the Soviet Union became more bitter and soon 
the two great powers were placed on an equal 
footing in terms of the distrust voiced by Peking. 
25. The crisis in August 1958 caused by the 
bombing of the Quemoy and Matsu islands by 
communist forces provoked a warning by the 
United States and a Soviet intervention, prob-
ably to induce China to halt all military action. 
For the first time, Soviet-American collusion 
appeared in opposition to China. Hence at that 
time Mao Tse-tung denounced the paper tigers 
of imperialism and reaction, simultaneously con-
demning the Soviet Union for yielding to imperi-
alism, devoid of real strength. 
26. On 19th January 1960 the United States 
signed a military alliance treaty with Japan, 
leading to new accusations of arming Japan 
against China, denunciations of United States' 
nuclear tests and above all of a "two-China plot", 
aimed at considering Taiwan as a state in its 
own right. 
27. China's attitude towards the Western Euro-
pean countries was more ambiguous since on the 
one hand it wished to discredit their system of 
government, their allegedly excessive dependence 
on the United States, their colonial past, and 
any signs of a neo-colonial presence ; but on the 
other hand it did not wish to see a Russian-
dominB~ted Western Europe. 
28. France remained an enemy as long as the 
Indo-Chinese war lasted, but the trend of French 
policy under General de Gaulle from 1962 
onwards led, on 27th January 1964, to the 
announcement that diplomatic relations were 
being established between the two countries. The 
establishment of relations with France appeared 
to be and was a remarkable success for China 
but it did create an element of misunderstanding 
in the Atlantic world since the United States 
was opposed to it. In fact, the political positions 
of France and China were then very close on a 
number of points : refusal to sign a non-proli-
feration treaty, boycott of the Geneva talks on 
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the limitation of nuclear weapons, and, above all, 
common mistrust of twofold Soviet-.American 
hegemony, which they rejected in the name of 
national independence. 
29. Where West Germany was concerned, China 
initially denounced its rearmament. The German 
Government for its part refrained from taking 
any steps towards establishing diplomatic rela-
tions but considerably developed its trade with 
communist China. 
(iii) 1968 to 1972 
30. After the twentieth congress of the Soviet 
Communist Party China's main fear continued 
to be the "twofold hegemony" of Soviet-.American 
imperialist collusion. As long as the Vietnam 
war lasted, it considered danger from the United 
States as of first importance. However, during 
the summer of 1969 it became apparent that the 
United States had decided to withdraw its forces 
from South-East Asia. President Nixon's state-
ments on 26th July and 3rd November 1969 
showed his intention to restore Vietnam to the 
situation prevailing immediately after the 1954 
agreements. This implied a consequential cut in 
Soviet military assistance to Hanoi and, it was 
expected, a corresponding reduction of political 
influence, so China could envisage becoming the 
only great power entitled through history and 
geography to influence Indo-Chinese affairs. 
31. President Nixon's new policy allowed discus-
sion of Sino-American differences to be started, 
particularly through the resumption of talks 
between ambassadors in Warsaw. Naturally, the 
ups and downs of the United States' policy of 
disengagement in Laos, Cambodia and Thailand 
led to further minor crises in its relations with 
China, but it steadily multiplied its gestures of 
goodwill towards China, including removal of 
trade restrictions and authorisation for American 
citizens to visit China. On 25th February 1971, 
President Nixon's message on the state of the 
union gave a prominent place to relations with 
China. Contacts with China, he said, should be 
extended, obstacles separating it from the United 
States abolished, and account taken of its legiti-
mate national interests. 
32. China's main desire was, and is, to prevent 
new spheres of influence being established in 
eastern Asia without its own participation. Chou 
En-lai therefore took advantage of the visit of 
a team of American table tennis players on 14th 
April1971 to announce : 
"A new page has been turned; a new chapter 
has been started in relations between our 
two peoples ; your presence opens the door 
to exchanges of friendly visits between the 
two countries." 
33. On 23rd April, Mr. Rogers, Secretary of 
State, said he hoped that this really was a new 
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chapter in relations between the two countries, 
and the United States lifted the embargo on 
certain strategic products. On 15th July, Presi-
dent Nixon announced on American television 
that he would visit China before May 1972 and 
revealed that Mr. Kissinger had just spent two 
days in Peking. 
34. The essential obstacle to agreement was and 
remains the American "two-China theory", which 
held up all negotiations on China's membership 
of the United Nations; but in October there 
was a large enough majority in the General 
Assembly for China to take the place so far 
occupied by Taiwan. Once China became a mem-
ber, it found itself on the same side as the 
United States on a number of matters, parti-
cularly in regard to Indo-Pakistani disputes. 
35. President Nixon visited China from 21st to 
28th February 1972. The joint communique, 
while noting the existence of major differences 
between the two countries' foreign policies, recog-
nised the principle of the political unity of China, 
of which Taiwan formed a part, and wished a 
peaceful settlement to be found to the Taiwan 
question by the Chinese themselves. China thus 
achieved one of the essential aims of its policy 
by obtaining recognition as a great power - the 
great power - in eastern Asia. 
36. Meanwhile, better relations between China 
and Western Europe were also developing, inter-
rupted, albeit only temporarily, by the cultural 
revolution, especially in regard to Hong Kong, 
the effects of which continued until the begin-
ning of 1968, with strikes, local attacks and fron-
tier incidents. The inevitable result was sharp 
Sino-British tensions in August 1967. 
37. There have since been differences of 
emphasis in the growing closeness of ties with 
West European countries, but certainly com-
munist China now adopts a consistently favour-
able attitude towards the European Community, 
to which it has accredited an ambassador. It con-
siders the Community has a role to play in the 
potential resistance of European states to the 
Soviet Union. Similarly, for the same reasons it 
has shown increasingly strong and positive inter-
est in NATO and all Europe's efforts at co-opera-
tion in defence matters. 
(f11) 1972 to 1977 
38. Thus better relations between China and 
the United States and Europe began to develop 
long before the death of Chou En-lai and Mao 
Tse-tung and the change of administration in 
the United States. This process started when 
both sides realised that the Soviet Union was 
their only serious, aggressive, potential enemy. 
39. Hence, while China and the United States 
have always retained some degree of caution 
towards each other, they have drawn considerably 
closer due to their mutual distrust of the Soviet 
Union; and the same considerations apply to 
Sino-European relations. 
40. From a political standpoint, China noted 
that as the United States abandoned Vietnam 
the Soviet Union sought to increase its pressure 
in Asia, either directly against China or, through 
an intermediary power, in Bangla-Desh or the 
Indo-Chinese peninsula. The United States reci-
procated by seeking to strengthen China's role 
in the world. 
41. From an economic standpoint, China appears 
to have reached a turning-point in about 1970. 
It still needs to build up production in certain 
industrial sectors (metallurgy, petrochemicals, 
electronics and aircraft among others) and effec-
tive external assistance would be most useful, 
allowing it to advance more quickly. Further-
more, its agricultural development seems to have 
reached a limit which cannot be easily exceeded 
without bringing in fertilisers and agricultural 
machinery from abroad. Hence China has sought 
and managed to increase its external trade to 
a point where it has improved faster than the 
gross national product. This is due inter alia to 
the Chinese Government applying a more flexible 
credit policy. In short, China has a demand for 
more sophisticated capital equipment in greater 
quantities. 
42. From a military standpoint, China's problem 
has been to develop its defence capability with-
out relying on procurement from the Soviet 
Union, which hitherto has been its only supplier. 
It therefore had to obtain more advanced equip-
ment from the Americans and their allies, urging 
them to produce in China some of the equip-
ment ordered so as to give China the necessary 
technical capability for modernising both its 
domestic industrial capacity and the equipment 
for its armed forces. 
43. The question facing the United States has 
been how far it is worth strengthening a power 
which ultimately might become a threat. The 
negligible progress in detente and in the arms 
negotiations between the Soviet Union and the 
United States appears to have made the United 
States Government opt in favour of strengthen-
ing China. 
44. Nevertheless, anxious in the cause of detente 
to avoid appearing, in isolation, too unfriendly 
towards the Soviet Union, the United States has 
begun also to encourage its allies to develop trade 
relations with China in the military field, which 
it had hitherto opposed. The first such step was 
the $200 million contract concluded between the 
People's Republic of China and Rolls-Royce for 
the British firm to fit out obsolescent Chinese 
air force MiG aircraft with jet engines similar 
to those equipping the British version of the 
Phantom F-4. The contract provided for the 
subsequent manufacture of these jet engines in 
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China, thus allowing China a means of develop-
ing a modern aircraft engine industry. The 
United States could have opposed this contract, 
but wisely did not do so. 
45. France has sold helicopters to China and 
there have been talks between French and 
Chinese military headquarters with a view to 
the purchase of Mirage aircraft and AMX-30 
tanks. China has also held negotiations with 
Japan for the purclm.se of military aircraft. 
Prospects have recently arisen of sales of British-
built warships and the British Government has 
just announced its readiness and willingness to 
sell to China Harrier vertical take-off combat 
aircraft. 
46. The new emphasis given to modernising and 
re-equipping its vast armed forces, so vast in 
human terms, seems bound to lead to a signifi-
cant increase in co-operation to that end between 
China and the West, and there are continuing 
indications that this process is under way. 
47. Such deals and prospective deals with the 
United States' allies have furthered Chinese as 
well as American interests. They have allowed 
Chinese leaders to avoid being accused of reliance 
only on the United States and thus further 
irritating the Soviet Union. For their part Amer-
icans may have seen these developments as a 
means of bringing pressure towards the attain-
ment of a real detente to bear on the Soviet 
Union, especially so since in 1976 China announ-
ced that it wished to procure a number of 
weapons available only in the United States, e.g. 
anti-submarine warfare equipment, sophisticated 
anti-tank weapons and, above all, very large-
capacity computers. 
48. There is still a question-mark in Washington 
whether priority should be given to detente with 
the Soviet Union or on the contrary to keeping 
China outside the influence of the Soviet Union, 
by supporting the former's resistance to becoming 
part of a Russian-dominated hegemony. 
Obviously, recent political changes in China have 
encouraged the American authorities to streng-
then the authority of the new Chinese leaders 
in any way open to them. 
49. The United States National Security Coun-
cil's decision to approve the sale of two Cyber 
172 computers to China appears to have been 
a decisive step in this direction. It was taken less 
than a week after the arrest of leaders of the 
"Gang of Four" and three days after a private 
meeting in New York between Mr. Kissinger 
and Chiao Kuan-hua, Chinese Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. 
50. It is impossible to be more precise about the 
relationship between the trend in China in 1977 
and its policy towards :western countries, except 
to assert that there is every indication that since 
the communist regime was established in China 
there has been a steady evolution in relations bet-
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ween China and the West which, although at first 
hampered by the Korean war and the decoloni-
sation struggles and then by the Vietnam war, 
has increasingly estranged China from its Soviet 
partner. 
51. Nowadays, the latter appears, at least for 
the foreseeable future, to be its main potential 
enemy, indeed its only one since the United 
States is no longer thought even to have the 
national will to pursue an offensive imperialist 
role. Moreover, the USSR's increasingly blatant 
intervention directly or indirectly through the 
use of the Cuban mercenaries, especially in 
Africa, has forced the Americans and their Euro-
pean allies to reassess detente and appreciate the 
role that China, without weakening or abandon-
ing its ideological stance, can play in preventing 
detente being exploited in the service of Russian 
"social-imperialist" expansionism. 
CHAPTER II 
China and its eastern neighbours 
(excluding the USSR) 
(i) Japan 
52. Immediately after the oommtmists assumed 
power in China, Japan was considered a major 
potential enemy. As time showed that Japan was 
not seeking to become a great military power 
again, its economic progress, always faster than 
that of communist China, in turn was seen as 
another chaLlenge because it showed that com-
munism did not offer the only practical solution 
to Asia's overall economic development problems. 
China has continued to encourage neutrality in 
Japan, including the denouncement of the estab-
lishment of American bases in Japan, particu-
larly nuc1ear ones. Similarly, all forms of rappro-
chement between Japan and South Korea, for 
instance the Japanese-South Korean basic treaty 
of 22nd June 1965, have been denounced. 
53. On the other hand, China has always paid 
close attention to its relations with North Korea 
since the treaty of alliance of 11th July 1961. 
54. Despite continuing suspicion of Japan, the 
latter has become an important trade partner for 
communist China. The first trade agreement 
dates back to 5th March 1958, but trade relations 
between the two countries have developed mainly 
since 1962 and there is every indication that 
China needs this trade for its own deveLopment. 
Two-way visits have increased in recent years 
and, provided Japan continues to renounce the 
idea of regaining a foothold on mainland Asia, 
China is prepared to accept it as a most import-
ant trade partner, and even to take advantage 
of its capacity to help it to develop its defence 
potential. 
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(il) China and Indo-China 
55. China's policy in the Indo-Chinese peninsula 
has been shaped by the suCC€S'Sive wars in this 
area. From the outset, China supported 
nationalist and anti-colonialist movements, such 
as the Vietmi.nh and the Malaysian guerriil.las. 
However, in 1954 China started to take effective 
steps to promote the SI1CC€8S of the Geneva 
conference on Vietnam. In the years when United 
States' influence had replaced that of France in 
South Vietnam, China, at the same time as 
France, supported neutral movements, particu-
larly in Laos. 
56. In 1958, to counter North Vietnamese 
infiltration in Laos, the United States threw its 
weight behind a right-win:g guvernment in that 
country, which led China to Slllppol"t North 
Vietnam and the Pruthet Lao. The more the 
Americans became involved in fighting in ludo-
China, the more China granted assistance to 
those who resisted the United States and its 
allies, egged on by its fear of the Americans 
establishing a permanent presence on the Indo-
Chinese peninsula. 
57. However, the Chinese Government was 
careful to avoid direct involvement in the Indo-
Chinese war d~pite the many infringements of 
its sovereignty committed by the Americans 
during that war. Ultima.tely the withdmwal of 
the Americans from Indo-China was accompanied 
by reconciLiation between the United States and 
China on the one hand and by tension in -rela-
tions between China and Vietnam on the other. 
58. Similar motives governed relations between 
China an.d Cambodia. China, together with 
France, gave maximum support to K:ing 
Norodom Sihanouk's neutralist government 
whose downfall may be attributed to South 
Vietnamese intervention, encouraged by the 
Americans, as a result of which the Cambodia 
communists came to power. The King then took 
refuge in China. 
59. Only after his return to Cambodia did China 
draw cLoser to the Cambodian communists because 
they appearred better able to handle the 
Vietnamese. Chirna's coolness to a reunified 
Vietnam, as an ally of the Soviet Union, is 
therefore the reaBOn why it has been supporting 
the Cambodian Government in frontier clashes 
with its neighbours. 
(iii) China and India 
60. India was the first non-communist country 
to establish friend.lw relations with communist 
China, ambassadors having been exchanged in 
1950. In 1951, Mr. Nehru's government conceded 
China's pre-eminence in Tibet. 
61. While India and China were olliginally on 
the same side at Bandung, there were already 
signs of some rivalry between the two countries 
which both sought new and strengthened con-
nections in the third world. This rivalry became 
more clearly defined when China implemented 
its historic authority in Tibet in 1956, and the 
Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959. 
62. Since then, and following on a series of other 
incidents causing tension between the two 
countries, Chinese-Indian relations have con-
tinued to be marred by suspicion and China 
has drawn closer to P1akistan and India to the 
Soviet Union. In 1963, China concluded an 
agreement with Pakistan whereby China 
obtained the Himalayan territories which it had 
claimed. In 1965, China, short of military 
involvement, supported Pakistan in its war 
against India. 
63. Very recently, especiallly since the change of 
government i.n Delhi, of less pro-Russian 
inclinations, there have boon welcome signs of a 
mutual desire for rapprochement. 
CHAPTER Ill 
History of Sino-Soviet relations 
(i) Territorial problems 
64. During the nineteenth century, Russian 
expansion in Asia raised the problem of sharing 
central and eastern Asia between Russia and 
China. 
65. Central Asia was mainly inhabited by 
nomadic tribes of various ethnic origins : Turks, 
Mongols, Buriats, etc., over which Chin:a claimed 
suoorainty but with little de facto control. 
Russian expansionism, which continued through-
out the nineteenth century, led Tsarist Russia 
to try to have China acknowLedge Russian 
sovereign rights over the regions it in fact 
occupied. This occupation was gradually accom-
panied by the set1JLement of Russians, particularly 
peasants, in central and eastern Asia, then by 
the foundation and development of a number of 
towns, and finally, at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, by the building of the trans-
Siberian railway. 
66. The fiTSt significant territorial demarcation 
at China's expense (after the earlier Russian 
territorial gains embodied in the Treaty of 
Nerchinsk in 1689) between. Siberia and China 
was effected under duress in 1858 under the 
Aigun Treaty. The lands then lost correspond to 
the boundaries of the territories now being 
claimed back by China. But as early as in 1860 
these encroachments were extended by Russia, 
which additionally took over Vladivostok 
("Master of the East"). The subsequent Peking 
Treaty recognised Russian sovereignty over the 
Siberian Far East. Russian advances continued 
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and in 1881 the Ill Treaty recognised Russian 
sovereignty over Kazakhstan. However, China 
never ratified this treaty and even today stiU 
regards it as an illegally-occupied territory. 
67. Russian expansion continued until 1905, 
with settlements in Manchuria, Korea, Port 
Arthur and the island of Sakhalin. The Russo-
Japanese war of 1905 brought this to an end, 
forcing the Russians to leave Manchuria and 
abandon Port Arthur and part of Sakhalin. The 
total area of territories occupied by Russia si.nce 
the Aigun Treaty is 2.5 million sq.km., a very 
large area but in sparsely-populated regions. 
Even the 1917 revolution did not put an end 
to Russian expansion since Outer Mongolia 
progressively became a Soviet protectorate. It 
still covers 500,000 sq.km. 
68. Initially the Chinese Communist Party 
depended too closely on the Soviet Union to be 
able to call openly for the return of all or any 
of the territoriAls thus annexed in turn by Tsarist 
Russia and later by the Soviet Union. In 1939, 
Moo Tse-tung drew up a list of territories taken 
away from China by imperialists, but without 
referring to territories occupied by the Russians. 
Only in 1954 did a history textbook written for 
Chinese schoo1-child~ include a map showing 
"territories snatched away from China by 
imperialists between 1848 and 1919". This map 
showed quite clearly that the major part of the 
niineteen provinces lost by China had been 
occupied by the Soviet Union. 
69. For all these reasons, it may be thought 
that the frontier incidents between China and 
the Soviet Union which have occurred since then 
are merely intended to record the fact that China 
refuses to recognise Russia's annexations. The 
Soviets seem well aware that in the result China's 
claims are levelled at what in fact amounts to 
a considerable part of Soviet territory today, as 
defined by the Kremlin. 
(ii) Relations between the Russian and Chinese 
Communist Parties 
70. Marxism originated in highly-industrialised 
countries of Western Ellil"'pe and the revolution 
it envisages is an assumptiom. of power by the 
working dass. Soviet leaders, since Lenin, have 
always thought that revolution could start only 
in independent, industrialised countries. But by 
1910 communist parties were emerging in many 
wholly or partially colonised countries, including 
China. They assimilated the struggle against 
colonialism with the struggle against capitalism 
and thought they colrld achieve national inde-
pendence and proletarian revolution at one and 
the same time. 
71. In 1924, at the congress of communist 
parties of colonial and semi-colonial countries in 
Baku, Soviet doctrine in respect of the prospec11! 
of revolution in th69e countries was laid down. 
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This oongress declared that proLetarian revolu-
tion should break out in industrialised countries 
but that the communist parties of the colonial 
or semi-colonial countries oou1d contribute to 
world revolution not by taking power but by 
fight:iJng colonial imperialism so as to weaken 
capitalism. Since then, the Soviet Union has 
constantly assisted nationalist parties in colonial 
countries and encouraged commnnist parties to 
ally themselves with such parties. This was 
particularly the ca.se in China where the 
Kuomintang was considered the nationw1ist party 
which must be helped first and foremost. The 
Chinese Communist Party was happy to play 
this game in the days of Sun Y wt-sen but the 
coming to power of Chlang Kai-shek changed its 
attitude. As from 1926, it opposed the Kuomin-
tang and it was the Soviet Union that impelled 
it to continue to c<H>perate with Chi!ang Kai-
shek and thus gave Chiang the possibility of 
liquidating the core of the then Chinese com-
munist movement in a most brutal mwnner. 
72. Mter 1930, under the influence of Mao Tse-
tung, the Chinese Communist Party in its own 
right again assumed considerabLe importance, but 
this time in rural areas, and showed far greater 
independence of the Soviet Union, which stopped 
controlling it through Komintern representatives. 
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union still intervened 
in Chinese internal affa.irs on many occasions, 
particulal'lly during the Sirun incident in 1936. 
Mao Tse-tu.ng then managed to take Chiang Kai-
shek prisoner but he was freed, thanks to Soviet 
pre!lml'e. 
73. Right up to the end of the second world 
war, at least as much Soviet assistance was 
afforded to the Kuomintang as to the commulllist 
party. And, contrary to what certain western 
observers claimed at the time, it was virtually 
witthout external support that the communist 
pal'lty first took power in China in 1949. At that 
time, Mao Tse-tung appears even to have 
hesimted between the Soviet and American 
"models of democracy". For the very least, he 
sought to reliy on the Americans in the hope of 
thus limiting Soviet influence m the Far East 
and it was the short-sighted refusal of Am.eriC8Jil 
political leadership to co-operate with the 
Chinese Communist Party that compelled it to 
turn exclusively to the Soviet Undon. 
74. In the result, and for several years (1949-57), 
Soviet assistance was very generous and it made 
a major contribution to China's economic 
developmenJt. However, the price of this assist-
ance was high : 
( i) the Chinese had to soft-pedal, if not 
to seem to abandon, their territorial 
claims in mainland Asia ; 
( ii) the Chinese had to accept Soviet 
domination over their economy and the 
presence of large numbers of Soviet 
technicians ; 
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( iii) the Chinese had to bow to Soviet policy 
on several occasions, pal'lticularly dur-
ing the Korean war ; 
( iv) the Chinese had to follow the "Soviet 
model!" of so-called socialist democracy, 
or Russian revisionism as it is now 
scathingly referred to in Peking. 
75. Stalin's personal prestige and Mao Tse-
tung's position of dependence made the latter 
accept these conditions of continuing economic 
aid until 1953. The first signs of Chinese 
dissatisfaction and consequent conrrontation 
emel1ged in 1954, as indicated by : 
(a) the publication of a new school textbook 
in 1954 containing the map of historic 
Russian encroachments ; 
(b) the claim to a Chinese model of 
socialism, and economic expansion 
accompanied by the assertion that China 
would quickly catch up with the Soviet 
Union (this was mainly in the hundred 
flower era, when Mao attempted a 
degree of ideological liberalism, and the 
great •Leap forward era in support of 
these claims ·to catch up with Soviet 
economic strength) ; 
(c) China's ever--clearer opposition to the 
direction taken by Russian and world 
communism under Khrushchev. 
Although the 1954 treaty was designed to 
strengthen Sovret MSistance to China, which 
supported the Soviet Union in the Hungarian 
affair (1956) and in the struggle against Tito 
(1958), Sino-Soviet relations subsequently deteri-
orated rapidly. 
76. In 1960 the Russians responded to Chinese 
criticism of their policies by withdrawing their 
technicians (some 1,400) and terminating their 
economic aid, which probably in the long run 
left China with more economic independence 
than irt could quickly or easily sustain. 
(iii) The stages of the conflict 
77. The Chinese appear to consider that these 
tensions had their origin in the twentieth con-
gress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956 
when Leninist Russia of Stalin's days came into 
opposition with revisionist Russia of Khrush-
chev's days. In fact, it is quire clear that the 
origins go back much further. China's ideological 
grievances against the twentieth congress are 
essentially as follows: 
(a) The proclamation of "peaceful coexistence". 
Whereas Khrushchev's principaL aim seems to 
have been to consolidate Soviet gains and avert 
the risk of a world war, the Chinese considered 
that the status quo was extremely unfavourable 
to them and had little fear of a world war at 
a time when the "massive retaliation" doctrine 
meant that only the Soviet Union could be the 
target of such retaJJ:ation. The bombing of the 
Quemoy and Matsu is1aiDJds in August 1958 seems 
to have been intendoo to demonstra,te that China 
did not accept the status quo and therefore 
refused peaceful coexistence. 
(b) The "peaceful movement towa,rds socialism" 
doctrine was condemned, particularly by Lin 
Piao in September 1965. Soviet doctrine was 
based on an interpretation of Marxism which 
stressed economic determinism. H meant that 
when the right economic condi&nB for revolu-
tion had been reached revolution booame 
inevitable, but it could not succeed if these 
conditions did not exist. As opposed to this 
doctrine, the Chinese followed a doctrine of 
voluntarism. which was more in conformity with 
Leninist trllidition. This volunmrism was based 
on the very history of the Chinese Communist 
Party and the methods of war which ilt had 
developed. They used the example of the Vietnam 
wa,r as an argument for showing that a small 
country could win the day agruinst the largest 
powers and that the will to win was more 
important than the material conditions of the 
struggle. 
(c) The condemnation of "Stalinism" was 
accepted by the Chinese and put into effoot in 
1956 during the hundred flower 0ampaign, but 
as from 1957 this gave way to a series of so-
caRed "rectification" campaigns directed against 
"revisionism" inspired by the bourgeoisie, which 
just would not die. This implied that 
Khrushchev, a revisionist, was an :instrument of 
the international bourgeoisie, which explained 
all the acts of treason towards the communist 
cause of which he was aililegedly guilty. 
78. But while ideological factors played an 
imporltant part in the split between China and 
the Soviet Union, a series of territorial affaks 
considerably aggravated their differences, as 
high-lighted during the Sino-Indian war in 
November 1962. This was caused by India 
building roads in territories claimed by China in 
the Himalayas. During the fighting, Khrushchev 
clearly showed his preference for India, to which 
he provided assistance. The Soviets then seem 
to have elected to play the roLe of defenders of 
underdeveloped countries rather than endorsre a 
policy of territorial cllaims by China which they 
well knew could in due course, and probably 
would, also be directed against them. 
79. Accusations of treason were reciprocal, 
illlustrnted by the Vietnam war during which 
China was able to take -advantage of its geogra-
phical pOSiition to allow or seriously hinder, 
depending on the case, Soviet assistance to North 
Vietnam. Moreover, Vietnamese resistance was 
brandished as proof of the value of Chinese 
thoori.es on revolutionary warfare. 
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80. More directly, in Ma,rch 1969, fighting broke 
out over ownership of the island of Damansky, 
an uninhabited island on the middle reaches o.f 
the Ussuri River. Soviet and Chinese versions 
are so contradictory that it is difficult to make 
an outside objective appraisal of how the prob-
lems originated. On 15th Ma,rch, there was a 
second atmck, oortain1y this time by the Soviet 
Union. No estimate can be made of losses 
sustained by either side but there were certainly 
severall hundred killed, and Soviet and Chinese 
propaganda refertred to atrocities committed by 
the other side, indicating particularly bitter 
fighting. The Soviet Union proposed resuming 
the negotiations on frontiers which had been 
interrupted since 1964, but China insisted on 
overall negotiations covering all Sino-Soviet 
frontiers, to which Moscow did not agree. 
81. In August 1971, the Soviet Union signed 
an allilianee with India, which allowed the Latter 
to declare war on Pakistan. China felt threatened 
by the Soviet-Indi·an treaty and afforded assist-
ance to Pakistan. However, it was unable to take 
part in the fighting because the Soviet Union 
had massed la,rge forces in Sinkiang, ·effectively 
inhibiting any Chinese military counter-moves. 
82. It was after this war that China adopted 
the "superpower" doctrine according to which 
interests common to the Sowet Union and the 
United States were greater than the interest 
which the Soviet Union might have in world 
revolution. This theory, which placed the Soviet 
Union and the United States on the same plane, 
was soon interpreted in realpolitik as a primarily 
alliti-Soviet doctrine. These were the circum-
stances in which President Nixon was received 
in China from 21st to 29th February 1972, and 
the joint statement stressed the interest of the 
United States and China in preventing any 
growth in the Soviet area of influence in Asia 
or the Pacific area. 
83. Consequently, the deterioration in Sino-
Soviet relations now seems to have reached a 
point where China considers the Soviet Union as 
its main potential enemy and is actually 
encouraging western capitalist countries to 
organise the most effective defence possible 
against future ·aggression by the worLd's most 
powerful "imperialists", i.e. the Soviet Union, 
which Peking believes will begin in W astern 
Europe, expecting the Kremlin only to launch 
further expansionism in the east when the 
former is crushed or, at least, "Finlandised", to 
the exclusion of American support. 
CHAPTER IV 
The deployment of Soviet and Chinese forces 
in central Asia 
84. According to the Military Balance 1977-78, 
published by the Institute for Strategic Studies, 
which gives information covering 1976, the Soviet 
DOCUMENT 770 
Union has total armed forces of 3,675,000 men, 
of which 1,825,000 in the army. They are 
divided into 45 tank divisions, 115 motor rifle 
divisions and 8 airborne divisions. Of these, 
43 divisions are deployed a1ong the Sino-Soviet 
border, including 3 in Mongolia. About one-third 
of these divisions are almost BJt fuhl strength and 
most of the others at over 50 % strength. 
85. The Soviet Union has 31 divisions i.n Central 
Europe and 64 in European USSR. Where tank 
divisions are concerned, 5 are believed to be 
deployed on the Sino-Soviet border, 14 in Central 
Europe and 20 in European USSR. 
86. These figures give more details about and 
confirm General Haig's statement that for every 
two divisions deployed in the west there is 
believed to be one in the east. 
87. The Soviet Pacific fleet includes 70 sub-
marines, of whieh about 30 are nuclear-propelled, 
and 60 major surface combat ships. Its northern 
fleet includes 110 submarines, of which 54 
nuclear-propelled, and 50 major surface combat 
ships ; its Baltic fleet 35 submarines and 50 major 
surface combat ships ; and its Black Sea fleet 
20 submarines and 60 major surface combat 
ships. 
88. Account must be taken of the fact that the 
Soviet Pacific fleet is not deployed only with a 
view to a possible clillSh with China but may 
also take part in various naval operations against 
a .lJarge number of possible enemies. 
89. As regards the air force, the Soviet Union 
is believed to have about 4,600 combat aircraft, 
not including strategic nuclear forces, the air 
defence force or the naval air force. These ·air-
craft are grouped in 16 tactical air armies, o.f 
which 4 (with 1,700 aircraft) appear to be 
deployed in Central Europe and 1 in each of the 
12 military distl'licts of Soviet territory. 
90. It is impossible to determine against which 
potential enemy Soviet nucloo.r forces are 
deployed since even miso:rlles located on Soviet 
eastern territory can be aimed at the territory 
of the United States or its allies. 
91. China has 3,950,000 men in its regular 
forces, of which 3,250,000 in the army. These 
are divided into 12 armoured divisions, 121 
infantry divisions, 3 airborne divisions, 40 
artillery divisions and 15 engineer divisions. 
92. China is divided into 11 mHitary regions 
in turn divided i:nto some 30 districts. Divisions 
are grouped into some 40 armies, generally of 
3 infantry divisions, 3 armoured regiments and 
3 artillery regiments. A large part of these forces 
(55 divisions) are believed to be deployed in 
north and north-east China, 20 in the north 
and north-west, 28 in the east and south-east, 
15 in central China and 18 in the west and 
south-west, which means that the northern 
region, where Soviet pressure is strongest, is also 
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the best prepared by the Chinese Government to 
defend itself. 
93. The navy is wholly deployed in the Pacific 
Ocean, with about 200 vessels in the north, the 
same number to the south and about 500 to the 
east. The air force has about 5,200 combat air-
craft whose tasks appear ~ntially defensive. 
94. Finally, China has a pubhlc security force 
and a civilian militia, which has about 7 million 
men organised into about 75 divisions, plus 
several million men in other branches of the 
militia, some of whom are unarmed. 
95. No review of the two countries' defence 
posture would be comprehensive without mention 
of China's enormous devotion of resources 
(including a very substantial voluntary element 
in the l'abour force) .to building a vast nationwide 
network of anti-nuclear underground shelters in 
a11 heavily-populated areas. 
Conclusions 
96. The lessons of history, a profound national 
pride and a widely-held conviction that their 
adoption of the commundst ideology has brought 
coherence and a sense of purpose back again to 
a fragmented former empire, have all combined 
to give a sense of .assurance to the present 
Chinese Government as to the correctness of their 
analysis of the world situation which, whether 
one agrees with them or not, is refreshing in this 
day and age when so many other countries and 
peoples across the globe are beset with doubts 
about how best to obtain material progress for 
their peoples and to safeguard their security 
from extema1 aggression. 
97. It is not difficult to summarise China's 
aims. There is a need to provide the best possible 
opportunity for it to deveLop its long-neglected 
capability to emerge as a great industrial power 
without losing the strength that comes from its 
ability to feed its own people, without recourse 
to foreign aid. This should lead to the achieve-
ment of an overall standard of living for its 
people, comparable with conditions in other parts 
of the woJ'Ikl. with a success story to tell. To 
this end a maximum period of peace is essential 
in which to develop its strength to a level where 
it need never fear aggression again, such as has 
ravaged it in the paBt, from any source. The 
Chinese believe that the only present threats to 
such a peace derive from the rivalry of the two 
superpowers - the United States and the USSR. 
These two they are convinced at some future 
date must resort to a global contest or the abject 
surrender of one or the other. This is a struggle 
from which they wish to be able to stand aloof 
if thll!t should then be in their own best interests. 
Conversely they are anxious lest the conflicting 
interests of the two superpowers should lead 
them both in order, ·even temporarily to delay 
an open confrontation between themselves, to 
JOin together in agreeing to more specific 
divisions of spheres of interest than exist at 
present, to the peril of other powers medium 
and great including, at this stage, themselves. 
98. With this thought in mind it is not sur-
prising to find open, indeed enthusiastic, support 
for the concept of a united Europe powerful 
enough to defend its€!lf against the Soviet Union 
even without American assistance. 
99. Similarly, both by their own efforts and 
the development of good relations with other 
eastern countries on their borders, e.g. notably 
Japan and Pakistan, to be able to deter a Russian 
attack on themselves felt to be likely to take place 
only after Western Europe has been crushed, 
when the USSR need then no longer fear the 
same fate that ultimately brought down Hitler 
- a war on two fronts. In interpreting Chinese 
thinking on how to thwart Soviet intentions it 
would be wrong to assume that their leaders do 
not regard the United States as also ·an 
expansionist, imperiaJ.rist power even though its 
expansionism takes a different form. However, 
as regards the near and immedilllte future, it is 
felt that whereas the United States possesses the 
material strength to wage ·an aggressive war, its 
people for the foreseeable future have lost the 
will to do so ; and hence, in China's ldst of 
priorities of dangers to be faced, any American 
threat to them seems remote. 
lOO. Indeed one immediate, outstanding impres-
sion is the obvious sincerity of Peking's belief 
that a third world war, if there is to be one, 
will: be best delayed by the continuing presence 
of American military power to support Western 
European forces, together with the maintenance 
of a full updated nuclear capability. 
101. lt is not only at NATO headquarters that 
the belief exists in Russia's ability and rellidiness 
to launch a sudden wa.r in Europe using conven-
tional weapons if only the Kreinlin could first 
be certain this would not escalate into a mutullil,ly-
destructive nuclear confli0t. 
102. Moreover "detente" as it is deemed the 
Russians interpret it, is as harshly criticised in 
Peking as being just another way of spelling 
appeasement as it is in the most conservative 
circles in the West. The fact that your Rappor-
teur shares this evaluation does not detract from 
the accuracy of this analysis of Chinese thinking, 
as any visitor to Peking wouLd speedily find out 
within twenty-four hours of his a.rrival. 
103. This does not mean tha.t the Chinese rulers 
of today have any less faith in communism as 
the best form of government for their country 
than their predecessors, aLthough since the 
departure of the "Gang of Four" from the 
political scene there is a greater appreciation 
that an ideology, however excellent in itself, 
provides no viable alternative also to maintaining 
an increasing production, ru·ral and industrial, 
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for domestic purposes but above all to increase 
their security. 
104. Indeed far from turning against communism 
as a consequence of their dispute with the USSR, 
it is the conviction of .the Chinese that Russia 
has abandoned the true communist faith in 
favour of "socirul imperialism" that is a major 
bone of contention. Thus those who believe that 
sooner or later the two countries are bound to 
get together in renewed amity because of a 
common politicaJ, faith are wholly misguided. 
105. One other 88pect of Chinese policy deserves 
cl.arification : that of thei·r own infiltra.tion intfl 
various parts of the world thousands of miles 
from their borders which could at first sight be 
facilely interpreted as imperialism along the 
same lines as the Kremlin pursues. In fact 
whether it be in Africa or elsewhere abroad, 
Peking claims - and your Rapporteur believes 
their assertion - that everything that China does 
in this context is primarily in pursuit of the 
same overall central policy-thinking, nameLy to 
prevent its presently more powerful neighbour 
the USSR from extending its hegemony to the 
future prejudice of China's own national security. 
With no loss of revolutionary fervour, with no 
slackening in their belief tha.t true communism 
prowdes the best answer to mankind's problems 
there is therefore, nevertheless, a readiness to 
accept an identity of interest with a.ll the western 
powers and third world countries in thwarting 
Russian "soci~l imperialism". The fact that this 
identity of interestB arises simply and soleLy from 
China's determiootion to look after its own 
security makes it ahl the more convincing. 
106. With a similar sense of realpolitik and with 
no weakening in our determination to support 
and advocate our own free democratic way of life 
as the best for all mankind and to promote respect 
for human rights throughout the world, Western 
Europe in general, and WEU in particular, 
should respond favourably to the growing oppor-
tunities to co-operate with China in increasing the 
latter's defence capacity, realising that with no 
counter-balancing dangers to our own security, 
but quite the contrary, the overall deterrent 
against any Soviet military opportunism can only 
be reinforced. 
107. Surveying the European scene after the 
final fahl of Napoleon and searching to establish 
a new durabJe security system, Prince Metternich 
with his usual perspicacity adapted the old 
French proverb "Les amis de mes amis sont mes 
amis" to read "The enemies of my enemies are 
my friends". 
108. Although today's politici·ans, rather than 
statesmen, are all too often unduly influenced 
by ideologicaJ. prejudices at the expense of the 
natiooo:l interest and that of western sooiety as 
a whole, yet the former Austrian foreign 
minister's adage surely has as much validity in 
the twentieth as it did in the nineteenth century. 
DOCUMENT 770 
APPENDIX 
1. Extension of the Ch 'ing Empire in 1759 
l"'oho,- S I 8 E R I A 
.. 
VeniMysk 
. ....... },:::;;, Tomak 
Punjab 
RAJ PUT ANA 
Mandha 
Fecleretion 
Barar 
Hyderabed 
maximum extension of the Ch'ing Empire 
boundaries of dependent and associated territories 
present frontiers of the People's Repubhc of China 
boundaries of the area temporarily annexed 1n the eighteenth century 
88 
... ~ 
APPENDIX 
.~::!Do 
\fl. 
•• 
• 
APPENDIX DOCUMENT 770 
2. Foreign concessioRB in China 
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3. Sino-Russian frontiers 
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Amendment No. 1 
China and European security 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett 
13th June 1978 
I. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out the third and fourth paragraphs and 
insert: 
"Welcoming and reciprocating the Chinese Government's continuing efforts to develop good 
relations with Europe ; 
Considering that China is now a significant factor in the maintenance of peace and security, 
not only in the context of Europe, but also in Asia and Africa,". 
2. In the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 4 as follows: 
"4. Consider objectively, in accord with already-declared British policy, any requests by 
China to purchase defence equipment." 
Signed : Bennett 
1. See 4th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment withdrawn). 
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Amendment No. 2 
China and European security 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett 
19th June 1978 
In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out the third paragraph and insert: 
"Welcoming and reciprocating the Chinese Government's continuing efforts to develop good 
relations with Europe ; ". 
Signed: Bennet 
1. See 4th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment No. 3 
ChiruJ and European security 
AMENDMENT No. 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Handlos and Mr. Page 
In the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 4 as follows: 
19th June 1978 
"4. Consider objectively, in accord with already-declared British and French policy, any 
requests by China to purchase defence equipment." 
Signed: Handlos, Page 
I. See 4th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment negatived). 
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Amendment No. 4 
China and European security 
AMENDMENT No. 4 1 
tabled by Mr. Rubbi and others 
20th June 1978 
I. In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "determination" 
add ", shared by all the peoples of the world,". 
2. Leave out the second paragraph of the preamble. 
3. In paragraph I of the draft recommendation proper, delete from "and study carefully" to the 
end of the paragraph. 
Signed: Rubbi, Oalamandrei, Bernini, Antoni 
1. See 4th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment negatived). 
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Draft Recommendation 
on international terrorism 
The Assembly, 
Considering the use of terrorist methods by anarchist, nationalist, regionalist or other organisations 
to be a challenge to the practice of democracy by Western European countries and liable to jeopardise 
their security ; 
Considering that the growth of modern technology makes the more industrialised countries particularly 
vulnerable to terrorist organisations; 
Noting that the framework of terrorist action has widened beyond national frontiers; 
Considering therefore that terrorism constitutes a problem which can be tackled only in an 
international framework, as the Council of Europe did in preparing a European convention covering the 
matters within its competence; 
Deploring the fact that certain sovereign states have on a number of occasions granted passive 
and even sometimes active assistance to terrorist operations ; 
Noting that these movements have become particularly active since 1970, compelling some govern-
ments of member countries to make large-scale increases in their internal defence and police forces; 
Noting that the modified Brussels Treaty gives the Council specific responsibility with regard to 
the fight against terrorism ; 
Welcoming the fact that the Council, in 1970 and subsequent years, took the initiative of exercising 
its responsibilities with regard to the fight against piracy in the air and the protection of diplomats, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNOIL 
1. Promote the ratification by the member states of WEU of the convention on terrorism drawn up 
by the Council of Europe and already signed by the member governments; 
2. Examine, when approving the tables submitted by member countries on their internal defence and 
police forces, the reasons justifying variations in these tables ; 
3. Seek thereby to co-ordinate the conditions in which such forces may be used to combat terrorism ; 
4. Set up for this purpose a group to co-ordinate anti-terrorist action, on the lines of Interpol; 
5. Encourage political consultations between its members towards finding international solutions to 
problems liable to provoke terrorist activities ; 
6. Study the means by which Western Europe can effectively dissuade any state from granting assistance 
to terrorists through asylum or otherwise ; 
7. Ask member governments to demonstrate their solidarity towards terrorist threats by applying 
strictly all agreed measures; 
8. Report to the Assembly by appropriate means on the measures it has taken to meet the challenge 
of international terrorism. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Muller, Rapporteur) 
I. The problem of the Assembly of 
WEU's competence 
1. At its meeting on 27th February 1978, the 
General Affairs Committee raised the question 
of the Assembly's competence and wondered to 
what extent the subject of the present report 
came within the scope of its responsibilities. 
2. It is true that other organisations and par-
liamentary assemblies, particularly the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 
have done a considerable amount of work on this 
subject. It was the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe and not the WEU Council 
which worked out an anti-terrorist convention 
now in the process of being ratified by most 
WEU member countries. 
3. It should first be clearly borne in mind that 
the responsibilities assigned to the Assembly in 
the modified Brussels Treaty are of a general 
nature. Furthermore, Article III, which specifies 
that "the high contracting parties will make 
every effort in common to lead their peoples 
towards a better understanding of the principles 
which form the basis of their common civilisa-
tion ... ", Article VIII, paragraph 1, which defines 
the prerogatives of the WEU Council based on 
the will of its members "to [strengthen] peace 
and security", and the preamble, which calls on 
member countries "to fortify and preserve the 
principles of democracy, personal freedom and 
political liberty, the constitutional traditions and 
the rule of law, which are their common heritage" 
make it perfectly clear that the question of 
international terrorism may be raised in the 
framework of the Assembly. 
4. Admittedly, from the very beginning of 
WEU the member countries decided to entrust 
NATO with the exercise of the Council's external 
security responsibilities and it is NATO that 
communicates tables to the Council showing levels 
of forces and armaments assigned for joint 
defence, except for France, whose tables have 
been communicated by the French authorities 
since France withdrew from the NATO integra-
ted military structure. But the responsibilities 
attributed to NATO in no way affect the exercise 
of the internal security responsibilities assigned 
to the Council under Article VIII. Internal 
security of course remains a matter for each 
individual country, but the modified Brussels 
Treaty is the only treaty committing member 
states to hold consultations in the framework of 
the WEU Council on questions of internal 
security, and in this case the Council has 
relinquished neither its responsibilities nor their 
exercise. 
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5. There is another consideration, stemming 
from the most elementBJry common sense : when a 
treaty establishes an alliance intended to organise 
joint defence, this brings into play the solidarity 
of its signatories not only in face of any danger 
from without but also with regard to any internal 
threat whatsoever. In fact, any attack on one of 
the partners is necessarily an attack on the 
a!lliance as a whole, which is thereby weakened. 
Joint defence cannot ignore threats to the 
security of each partner, from wheresoever it 
may come. 
6. It nevertheless remains that insofar as other 
European parliamentary assemblies have dealt 
with this subject, without thereby exceeding their 
responsibilities in any way, it would be a pity to 
dea:l among the parliamentarians of seven coun-
tries with what has been dealt with in a frame-
work including seventeen countries such as the 
Council of Europe. Lt is not therefore because 
the subject is outside its responsibilities but in 
the desire to avoid overlapping that the WEU 
Assembly should probably refrain from discuss-
ing the social or juridical aspects of the problems 
raised by international terrorism. 
7. However, the Genera:! Affairs Committee 
noted that WEU had special responsibilities in 
this field which are not covered by any other 
international assembly. These special responsibi-
lities derive first from Article V of Protocol 
No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty which 
stipulates that : ' 
"The strength and armaments of the internal 
defence and police forces on the mainland 
of Europe of the high contracting parties to 
the present protocol shall be fixed by agree-
ments within the organisation of Western 
European Union, having regard to their 
proper functions and needs and to their 
existing levels.': 
8. These agreements were signed on 14th 
December 1957 and specify that member states 
shall report to the WEU Council on the strength 
of forces at their disposal and that the Council 
shall approve this report. These forces include 
"internal defence and police forces". 
9. Insofar as possible, some idea should be 
given of the nature of "internal defence and 
police forces". It is relatively easy for internal 
defence forces : they are armed forces assigned 
to the defence of home territory, as opposed to 
those which are assigned to joint defence, whether 
or not under NATO command. However in 
. ' practice each government apparently has its own 
criteria for defining such assignments. But, 
except in times of serious crisis, such forces are 
not intended for use against terrorism. 
10. The case of police forces is different since 
most countries have several police forces under 
different authorities, some wearing P'lain clothes 
and others uniform ; some armed, others not, etc., 
and their tasks may vary infinitely depending 
on circumstances and requirements. In general, 
moreover, their arms are not subject to limita-
tions under the Brussels Treaty. The levels of 
such forces declared to the Council by national 
authorities may include certain police forces and 
not others, depending on whether they come 
under one government department or another, 
whether or not they are -armed and whether or 
not they wear uniform. But it is of course these 
forces which are engaged in the fight against 
terrorism and the fact that Protocol No. 11 
includes them among forces whose levels have to 
be declared to the Council, which has to approve 
these declarations unanimously "having regard to 
their proper functions", gives the Council the 
responsibility of examining these functions and 
the way each country carries them out. It goes 
without saying that the Council's approval does 
not have to be granted automatically but implies 
effective study of member states' reports by the 
Council and shows what a European policy or 
will might be in respect of internal defence and 
police forces as well as all member countries' 
other forces. 
11. However, when it stipulates that the Council 
must approve member countries' reports on the 
strength of their internal defence and police 
forces unanimously, the agreement of 14th 
December 1957 shows that the authors of the 
treaty wished the Council to pay attention to 
these forces. Article 4 of this agreement specifies 
in fact that the Council "shall accept : 
(a) 
(b) 
for the strength of such forces, the 
levels which shall be communicated 
annually to it by the North Atlantic 
Council; 
for the armaments, the levels which 
shall be communicated annually to it by 
member states through the Agency for 
the Control of Armaments." 
12. Similarly, Article 5 indicates that the 
Council shall accept the strength and armaments 
of its forces stationed on the mainland of Europe 
and intended for the defence of overseas ter-
ritories. It is therefore most significant that 
Article 6 includes "internal defence and police 
forees" among those forces whose strength and 
armaments must be considered by the Council 
which must approve them, not on a compulsory 
basis, but "unanimously". This would appear to 
mean that the Council must really deliberate 
on th'is chapter in the case of new tasks being 
entrusted to these forces and in the event of 
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significant changes in their levels, since it is 
specified that the Council must unanimously 
approve any amendment resulting from the 
reviews of tables submitted by member coun-
tries. In short, the treaty, in Protocol No. 11 
and the agreement of 14th December 1957 
organising implementation of Article V of Pro-
tocol No. 11, assigns responsibility to the Council 
with regard to forces intended to fight terrorism. 
13. But information obtained by your Rappor-
teur about the way in which the Council carries 
out its duties in this respect indicates that mem-
ber countries do in fact report on the level of their 
internal defence and police forces but that these 
reports are approved by the Council without real 
discussion. It would therefore appear that on this 
matter the Counc'il acts in a routine manner, 
ensuring formal application of the treaty and its 
appended protocols, but without discussing ques-
tions raised by the strength and tasks of these 
forces. 
14. Thus, WEU's responsibilities in the field of 
international terrorism seem very well defined. 
They relate first to measures to meet the political 
or economic challenges stemming from interna-
tional terrorism and also to police or military 
action to be taken against terrorist undertakings. 
15. The Council's competence to deal with inter-
national terrorism has moreover been recognised 
since it has in practice been doing so since 1970. 
'rhe Council's annual report for that year indi-
cates in fact that : 
"1970 saw an increase in kidnappings of 
diplomats which are a matter of great con-
cern and, as a number of these distressing 
incidents involved representatives of mem-
ber countries of WEU, the Council devoted 
part of their work to the subject of the 
protection of diplomatic and consular mis-
sions abroad. They also considered the 
problem of the hijacking of aircrnft." 
16. In this connection, the Council has been 
careful to co-ordinate its action with that of 
other competent international organisations and 
in particular with the Council of Europe, but 
neYertheless "thought it would be useful for the 
Seven to continue working together on all these 
questions within "'WEU". Inter alia, it set up a 
special working group to hold "consultations, as 
required and in the light of experience, regarding 
practical measures to improve the security of 
diplomatic and consulaT missions" and reported 
to the Assemblv on action it had taken with 
regard to terro;ism both at ministerial level and 
at the level of ambassadors in the annual reports 
on its activities for 1971 and 1972. 
17. All this clearly shows that in tackling the 
question of international terrorism the Assembly 
is keeping to the strict limits of WEU's respon-
sibilities as defined in the treaty and until now 
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interpreted by the Council. The Assembly 
already accepted this point of view when it 
adopted the report on political violence and 
internal security submitted by Mr. Schloesing on 
behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments on 16th November 1971. 
D. International terrorism 
18. The notion of international terrorism is far 
from clear. Nowadays, it would appear to cover 
a range of undertakings which differ in any case 
because of the aims behind them and often too 
because of the means used. But it would appear 
to be the aims of these terrorist movements which 
allow them to be distinguished from each other. 
19. There are some indeed for whom terrorism is 
considered to be a means of achieving a number 
of political aims. The most typical case is prob-
ably that of the Palestinian movements whose aim 
is clearly the establishment of an Arab state in 
Palestine and for which terrorist operations are 
either a means of fighting the state of Israel, 
or aC'tion aimed at making neighbouring Arab 
states change their policy or, finrully, attempts 
to draw the ·attention of international public 
opinion to the problem of the fate of the 
Palestinian Arabs. 
20. In recent years, many national liberation 
movements, or movements merely making 
regionalist claims, have used terrorist methods, 
sometimes with a degree of moderation ·and some-
times with unreasoning violence. Mention may be 
made of the Irish Catholics and the regionalist 
movements in Brittany and Corsica, without 
forgetting the guerrilla organisations in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. 
21. But in the last decade movements of another 
kind have emerged for which terrorism developed 
without any clear political aims having been 
defined. These would appear to be reactionary 
movements of the same kind as those prevailing 
in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century 
when the anarchist movement was developing on 
a large scale. Germany and Italy would appear 
to have suffered the most from this neo-nihilism 
in recent years, but similar movements have 
developed in other countries, including Japan. 
The recent kidnapping of Mr. Aldo Moro has 
caused concern and indignation throughout 
Europe. 
22. However, this distinction between move-
ments with specific political claims and anarchist 
movements cannot be strictly adhered to insofar 
as these anarchist movements have on several 
occasions been associated with movements of a 
more political nature in a number of terrorist 
undertakings. For instance, the famous massacre 
at Lod airport was the work of Japanese ter-
rorists, who were in no way directly concerned 
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with the Palestinian problem but had probably 
seen Palestinian terrorism to be a movement of 
protest against contemporary western society and 
therefore mingled their cause with the political 
struggle of the Palestinians. Similarly, it would 
appear that there are close links between the 
terrorist movement which has developed in Ger-
many and the Palestinian movement since 
apparently reliable information indicates that 
German terrorists have often received technical 
training in camps in the Middle East which 
makes them particularly da;ngerous. 
23. Thus, although terrorist action often appears 
to be limited to a single country and the claims 
made sometimes even limited to regional or 
provincial problems, it is beginning to assume an 
in'Creasingly international aspect. The way in 
which numbers of aircraft have been hijacked in 
recent years clearly shows - as does the success 
achieved by the cause of order - that only 
international action can enable such movements 
to be overcome, even if they have purely national 
aims. It is because their own undertakings very 
soon overstep state frontiers, particularly where 
the hijacking of aircraft or crimes against 
diplomats are concerned, that international co-
operation on as wide a scale as possible has 
become essential to counter these terrorist acts. 
24. But it is evident that movements acting in 
accordance with political aims, with which there 
can be dealings and an attempt made to find 
solutions to problems which are sometimes very 
real, cannot be approached in the same way as 
anarchist-type organisations for whieh terrorism 
appears to be an aim rather than a means and 
which are liable to interpret any attempt at 
negotiation as a pointless sign of weakness. This 
is particularly important since methods used in 
the two cases are not always the same. Some 
movements of a political nature know how to 
keep their activities within certain bounds, 
endeavouring for instance to destroy property 
without killing wherever possible or taking 
hostages only with a view to obtaining specific 
concessions. Conversely, certain anarchist-type 
movements appear to be waging a relentless war 
on societv. In the firrst case reactions may be 
modulated in accordance with the challenge in-
volved, whereas in the second case there appears 
to be no alternative but to eliminate the peril by 
any means. It :is essential for the WEU Council 
to assess the nature of the terrorist challenge in 
its discussions. 
ID. The fight against terrorism 
25. It is clear that the deployment of large-scale 
police forces in a country, or even in a large prurt 
of the world, is not enough to overcome move-
ments which are sometimes based on political or 
economic claims that are in themselves worthy of 
attention. On the contrary, political and economic 
measures can bring about a transformation of 
society so that terrorism no longer finds justifica-
tion in over-flagrant injustice. Such measures 
can sometimes be taken within states; this applies 
in particular to movements with regionalist 
claims or movements resulting from protests 
against certain authoritarian regimes, particu-
larly in Latin America. 
26. In other cases, a sea;rch for international 
solutions can allow the deep-rooted unrest 
expressed in the development of terrorism to be 
overcome. This is for instance the case of the 
Palestinians who are liable to continue to find 
new ways of endangering both individuals and 
international order if by some means or another 
they are not given the possibility of becoming 
citizens with full rights in some pall"t of the 
Middle East. 
27. As soon as problems of this kind arise, they 
are of direct concern to the WEU Council in 
accordance with Article VIII of the treaty, which 
requests the Council "to consult with regard to 
any situation which may constitute a threat to 
peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, 
or a danger to economic stability". But they 
concern it by virtue of that political co-operation 
which the governments are currently trying to 
develop in wider frameworks than WEU. 
28. But the1re is another aspect of the fight 
~gainst terrorism which must not be neglected, 
I.e. the defence of persons first but also of eco-
nomic, military and, nowadays, above all nuclear 
installations against possible action by terrorist 
movements. It is this defence which is covered 
by Article V of Protocol No. II to the modified 
Brussels Treaty. 
29. In this report there can therefore be no 
question of considering either long-term pre-
ventive measures consisting of eliminating the 
underlying reasons for revolt which may be 
found in our society or the international prob-
lems which make people find no other means of 
asserting their national claims than recourse to 
terrorism. Nor will consideration be given to the 
form which might or should be taken by a policy 
of repression with its legal implications, since the 
Council of Europe is responsible for this. But 
the Brussels Treaty encourages us to consider 
the means of action and of coming to grips with 
terrorism employed by member countries, i.e. 
defence pol,icy as it appears necessary when con-
fronted with international terrorism. 
30. When terrorist acts first began, each country 
had to take the most appropriate measures to 
overcome local problems without worrying about 
co-ordinating their efforts. Use was made of 
existing police forces which, whenever necessary 
were given wider duties and more staff. But th~ 
increase in terrorist acts has made a major 
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development of passive and active defence 
mea;sures essentia;l. 
31. Where passive defence is concerned, it is 
first a matter of coming to grips with piracy 
in the air, which ~w considerably as from 1970. 
Airports and runways had to be guarded and 
passengers searched to prevent them carrying 
arms and explosives. This required a large num-
ber of staff who have been progressively provided 
with ever more advanced methods of detection. 
32. But a number of attacks made it evident that 
such measures could not suffice if taken in only 
one country and tJhat they could be effective only 
if the same measures were taken everywhere. 
Each time a country lagged behind in applying 
preventive measures of passive defence, it served 
as the point of departure for terrorist commando 
units which could operate in aircraft belonging 
to airlines from other countries. In turn, France, 
Greece and Spari.n, which had not yet felt the 
direct effects of international terrorism, served 
as a point of departure for terrorist commando 
units which were guilty of serious misdeeds 
elsewhere and in the end they were compelled 
to adopt measures in line with those taken in 
other countries. 
33. The practice of taking hostages and assas-
sinating politicians raises problOO!S which are 
far more difficult to solve. Attacks on diplomatic 
missions have compelled accrediting and host 
countries to agree to c~ordinate passive defence 
measures without harming rights and preroga-
tives on either side. The assassinations carried 
out in Germany by the anarchist group formerly 
led by Andreas Baader on the one hand forced 
an increase in the number of identity control 
measures and on the other hand the large-scale 
deployment of heavily-armed police forces in 
towns, intensified protection of all the country's 
nerve centres and particularly its capital and 
finally an increase in the number of bodyguards 
attached to a very large number of persons. 
34. To date, these measures have remained 
specific to certain countries, but they are tending 
to grow, particularly since it has become apparent 
that terrorist groups make use of the ease with 
which European states' frontiers can be m'OSSed 
nowadays to organise their attack's from without, 
to go abroad after the attacks have been carried 
out and sometimes even to hold hostages abroad. 
For instance, the body of Hans Martin Schleyer, 
kidnapped in Germany in September 1977, was 
found in France and it would appear that the 
murder of two Swiss police officials near the 
Swiss, Germa.n and French frontiers in recent 
months can be attribut,ed to terrorist groups. In 
short, the defence of persons too implies increased 
measures and agreement between the various 
European countries to prevent what has become 
too difficult on the territory of one of them being 
perpetrated on the territory of another. As far 
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88 possible, such co-operation should be extended 
beyond Europe's boundaries, aB demonstrated by 
the recent discovery of German and Swiss ter-
rorists in Egypt. 
35. Military installations have always been 
guarded. However, they are now a frequent tar-
get of terrorist groups, either because they wish 
to show their hostility towards the military orga-
nisation of Europe and particularly NATO (this 
apparently explains a number of attacks on 
American servicemen or NATO installations in 
the Federal Republic) or because they allow 
arms, explosives or munitions to be procured. 
Here too it is important for meaBures to be 
adequate everywhere, for arms stolen in one 
country can perfectly well be used in another in 
view of the permeability of frontiers. 
36. Finally, economic installations, whatever 
they may be, are also targets for international 
terrorism, because they are of considerable value, 
because money can be stolen directly from them, 
because their destruction involves very heavy 
expenditure for the country where they are 
installed or finally because of the spectacular 
nature of such acts of destruction which consti-
tute instruments of propaganda in favour of the 
cause upheld by the terrorists. Thus in France 
. . ' ' 
regionalist movements have attacked television 
relay stations, expensive installations whose 
destruction cannot pass unnoticed by the popu-
lation of entire regions. There can of course be 
no question of protecting all economic installa-
tions, but the number of protected premises 
haB had to be increased, armed guards surround-
ing those which are the most sensitive. 
37. The increaBing number of nuclear installa-
tions in Europe since the oil crisis in October 
1973 is liable to provide terrorists with choice 
targets, either to enable them to seize means of 
carrying out nuclear explosions or in order to 
make the population tremble at the risk of the 
plant itself exploding. It would therefore seem 
essential, even before there has been a serious 
terrorist attack on a nuclewr plAnt in Western 
Europe, to surround such plants with powerful 
security systems. Any government which allowed 
fissile material to he seized would bear very 
heavy responsibility vis-a-vis the whole of inter-
national society. It is essential for tnis point to 
be borne in mind when working out any pro-
gramme for developing output of nuclear energy 
or selling power stations abroad: such installa-
tions imply permanent and stringent security 
measures and any seller of power stations must 
ensure that purchaSing countries do not merely 
take all measures necessary for the technical 
security of the plant but also all the passive 
defence measures ll'equired by the potential 
d~ger of ~rrorist action against it. Here again, 
an mternatiolllal "code of good conduct" for both 
sellers and buyers is essential, even if preparing 
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and respecting it were to ho1d up the development 
of nuclear energy throughout the world. 
38. It is to be aBSUmed that the governments' 
reports to the WEU Council with regard to 
"internal defence and police forces" have refer-
red to an increase in forces assigned by certain 
countries to the police for defence against ter-
rorist activities. 
39. So far, active defence has not necessitated 
the deployment of comparable forces, but their 
importance must not be overlooked. In fact, most 
western countries have acquired special police 
forces prepared to intervene at very short notice 
to destroy terrorist commando units in action. 
The Entebbe affair, during which an Israeli force 
of this kind overcame with practically no loss of 
human life a particularly dangerous terrorist 
commando unit which benefited from the com-
plicity of an African state, encouraged the spread 
of such forces which are now available in most 
of our countries. The Mogadishu affair, when a 
group of experts from the Federal Republic 
overca;me within minutes the terrorists who had 
hijacked an aircraft and its passengers, showed 
the effectiveness of meaBures of this kind. Their 
intervention implies considerable logistic resources 
and may raise special legal problems since the 
speed and effectiveness of their action in this 
case takes priority over all other considerations. 
Moreover, the use of such forces outside national 
territory involves a number of risks which should 
be considered, among European countries at 
least, to ascertain how they might be avoided 
or limited. 
40. The most delicate problems of course stem 
from attacks on aircraft or diplomatic missions : 
is it for the country to which the aircraft or 
embassy belongs to take on the intervention and 
decide whether it is necessary ? On the contrary, 
should the country on whose territory the attack 
takes place assume responsibility for this decision 
and its implementation? There are many examples 
of various kinds of solution in recent history, 
but no clear conclusion can be drawn. Each new 
affair makes consultations between the govern-
ments concerned necessary at very short notice, 
with all the misunderstanding and hazards 
implied by carrying out such a delicate taBk. The 
result is sometimes pointless tension between 
states wnich, being victims of the same terrorist 
act, should stand together to retaliate. But prior 
consultations covering matters relating to the 
deployment of these active defence forces should 
enable fuller and more rapid agreement to be 
reached when the time comes to act. This is what 
the WEU Council appeared to have understood 
when, in 1970, it began to study meaBures to be 
taken in the event of attacks on civilian aircraft. 
and diplomatic missions. 
41. From all these considerations, it follows that 
practically no aspect of the fight against ter-
rorism can remain the affair of a single state. 
Insofar as terrorist acts have no frontiers, 
defence too must overcome frontiers if it is to 
prove effective, which is possible only after 
agreement between governments. 
IV. Internal defence and police forces 
42. While the needs of the action require co-
ordinated efforts by European countries in this 
field, there are other considerations which cannot 
be overlooked· in international co-operation in 
internal defence matters. These include the 
danger which in itself may be presented by 
excessive inflation of the numbers of police, uni-
formed or not, and to an even greater extent an 
increase in the amount of action taken by the 
police, however necessary it may be. 
43. Everyone knows how a force responsible for 
keeping order, and above all having an active 
role to play in re-establishing order, may be 
tempted to give priority to this task over every-
thing else. There have been frequent cases of 
such forces going too far, which is liable to give 
rise to an obsession of fear throughout the popu-
lation due not only to terrorism itself but even 
more to protective anti-terrorist measures. 
44. There is no doubt that a government faced 
with a serious terrorist crisis is obliged to deploy 
forces on a large soole to meet it. It is generally 
encouraged by public opinion, struck by the 
spectacular aspect of many terrorist attacks. But 
by doing so it plays the game of the terrorists, 
who aim at magnifying their own importance, 
representativeness and power among public 
opinion. This would appear to endorse the views 
of those who justify terrorism, accusing the 
lawful authorities of being excessively repressive 
and violating the principles which they claim to 
be upholding by their anti-terrorist measures 
and the brutality, sometimes exaggerated, of the 
special intervention forces. Finally, in the long 
run retaliation which uses over-strong, too visible 
and too unscrupulous means is liable to lead to 
results which are the reverse of those sought and 
sometimes achieved in the short run : far from 
discouraging terrorism, they encourage it. It is 
difficult to insist that a government, when 
dealing with a crisis which the country's public 
opinion finds serious, show all the care, lucidity 
and moderation necessary when countering ter-
rorism. 
45. Neighbouring countries may sometimes be 
more composed about and have a more aloof 
view of the situation, which allows them too to 
weigh up the dangers involved in these terrorist 
acts and the danger of such a deployment of 
forces. Thus, the WEU Council's discussion 
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should not be limited to approving without deli-
beration the level of internal defence forces 
notified by each member state nor consist merely 
of mutual encouragement to increase such forces 
but should be a serious study of the problems 
encountered by each country and the means used 
to solve them, which in certain cases should not 
preclude an appeal to moderation in their 
deployment. Similarly, the tasks entrusted to 
special groups responsible for active defence 
work ought to be studied at the same time 
as their strengths, armaments and methods 
of action, with a view to possible co-ordination 
of their work whenever necessary but also in 
order to put governments on their guard against 
possible excesses committed by such groups. So 
in tllis connection the WEU Council should 
discuss not only strengths but also the require-
ments, deployment and tasks of the various 
elements making up these internal defence and 
police forces with a view to co-ordinating their 
activities. 
46. The apparently formal and routine nature 
of meetings of the WEU Council where reports 
on member countries' forces are "examined" and 
in any event approved might have been appro-
priate at a time when these forces and their tasks 
varied little and raised few problems in view of 
the role played in this respect by NATO, but this 
is not at all the case nowadays in view of the 
increase in these forces and the tasks entrusted 
to them since international terrorism assumed a 
new dimension in about 1970. 
4 7. For example, the l,arge-scale deployment of 
police in the Federal Republic following acts by 
anarchist groups on its territory in recent years 
has certainly often been misunderstood and ill-
appreciated by public opinion in other European 
countries, less sensitive to the danger represented 
by terrorism in Germany than the latter's own 
public opinion and the government, but more 
sensitive to the terrifying nature of this police 
dep1oyment. This is a cause of mistrust and 
misunderstanding between our countries and the 
WEU Council might help to dispel it if it quite 
simply played its role by applying both the letter 
and the spirit of the Brussels Treaty. 
48. But the aim of this report is not to accuse 
the Council but to urge and if possible bring 
about a true dialogue between the Council and 
the Assembly on a matter which is within their 
field of responsibilities and competence, where 
both pursue identical objectives clearly based on 
application of the treaty. Your Rapporteur there-
fore suggests that the Committee propose that 
the Council deal with matters relating to 
measures taken or to be taken to counter interna-
tional terrorism at the next joint meeting between 
the Council and the General Affairs Committee. 
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Amendment No. 1 
International terrorism 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Hardy 
In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 4. 
I. See 4th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Signed : Hardy 
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Amendment No. 2 
International terrorism 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and Mr. van den Bergh 
19th June 1978 
In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "through asylum or other-
wise". 
Signed : Stotfelen, van den Bergh 
1. See 4th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment negativerl). 
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Amendment No. 3 
International terrorism 
AMENDMENT No. 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Calamandrei and others 
20th June 1978 
In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "anarchist, 
nationalist, regionalist or other organisations" and insert "organisations of any denomination". 
Signed: Oalamandrei, Bernini, Antoni, Rubbi 
1. See 4th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment No. 4 
International terrorism 
AMENDMENT No. 4 1 
tabled by Mr. Calamandrei and others 
21st June 1978 
In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "only" and 
insert "also". 
Signed: Calamandrei, Bernini, Antoni, Rubbi 
I. See 4th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Draft Recommendation 
on European security and African problems 
The Assembly, 
Considering that co-operation between Western Europe and the Mrican countries is essential 
to the security of Europe and the necessary economic development of Mrica ; 
Welcoming the determination constantly expressed by Mrican states to settle problems between 
themselves free from intervention by powers outside the continent of Mrica ; 
Noting nevertheless that unrest in the African continent has often provided an opportunity or 
pretext for external intervention ; 
Considering that respect for the sovereignty of Mrican states remains a. basic goal of any European 
policy; 
Regretting that the political framework inherited from the colonial period is ill-adapted to ethnic, 
linguistic and religious realities ; 
Considering that Europe should contribute fully to the economic, social and cultural development 
of Mrica; 
Condemning the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms by some African governments ; 
Condemning the policy of apartheid pursued by the South Mrican Republic as contrary to the 
principles of democracy and human rights on which western civilisation is based, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
l. Ensure that its members hold continuing consultations in the most appropriate framework with 
a view to co-ordinating their African policies ; 
2. Co-ordinate the efforts of its members to assist in establishing peace and security in southern Africa 
in order to establish a just and democratic transition to majority rule in Rhodesia, induce the South 
African Republic to terminate apartheid and promote the independence of Namibia ; 
3. Initiate steps to reduce the present level of arms sales from external countries to Africa ; 
4. Study means of achieving a strict limitation of such sales, including enforcement of the embargo 
on arms supplies to the South Mrican Republic ; 
5. Approach other arms suppliers with a view to their participating in this undertaking; 
6. Reconsider policies of investment and technology transfer in South Mrica and Rhodesia which 
might render ineffective the embargo on supplies of military equipment in that they strengthen the 
industrial potential of these countries ; 
7. Link the assistance Europe extends to the African states with the respect they show for human 
rights; 
8. Promote through co-operation with Mrica.n states their economic and social development, as well 
as their democratic development, with due respect for human rights ; 
9. Foster the development of co-operation between Europe and Mrica as defined in the Lome 
Convention ; 
10. Condemn the repeated military operations across the borders of South Mrica and Rhodesia; 
11. Condemn any aggressive military intervention in Mrica, particularly the present Cuban operations; 
12. Promote the implementation by European firms operating in Africa of the code of conduct adopted 
by the EEC. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Muller, Rapporteur) 
I. The African continent's importance for 
Westem Europe 
1. Since the nineteenth century, the African 
continent has been of considerable importance 
to Europe. In the nineteenth century in parti-
cular, Mrica's economic value led to colonial 
expansion by a number of European powers 
which, by the twentieth century, covered almost 
the entire continent. 
2. The end of the colonial empires after the 
second W10r1d war did not stop the flow of trade, 
which has developed still further since Africa 
has proved to be a source of a number of raw 
materials and foodstuffs consumed in large quan-
tities in Europe. There are vast oil reserves, 
particuJarly in the Algerian and Libyan Sahara 
and in Nigeria. There are uranium reserves in 
Central and Southern Africa which Europe will 
find even more essential in the coming years 
since nuclear energy will be playing a more 
important role in industry. Finally, where non-
ferrous metals are concerned, Mrica supplies 
particulavly large quantities of gold, copper and 
manganese, which are in very short supply in 
Europe. 
3. Conversely, the present low level of indus-
trialisation in Africa makes it a worthwhile 
customer for European industry offering outlets 
which will increase in time insofar as Africa 
manages to overcome its economic and technical 
underdevelopment. Economic association between 
Europe and Africa is not therefore solely the 
result of colonial relationships but something of 
a geographical necessity, particularly as Africa is 
closer to Western Europe than any other conti-
nent. 
4. But it is not only for economic reasons 
that Europe cannot sever its ties with the Mrican 
continent. Indeed, the latter plays an essential 
role in Europe's security now that military 
threats are no longer localised. Africa controls 
the whole southern shore of the Mediterranean, 
the eastern shores of the Atlantic and the western 
shores of the Indian Ocean. Its three maritime 
fronts would thus allow any adversary who might 
establish ·air or naval bases there to control 
shipping in the Atlantic and play an important 
role in the Indian Ocean, an essential launching 
base for American nuclear submarines which 
ensure Europe's security through their deterrent 
effect on the Soviet Union while giving the 
United States a second strike possibility in the 
event of the Soviet Union attempting a surprise 
nuclear attack on American territory. 
5. In short, while the positive role of Africa 
in the West's defence policy remains secondary, 
the negative role it might play if it fell into the 
no 
hands of other powers would be considerable. For 
all these reasons, therefore, Europe should keep 
a close watch on present developments in Africa 
and ensure that the African continent does not 
swing over to the side of a potential enemy. 
Ensuring real independence for the African 
states concords with the political principles 
upheld by the West and the economic, political 
and strategic interests of Europe, now the colonial 
era is over. 
6. This is the view of the EEC, which has 
constantly sought a policy of assistance to and 
co-operation with any African countries which so 
wish, granting them a major proportion of its 
development aid and concluding preferential 
trade agreements. In defence matters, on the 
other hand, the Western European countries have 
no similar policy since some of them are linked 
with African states by bilateral treaties which 
in effect are alliances ; this applies in particular 
to several former colonial mother countries and 
some of their former colonies, although others 
considered it preferable not to shoulder any per-
manent commitments in Africa. Thus, some Euro-
pean countries maintain armed forces ready to 
intervene at short notice in Mrica and which 
are sometimes stationed on Mrican territory, 
whereas their European allies contemplate no 
such intervention whatever may happen. This 
leads to differences between the WEU countries' 
concepts of Europe's ability to promote the free-
dom of peoples and independence of states in 
Africa. For instance, there were differences when 
France supplied aid to Morocco for transporting 
troops and equipment to Zai're in spring 1977. 
The French Government's claims to be acting on 
behalf of Europe were particularly groundless 
since, as far as your Rapporteur is aware, it had 
consulted none of its European partners before 
acting. 
7. In short, although to some extent the Western 
European counrtries have common views and 
interests which favour political, economic and 
social stability in Mrica and real independence 
for the African states, this has produced no 
joint policy, outside the economic field, nor even 
mutual support, apparently due to insufficient 
consultation. On the other hand, in economic 
matters the Lome Convention of 28th February 
1975, which associates forty-three states with the 
European Community, thirty-seven of which are 
African 1, is a particularly important example of 
I. Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea., Ethiopia., 
Gabon, Gambia., Ghana, Guinea., Guinea.-Bissa.u, Ivory 
Coast, Kenya., Lesotho, Liberia., Malagasy Republic, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania., Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria. 
People's Republic of the Congo, Rwanda., Senegal, Sierr~ 
Leone, Somalia., Sudan, Swa.ziland, Tanzania., Togo, 
Uganda., Upper Volta., Zambia., Zaire. 
co-operation because it recognises and develops 
reciprocal interests. It mainly concerns poor 
countries largely dependent on agriculture and 
guarantees them markets at sufficiently profit-
able prices. For these weaker states, it is their 
only guarantee against price fluctuations and the 
only way they can protect their economy. 
8. The convention's main provisions covered: 
( i) the granting by the Community of 
duty-free access to all industrial and 
to 96 % of agricultural imports from 
signatory countries ; 
( ii) the creation of an export stabilisation 
scheme guaranteeing the exporting 
countries a certain level of income ; 
( iii) increased development aid ; 
( iv) increased eo-operation ; 
( v) the creation of bodies to provide the 
institutional framework for the agree-
ment. 
9. The agreement is to remain in force until 
28th February 1980, only the provisions on sugar 
being subject to revision at an earlier date. 
10. This agreement meets a number of the Afri-
can states' requirements. It is certainly not in 
the short-term interests of the European states 
but it is in the common interest for the African 
continent to develop rapidly and in a balanced 
manner. 
11. Clearly the maintenance or re-establishment 
of close links between Europe and many African 
countries involves far-reaching economic obliga-
tions for Europe, particularly since several 
countries in Western Africa along the Gulf of 
Guinea coast from Senegal to Guinea Bissau 
have been experiencing an unprecedented food 
crisis for several years due to drought which, 
since 1973, has repeatedly plagued the Sahel 
area affecting more than thirty million inhabi-
tants. 
12. At the beginning of March 1978, the FAO 
estimated the food deficit in this area at not 
less than 600,000 tons and needs are becoming 
increasingly urgent. Assistance pledged so far 
falls far short of this figure, yet already in 
September 1977 countries in the area started 
to call attention to the tragic situation they 
foresaw for spring 1978. The most seriously-
affected countries are probably the Cape Verde 
Islands, Gambia, Mauritania, Senegal, Mali and 
Upper Volta, but Niger, Chad, Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Nigeria and Cameroun are also threatened 
by the spread of the desert. Livestock is dying 
off everywhere and cereal crops and basic pro-
duce for the food industries have dropped 
sharply. 
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13. For instance, in 1977 the cereal crop in 
Mauritama was only 30% of its usual volume 
and in Senegal 50%. Similarly, Senegal's ground-
nut crop in 1977 was only 40% of its 1976 
production. The consequences are twofold : first, 
the overall populati<>n of the Sahel needs 
immediate assistance in food supplies, particu-
larly cereals ; second, there is an economic loss 
due to the fact that the economy of these coun-
tries is based mainly on agricultural produce, 
and practically just groundnuts in the case of 
Senegal. 
14. It would therefore be essential for Europe 
to make every effort to grant these cormtries 
compellSaition for their economic loss which leaves 
them unable to muster the necessary investments 
for developing their economy and, as a matter 
of urgency, it should afford assistance in the 
form of foodstuffs. Indeed, talk of economic 
solidarity with Africa is meaningless if not 
accompanied by large-scale and effective assis-
tance when the African countries associated with 
the European Communities most need it. 
D. The internal situatton 
15. The present-day political geography of 
Africa is strongly marked by the colonial period. 
Before colonisation by Europe there were few 
real states in Africa and the present frontiers 
are a result of the division of African territory 
between the colonial powers. 
16. Very few countries have any ethnic, 
linguistic, cultural or religious unity. Most of 
them group several peoples and inter-state 
frontiers often divide the same peoP'le, which has 
been a major source of instability and above all 
a permanent threat to the stability of the states 
concerned. Thus, the military operations opposing 
Zaire and forces from Angola which invaded the 
province of Shaba at the beginning of 1977 took 
place in a region where political frontiers divide 
several ethnic groups living in both countries. 
Similarly, many of the difficulties now facing 
Ethiopia stem from the division of the Somali 
people between several states and the fact that 
in certain states several peoples have been 
brought together who have never been on good 
terms. Everywhere this fundamental instability 
makes it difficult to achieve the consensus which 
is needed for the stability of political regimes in 
many African countries and is a source of strong 
temptation to them to intervene in the internal 
affairs of neighbouring states. 
17. Thus, the notion of interference in the 
internal affairs of states does not mean exactly 
the same as in other continents since frontiers 
are often contested, ill-defined and, particularly 
in regions such '88 the Sahara, where nomadic 
customs persist, barely respected by the popula-
tions themselves. 
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18. As soon as they became independent, the 
African states as shaped by the colonial divisions 
agreed to base their relationships on the main-
tenance of states and frontiers inherited from 
colonial days. This was the basic principle of the 
·constitutive charter of the Organisation of Afri-
can Unity adopted in Addis Ababa on 25th May 
1963. Until quite recently this principle was 
quite well respected, but it is apparent that it 
is now being called in question in several regions. 
For instance, Libya is now occupying a fringe 
of territory which had been attributed to Chad. 
Similarly, when Spain withdrew from the 
Western Sahara, Morocco and Mauritania shared 
the territory, which led to disturbances which 
are still far from settled. Many African states 
therefore no longer feel secure because they know 
their neighbours can lay claim to one or another 
portion of their territory and in many cases with 
the support of part of the population. This has 
involved them in an arms race which has been 
most evident in recent years in West Africa, but 
which is also developing in North Africa, where 
Morocco and Algeria have acquired considerable 
military strength. 
19. The Organisation of African Unity has 
constantly tried to impose the principle that the 
fate of Africa should, whatever the circumstances, 
remain in African hands. However, the conflicts 
and mistrust which have developed between 
African states mean that the OAU no longer 
affords the African states sufficient guarantees 
and they have formed other groups within the 
continent, turning increasingly to non-African 
powers in order to increase their influence or 
ensure their security. 
IU. External interference 
20. This takes very many forms, some being 
an aftermath of the colonial era in that the 
former colonial powers endeavoured and in many 
cases managed to maintain privileged relations 
with the territories of their former empires. The 
desire of certain African states to escape from 
what they considered to be the excessive influence 
of the former colonial powers led them to seek 
support elsewhere. Thus, the United States played 
an important role in the fighting which followed 
the decolonisation of the Congo. But the Soviet 
Union in turn has intervened to strengthen the 
positions of those African states which sought 
to break away more completely from the domina-
tion of the former colonial powers and this has 
resulted in the rivalry between the two great 
powers being extended to the African continent. 
Finally, the rapid increase in wealth in certain 
Arab countries and Iran since 1973 and the 
parallel development of their military strength 
give them an increasingly important role in the 
East African balance. In particular, they seem 
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to have strongly encouraged Somalia's action 
against Ethiopia in 1977. 
21. So far, the influence of the Soviet Union 
has not resulted in any permanent foothold, and 
its diplomatic activity in Africa may be con-
sidered above all as an attempt to weaken western 
positions, thus harming world capitalism, rather 
than an attempt to set up communist regimes. 
However, the considerable development of the 
Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean in recent years 
gives reason to fear that the Soviet Union may 
endeavour to set up bases in the area and extend 
its economic, ideological, political and military 
influence. 
22. In 1977, there was some development in 
American policy inasmuch as President Carter 
clearly showed that he did not intend the United 
States to intervene directly in Africa. Thus, he 
allowed a government to be set up in Angola 
which received aid and arms from outside and 
did nothing to ensure the defence of Zaire when 
it was invaded by forces from Angola. 
23. However, at the beginning of 1978, in con-
nection with the Ethiopian affair, the American 
administration showed that it did not intend to 
allow the Soviet Union to take advantage of 
political instability to gain a foothold and alter 
the shape of the map. An understanding was 
reached between the Soviets and the Americruns 
that the Ethiopian offensive with Cuban assis-
·tance and Soviet arms should not be carried into 
Somali territory but should merely re-establish 
the status quo ante. The Soviet Union, which 
could perhaps have hoped to take advantage 
of the Ethiopian offensive to gain their revenge 
on the Somali Government which had expelled 
its Soviet technical advisers in 1977, abided by 
this understanding and there is now a chance 
that the fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia 
will cul.,minate in a reversion to the frontiers as 
they were before decolonisation, neither side 
being the winner. The recent coup d'Etat in 
Somalia perhaps means however that the Soviet 
Union is resuming control. 
24. The Angolan affair was considered very 
important by many African governments because 
they felt it was a challenge to the West's deter-
mination to keep Africa free of Russian or 
Chinese intervention. China too pursues an active 
policy on the shores of the Indian Ocean. It co-
operates closely, particularly with Tanzania, most 
of whose arms it supplied, although it is not pos-
sible to speak of direct military intervention by 
China, any more than in the case of the Soviet 
Union which, even in Angola, seems to have relied 
on Cuban forces to ensure that its side won. 
25. In all, and although no official statistics have 
been published, the number of Cubans engaged in 
Africa has been estimated at more than 30,000 
and sometimes even as many as 70,000, most 
being in Angola but some 10,000 in Ethiopia 
where there are reports that wholely Cuban 
units have taken part in the fighting against 
Somalia. In other countries the numbers involved 
in Cuban eo~operation seem to be rather less 
and restricted to non-military activities. There 
are certainly far less Soviet advisers but about 
1,000 are reported in Ethiopia. 
26. According to recent information, a Cuban 
organisation, "The Che Guevara International 
Pedagogical Brigade", is believed to have placed 
1,000 teachers in Angola when the school term 
began on 1st April 1978, which would imply 
ideological penetration in depth by Cuba in 
Angola. 
27. Future relationB between Europe and Africa 
may therefore be in doubt because of external 
intervention on the African continent and this 
can but have major repercussions on both the 
economy and the security of Europe. 
28. However, attempts by certain African coun-
tries such as Tanzania, Algeria, Tunisia and 
Mozambique to organise their economies along 
"socialist" lines adapted to the characteristics of 
African society must not be considered as the 
result of external interference. On the contrary, 
greater economic strength and some balance in 
the division of wealth are elements of stability 
and independence worthy of encouragement. 
29. It is not possible however to overlook the 
important advantages stemming from this situa-
tion for the African countries which have elected 
to maintain close ~peration with Western 
Europe. One of the most remarkable cases in 
this respect is that of the Ivory Coast which, 
thanks to the development of its sales of agri-
cultural produce, has obtained one of the highest 
GNP growth rates in Africa and seems about 
to emerge from the status of underdevelopment. 
IV. Southern African problems 
30. The most serious problem in present-day 
Africa arises from the presence and policy of the 
white-dominated South African Republic at the 
southernmost tip of Africa. For a long time, it 
had the support of most western powers, which 
looked upon it as a major economic partner, a 
bastion of western civilisation standing in the 
way of the threats now hanging over the African 
continent and occupying an essential strategic 
position between the Indian Ocean and the 
Atlantic, particularly at a time when oil from 
the Arabian-Persian Gulf had to be routed via 
the Cape because of the closing of the Suez Canal. 
31. However, the policy of racial discrimination 
has had effects which jeopardise the very objec-
tives of western policy in Africa. The majority 
of African states find such a policy intolerable 
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because they view it as the prolongation and 
aggravation of the colonial regime in forms most 
inacceptable to the African peoples leading to 
permanent opposition between black and white 
with world-wide repercussions. 
32. There are now two things at stake in the 
unrest in southern Africa. First, there is the 
question whether the future of the white inhabi-
tants who settled in that part of the world is 
in remaining in the territories they have been 
developing for several centuries. But the question 
also arises as to what extent the black and white 
populations can cohabit on an equal footing after 
the minority element has dominated the majority 
for so long. It is thus a major problem which 
is raised on the basis of a number of seemingly 
minor matters. In fact, the fate of the govern-
ment of Rhodesia and Namibia depends to a very 
large extent on the strength and will of the 
South African Republic. 
33. It is evident that while all the Western 
European countries condemn the very principle 
of apartheid it would be easier to fight it effect-
ively if the governments in power in other parts 
of Africa showed greater determination to ensure 
respect for human rights within their frontiers. 
Recent massacres in Burundi, persecutions and 
massacres of Christians in the southern Sudan, 
torture in Equatorial Guinea a:nd despotism in 
Uganda considerably diminish the strength of any 
complaints these countries may make about ~nuth 
Africa and to some extent explain why the white 
population of South Africa is against any move 
to bring them under the domination of the black 
majority. 
A. The Rhodesian problem 
34. This problem bega:n twelve years ago. Rho-
desia has a population of more than six million, 
only 270,000 of whom are white. It was the white 
population that terminated British colonisation 
and seized power in a country where they formed 
only a very small minority. The Rhodesian 
Government succeeded in recruiting among the 
black population certain units for its army which 
for several years has been fighting the rebellion 
of the Patriotic Front, which aims to set up a 
new African-dominated state on the territory of 
what is now R.hodesia : Zimbabwe. 
35. Without delving into the history of the 
difficuJ.t relations between the Rhodesian Govern-
ment and its African neighbours and the United 
Kingdom, your Rapporteur merely wishes to 
recall that during summer 1977 the United States 
and the United Kingdom informed Mr. Ian 
Smith's government of a plan to re-establish peace 
in Rhodesia. This plan implied the withdrawal of 
Mr. Smith's government and its replacement for 
six months by a British administrator in Salis-
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bury. The government armed forces and those of 
the Patriotic Front were to be disbanded and 
replaced by an independent peacekeeping force 
in which Nigeria, Canada and India might par-
ticipate. The British administrator was to arrange 
free elootions based on the principle of equal 
voting rights for all persons and the government 
resulting from these elections was to organise 
a new Rhodesian army. Finally, a fund of $500 
million was to be set up to guarantee the property 
of the white population while the black popu-
lation's adhesion to the new regime was to have 
been facilitated by a $1,000 million development 
fund which would have been granted in exchange 
for a guarantee of constitutional order ensuring 
freedom for all. 
36. This Anglo-American initiative was turned 
down by the white government of Rhodesia which 
insisted on special representation for white resi-
dents, particular guarantees for the independence 
of the administration, police and army and 
restrictions on the application of universal suf-
frage. But one result was that the Rhodesian 
Government started its own direct negotiations 
with representatives of the black majority 
within the country. Thus, while the British and 
Americans were negotiating in Dar es Salaam 
with the exiled opponents of the Rhodesian 
regime, on 3rd March 1978 an internal agree-
ment was established between Mr. Smith, Bishop 
Muzorewa, Reverend Sithole and Chief Chirau. 
The agreement signed in Salisbury provided for 
the formation of a four-member executive Council 
and a ministerial council in association with 
the British Resident Commissioner to lead the 
country to independence. In these bodies, blacks 
and whites were to be on an equal footing pend-
ing the end of a transitional period on 31st 
December 1978 after which a black majority 
assembly should be set up. The Salisbury agree-
ment was not recognised by a large part of the 
Patriotic Front forces, nor by the neighbouring 
states with the exception of South Africa and 
there is every indication that its application 
would not put an end to the increasing guerrilla 
warfare in the country. That is probably why 
the United Kingdom and the United States have 
continued their efforts to find a satisfactory 
solution to the Rhodesian problem in spite of the 
signing of this agreement. 
37. At the beginning of April, Mr. Cyrus Vance, 
United States Secretary of State, and Mr. David 
Owen, United Kingdom Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, went to Rhodesia to consult 
the representatives of the Rhodesian executive 
council and of the Patriotic Front which directs 
the guerrill·as from the outside. Reports following 
this visit indicate that each side preferred to 
take part in a broader conference grouping all 
those concerned. However, the signatories of the 
Salisbury agreement of 3rd March seem in no 
way prepared to allow this agreement to be 
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questioned, whereas the representatives of the 
Rhodesian guerrilla, Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo, 
who met Mr. Vance and Mr. Owen in Dar es 
Salaam, seem firmly opposed to any statute for 
Rhodesia guaranteeing the survival of the white 
minority. They are claiming a dominating posi-
tion for the Patriotic Front in the future Zim-
babwe state which means, at least as Mr. Mugabe 
sees it, a single party system. 
38. Thus the prospect of a broader conference 
at the end of April between the various parties 
concerned now seems highly unlikely and there 
is every sign that it will be a 1ong time before 
a satisfactory agreement can be reached allowing 
peace to be established in Rhodesia. It should 
be added that even before its first meeting 
on 20th April 1978, the Rhodesian executive 
council ran up against a number of differences 
over the respective powers of black and white 
ministers. 
39. The Rhodesian Patriotic Front forces have 
their bases in Tanzania, Mozambique and Zam-
bia. This has induced the Rhodesian forces to 
make several incursions into the territories of the 
latter two countries causing considerable damage 
and loss of life. These occurrences were instru-
mental in making the Zambian Government and 
President Kaunda, who was one of the leaders 
of the area who entertained the best relations 
with the countries of the West, to threaten in 
turn a reversal of alliances and an appeal to the 
Soviet Union to obtain the arms they needed to 
meet this danger. Thus, unless the West is very 
careful, the evolution of the Rhodesian situation 
might help to worsen the situation throughout 
southern Africa by encouraging the birth of a 
group of pro-communist Mrican states face to 
face with white South Africa which would in 
no way facilitate a peaceful evolution in the 
area towards a political system acceptable to 
all. 
40. In fact, Rhodesia's fate seems to depend 
essentially on the external support its govern-
ment receives from outside. Although it was 
difficult to achieve a united western front to 
ensure respect for a trade embargo intended to 
bring pressure to bear on the Rhodesian Govern-
ment, it seems that Mr. Smith's government can 
no longer expect direct assistance from any Euro-
pean government, particularly if it rejects the 
Anglo-American plan. 
41. No great results are to be expected however 
from the boycott measures since they are applied 
very unevenly by both eastern and western coun-
tries. There have even been cases of "socialist" 
countries serving as intermediaries between 
western countries and Rhodesia. For instance, it 
has been claimed that Yugoslavia sold, at world 
rates, butter purchased at cut price from the 
EEC, the Soviet Union is said to have sold to the 
United States chromium imported from Rhodesia, 
and China to have sold Rhodesian tobacco. 
42. The government's survival therefore depends 
mainly on South African assistance. But South 
Africa seems to have two ways of looking at the 
problems. On the one hand, Rhodesia is seen as 
the forward bastion of the white cause in 
southern Africa, which would induce South 
Africa to give the Rhodesian Government uncon-
ditional support. On the other hand is the acknow-
ledged fact that Rhodesia is at present facing 
problems which are unknown in South Africa 
and an understanding with the western powers 
or a certain number of African States which 
might involve abandoning Rhodesia might streng-
then South African positions. 
43. There is thus some ambiguity in South 
Africa's attitude towards the Rhodesian problem 
and it is anxious to demonstrate that there is 
absolutely no connection with the problems 
peculiar to the South African Republic. So far, 
the South African Government has always 
refused to bring any pressure whatsoever to bear 
on the Rhodesian authorities, but it would appear 
that in April 1978 Mr. Botha, South African 
Minister fur Foreign Affuirs, did not refuse 
Mr. Vance and Mr. Owen the support they 
requested, since he recalled that South Africa 
had always favoured a solution likely to secure 
wider international recognition of Rhodesia and 
that the South African Government would foster 
the creation of the right conditions for a peaceful 
solution. 
B. The problem of Namibia 
44. South-West Africa, a former German colony, 
was entrusted by League of Nations mandate to 
the then South African Union after the first 
world war. When the United Nations decided to 
terminate this mandate and make South-West 
Africa independent, South Africa unilaterally 
annexed the territory, thus placing considerable 
strain on relations between many African coun-
tries and South Africa and also between those 
countries and the western powers, which were 
accused of being accomplices in the South 
African action. 
45. The result was to further justify the reta-
liatory measures against South Africa and the 
boycott recommended by the United Nations 
General Assembly. Although such recommenda-
tions are not binding, they have been respected 
by certain countries. The fact that several Euro-
pean governments have not respected them, 
however, has been partly responsible for the 
deterioration of their relations with many African 
countries. During his visit to southern Africa 
in August 1977, Mr. de Guiringaud, French 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, ascertained that 
France's policy towards South Africa, to which 
it has sold arms and where it is to build several 
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nuclear power stations, has aroused strong 
hostility among the blaek states in the region. 
However, in September 1977 the South African 
Government decided to take steps to make Nami-
bia independent and appointed an administrator-
general for this purpose. But the guerrilla war-
fare being waged in the north of the country 
by the SWAPO did not stop and on 27th March 
1978 Chief Herro Clemens Kapuuo, Leader of the 
Democratic Alliance, was assassinated. This led 
to further tension and on 18th March the South 
African administrator-general re-established the 
legal South African regime which had been 
terminated a few months earlier. Furthermore, 
at the end of April 1978 the United Nations 
General Assembly discussed the Namibian affair. 
A plan for a settlement covering the transitional 
period leading to independence for Namibia on 
31st December 1978 was submitted by five wes-
tern countries and agreed to by the parties 
concerned. But _on 28th April the SWAPO 
insisted on the negotiations being reopened since 
it was against Walvis Bay remaining under 
South African sovereignty and South African 
forces being kept in northern Namibia until the 
election of the future Constituent Assembly. In 
the circumstances, one may wonder whether it 
will be possible to organise independence within 
the prescribed time limit. 
C. The South African problem 
46. In South Africa itself the numerical balance 
between the various elements of the population 
swings less against the white population than in 
Rhodesia, there being 4.3 million whites compared 
with 22 million blacks, Indians or coloured. The 
latter large minorities further complicate the 
confrontation between black and white popula-
tions. 
47. Despite a regime which radically separates 
the various elements of the population, height-
ening the considerable economic disparities 
between them, the South African Government 
has for many years managed to maintain peace 
within its frontiers. But it is pursuing an increas-
ingly repressive policy which can but lead to 
increased tension. To meet demands for indepen-
dence, the government hal" set up autonomous 
black states (Bantustans), which are generally 
located in the poorer regions where few whites 
had settled. However, for the last few years 
South Africa has been having internal difficul-
ties, particularly in the suburbs of large cities, 
and disturbances are increasingly frequent. In 
August 1977, a large number of black secondary 
schools and universities had to be closed by the 
government. 
48. South Africa has such economic, and military 
strength that even with the support of neigh-
bouring black countries the native populations 
have little hope of achieving even their most 
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rightful claims without the co-operation of the 
whole international community. 
49. The South African Government's present 
threat to acquire nuclear weapons would appear 
to demonstrate its determination to resist any 
intervention from without and at a1l costs main-
tain a regime of white domination over the black 
element. For the first time, however, this threat 
appears to have given rise to a unanimous reac-
tion among the western powers, which are 
showing their radical opposition to the use of 
this means of intimidation. But there is little 
doubt that South Africa would use every means 
available to ensure its security if it found itself 
completely abandoned by the West. But there are 
signs that South Africa's aim is now economic 
autarky which would shelter it from external 
pressure and the white population, thus hemmed 
in, would feel itself less influenced by views from 
outside. 
50. Southern Africa is therefore the most 
important area of tension on the African con-
tinent and there is every reaBOn to foresee a 
considerable increase in tension in the coming 
months and years to the point that, although 
South Africa does not seem seriously threatened 
at present, no guarantee can be given of its 
longer-term survival. 
51. This situation raises a number of problems 
for all the western powers, particularly as to the 
steps they can and should take with regard to 
the South African Republic, which is a major 
economic partner for many of them and with 
which some, such as the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands, maintain a relationship based on 
common Languages. 
52. The "front-line" Afriean states, i.e. those 
which have frontiers with South Africa, Rhodesia 
or Namibia, wish the investment and trade 
boycott of South Africa to be applied in 
full, very probably not only in order to impose 
their solution to the Rhodesian problem, obtain 
independence for Namibia and terminate racial 
discrimination in the South African Republic, 
but also to put an end to the domination of 
whites throughout southern Africa. They have 
received a certain amount of outside support, 
particularly from the Soviet Union and 
China, which have supplied arms to several of 
them (Tanzania and Zambia, for instance), and 
they have a strong majority in the United 
Nations. Moreover, all African countries have 
affirmed the principle of solidarity with the 
cause of the black population of southern Africa, 
although some are afraid that new communist 
regimes may be set up in southern Africa and 
stop we11 short of unconditional opposition to the 
South African Republic. 
53. The western countries certainly agree that 
a solution should be found in Rhodesia and 
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Namibia which meets the claims of the African 
countries. They are not so unanimous when they 
envisage the consequences of a possible overthrow 
of the present regime in South Africa. Admitted-
ly, they all feel that the policy of racial discri-
mination practised by the South African Govern-
ment is moralJy unacceptable and endangers 
relations between Europe and Africa. But none 
of them has dared to consider openly the con-
sequences of the black population assuming power 
in South Africa which might mean strongly anti-
western forces being moved into this vital area. 
Thus, on 25th August 1977, Mr. Young, United 
States representative at the Lagos anti-apartheid 
conference, did not hesitate to warn the African 
countries against a policy of over-radical sanc-
tions against South Africa, which he said might 
kill rather than cure the patient. 
54. The principal aim of western pressure on 
South Africa was to induce it to halt its policy 
of annexation in Namibia, stop supporting the 
Rhodesian regime and transform its internal 
regime by giving equal treatment to blacks and 
whites. The policy pursued by South Africa in 
recent months with regard to Namibia and Rho-
desia shows that this pressure was to no avail, 
but the results have also eliminated some of the 
more serious reasons for continuing to exert 
pressure. It must be borne in mind that if this 
pressure were to lead to the total isolation of 
South Africa and endanger the continued pre-
sence of the white element there, it would be 
going far beyond the intentions of many of those 
who called on the West to adopt a firm policy 
towards South Africa. 
55. In short, it is most important for all members 
of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly the EEC 
countries which are endeavouring to work out a 
common policy for their relations with Africa, 
to hold close and frequent consultations on the 
action to be taken and also on the very aims of 
their policy so as to avoid hasty action which 
might compromise the permanent interests of 
Europe and the West and lead to a situation in 
Africa liable to harden positions or encourage 
intervention from without. 
V. Equatorial Africa 
56. Equatorial Africa is dominated by the 
former Belgian Congo, now Zai:re, which occupies 
a central position, covers a large area and has a 
population of 26 million. The West, and particu-
larly the United States, made considerable efforts 
following the decolonisation of the Congo to 
maintain its territorial unity, which was threat-
ened by a large number of internal and external 
forces working to break it up. 
57. But when Portugal granted independence 
to Angola, several political organisations fought 
for power until the MPLA won with the help of 
the Soviet Union. The regime set up in this region 
traversed by most of southern Za'ire's lines of 
communication with the Atlantic thus received 
considerable military assistance from the Soviet 
Union, particularly through the intermediary of 
Cuba which sent several thousand "volunteers" 
t,o Angola (more than 20,000 according to reliable 
sources). Nor does it seem, despite the presence 
of these Cuban forces, that the MPLA is able to 
exercise effective control over the whole country. 
58. The regime which has been established in 
Mozambique moreover does not seem content, as 
is the case in many African countries, with 
deveLoping the alliance with Moscow or Peking 
and purchasing arms from them. Recent informa-
tion indicates that the aim is to impose a real 
economic and political dictatorship by authori-
tarian means. 
59. Moreover, since relations between southern 
Za'ire and the Indian Ocean are controlled either 
by Tanzania, where there is a considerable 
Chinese presence, or by Mozambique, the former 
Katanga, the province with the largest copper 
and uranium reserves, was in danger of being 
asphyxiated, which explains why Za'ire assisted 
the opponents of the MPLA during the Angolan 
war of independence. 
60. At the beginning of 1977, when President 
Mobuto's government in Za'ire appeared weakened 
by the effects of the world economic crisis, this 
province, now known as Shaba, was invaded by 
forces from Angola which threatened to cause 
a further split in Za'ire or to overthrow the 
regime. Finally, the Katanga "police force" seems 
to have returned to Angola. Za'ire received 
no direct assistance from the western powers 
apart from France's help in transporting Moroc-
can forces to Za'ire. During the crisis the United 
States did not wish to intervene on the side of 
the Za'ire regime as it had done fifteen years 
before. 
61. It may be quite a reasonable policy to leave 
the Africans full responsibility for organising 
their security. In any event, the West should not 
act in disarray and through one country's uni-
lateral action find itself involved in a political 
and military venture about which there had been 
no consultation or real consensus. Conversely, 
Europe cannot allow powers outside Africa to 
exploit internal African conflicts in order to 
establish an economic, political and military 
presence. In short, consultations with a view to 
joint action by the Western European countries 
should be essential in such circumstances. 
VI. North- West Africa 
62. Frontiers between North-West African 
States are particularly precarious and question-
117 
DOCUMENT 772 
able because they mainly cut across desert areas 
inhabited by nomadic tribes over which the 
governments have little control. Since the end 
of French control in Algeria, the latter has had 
clashes with Morocco over the position of its 
western frontiers, and this dispute flared up 
again in 1976 after Spain granted independence 
to the western Sahara. 
63. This region was shared between its two 
neighbours, Morocco and Mauritania, although at 
least part of the population (the Sahrawis) wished 
to remain independent. They formed the Polisa-
rio, which is waging guerrilla warfare against 
both Morocco and Mauritania. The latter, mainly 
desert, has very few armed forces and appears 
to be having great trouble resisting Polisario 
raids. Algeria supplies the Polisario with military 
assistance and also provides a base for the fighting 
or non-fighting elements responsible for the raids 
on Morocco and Mauritania. The seriousness of 
this affair stems inter alia from the fact that 
when Morocco and Mauritania shared the 
western Sahara they took no account of the 
principle that frontiers established in Africa 
during the coLonial period should be maintained. 
Their action would have been justifiable only if 
there had been very wide agreement from the 
inhabitants of the western Sahara, which does 
not appear to have been the case. 
64. The covert war being waged in this region 
is one reason for the serious tension between 
Algeria and its western neighbours, and the 
European countries interested in the exploitation 
of Mauritania's mineral resources may find 
themselves involved in this problem one way or 
another. This is particularly true of France, 
several of whose nationals have been kidnapped 
or killed during Polisario raids. 
65. There is a similar problem in the frontier 
area between Libya and Chad. The Government 
of Chad has never had any real control over an 
immense territory consisting mainly of very 
sparsely populated desert. Northern Chad (the 
Tibesti area) and particularly the Toubou tribe 
have been in constant rebellion since Chad became 
independent. They are S'Upported by Libya, which 
has territorial claims to the northern part of 
Chad of which it occupies a part. For several 
years France gave Chad military support in 
putting down the rebellion. It continues to sup-
ply Chad with military equipment and advisers 
and is thus indirectly involved in the conflict. 
66. It is extremely difficult to assess how 
representative the Chad rebellion is compared 
with the N'Djamene government and to obtain 
an accurate picture of the positions occupied by 
the forces on either side. So far, action by non-
African powers in the western Sahara and in 
Chad has been very limited, and it would prob-
ably be wiser for Western Europe to adopt a 
cautious wait-and-see attitude in both areas. 
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VU. North-East Africa 
67. Ethiopia, which is in the centre of this 
region, is its largest and most heavily-populated 
country. It might have been thought that its 
Long history and the existence of a state reconsti-
tuted after the collapse of a brief Italian rule 
would have allowed it to evade the kind of chal-
lenges arising in states of colonial origin. This 
is not so. Ethiopia annexed the former Italian 
colony of Eritrea, where a major rebellion has 
progressively developed. As long as there was 
still a sufficiently strong regime in Addis Ababa, 
external powers refrained from intervening in 
Ethiopia. However, there was a growing number 
of revolts and Haile Selassie's regime proved 
increasingly incapable of maintaining internal 
order. When this regime collapsed and was repla-
ced by a military directorate, the situation dete-
riorated still further. The rebellions spread to a 
very large part of the territory and in the Soma-
li-populated south-east, support is received from 
Somalia, which in turn seems to be receiving con-
siderable military and financial assistance from 
Saudi Arabia after previously having received 
support from the Soviet Union. In the early 
months of 1977, the insurgent Somalis and the 
regular forces of the Somali army occupied a 
large section of Ethiopian territory, including 
the Ogaden Plateau. 
68. The former Eritrea is in full revolt and the 
French withdrawal from Djibouti in spring 1977 
may give further extension to a conflict which 
stemmed partly from the wish of the Somali 
people to reconstitute a vast Somali empire cover-
ing present-day Somalia, Djibouti and a large 
part of Ethiopia. The Somali Government denies 
such expansionist aims but there can be no 
doubt that it was involved on the side of the 
revolt of the Somali people in Ethiopia. The 
West was not directly involved in the North-
East African conflicts but the maintenance of 
a French force in Djibouti raises the question 
of how long it could avoid involvement should 
fighting continue. 
69. FolLowing the fall of Haile Selassie, Ethiopia 
turned to the Soviet Union for technical and 
military assistance. But until quite recently 
Somalia was also supported by the Soviet Union 
which provided it with weapons too. In the cir-
cumstances, it is therefore the Soviet Union 
which is making the greatest effort to re-establish 
peace between its allies. It announced in Sep-
tember 1977 that it would no longer supply arms 
to Somalia, but it has supplied increasing quan-
tities to Ethiopia and the Cuban "volunteers" 
fighting with the Ethiopian army and has sent 
a large number of technical advisers to Ethiopia. 
By the beginning of 1978, it at least seems to 
have managed - in response to American 
requests - to halt Ethiopian counter-offensives 
on the Somali frontier, thus preserving the 
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chances of a return to peace based on the status 
quo ante. 
70. Furthermore, in the next few years, all 
the problems connected with East Africa may 
feel the repercussions of the considerable develop-
ment of the wealth and power of certain Middle 
Eastern countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. The reputation of the Arab countries which 
for a long time practised slave trading, probably 
leaves much to be desired in black Africa. But 
the vast sums they have accumulated from the 
sale of oil now allow them to provide large-scale 
development assistance to countries which are 
still very poor as Saudi Arabia has done in the 
Sudan and Kenya. They can also supply arms 
either to states or to insurgents and have very 
probably done so in Eritrea and Somalia. Finally, 
Iran is in the process of building up a powerful 
navy which will probably play a decisive role in 
the Indian Ocean in future years. 
71. Such interventions at present favour conser-
vative forces, particularly in Oman, where Ira-
nian assistance has enabled the sultan to over-
come the Dhofar revolt and in the Sudan, where 
Mr. Nemery's government seems to have aban-
doned its former radical positions. 
72. But the indications are that African prob-
lems will slip increasingly away from the con-
trol of those who envisaged a continental order 
in Africa and will gradually find a point of 
balance controlled from outside Africa. The eco-
nomic progress of certain Middle Eastern coun-
tries is already making them a pole of attraction 
for immigrant workers from Pakistan and Soma-
lia. The control they can exercise over Red Sea 
and Arab-Persian Gulf issues is thereby becoming 
ever more real and they will probably soon be 
able to extend this control along the western 
shores of the Indian Ocean. 
73. The Ethiopian affair may become particu-
larly serious because it might be the start of a 
challenge to everything that seemed stable in 
Africa., particularly the principle of the intan-
gibility of states and frontiers inherited from 
colonial times. Indeed, the situation in Ethiopia 
where different tribes, languages and religions 
are grouped together is to be found throughout 
the whole of Africa and has already led to 
disturbances and fighting as in Zaire and Nige-
ria. But the case of Ethiopia is even more com-
plicated by outside intervention and particularly 
by the flow of Arab money to Somalia. 
Vffi. Western Europe's policy in Africa 
7 4. A rapid review of developments on the Afri-
can continent in recent years and the problems 
now facing it demonstrates the extreme complex-
ity of the situation that has developed there. 
Over-simplified or over-hasty judgments such as 
the classification of the African countries into 
supporters or opponents of the West, the Soviet 
Union or China are very misleading since the 
courses followed by those countries are always 
liable to change at very short notice as has often 
occurred in the past. 
75. There is probably one permanent factor, 
i.e. the Africans' desire to settle African prob-
lems themselves. But even this principle, to 
which they all claim to be attached, is often 
infringed by the African states themselves and 
even more so by revolutionary movements 
endeavouring to change the status quo. 
76. Faced with this extremely complex situation, 
Europe has the utmost difficulty in defining a 
meaningful policy. Several European states ad-
mittedly have an African policy but rare are those 
whose policy covers all African problems. Most 
have special relationships with a specific state 
or group of states and consider their action in 
Africa as a development of these connections. 
77. In this respect, the EEC was perhaps for 
too long guided by the fact that, prior to the 
accession of the United Kingdom, France and 
Belgium played a major role in working out 
the Community's African policy. The Commun-
ity was more concerned with northern, western 
and central Africa than with eastern and south-
ern Africa. Western Europe's policy towards 
Africa should probably now be reviewed because 
the links between ex-colonial powers and some 
of their former colonies are more relaxed and 
greater interest is being taken in African prob-
lems, precisely because of the close relations be-
tween the EEC and Africa, by countries which 
had not played a major role in Africa in the 
ea:dy post-war years. Furthermore, the fact that 
Europe is seeking political unity means it should 
try to unify the policies of the separate European 
countries. Encouragement is to be found in the 
fact that Africa is essential to Europe and will 
be increasingly so insofar as the latter seeks a 
place in the economic, political and military 
balance of the world. The limited area covered 
by Western Europe, sadly lacking in raw mate-
rials, means that industrial and trade activities 
can be developed only in close association with a 
larger continent with greater resources but less 
geared to such activities. 
78. Moreover, Europe's African policy cannot be 
seen in isolation from its general policy be it 
in economic matters or external policy and 
defence. A cursory review of Africa's present 
problems shows that all the forces now playing 
a role in the world have one or more points 
of contact on the African continent. It therefore 
seems increasingly difficult to uphold certain 
principles, in East-West relations in Europe, for 
instance, and at the same time act in a manner 
which is contrary to these principles in Africa. 
This is certainly true of the Soviet-Union's inter-
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vention in Angola when it ignored the principles 
of non-intervention and respect for frontiers 
which it upheld in Europe in the framework of 
the CSCE. 
79. But it also applies to the Western European 
countries which, in southern Africa, for instance, 
can hardly ignore breaches of human rights no 
less serious than those they denounce in the 
Soviet Union's application of the Helsinki third 
basket. Finally, it is quite evident that a Euro-
pean defence policy requires security of access 
to raw materials and lines of communication, 
which cannot be guaranteed if external powers 
install themselves on the African continent. 
80. Again, Europe must fully realise the Afri-
cans' need for close co-operation. For the African 
countries, only such co-operation can compensate 
the disadvantages of very sharp fluctuations in 
the price of raw materials, exports of which 
are an essential part of their economy. They 
also know that their development, including their 
agriculture, cannot be satisfactorily pursued 
without continuing technical co-operation or even 
financial assistance from Europe, whose invest-
ments are often essential. 
81. Thus, the idea sometimes expressed in the 
term "Eurafrica" must be retained. There must 
be no question of resuscitating an obsolete colo-
nial system or 'again making Africa dependent on 
or subordinate to Europe. But underlying this 
notion is the idea of deep solidarity which neither 
side can avoid. The colonial past certainly still 
plays a major role, both positive and negative, 
in relations between Europeans and Africans, but 
it must not veil the fact that there are even 
earlier, and so to speak permanent, links between 
the two continents. 
82. Nevertheless, while it is possible to define 
a few principles which should govern relations 
between Europe and Africa such as respect for 
human rights or non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of states, it is very difficult to translate 
these principles into a common policy. 
83. Thus Europe is bound to take account of 
the special agreements associating certain Com-
munity members with certain African states. 
But because of these agreements it might find 
itseLf involved, as France was inter alia in the 
Chad conflict, on the side of established regimes 
which are also contested regimes and consequently 
have to take part in defending a political and 
territorial status quo which the African people 
find increasingly inacceptable and which would 
conform neither to the principles it claims to 
defend nor to its own true interests. 
84. Nor, clearly, can it support or allow to 
develop revolutionary forces which sometimes 
have considerable ambitions but which may not 
necessarily be representative of the country as a 
whole. Naturally, the principle that it is for 
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the Afdcans to settle problems concerning their 
continent fully conforms to the interests of 
Europe, which would have nothing to gain from a 
military undertaking whose principal result 
would be to turn the Africans unanimously or 
almost unanimously against it. But full applica-
tion of the principle of non-intervention would 
also involve dangers which would be the greater 
since external powers such as the Soviet Union 
and China have no compunction about interven-
ing directly or indirectly according to the case. 
85. Moreover, Europe is still the principal sup-
plier of arms to Africa. Generally speaking, 
European arms are sold to states and not to 
insurgents and they should help to maintain a 
certain degree of stability. But in the event of 
civil war in those states or hostilities with their 
neighbours these sales of arms involve Europe 
in spite of itself in sometimes dubious and 
morally ill-founded complications. 
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86. At first sight therefore it seems impossible 
to define a policy which the European countries 
should follow in Africa. They must exercise great 
discernment and above all exchange information 
on a continuing basis about their respective 
interests and aims in order to avoid their legitim-
ate interests bringing them into conflict or involv-
ing them in differences over which there has 
been no prior agreement. 
87. Such consultations are held in the framework 
of the EEC where trade and economic and tech-
nical assistance are concerned. Views are not 
sufficiently concerted on political and military 
matters, as has been elearly demonstrated by 
events in recent months and the mistrust they 
have aroused between Western European coun-
tries. Now that African problems seem to be 
taking a more serious turn, it is primordial to 
call upon our governments to intensify such 
consultations. 
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APPENDIX 
Economic role of the South African Republic 
1. Share of South Africa in world mineral production and reserues 
Known reserves 
Tons 
Gold 15,000 
Platinum and 
related metals 30,000 
Vanadium 14,000,000 
Antimony 200,000 
Chromium 3,000,000,000 
Manganese 3,000,000,000 
Diamonds 10 
Uranium 250,000 
Asbestos 9,000,000 
Nickel 5,000,000 
Fluorine 200,000,000 
Zinc 12,000,000 
2. South Africa's customers (%) 
1. Western Europe 
%of 
world 
reserves 
49% 
86% 
64% 
4% 
83% 
48% 
7% 
17% 
10% 
10% 
46% 
9% 
55.2% 
) 
Federal Republic 
of of Germany 
which United Kingdom 
18.2% 
16.6% 
2. Japan 
3. United States 
4. Africa 
5. Canada 
19.6% 
10.6% 
7.4% 
4.1% 
World 
rank 
1 
1 
1 
5 
1 
1 
2 
4 
5 
3 
1 
4 
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Production 
%of World %of Tons world 
rank African production production 
713 59% 1 94% 
125 55% 1 100% 
8,510 46% 1 92% 
15,173 21% 1 87% 
2,607,000 30% 2 74% 
5,900,000 24% 2 73% 
1.5 17% 3 20% 
2,900 13% 3 60% 
354,500 10% 3 56% 
20,750 3% 7 62% 
202,580 5% 8 62% 
61,260 1% 18 23% 
' 
3. Oil transported uia the cape route 
596. million tons 
65 % of Middle East oil exports 
58 % of the oil tankers in commission 
42 % of all oil transported by sea 
65 % of the oil consumed in Western Europe 
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Amendment No. I 
19th June 1978 
European security and African problems 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
talbed by Mr. Kershaw and others 
In paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper, after "of" insert "Zaire". 
Signed: Kershaw, Page, Bennett 
1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment No. 2 
European security and African problems 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Roberti 
20th June 1978 
At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add the following new paragraph: 
"Ensure that there are not created on the African continent, through the acts of the Soviet 
Union or its allies, in particular Cuba, military or strategic zones of influence because of the 
danger of encirclement that such situations would present for Europe and the Mediterranean." 
Signed : Roberti 
1. See 5th Sitting, 21st JWie 1978 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment No. 3 
European security and African problems 
AMENDMENT No. 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Muller 
20th June 1978 
1. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add the following new paragraphs: 
"Welcoming the effort made by several African states to form a force with a view to main-
taining peace on the African continent and defending it against any interference from out-
side; 
Encouraging the member countries to pursue the efforts made in Paris on 5th June 1978 by 
five western powers and in Copenhagen on 12th June by the members of the European 
Community to concert their African policies,". 
2. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add the following new paragraph: 
"Encourage and afford effective support for the steps taken by several African states to com-
bine their efforts with a view to maintaining peace in Africa and defending the African con-
tinent against any interference from outside." 
Signed: Muller 
1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Part 1 agreed to; part 2 amended and agreed to). 
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Amendment No. 4 
European security and African problems 
AMENDMENT No. 4 1 
tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others 
In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 7 and insert: 
20th Jnne 1978 
"7. Relate the economic assistance extended by European countries to the African states to the 
development of human rights in those countries." 
Signed : Stofjelen, Roper, van den Bergh, Whitehead 
1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment No. 5 
European security and African problems 
AMENDMENT No. 5 1 
tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others 
20th June 1978 
In paragraph ll of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "particularly" and insert 
"for example". 
Signed : Stoffelen, Bagier, van den Bergh 
1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment withdrawn). 
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Amendment No. 6 
European security and African problems 
AMENDMENT No. 6 1 
tabled by Mr. Antoni and others 
I. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 10. 
21st June 1978 
2. In paragraph ll of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "aggressive"; leave out "par-
ticularly the present Cuban operations" ; at the end of the paragraph add "and obtain the with-
drawal of all foreign military presence in Mrica". 
Signed : Antoni, Oalamandrei, Bernini 
1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment negatived), 
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Amendment No. 7 
European security and African problems 
AMENDMENT No. 7 1 
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere 
21st June 1978 
At the end of paragraph ll of the draft recommendation proper, add "encouraged by the 
support of the Soviet Union". 
Signed : Oavaliere 
I. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Draft Recommendation 
on United Statea-Buropean co-operation and competition in advanced technology 
The Assembly, 
Considering that, notwithstanding the mutual European-United States interest in a common defence 
system, S 10-15 billion is wasted each year on complicated military equipment either already produced or 
in service on this or the other side of the Atlantic ; 
Convinced that greater international co-operation in advanced technology projects is a necessity if 
the free world is to strengthen its posture vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc ; 
Noting the need expressed in industrial circles for more transatlantic co-operation to strengthen 
the Atlantic Alliance ; 
Considering that existing organisations can adequately and actively promote the necessary co-
operation ; 
Aware of the strong influence the adoption of an American national energy plan will have on Europe's 
possibilities as regards oil and gas supplies and the dangers which will arise if the oil-producing nations 
are unable to meet world demand in 1985 by as much as 20%; 
Aware that several member countries and the United States are independently developing new 
methods for the gasification and liquefaction of coal and that large sums of money are needed to promote 
alternative technologies ; 
Convinced of the need to relay data from European satellites via the new tracking and data relay 
satellite system TDRSS; 
Considering that member governments should pursue a policy whereby all Europe's space activities 
are integrated in ESA and that through ESA they should co-operate with the United States, and with 
NASA in particular, since there will shortly be new space developments in both communications and energy 
and both agencies have restricted budgets ; 
Considering that the United States Government's new aviation policy and liberal pricing system 
will have far-reaching repercussions for both the airlines and the aircraft industry ; 
Regretting the deplorably slow rate of progress in the Law of the Sea Conference now in its seventh 
session; 
Noting that : 
(a) marine scientists in the United States and elsewhere are inhibited by the 200-mile limit of the 
economic zone following the Law of the Sea Conference in their fundamental and applied research 
on mineral and organic resources of the oceans, and on energy which might be derived from 
tapping the natural flows of tides, waves and currents ; 
(b) fish supplies in the Mediterranean and oceans can be enhanced by the addition of organic wastes; 
(c) measures to conserve or destroy certain species of sea fauna can disturb the balance of nature 
and cause a chain reaction of effects upon other species, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments : 
A. To establish a high-level Europea.n-United States committee to promote Europea.n-United States 
co-operation in advanced technology projects in which the EEC would also participate on the European 
side, this high-level committee meeting at least once a year and submitting proposals to the governments 
concerned on : 
(a) how to implement the two-way street policy in respect of advanced military equipment in order 
to make more efficient use of Alliance resources ; 
(b) how to promote this policy at an early stage in research and development of new advanced weapon 
systems; 
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(c) how to include military satellites and other military communications equipment in this co-
operation whenever possible ; 
(d) how to work together in research and development of alternative technologies such as gasification 
and liquefaction of coal, solar energy and other new sources of energy and how to improve the 
productivity of certain nuclear reactors ; 
(e) how to co-operate in civil and military oceanographic activities, especially in seabed mining 
and the sharing of data. on fish conservation, and promote the successful conclusion of the Law 
of the Sea Conference ; 
B. 1. To initiate urgent consideration by the United Nations as to means by which fundamental and applied 
ocean research can continue without restraint whilst providing for the mineral and other rights of each 
coastal state by sharing and publishing the results of research ; 
2. To adopt national fisheries and conservation policies which reflect scientific knowledge in respect of: 
(i) the interrelationships between each species and its prey (e.g. porpoises and tuna); 
(ii} the effect upon fish stocks of organic wastes which when sufficiently diluted are generally beneficial 
and inorganic wastes which are generally detrimental ; 
C. To adopt a common policy in the EEC framework vis-a-vis the new United States aviation policy 
and not act in a dispersed manner with regard to the new aviation agreements now suggested by the United 
States; 
D. 1. To instruct ESA to study the possibilities either of participating in the United States tracking and 
data relay satellite system and building the required European ground station or of building its own TDRS 
system; 
2. To draw up guidelines for working with the United States authorities on the development of the 
space shuttle transportation system, with special reference to communications and solar power satellites ; 
3. To participate in more of NASA'S scientific space projects through ESA. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by MM. Konings, Treu, Dr. Phipps and Mr. Jessel, Rapporteurs) 
Introduction 
1. The Committee wishes to preface its report 
with its sincere thanks to the Presidential Com-
mittee which gave its agreement to the visit which 
was made to the United States from lOth to 21st 
April 1978 1 • 
2. The outline of the visit was drawn up by 
the Chairman and the United States Ambassador 
in Paris Mr. Arthur Hartmann, who afforded 
the Co~ittee every assistance in establishing 
a highly interesting and useful programme. The 
staff at the Embassy, the State Department and 
NASA civil servants in charge of the arrange-
ments the representatives of NASA in Paris, 
of B~eing General Dynamics and TRW in 
Brussels ;nd many others contributed to making 
the visit a remarkable success. The Committee 
expresses its sincere appreciation of their valuable 
assistance. 
3. In order to handle the mass of information 
and material collected during the visit the Com-
mittee decided to appoint four Rapporteurs to 
cover the various questions as follows : 
Mr. Konings : Communications ; 
Mr. Treu : Aerospace developments ; 
Dr. Phipps: Energy; 
Mr. Jessel : Oceanography. 
4 In addition to visits to industries or institu-
tions related to these matters, the Committee 
had the opportunity of meeting representatives 
of the City Council of Seattle and the ~~get 
Sound Council of Governments and v1s1ted 
modern developments in urban planning and 
social housing projects. Modern urban transport 
planning was discussed with Mrs. Williams, Ci.ty 
Councillor, Mr. Stafford, Mr. Power and M1ss 
Rona Zevin. 
5. In San Diego, the Committee visited the 
Salk Institute where Mr. John B. Pinto, Public 
Affairs Manager, explained the workings of this 
institute for biological studies 2• 
6. In preparing for its visit the Committee 
studied a number of questions for use as guide-
lines for its discussions in the United States, 
covering matters of concern to the State Depart-
1. See Appendix I : Programme of the visit to the 
United States by the Committee on Scientific, Technolo-
gical and Aerospace Questions - 10th-21st April 1978. 
2. See Appendix II : The Salk Institute for Biolo· 
gical Studies. 
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ment, NASA, the Energy Department and the 
Senate Sub-Committee on Science, Technology 
and Space 1 • 
I. Communications 
(submitted by Mr. Konings, Rapporteur) 
7. The telephone has become such an integral 
part of our daily lives in Europe and the United 
States that it is sometimes surprising to recall 
that this early marvel of communication was 
invented only 100 years ago, and that there was 
no telephonic communication between Europe and 
America by cable until 1956 2 • The radio-
telephone links on which transatlantic communic-
ations had depended during the previous thirty 
years were subject to ionospheric di~rupt~ons 
which frequently caused prolonged d1stortwn, 
fading and even total blackout. 
8. The continuous growth in the volume of 
telecommunications - an important index of 
growth and development - is no longer con-
ceivable without an ever-increasing use of space 
techniques. The annual turnover of the world's 
telecommunications industry is now about 
$66,000 million ; it is increasing at an annual 
rate of 15 % and there is nothing to indicate that 
this rate may slacken in the near future. Like-
wise the International Telecommunications Union 
estimates that the volume of long-distance tele-
phone calls will grow by anything between 15 
and 27 % a year in the foreseeable future. More-
over, while the industrial aspect of telecommunic-
ations makes them an important sector of econo-
mic activity they also play an important role 
in other ess~ntial functions such as production, 
marketing and administration. The mastery of 
space communications therefore has major indus-
trial, economic and politico-military significance. 
9. It was not surprising that the first wide-
spread use of space was through the use of com-
munications satellites in earth orbit. Beginning 
by bouncing signals off the Echo I balloon satel-
lite in 1960, NASA in the United States pioneered 
a series of active research satellites. 
10. Communications satellites have revolution-
ised communications in a very short time and 
have substantially reduced the cost of world-wide 
communications ; they have more than repaid 
the cost of their development and launching. For 
1. See Appendix III : List of questions put during 
the visit to the United States. 
2. See ESA publication : "Space - part of Europe's 
environment", pages 21-23. 
example, a decade ago the cost of a three-minute 
daytime telephone call from New York to London 
via transatlantic cable was $12.50 ; now, the same 
call via satellite costs only $5.50 in today's cur-
rency. The cost of world-wide television transmis-
sion has dropped by 80 % from the early satellite 
broadcasts to the present. Prior to the introduc-
tion of satellites, a cable circuit from the west 
coast of the United States to Japan cost $15,000 
a month ; today a communications satellite offers 
the same services for $4,000 per month. 
11. Satellites making direct television broad-
casts to community receivers are demonstrating 
their potential for delivering educational, medical 
and other services to remote and hitherto un-
reachable populations. 
12. The development of operational space tele-
communications in the world is ahead of all other 
applications sectors. Satellites have been provid-
ing cost-effective ~ntercontinentallinks for twelve 
years, and the first domestic system was commis-
sioned in 1973. 
13. Satellite communications are divided into 
three sectors of activity : 
(i) point-to-point communications (fixed 
service) ; 
( ii) maritime and aeronautical communic-
ations (mobile services) ; 
( iii) direct broadcasting. 
Point-to-point communications 
14. The aim of the European Space Agency 
(ESA) in Europe and of NASA in the United 
States in this field is to provide the post and 
telecommunications and broadcasting administra-
tions of the member countries with satellite links 
capable, as from 1980, of carrying a large part 
of intra-EuropP.aH and American telephone, tele-
graph and telex traffic and of relaying television 
programmes. More specialised services such as 
data transmission, teleconferring and off-shore 
oil-rig communications are also envisaged. 
15. Traffic forecasts made by European and 
American postal authorities show that the opera-
tional satellite system needs to be able to carry 
the equivalent of approximately 5,000 telephone 
circuits in 1980 (for traffic between points 
more than the economic minimum of 800 km 
apart) rising to about 20,000 in 1990. In this 
programme will be the first launching of the 
new generation of Intelsat in 1979. Intelsat V 
will be a co-operative project between ESA and 
NASA. This satellite will have 10,000 telephone 
circuits. The basic requirement for TV channels 
is the permanent allocation of two wide-band 
repeaters capable of transmitting high-quality 
television. There will be at least one large earth 
station handling telephone traffic and TV trans-
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mission in each country or state requiring these 
services. A number of earth stations handling 
exclusively TV transmission are envisaged for 
countries (in North Africa, the Middle East and 
South America, for example) requiring this 
service only. 
Orbital test satellite (OTS) 
16. In Europe point-to-point satellite com-
munications activities began in 1971 with the 
evaluation of a European regional system. The 
development of an OTS was started in 1972, 
based on needs defined in consultation with the 
European Conference of Post and Telecom-
munications and the European Broadcasting 
Union. The programme provided for the launch-
ing of this satellite in the middle of 1977 to 
enable the future users to prepare for the opera-
tional phase, but this date could not be main-
tained. The first, but unsuccessful, launch took 
place in September 1977. 
17. OTS is designed to : 
( i) demonstrate the performance and 
reliability in orbit of all on-board 
equipment (payload, spacecraft sys-
tems and sub-systems) ; 
( ii) fulfil from an experimental com-
munication system point of view the 
objectives required by a subsequent 
operational mission (experiments on 
propagation, frequency reuse, trans-
mission impairments, time division 
multiple access, etc.) ; 
( iii) provide an experimental and pre-
operational traffic capacity (6,000 
telephony circuits and two television 
channels). 
18. Prior to the launch of OTS, several items 
of equipment developed for the satellite (flexible 
solar panels, travelling wave-tube amplifier) were 
successfully flown and tested on board the 
Canadian Communications Technology Satellite 
(CTS). 
19. CTS is a communications satellite with a 
new type transmitter with a power of 200 watts 
with a very large transmitting aerial. It was a 
co-operative project between Canada and the 
United States. The satellite has two channels 
for full-colour TV relays. 
20. OTS was the third European communica-
tions satellite to be developed in Europe after 
the experimental Franco-German Symphonie and 
Italian Sirio satellites. Unlike its predecessors, 
however, OTS forms part of a programme 
designed to lead to the establishment of an 
operational European regional satellite system. 
The satellite's capacity falls in the lntelsat IV 
class. 
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21. OTS is three-axis stabilised and of modular 
construction with two main components : a service 
module, providing all the basic service functions 
and a communications module containing the 
payload. The satellite's attitude is controlled to 
keep the six SHF antennas pointed towards the 
earth within 0.2° of their assigned direction. The 
coverage of the antennas (one Spotbeam, three 
Eurobeam A and two Eurobeam B) include not 
only the whole of Western Europe but also the 
Middle East, North Africa and Iceland. The 
Spotbeam antenna, serving a restricted area, 
transmits point-to-point telephone communica-
tions ; the Eurobeam antennas transmit television 
signals which normally have multiple destina-
tions. There are plans in the United States to 
operate with the Spotbeam antenna in very 
restricted areas such as a town or state. In tele-
phone communications satellites replace the need 
for cables. 
22. As one of the first communications satellites 
operating at frequencies in the region of 11 and 
14 gigahertz, OTS gives experimenters the pos-
sibility of testing simultaneously wide-band 
digital transmissions between large stations and 
narrow-band signals between small stations. 
Propagation measurements at up and down link 
frequencies are also possible. The modular con-
cept of the satellite enables it to be adapted 
easily and economically to different missions. 
Various payloads can be carried without costly 
redesign of the service module and even the com-
munications module can be adapted to carry 
alternative payloads without major redesign. 
Further flexibility is provided by the fact that 
the satellite structure is designed to accommodate 
a heavier weight than is needed for OTS and 
thus has significant growth capability for future 
requirements. 
23. Development of the OTS spacecraft and of 
its derivative Marots was entrusted by ESA to 
the MESH consortium, with Hawker-Siddeley 
Dynamics as prime contractor. 
24. The communications payload main contrac-
tor chosen for OTS was AEG-Telefunken, and 
for Marots Marconi Space and Defence Systems. 
25. An important development is the steadily-
growing number of frequencies thanks to the 
increasing capacities of more sophisticated satel-
lites. The larger satellites cover frequencies of 
11-14 gigahertz. The first experiments were made 
under ESA supervision with the American 
applications technology satellite ATS-6 which was 
launched in May 1974. With this satellite fre-
quencies of 20-30 gigahertz were used and the 
lotalmn Sirio satellite contains experiments in the 
range of 12-18 gigahertz. These experiments are 
still being conducted and important results can 
be expected in the course of next year. The ATS-6 
was the first communications satellite with the 
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power to broadcast TV images to small local 
receivers. 
26. The OTS was successfully launched on 
11th May 1978 at Cape Canaveral by a NASA 
Thor-Delta 3914 launcher. It will be placed in 
a geostationary orbit of 36,000 km altitude and 
its first telephone and television emissions are 
programmed for the beginning of June 1978. 
Europe's regional system 
27. In 1971 the European Space Research 
Organisation decided to undertake as a major 
applications programme the development of a 
European communications satellite system with 
the ultimate goal of self-sufficiency for Western 
Europe in satellite communications. Neither the 
programme nor the needs it was to meet were 
defined concretely at that time and they were to 
evolve over the next few years. However, the 
goal remained to provide an operational satellite 
system by 1980 which would meet the needs of 
the European Conference of Post and Telecom-
munications and the European Broadcasting 
Union. 
28. As currently planned, the European com-
munications satellite (ECS) will be designed to 
meet the requirements of the European Broad-
casting Union. The satellite will also be able to 
provide specialised services and transmit signals 
and telex communications, for instance between 
oil-rigs and land stations. 
29. Between 1981 and 1990 four of these satel-
lites will be placed in geostationary orbit by the 
Ariane launcher and operated by Eutelsat, the 
organisation which was established by the Euro-
pean Conference of Post and Telecommunica-
tions. This will be the decision-making authority 
and it will be legally competent to implement the 
wishes of the telecommunications entities con-
cerned. 
Telecommunications developments in the United 
States 
30. During the Committee's visit to the United 
States it learnt of new developments in the United 
States defence satellite communications system. 
This system is a high-capacity super-high-
frequency system intended to satisfy the Ameri-
can national security communications require-
ments for world-wide military command and 
control, intelligence information transfer and 
crisis management. Apart from the requirements 
of the highest civil and military authorities it 
also covers diplomatic telecommunications needs. 
Since 1968, the year in which the system was 
established, a whole series of communications 
satellites have been placed in orbit, the most 
recent, to the best of your Rapporteur's know-
ledge, being the Fleetsatcom satellite. This is a 
major and vital step in improving naval corn-
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munications to meet the needs of the fleet in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. The satellite system 
provides protection against jamming for fleet 
broadcast transmissions and shore commands to 
ships and is extremely reliable in communications 
between ships, aircraft and command posts. Four 
of .these satellites are to be launched ; they will 
operate in the ultra-high-frequency belt which 
allows small, simple antennas aboard ships and 
other mobile users where size and weight are 
important considerations. Channels 2-10 will be 
used by the navy, 11-22 by the air force, and 
23 for the command. The channels used will be 
12-15KHz. 
31. Based on this type of satellite is the search 
and rescue mission project which will use satel-
lites as an aid in detecting and locating distress 
beacons carried by general aircraft and certain 
ships. The purpose of the project is to demon-
strate the feasibility of satellites to provide a 
significant improvement in the capability of 
search and rescue forces to detect and locate 
distress signals during emergencies. The project 
is planned as an international co-operative effort 
which will include Canada, France, and possibly 
the Soviet Union. 
Communications services for ships, aircraft, etc. 
32. Long-distance radio connections between 
ships, aircraft and ground stations use high-
frequency signals but often these communica-
tions are unsatisfactory as the high-frequency 
radio wavelengths have a tendency to fade and 
it becomes impossible to establish permanent 
communications. As a result of this, 93 % of the 
communications between ships and ground sta-
tions are in Morse ar.d only 7 % by radio tele-
phone. This is one of the reasons why ESA 
established its Marots system. 
33. Nine European nations own about 36 % of 
the world's shipping tonnage and they felt the 
need for a faster and more reliable communica-
tions system. It takes an average of six hours 
for a message to reach a ship and an additional 
six hours for the reply to be received. The United 
Kingdom was the first to promote this pro-
gramme and agreed to shoulder the major share 
- 56 % - of the financing of this maritime com-
munications satellite programme. The other ESA 
members participating in the development of 
Marots are Belgium, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. Norway, though 
not a member of ESA, is also participating. The 
member countries anticipate that communications 
via satellite will greatly increase the speed and 
reliability of maritime communications. In addi-
tion, it is hoped that the Marots system will 
relieve congestion on the frequency bands cur-
rently used, improve the quality of transmissions, 
extend the geographical coverage of communica-
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tions, provide for high-speed data transmission, 
afford more effective assistance to ships in 
distress, offer more circuits and allow automation 
of voice and telex transmissions. 
34. The first satellite will be launched from 
Cape Canaveral in August 1978 and will be 
placed in a position at 14° east longitude over 
the Indian Ocean. In ESA's opinion it is possible 
that Marots and the two Marisat satellites -
one over the Atlantic and the other over the 
Pacific - could provide almost world-wide 
operational maritime services. 
35. The Marisat system is an American system 
run by Comsat General serving some needs of 
the United States navy but, above all, providing 
commercial maritime service. Three Marisats 
were launched in 1976, the third one serving 
mainly the United States navy. Comsat General 
owns 83.6 %, the remainder being owned by the 
traditional suppliers of ship~to-shore communica-
tions such as RCA, Western Union and ITT. 
Apart from the United States navy the system 
also serves tankers, passenger ships, oil-drilling 
platforms, seismic service ships, ice-breakers and 
a British cable ship. 
36. The International Maritime Consultative 
Organisation (IMCO), a United Nations' agency, 
promoted a convention establishing Inmarsat as 
owner and operator of a global communications 
system for merchant shipping. The convention 
was drawn up on 3rd September 1976 and is now 
open for signature. Whether it will -become 
operational is not yet certain, but the possibility 
of collaboration with the Marisat Marots system 
is now being discussed. 
Aerosat 
37. The Aerosat programme was originally 
designed as a co-operative programme under 
which the United States, Canada and the member 
nations of the European Space Agency were to 
develop jointly an aeronautical communications 
satellite. There have been negotiations concerning 
this programme since the early 1970s. Several 
times during the negotiations the Europeans drew 
up agreements with United States Government 
agencies concerning Aerosat only to see them 
negated by other branches of government. 
38. In his address to the Committee on 2nd 
March 1978, Mr. Roy Gibson, Director-General 
of ESA, declared that this project was a negative 
example of co-operation with the United States. 
Originally ESA discussed the programme with 
NASA but it was then transferred from NASA 
to the Federal Aviation Agency and was recently 
abandoned. It proved, according to Mr. Gibson, 
that space agencies worked better with space 
agencies than with individual government depart-
ments. 
39. The history of the Aerosat programme 
raises many questions of policy. It is quite clear 
that conflicting interests in the United States -
the differences of opinion within government 
agencies and the interests of the private sector 
- were not handled in an orderly fashion and 
the areas of conflict were not properly defined. 
Direct television broadcasts 
40. At the present stage in the use of satellites 
for radio and television broadcasts large ground 
stations are required. A new development seeks 
to eliminate the need for such large stations. The 
orbital test satellite now being developed by 
ESA will test the possibilities of direct broad-
casting first through smaller terminals to be 
operated by the national postal authorities and 
at a later stage directly into homes. An experi-
ment in Japan with a 36 cm round antenna has 
already produced satisfactory results. 
41. New kinds of communication links are now 
being developed. In order to avoid a vast network 
of ground stations with their antennas scattered 
across the world and large numbers of satellites 
in space, especially in low orbit, a new type of 
satellite is being developed. For budgetary 
reasons NASA has accepted that this be done 
by Western Union, which has asked TRW to 
build the tracking and data relay satellite system 
(TDRSS) . The purpose of this satellite is to 
function as a ground station above the earth. 
One of the advantages of operating in space is 
that the higher the altitude the greater the 
range. 
42. The satellite will have two 16-ft antennas 
each weighing over 1,000 kg and will generate 
1,700 watts of electric power from solar arrays. 
Western Union, which already owns and operates 
the first domestic communications satellite system 
in the United States, expects the communications 
traffic to grow rapidly and wishes to expand its 
commercial services to meet demand. Six satellites 
will be built with an expected life-span of ten 
years. They will be owned and operated by 
Western Union for use by NASA, the defence 
communications satellite system and the fleet 
satellite communications system, and they will 
relay data to and from the space shuttle when 
this system becomes operational. 
Solar satellites 
43. A special communications problem will arise 
when solar power satellites become operational 
as now proposed by Boeing Aerospace Company. 
Boeing is studying the possibilities of placing 
large platforms of solar cells in space for con-
verting solar power to microwave radiation for 
transmission to receiving antennas. These plat-
forms would measure 30 X 5 km. The satellites 
are to be located in geosynchronous orbit some 
s· 
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22,000 miles above the earth. In this orbit they 
would remain in one position over the equator 
and provide a direct line-of-sight transmission 
of energy by radio beam to receivers on the 
earth. Experiments have proved that it is pos-
sible to transmit a great mass of energy to 
receivers placed relatively near the area where 
the demand for energy exists. The microwave 
beam which would be used to transmit the energy 
from space to ground can be made completely 
safe. 
44. Solar power satellites could be operational 
before the year 2000. In the development of this 
new source of energy Europe and the United 
States should collaborate. 
Co-operation between the United States and 
Europe 
45. There are many developments in the field 
of communications in both the United States and 
Europe but in the main there is little collabor-
ation whether in research and development or 
in marketing. There are some collaborative pro-
jects, but your Rapporteur has the impression 
that many obstacles have still to be overcome on 
both sides of the Atlantic and industry in parti-
cular is reluctant to co-operate as it is afraid 
of losing a competitive edge in advanced techno-
logy projects. In Europe the member countries 
of ESA have agreed to collaborate in space but 
from time to time individual member countries 
conclude separate contracts with the United 
States industry or with NASA without involving 
ESA as such. The ESA convention stipulates 
that gradually all European space projects should 
. be channelled through the agency and your Rap-
porteur regrets that some governments do not 
always apply this rule. 
46. Collaboration between ESA and NASA 
started long ago with an exchange of technical 
information. The predecessor of ESA - ESRO 
- reached the first agreement with NASA on 
the launching of its satellites in 1966 and this 
memorandum of understanding is still valid and 
will be invoked for all launches. Of special 
importance is the agreement on the space tele-
scope mission. This programme is linked to the 
use of the shuttle and the idea is that a large 
telescope wi~l be flown in the shuttle and off-
loaded in space. A similar form of agreement is 
now being discussed on the solar polar mission 
which is a scientific mission to study the poles 
of the sun. The most important collaborative 
programme is of course spacelab and the shuttle. 
47. Your Rapporteur hopes that the trend 
adopted by all European member governments 
will be towards greater integration of Europe's 
space work through ESA. The future magnitude 
of ESA's space programme will depend to a 
large extent on the future development of Euro-
..... 
~ 
QO 
FORWARD 
UNK 
MULTIPLE 
ACCESS 
S-BAND 
\ 
~ 
SPACECRAFT 
The tracking and data relay satellite system (TDRSS) 
USER 
SPACECRAFT 
TDRSS 
SERVICE 
(EAST) 
©1977 TRW Inc. all rights reserved. 
DOOUMENT 773 
139 
DOCUMENT 773 
pean society as a whole. Future space efforts 
should be extended as it is clear from the Com-
mittee's visit to the United States that many new 
developments will arise in the field of both com-
munications and energy. 
D. Aerospace developments 
(submitted by Mr. Treu, Rapporteur) 
Introductory remarks 
48. In this chapter your Rapporteur wishes 
to underline that it is not possible to discuss all 
the aerospace developments which have occurred 
during the last few years. He will therefore 
restrict himself mainly to subjects which were 
discus1red during the Committee's visit to the 
United States. The Committee was able to visit 
on the one hand the NASA headquarters and 
several NASA centres such as the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory, the Marshall Space Flight Centre 
and the Office of Science and Technology Policy 
of the President's Science Adviser and, on the 
other hand, the Boeing aircraft factories, General 
Dynamics and TRW. The general policy of the 
United States Government and some of its most 
important aeronautical industries were discussed 
in great detail during these visits. 
49. Your Rapporteur wishes to deal with two 
main subjects : new developments in aircraft 
construction and aviation and the space policy 
and activities of governmental agencies, but he 
would point out that during the visit the Com-
mittee was able to see only a few of the more 
important and interesting activities in the private 
or public sectors. 
Aviation policy 
50. Mr. Michael H. Styles, Director, Office of 
Aviation, State Department, briefed the Com-
mittee on United States international aviation 
issues and policies. Recent new developments in 
governmental aviation policy in the United States 
might have far-reaching consequences for both 
the airlines and the aircraft industry. Historically 
the United States Government advocated an open 
approach to air traffic questions. In the 1930s 
the government took control of prices and at the 
same time instituted a system of licences to be 
granted by the Civil Aviation Board. This system 
regulated competition and resulted in high prices 
for air fares. The present government believes 
that after thirty years the airlines have now 
reached maturity and that intensive government 
involvement should be stopped. The CAB is now 
encouraging a relaxation of air fare regulations. 
On international routes, the Laker Skytrain 
between London and New York showed how low 
fares could be offered to the public. 
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51. The programme of liberalisation now being 
pursued is illustrated by greater readiness to 
accept applications for new operations by existing 
companies and new ones. Applications accom-
panied by proposed new low fare options will be 
given priority. Authorisation to operate certain 
routes will be given for five years in the first 
instance and will be renewed only if the airlines 
continue to offer the low fares they promised. 
More direct air services between inland towns 
and foreign countries will be promoted and gate-
ways like New York will be gradually phased 
out. 
52. The United States authorities are convinced 
that such a system cannot be imposed by one 
country alone ; international agreements are a 
necessity and the government will try to promote 
this policy in the new agreements to be concluded. 
This has already been done in agreements with 
the Netherlands and Belgium as well as with the 
United Kingdom. Discussions have started with 
the European Civil Aviation Conference to 
formulate common principles towards charter 
flights ; the United States Government wishes to 
remove its protective mantle from the airlines 
and feels that management should shoulder its 
responsibilities in a market economy and face up 
to the true situation in which capital markets 
influence the decision-making of airline directors. 
The United States Government will not grant 
any subsidies for national or international air-
lines and will not condone the airlines sharing 
the market between themselves. 
53. In aircraft construction, no major techno-
logical breakthrough is to be expected and 
emphasis is laid on improving existing aircraft. 
The present approach will provide new oppor-
tunities in trade and commerce and will mean a 
less regulated national and international system. 
The United States is still at loggerheads with 
several European governments over the course 
of its aviation policy and problems will have 
to be worked out in negotiations. 
Boeing activities 
(i) Civil aviation 
54. When the Committee was received at the 
Boeing Company in Seattle the Executive Vice-
President, Mr. J.H. Goldie, underlined that the 
new regulations for international aviation would 
certainly change the content of the present air-
line market. He thought that greater interna-
tional co-operation in this field should be pro-
moted as this would strengthen the posture of 
the free countries vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc. 
55. In the civil field the Boeing Company is 
promoting three new aircraft: the 757, 767 and 
777. These new aircraft are a continuation of 
the series which started with the 727 ; the new 
parts are the wings and engines. The 757 is a 
150-passenger aircraft to be equipped with either 
two or three engines. The fuel consumption of 
all three aircraft will be considerably lower than 
present-day aircraft and the noise level minimal. 
The 767 and the 777 will be equipped for 180-
250 passengers. They also can be equipped with 
either two or three engines. The number of pas-
senger seats depends on the configuration 
requested by the airlines, but for the 767 a seven-
abreast configuration will be the most economical 
and the operating costs will be 30 % lower than 
the current wide-bodied aircraft. Its range of 
more than 2,000 nautical miles will give it a one-
stop transcontinental capability if equipped with 
two engines and the three-engine model will 
have non-stop transcontinental range. 
(ii) M~"litary activities 
56. In the military field much emphasis is 
placed on the mutual interests of the United 
States and Europe in the North Atlantic 
Alliance. Mr. Goldie said that in the Alliance 
enormous sums and great efforts on weapons and 
logistics were wasted as each country was building 
weapons which other members of the Alliance 
were also building or had in service. The Warsaw 
Pact countries were growing stronger every day 
with modern well-integrated equipment in vast 
quantities. The practice of each member nation 
following its own course in defence equipment 
had to be reversed if NATO was to remain 
effective. 
57. The United States Senate Armed Services 
Committee estimated this waste of resources at 
$10-15 billion per year. Even more important was 
the resulting 30% reduction in combat-effect-
iveness of the West's military forces. This 
estimate has been made by General Goodpaster, 
former Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The 
money wasted in duplication could be much 
better spent in providing our troops with fewer 
different weapons in greater numbers and in 
developing new weapons which would improve 
their ability to fight together. The two-way street 
policy advocated by the United States Govern-
ment should therefore be implemented. This 
would increase opportunities to sell European 
defence equipment provided it resulted in more 
efficient use of Alliance resources. 
58. One of Boeing's earliest involvements with 
equipment for NATO forces was the patrol hydro-
foil missile ship. The United States, Italy and 
Germany, the signatories of the original co-
operation agreement in 1972, abandoned this 
programme some years later because of the econ-
omic situation and severe budgetary limitations 
as well a change in national priorities. All that 
remained of this programme were the five boats 
ordered by the United States nayY. 
59. This was a discouraging start, but the 
Boeing Company nevertheless co-operated in the 
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AWACS system, the E-3A airborne warning and 
control system, designed to support the military 
forces in many areas of operational interest : 
air defence operations, tactical air operations, 
maritime operations, threat assessment and tac-
tical ground force operations. The AWACS will 
provide NATO commanders with improved force 
effectiveness and surveillance and control flexibil-
ity. The system will normally be used to transmit 
track and target data to ground- or ship-based 
command and control centres, where actual 
deployment decisions will be made. However, it 
can also act as the command and control centre 
in the event of the ground control centres being 
disabled. 
60. The NATO airborne early-warning pro-
gPamme is now estimated at $1.8 to $1.9 billion 
for eighteen Boeing E-3A aircraft, spares, flight 
and mission simulators, maintenance and test 
equipment, modifications to the existing ground 
system and establishment of a main operating 
base. Of this total, about $1.4 billion is for the 
aircraft. 
61. Dornier GmbH has been recommended by 
Boeing to be the avionics installation and check-
out contractor for the NATO aircraft. This 
recommendation still must be confirmed by 
NATO, but is considered fairly certain. 
62. The NATO E-3A main operating base is 
expected to be located near the European instal-
lation centre, in Germany or the Netherlands. 
Approximate cost of activating the base will be 
$100 million and the cost of operating it for a 
ten to fifteen-year period is estimated at $500 
million. Annual maintenance costs of the NATO 
E-3A are estimated at $100 million. 
63. The AWACS programme has shown that it 
is rather difficult to introduce into the Alliance 
an extremely large and complex system that has 
already been developed and it therefore proved 
difficult to find meaningful industrial hardware 
to be manufactured in the other NATO countries. 
Once a programme is well under way it is diffi-
cult and often too late, from an investment and 
cost standpoint, to add new partners. 
64. Another weapons system in which Boeing 
has a close interest is the Roland air defence 
system. This is a surface-to-air missile system for 
short-range defence against aircraft attacking at 
low level. Hughes Aircraft Company and Boeing 
are joint licensees to transfer the Euromissile 
technology to the United States for manufacture 
and testing. The army's selection of Roland 
marked the first time a major foreign weapons 
system design had been procured for production 
in the United States. The American companies 
will build the fire units and missiles and deliver 
them to the army for co-operative tests with 
European-built systems. During the tests Ame-
rican missiles could be launched from European 
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fire units and American fire units will launch 
European missiles. Boeing and Hughes are buil-
ding the United States Roland from drawings 
provided by Euromissile. Approximately 90 % of 
the field replaceable parts are interchangeable 
between the American and European systems. 
Four firing units and approximately 100 missiles 
will be built for the test programme. 
65. By using the technology already developed 
in Europe the army is avoiding duplication of 
effort and expects to save $4-5 billion and four 
years in research and development time. Aero-
spatiale of France and MBB of Germany will 
recover some of their development costs through 
royalties paid to them. United States and Euro-
pean troops will be able to exchange munitions, 
parts and maintenance. The programme should be 
a major step towards improved weapon standard-
isation. 
66. The general support rocket system (GSRS) 
also has a promising potential for transatlantic 
co-operation. It is a. highly-mobile surface-to-
surface free-flight rocket system intended to 
complement cannon artillery and will be used in 
intense combat conditions. The launcher is 
designed to be installed on the army's infantry 
fighting vehicle. It is also adaptable to other 
'Vehicles. 
67. The United States and Germany have 
recently signed a declaration of intent on tactical 
and operational requirements for the system. A 
memorandum of understanding will be signed in 
mid-1978. France and the United Kingdom have 
also expressed interest in the programme and 
may become official participants by the end of 
this year. The system might become a joint 
development programme. 
68. Another programme which Boeing recently 
embarked upon is the anti-surface ship missile 
(ASSM) which is intended to serve as the next 
generation Harpoon. The ASSM concept began in 
late 1974 when the NATO naval armaments group 
agreed on an objective for a second-generation 
anti-surface ship missile. Six NATO countries 
have funded a feasibility study. Boeing is a sub-
contractor to MBB of Germany, the design leader. 
69. In industrial circles the need for more 
transatlantic co-operation to strengthen the North 
Atlantic Alliance is widely felt. In industry the 
initiative should be taken to share the work, seek 
co-operative agreements and include the common 
good as part of the profits. Industry should also 
try to educate the user of its products, i.e. the 
military, on how to approach international pro-
grammes based on its own experiences. 
United States Roland miss'tle 
70. The Committee had a special briefing on 
the United States Roland by Mr. R.L. Brock, 
Vice-President, General Manager of Boeing's 
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army systems division. It also visited the assembly 
area. 
71. Following a competition which led to selec-
tion of the European-developed Roland, the 
United States army decided for the first tj.me to 
select a major foreign weapons system design to 
be procured for production in the United States. 
The Roland system comprises both missiles and 
fire-control equipment ; the missiles are about 
2.4 m long, 160 mm in diameter and are super-
sonic. The system can intercept targets during 
day or night and in any weather. Missile range 
is about 6 km. The independent fire unit, 
mounted on a single-track or wheeled vehicle can 
carry ten missiles and fire-control equipment. It 
provides protection to troops or armour on the 
move. 
AWACS 
72. Mr. D.E. Graves, Vice-President, Head of 
the aircraft armaments section, explained the 
programme history of the NATO AWACS (air-
borne warning and control system) programme. 
In 1967 the United States Defence Department 
came to the conclusion that an airborne early-
warning system to detect low-altitude intruders 
was a security requirement. Three manufacturers 
- Boeing with its 707-320, McDonnell Douglas 
with the DC-8 and Lockheed with the C-141 -
submitted their entries. The result of the competi-
tion was that Boeing became the prime contractor 
whereas the radar was developed by Westing-
house. 
73. In October 1977 the first plane was ready. 
In the meantime, the NATO Military Committee 
had accepted the United Kingdom offer of eleven 
Nimrods as the United Kingdom's share of the 
NATO airborne early warning force. It decided 
that a mixed force of eleven Nimrods and eigh-
teen NATO AWACS would satisfy the require-
ments. The United States programme and the 
NATO programme are practically the same. 
7 4. The basis of the system is a modified 
Boeing 707-320 jet aircraft. The investment cost 
in 1977 dollars is $80 million and the total cost 
$300 million. Maintenance and spare parts over 
a ten-year period will be $375-500 million. 
Potential new markets for this air defence system 
might be some $1,025-1,480 million. This means 
that it will provide some 1,000 jobs over a four-
and-a-half-year period. In addition to the flying 
segment, some fifty-nine communications centres 
and support operating bases will be built. The 
aircraft can be equipped with Pratt and Whitney 
or the French CFM-56 engines. The first planes 
will be delivered to NATO in late 1981 or early 
1982. Final delivery will be at the end of 1984. 
YC-14 (AMST) 
75. Mr. J.E. Steiner, Vice-President, Corporate 
Product Evaluation, briefed the Committee on 
the Boeing YC-14 aircraft which the Committee 
had already seen during the Paris air show in 
1977. The aircraft is an advanced medium short-
take-off-and-landing transport aircraft (AMST), 
and has high tactical mobility. It has consider-
able lift power and can make steep accurate 
landings at very low speed. It has a global radius 
with a substantial payload. One squadron deploys 
sixteen aircraft, each of which can take off with 
a payload of 12,200 kg from a 610 metre field. 
Its wide-body compartment can carry tanks, 
howitzers, trucks and many other types of cargo. 
76. Boeing designed, built and tested two proto-
types of the aircraft under a $107 million contract 
with the American air force. The programme 
started in 1972 and was concluded in 1977. The 
first planes will be delivered in 1982 and become 
operational in 1984-85. Boeing hopes to sell 320 
of them over a twenty-year period. 
F'-16 
77. On 17th April 1978 the Committee visited 
General Dynamics in San Diego where it was 
briefed by Mr. Oats Schwarzenberger, F-16 
Marketing Manager, of the Fort Worth Division 
of General Dynamics. Before commenting on the 
F-16, he gave a general outline of the activities 
of General Dynamics which has a yearly turn-
over of $2.8 billion, 70,000 employees and a very 
diverse production line. The F-16 is produced in 
Fort Worth but, as the Committee could not visit 
the factory because of transport problems, he 
briefed it on the programme in the San Diego 
factory. 
78. The F-16 is a new generation single-engine, 
single-seat, multi-role tactical fighter aircraft. It 
is multi-role as it can be used in an air-to-air or 
air-to-ground configuration. It is able to repel 
air attacks and achieve air superiority, and in 
its air-to-ground capability it can destroy enemy 
surface forces and cut supply lines. It can fly at 
an altitude of 20,000 m. Two prototypes have 
been built and full-scale production could start 
immediately. The 1978 fly-away price is $6.5 
million ; in 1975 it was still $4.5 million. 
79. The plane is made in two versions, the 
F-16A single-seat or the F-16B two-place fighter 
trainer. The two planes are essentially identical 
except for the aft cockpit ; the F-16B carries 
about 1,100 lbs less internal fuel. The Norwegian 
version will also have extra floodlighting and a 
parachute compartment for landing on icy run-
ways. 
80. The replacement of F-104s with the 
advanced F-16 will substantially increase NATO's 
capability in both air-to-air and air-to-ground 
combat. The F-16 programme calls for an initial 
delivery of F-16 aircraft to the United States in 
August 1978. The air forces in Europe will 
receive their first aircraft in 1979 and other coun-
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tries such as Iran will receive F-16 deliveries 
from 1980 onwards. 
Cruise miss-ile 
81. Another important development introduced 
to the Committee by Mr. G.A. Robertson is the 
General Dynamics' cruise missile, a multi-purpose 
missile which can be launched from surface ships, 
submarines, land platforms, trucks or aircraft. It 
is a missile similar to a small aircraft placed in 
a steel capsule and is 54 cm in diameter and 7 m 
in length. It has a range of 5,600 km and can be 
equipped with nuclear or conventional warheads 
and aimed at sea or land targets. In a trial pro-
gramme it can be equipped with parachutes for 
recovery. The system has been developed over a 
three-year period. The cruise missile has a very 
good chance of reaching its target and as it is 
rather small it is very difficult to detect during 
its supersonic flight. It is comparable but superior 
to the Soviet "Exocet". Some 13,000 of these 
missiles will be produced in the next few years. 
Space developments 
82. On 11th April 1978 the Committee was 
received at the NASA headquarters by 
Dr. Lovelace, Deputy Administrator. He wel-
comed the Committee on behalf of Dr. Frosch 
and NASA and said that space co-operation with 
Western Europe, both on a national and multi-
lateral basis within ESA, had been a most impor-
tant element of NASA's programmes in its twenty 
years of existence. 
The shuttle 
83. Dr. Lovelace described the space shuttle 
as the key element of a versatile economical space 
transportation system that will provide a wide 
variety of national and international users with 
a round trip access to space beginning in the 
1980s. The development of the system is pro-
ceeding on schedule and operational test flights 
of the shuttle will take place in 1979. The shuttle 
will be the first reusable space vehicle and will 
be designed to carry many different types of pay-
load to and from low earth orbit. It will be able 
to retrieve payloads from orbit for reuse, service 
and repair satellites in space and carry space 
laboratories into orbit, operate them, and bring 
them back. Finally it will substantially reduce 
spaceflight costs. 
84. The space shuttle has four basic flight 
elements: the orbiter, the main engine, an 
external propellant tank and twin solid-rocket 
boosters, and a launch and landing system. The 
orbiter is the reusable spacecraft portion. The 
launch sites are at Vandenberg air force base 
and the Kennedy space centre. Both bases have 
the right inclinations to reach the required orbits. 
Just before the vehicle leaves the earth's atmo-
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sphere, the external tank will be jettisoned and 
will burn up in the atmosphere. The boosters will 
be separated from the main system at an altitude 
of about 46 km but will be recuperated by means 
of a parachute recovery system. The orbiter is 
roughly the size of a DC-9 aircraft and will be 
propelled by three liquid-fuelled reusable main 
engines. These engines will have a thrust of 
214 kg and a lifetime of seven-and-a-half hours of 
flight. The external tank is 46.8 m long and has 
a diameter of 8.4 m. The solid rocket booster 
is 45.5 m long with a diameter of 3.7 m. 
85. In 1975 dollars, the launch cost of an 
Atlas Centaur was $25.4 million and of a Delta 
39-40, $15.2 million ; the launch of the shuttle 
will cost $16.3 million but its capacity is four 
times rthe payload of a Delta launcher. Opera-
tions are to start in the middle of 1980 and space-
lab will be launched in 1981. 487 flights are 
already fully subscribed by customers in the 
period 1980-82. Of this number, 50 % will be 
taken up by NASA, 23% by the United States 
Department of Defence, 12.6 % by commercial 
interests, 12.1 % by foreign countries and some 
5.7% by foreign governments. For small cus-
tomers, self-contained payloads can be accepted 
which would cost $3,000-10,000 (in 1975 dollars) 
providing the volume is under 5 cu.ft. and the 
weight less than 200 lbs. Over 200 small customers 
have already subscribed. 
Collaboration with Europe 
86. The most important collaborative venture 
is of course the spacelab which is a vital element 
of the space transportation system. With regard 
to the possible extent of co-operation, NASA 
recently established with ESA a joint study 
group, the "Imaginators", to look at the needs of 
the spacelab user community for the next few 
decades with a view to identifying improvements 
in the shuttle-spacelab system which will increase 
the usefulness of the system. 
87. There is fast-growing collaboration between 
the United States and Europe in both science 
and applications satellites. The following agree-
ments in the science field were signed in 1977 : 
(a) the infrared astronomy satellite (IRAS) -
the Netherlands will build the spacecraft, NASA 
will supply the spacecraft instruments and the 
United Kingdom will provide a ground facility; 
(b) the Galileo orbiter and probe to Jupiter -
the Federal Republic of Germany will supply the 
retro-propulsion module based on Symphonie 
apogee motor technology which will place Galileo 
in orbit around Jupiter. The Federal Republic 
will also finance the participation of fourteen 
German scientists, selected competitively, and 
supply three scientific instruments; (c) the space 
telescope will make a major contribution to 
understanding the origin, evolution and scale of 
the universe, its stars and galaxies. It will be an 
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automated satellite placed in orbit by the space 
shuttle. Data from its scientific instruments will 
be transmitted to earth by the tracking and data 
relay system. ESA is providing the solar array, 
the "faint object camera" and extended opera-
tional support. This will give the European astro-
nomers about 15 % of the available viewing time. 
88. In the field of applications satellites the 
arrangements with ESA are nearly completed to 
cover direct reception of satellite data at several 
European locations from Landsat (Italy and Swe-
den), Seasat (United Kingdom), the meteorolo-
gical satellite Nimbus-G and the heat capacity 
mapping mission (HCMM) of the Explorer satel-
lites (France). Users throughout the European 
Community will be served. 
89. In establishing priorities for both domestic 
and international activities NASA will in future 
apply the same criteria as in the past, i.e. use-
fulness to human life and intellectual importance. 
90. During its visit to the United States the 
Committee visited NASA establishments in addi-
tion to NASA headquarters and the nearby ESA 
office in Washington. In Los Angeles it visited 
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and in Huntsville 
it was able to see the space shuttle. 
91. At the Jet Propulsion Laboratory the Com-
mittee was received by General C.H. Terhune, 
Deputy Director, who gave a general outline of 
the laboratory's work, one aspect of which is deep 
space automated scientific missions. The labor-
atory started in the late 1930s when it worked 
for the United States army on solid fuel and 
rocket design. After the 1958 Space Act it came 
under a NASA contract in order to support 
NASA flight projects. The laboratory also 
operates the world-wide deep space tracking and 
data acquisition network. In addition, the labor-
atory conducts selected projects to develop and 
apply new technologies to the solution of prob-
lems on earth and particularly those aimed at 
easing the nation's energy crisis. 
92. The energy budget is some $65 million, of 
which $35 million is earmarked for solar energy. 
The total budget is $280-290 million. It has some 
1,450 employees and 1,500 temporary staff. 
93. The laboratory passes on much of its work 
to private industry in so far as possible. It 
receives patents and licences from the work done. 
Scientific space projects 
94. Mr. R.J. Parks, Assistant Laboratory 
Director for Flight Projects, briefed the Com-
mittee on current space projects. The successful 
Ranger and Surveyor lunar projects, the Mariner 
missions to V en us, Mars and Mercury, and most 
recently the Viking Mars mission, are among the 
laboratory's most significant accomplishments. 
Two Viking spacecraft landed on Mars in the 
summer of 1976 after an eleven month's cruise to 
the planet. The first pictures ever taken from the 
surface of Mars were then relayed back to earth. 
The prime objective of the mission was to search 
for life on Mars in an attempt to discover extra-
terrestrial life. 
95. During a tour of the laboratory the Com-
mittee viewed the Viking orbiter and lander 
Voyager spacecraft. Two Voyager spacecraft 
were launched in the summer of 1977 and are 
scheduled to fly past Jupiter in 1979 and Saturn 
in 1981. The spacecraft will explore the two 
planets and their major satellites to obtain 
information on their environment and charac-
teristics. The laboratory manages the deep space 
network with stations in California, Spain and 
Australia and is continuously tracking and com-
municating with the spacecraft exploring the 
solar system. It will take two years to reach 
Jupiter and four years to reach Saturn. 
96. Although the laboratory has a project to 
search for extraterrestrial intelligence, it has no 
programme to study unidentified flying objects 
(UFOs). NASA does not consider that there is 
a sufficient scientific base to warrant funding 
such research. 
97. The laboratory is also managing the infra-
red astronomical satellite sponsored by the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United 
States ; the Galileo project, a joint project with 
the Federal Republic ; and the solar polar mission 
with ESA. The eventual goal of this mission 
is to identify and understand the influence 
of the sun and solar activity on the space 
surrounding the earth and in turn the 
influence of the sun on the earth and the 
other planets. Two identical spacecraft, for 
one of which ESA is responsible, will be launched 
by the shuttle on a trajectory towards Jupiter. 
The gravitational field of Jupiter will be used 
to deflect the trajectory of each spacecraft, bring-
ing them into an eliptical polar orbit of the sun. 
98. On 21st April 1978 the Committee visited 
the George C. Marshall Space Flight Centre at 
Huntsville, Alabama, The centre was established 
as one of the NASA installations in 1960 and 
Dr. W erner von Braun was named its first 
Director. During the early years the centre was 
primarily involved in launch vehicle development. 
The Saturn I and Saturn V launch vehicles, the 
Apollo missions and the Skylab programme were 
all developed at this centre. The centre is now 
deeply involved in the space shuttle programme 
as well as the spacelab programme. It has respon-
sibility for managing the first, second and third 
spacelab payload missions. The primary objec-
tives of the first mission are to verify perfor-
mance capabilities, verify spacelab/orbiter compa-
tibility, and determine spacelab-induced environ-
ments. An additional objective is to conduct 
meaningful science and applications experiments. 
145 
DOCUMENT 773 
It is important to mention that 222 scientists 
representing the United States and fourteen other 
countries have been selected by NASA/ESA to 
participate in the first spacelab mission. The 
second spacelab mission will be multidisciplinary 
but will emphasise astrophysics research. The 
third mission will be operational with emphasis 
on materials processing in space. 
High energy astronomy observatory 
99. A current science payload programme at the 
centre is the high energy astronomy observatory, 
or HEAO programme. The first of three observa-
tories was launched on 12th August 1977. This 
observatory, which is 4.1 m long, 2.4 m in diame-
ter, and weighs over 3 metric tons, is performing 
extremely well in its mission of high energy stellar 
astronomy. The primary objective for HEA0-1 
instruments was to survey the sky for X-ray 
sources. HEA0-1 was able to map the whole 
of the celestial sphere in six months and has 
already produced significant advances in know-
ledge of celestial X-ray and gamma-ray sources. 
Although this is basically a scanning mission, the 
observatory is versatile and its rotation can be 
stopped for pointing at sources of particular 
interest. A second laboratory will be launched in 
November 1978. This second mission will point 
very precisely at X-ray sources identified during 
the first mission in order to obtain highly-
accurate and detailed data on stellar sources for 
long periods. A third mission, for launch in 1979, 
will search for gamma-ray sources and study 
cosmic rays from outer space. This mission will 
include a cosmic-ray instrument and an expe-
riment developed by the French atomic energy 
group and the Danish research institute. 
Space telescope 
100. The centre is at present developing a 2.4. m 
space telescope designed for use by the inter-
national scientific community to significantly 
extend man's knowledge of the universe. The 
space telescope will be placed in earth orbit by 
the space shuttle and, from there, unhindered by 
the earth's atmosphere, it will be able to observe 
objects with a resolution approximately seven 
times better than that attainable with the largest 
telescopes on earth and over a wavelength region 
which reaches far into the ultraviolet and infra-
red portions of the spectrum. The telescope will 
be 13 m long, 4.3 m in diameter, and will be a 
shuttle payload of over 9 metric tons. The launch 
is scheduled for late 1983. 
Inertial upper stage 
101. In addition to the programmes mentioned 
above, the centre is responsible for the inertial 
upper stage, which will augment the space shuttle 
for delivery of pay loads (up to 2.3 metric tons) 
to geosynchronous orbit, and the teleoperator 
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retrieval system, which is a reusable, low thrust, 
earth orbital teleoperator that will be deployed 
from the space shuttle to reboost, retrieve, or 
place payloads into higher energy orbits. The 
centre is also responsible for numerous materials 
processing in space experiments and activities, 
and in a related field is responsible for solar 
heating and cooling activities in support of the 
United States Department of Energy. In addition, 
the centre conducts a vigorous research and 
technology programme and is deeply involved in 
the study and definition of future NASA science 
and applications programmes. 
102. The Committee visited the test facilities 
area to view the shuttle orbiter, the external 
tank, and the solid rocket booster, as well as the 
solar house, the spacelab and Skylab mockups, 
and the neutral buoyancy simulator. 
TRW 
103. On Thursday, 20th April 1978, the Com-
mittee went to the TRW at Space Park, Los 
Angeles, where it was received by Mr. J.N. Roos, 
Director of International Relations. TRW has a 
special interest in electronics and communica-
tions and is an important manufacturer of high-
quality advanced technological products. From 
the 1950s onwards it has been working on space-
craft, space communications and other aerospace 
hardware. 
104. Dr. Richard D. DeLauer, Executive Vice-
President, pointed out that Europe and the 
United States had to work together in advanced 
technological projects such as spacecraft, anti-
submarine warfare, digital communications and 
new forms of energy in order to share the great 
expense of research and development which was 
becoming too heavy a burden to bear single-
handed. 
105. Dr. G.T. Morton, Director of Customer 
Communications, explained that TRW had 
started with the production of cap screws on 
bicycles, engine parts for automobiles and air-
craft, spare parts for cars and aircraft, high-
quality tools, spare parts built in radios and 
televisions - all types of products manufactured 
by a firm called Thomson. The Hughes aircraft 
group, which had a high percentage of scientists 
and highly-qualified engineering teams, lost some 
of its teams when they joined a co-operative 
industrial effort under the leadership of Mr. 
Ramo and Mr. W ooldridge. They later joined up 
with Thomson, going together into energy 
products, drilling apparatus, cables and sub-
mersible pumps and other advanced modern 
technology ventures. Once united, they decided to 
call the new firm TRW which now employs 
90,000 people ; one-third of it is outside the 
United States including some 20,000 employees in 
Europe. TRW has fully-owned subsidiary firms, 
mostly in Germany, with others in the United 
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Kingdom and France. It also co-operates in 
Europe with firms such as Matra, Fiat and 
Hawker Siddeley. 
106. Since 1958 the space system division of 
TRW has built over 110 spacecraft, starting with 
the Pioneer and Explorer satellites, the earlier 
types were launched in 1958 and 1960. Six TRW-
built satellites were launched in 1965, seven in 
1966, eight in 1967, and nine in 1968. It also 
built Intelsat Ill, a 293 kg satellite with an 
apogee engine. 
107. One of the first military satellites was the 
TRW V ela satellite which since 1963 has been 
monitoring world-wide compliance with the 
nuclear test-ban treaty by looking for signs of 
nuclear testing above the surface of the earth 
and in space. Several advanced V ela satellites 
have since been built. Much larger detectors than 
those used in this type of satellite will be built 
for the NASA high energy astronomy observatory 
programme. The observatory satellites will scan 
the entire celestial sphere, systematically locating 
and measuring every significant source of X-rays 
and gamma-rays. The first satellite of this type 
was launched in 1977 and the second is to be 
launched this year. It will weigh 3.25 metric tons 
including 1.5 tons of experiments. 
108. TRW has also become one of the most 
important suppliers of military communications 
satellites such as the Ve1a, DSCS 8/nd the Fleet-
satcom satellites. Sixteen of the latter two will be 
built : twelve for the satellite defence communica-
tions system and four for the fleet. 
109. AB mentioned earlier, TRW is also building 
the tracking and data relay satellite system 
(TDRSS) which will be launched in late 1980. 
Together with the advanced W estar satellite net-
work it will allow NASA to monitor, track and 
control all its satellites from one point in the 
United States. The TDRSS introduces a new kind 
of data relay from and between satellites and 
spacecraft. ~ ~ 
110. TRW has also played an important role in 
the development of the Atlas, Thor-Delta, Titan 
and Minuteman launchers. 
J>erso~ re~rks 
111. Your Rapporteur does not wish to conclude 
this chapter without pointing to the need for a 
long-term programme for implementing decisions 
on the two-way street for arms procurement. 
Genuine transatlantic co-operation must be 
established. The role of the United States Con-
gress is most important - even more so than 
that of the legislatures in European countries. 
In this context your Rapporteur wonders why 
the Americans do not seem prepared to buy 
European defence material, bearing in mind the 
success of the sale to the United States of the 
Roland missile. If the European countries are 
to buy the sophisticated hardware they need from 
the United States, the Americans should buy 
other products of advanced technology from 
Europe in return. 
m. Energy 
(submitted by Dr. Phipps, Rapporteur) 
Introductory remarks 
112. Your Rapporteur will start this chapter by 
pointing out that it is impossible to discuss the 
United States energy position and policy in its 
entirety. He will therefore restrict himself to 
those aspects which have been discussed during 
the Committee's visit to the United States, i.e. 
the national energy plan, its advantages and dis-
advantages and the efforts made by the Federal 
Government and industry concerning new sources 
of energy. 
113. The national energy plan was presented to 
Congress on 20th April 1977 ; it prescribes goals 
and principles to guide the nation's energy future. 
The administration also submitted legislation to 
implement the plan. The basic problem in the 
United States is that domestic demand for oil 
is now much greater than domestic supply. The 
national plan focuses on reducing demand for oil 
and increasing domestic energy supplies. The 
plan's central theme is to promote energy con-
servation primarily by moving energy prices 
towards replacement cost. 
114. The need for a national energy plan derives 
largely from the fact that the United States now 
meets about 50 % of its oil demand through 
imports and that percentage is growing. Europe 
and Japan already have a very high level of oil 
imports and it is clear that energy waste or 
conservation by one country affects the supplies 
available to others. Consequently, the United 
States has an interest not only in moderating its 
own demand but in helping other countries to 
develop new sources of energy and expand their 
conservation programmes. If United States energy 
consumption is allowed to grow at historic rates 
and if domestic production remains stagnant as 
it has since 1970, oil-producing nations may not 
be able to meet world demands in 1985. The gap 
between world supply and world demand could 
be as much as 20 %, and even the threat of a 
shortage of this magnitude would lead industrial 
nations to start bidding up prices sharply in 
the mid-1980s. The resulting inflation and the 
impact of actual shortages would set the stage 
for a recession in strong economies and a collapse 
of weak economies, involving significant internal 
and external security risks. The national energy 
plan therefore proposes that the United States 
cut oil imports to 7 million barrels a day by 1985. 
115. United States domestic oil prices are such 
that their net price per barrel of oil is below 
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international level. The same is true for natural 
gas. This cheap oil and gas policy means that 
the United States continues to be the world's 
most profligate user of these scarce resources. 
Because the price is low the United States con-
sumes liberally, thereby drawing in greater 
imports than it otherwise would. The need for a 
national energy plan is generally accepted in the 
United States but Congress cannot yet decide 
how and in which way prices should rise. To 
raise oil prices through taxes would prevent 
windfall profits to the producers but not give 
them the price incentive to increase their explora-
tion for new reserves. This is a dilemma which 
the President and Congress have yet to resolve. 
Higher energy prices are also unpopular with 
voters in an election year. The same is true for 
the natural gas bill which has been languishing 
in Congress for over a year now. 
116. All the additional oil imported by the 
United States as a result of the cheap domestic 
oil policy is essentially oil that is being denied 
to the rest of the world and thus will not be 
available for other countries in the future. This 
policy also prevents the price of oil finding its 
true level in the international markets and, 
despite claims to the contrary, it is still the United 
States rather than Saudi Arabia which deter-
mines world oil prices. 
Federal policy 
117. On 11th April 1978 the Committee visited 
the Department of Energy where it was addres-
sed by Mrs. Sarah J ackson, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary, International Policy Department. She 
pointed out that alternative technologies to 
develop natural energy resources were a neces-
sity for both the United States and the rest of 
the world. It seems unlikely that large enough 
quantities of oil will be discovered in the United 
States in the future to make a meaningful impact 
on the present energy resources situation. The 
government's policy is to reduce the use of oil 
and natural gas in energy consumption from 
75 % to 60 % by 1985. 
118. Exploration for natural gas on the con-
tinental shelf might be promising but higher 
prices for this energy resource will also be inevit-
able. The problem is not so much to increase 
production of oil and natural gas in the long 
term as to manage by 1985 to meet the levels of 
production which will then be needed. The rate 
of discovery and development may not be fast 
enough in the next few years to reverse the 
downward trend in domestic production. 
119. The United States has an enormous reserve 
of coal but this also involves serious problems. 
Known coal reserves can meet the production 
target of the national energy plan without new 
discoveries. The vast United States coal reserves 
DOCUMENT 773 
amount to three times the energy contained in the 
Middle East oil reserves and currently account 
:for more than 90 % of the United States proven 
energy reserves. Yet over the last seventy-five 
years the United States has switched :from using 
coal :for over 90 % of its energy needs to depend-
ing on oil and gas :for 75 % of its energy. The 
cost of converting boilers and power plants :from 
oil to natural gas will be extremely high. One 
major utility has estimated that it will cost about 
$4 billion to convert 6,000 megawatts of generat-
ing capacity to coal. In order to arrive at this 
conversion many other new and existing techno-
logies will have to be explored, for instance the 
production of synthetic gas :from coal. 
120. One of the main :features of the energy plan 
is conservation of energy. This is possible only 
if the price of energy in the United States reaches 
a level where it is advantageous :for the individual 
to save energy. In transportation, :for instance, 
diesel fuel is much more economical than petrol 
and therefore cars with diesel engines should be 
cheaper than those with petrol engines. However, 
:for the manufacturers to convert an engine line 
might cost up to $1 billion. 
121. Dr. James S. Kane, Acting Associate Direc-
tor :for Basic Research Programmes, talked about 
the Department of Energy's approach to research 
problems and alternative technologies. He pointed 
out that the Department is especially interested 
in the use of coal and is therefore studying the 
possibilities of liquefaction and gasification. Its 
budget :for fiscal year 1979 :for these studies is 
$125.1 million and $186.6 million respectively. 
Liquefaction and gasification are necessary :for 
distribution reasons. The Department will give 
all necessary help and incentives so that techno-
logies which are now still in the research and 
development phase may become operational 
before 1985. 
122. In several areas of the United States geo-
thermal energy might be a solution, especially in 
a State such as Hawaii which has no other cur-
rent sources of energy. The amount earmarked 
for this type of research for fiscal year 1979 is 
$22.5 million. 
123. In the long term, at least after the year 
2000, :fusion might be a solution, but it is not 
reasonable to think that this will make a con-
tribution in time for the national energy plan. 
The Department's budget :for :fiscal year 1979 is 
$334 million. 
124. Dr. Harold Ja:ffe, Assistant Director, Office 
of International Programmes, gave a general out-
line of nuclear power policy. Apart :from coal, 
nuclear power generation will be the most 
important source of energy. In the words of 
Mr. Schlesinger, Secretary of State for Energy, 
"Coal and nuclear energy are the only large-
scale alternative :for the :foreseeable :future. This 
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winter's coal strikes indicate that coal-miners are 
hardly more reliable than Arabs as suppliers of 
energy." 
125. The decline of nuclear power from the high 
hopes of the 1960s has been astonishingly swift. 
Today the United States has sixty-eight nuclear 
power plants in operation and only a :few years 
ago the United States Government was still 
officially hoping that 175 additional plants would 
be operational by 1985, producing 30 % of the 
nation's electric power. However, since then, 
thirty-two reactors have been cancelled and con-
tracts :for some 150 have been deferred. In most 
cases it now takes ten or more years :for a nuclear 
power plant to be built. 
126. The government still endorses the current 
light-water reactors. At the same time research 
is being carried out to find solutions :for waste 
disposal ; these might be :found in the early 
1980s. A waste isolation pilot plant will go into 
operation in 1984. The Department is also study-
ing the possibility of improving the productivity 
of light-water reactors as most of them produce 
at only 60% of their capacity. A study is also 
being carried out to improve the quality of 
uranium being burned. 
127. If nuclear power is to provide a significant 
:fraction of new energy sources after 1985, con-
straints that have led to a virtual moratorium on 
contracts :for new plants will have to be eased. 
The energy plan recognises this problem and has 
proposed means to reduce the licensing time. The 
budget :for nuclear energy programmes :for :fiscal 
year 1979 is $1,891.2 million. 
128. The administration remains opposed how-
ever to breeder reactors as it considers that they 
increase opportunities :for proliferation of nuclear 
weapons among nations and terrorists. The 
President has therefore proposed indefinite 
world-wide deferment of the use of recycled 
plutonium together with a delay in the construc-
tion of breeders. 
129. Dr. Bennett Miller, Deputy Technology 
Programme Director :for solar, geothermal and 
electric storage systems, declared that the Depart-
ment is spending $260.3 million in fiscal year 
1978 on solar energy and other alternative sources 
of energy. This will be increased to $400 million 
in :fiscal year 1979. This budget increase will be 
necessary in order to bring the new technology 
into market readiness within a relatively short 
time. 
130. Your Rapporteur will discuss the new 
energy resources later in this chapter. 
131. Mr. Philip J. Farley, Deputy Special 
Representative :for non-proliferation at the State 
Department, briefed the Committee on Federal 
policy on :fast-breeder reactors and reprocessing 
plants. The decision of Presidents Ford and 
Carter on reprocessing and breeder reactors do 
not reflect a special United States commercial 
or other national interest but deep concern about 
the present way nuclear power is developing. The 
question is whether the march of technology and 
its industrial application should override other 
concerns such as the SALT discussions or environ-
mental problems. The government's attitude 
affects the United States industry and utilities as 
much as other countries' industries. 
132. During the London summit meeting on the 
evaluation of the nuclear fuel cycle, a declaration 
was adopted which stated that increasing reliance 
would have to be placed on nuclear energy to 
satisfy growing energy requirements and help 
diversify sources of energy. This should be done 
with the utmost precaution in the generation and 
dissemination of materials that can be used for 
nuclear weapons. The aim is to meet the world's 
energy needs and make the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy widely available while avoiding 
the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons. 
133. The principal issue is whether existing or 
new institutional or other international arrange-
ments are enough to minimise the risks of pro-
liferation. Should technologies such as fast 
breeding, reprocessing plants and enrichment 
facilities be contained? The United States 
Government is convinced that the issues should 
be studied seriously and that without sound 
safeguards one should not advance along a road 
which might be dangerous for future generations. 
134. During its meeting with the Senate Sub-
Committee on Science, Technology and Space, the 
Committee heard the opinion of Senator Harrison 
H. Schmitt from New Mexico who declared that 
one of the problems arising from the President's 
programme was that it was only a conservation 
programme and not a production programme. In 
fact, the only way to offset the economic impact 
of conservation, such as the loss of car sales, was 
to increase production of domestic oil. Unfortuna-
tely, the programme failed to reach the crux of 
the economic problems involved. The car industry, 
including labour, together with many others in 
the United States, would be interested in a more 
balanced programme, i.e. a programme which 
included reasonable increases not only in fuel 
prices but also in production, so that a drop in 
petrol consumption would not result in more 
unemployment. 
135. Of particular importance was the pricing 
of national gas at a more reasonable rate and 
taxation of oil at the well head. The deregulation 
of national gas prices would take some seven 
years, this period of adjustment being necessary 
after twenty-five years of national gas pricing. 
The Senator believed that there was still a 
tremendous potential of gas and oil resources in 
the United States and incentives should be given 
to exploit these resources. 
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136. From the administration side it was pointed 
out that in Europe petrol prices had been greatly 
increased during the last five years but nowhere 
had consumption fallen. At the most, consumption 
had stabilised. 
137. Your Rapporteur considers that the cheap 
energy policy in the United States puts a brake 
on any initiative to harness the enormous indus-
trial infrastructure in the development of new 
oil and gas resources. This also adversely affects 
the rest of the world as by far the largest single 
investment in oil and gas research is made in 
the United States. In addition, the Americans 
are making no effort to reduce the size of their 
cars, or the scale of their air conditioning and 
central heating. 
138. In 1976, total oil consumption in the world, 
excluding the USSR, Eastern Europe and China, 
was 47,940,000 barrels per day, of which North 
America used 18,770,000 barrels per day. With 
such a level of consumption the behaviour of the 
United States must affect every other nation and 
in particular the developing countries. 
New sources of energy 
139. Nearly everywhere in Washington, 
Seattle, San Diego and Los Angeles - the Com-
mittee was told about new sources of energy. The 
Office of Science and Technology is fully aware 
of the need to promote research and development 
in new sources of energy. In its studies it does 
not include only the promotion of basic research 
but also applied research and development in the 
transportation field, communications, and the 
structure of government. Many of the proposals 
submitted to the President are referred to this 
office for advice on scientific and technological 
aspects. 
140. NASA's energy programme has a budget of 
$3 million which represents a small but signi-
ficant effort to identify and verify potential 
energy-related technologies. This programme is 
aimed at effectively using aeronautical and space 
capabilities in direct support of national energy 
research and development and determining how 
the unique characteristics of the space environ-
ment may be exploited to help solve energy 
problems on earth. 
141. These efforts at present cover thirteen 
specific areas, i.e. wind turbine generators, solar 
heating and cooling, solar thermal electric 
systems, photovoltaics, advanced ground propul-
sion, energy conversion and storage systems, gas 
turbines, fuel cell and hydrogen systems, magneto-
hydrodynamics, advanced coal energy extraction, 
and finally, combustion, materials, and heat 
exchanger technology such as heat exchange pos-
sibilities in the sea and extraction of methane 
from geothermic overpressured shales. 
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142. At the Boeing factories the Committee was 
briefed on solar power satellites by Mr. D.L. 
Gregory, Senior Specialist Engineer. He felt that 
such satellites could provide a solution for re-
establishing a sound economy based on national 
energy resources. The desirable characteristics of 
such a solution included non-depletability, 
domestic availability, abundance, environmental 
acceptability, low cost and a short development/ 
implementation programme. Solar power satel-
lites could tap energy from the sun, beam it to 
earth via microwaves and provide base load 
electric power from ground receivers. The satel-
lites could be installed on a sufficiently large 
scale to provide an electrical capacity to meet 
foreseeable requirements. 
143. Solar power satellite electrical energy may 
relatively quickly achieve a price of only 4 cents 
per kilowatt hour ; with additional development 
the price from new satellites might be only 2 
cents per kilowatt hour by the early twenty-first 
century. This is well below the eventual costs 
of energy from fossil fuels. Solar power satellites 
require no fuel. Their useful lifetime, with appro-
priate maintenance, is indefinite. Thus, after 
amortisation of the original capital cost the 
energy price can be extremely low, perhaps 1 cent 
per kilowatt hour. 
144. The United States should move forward 
with a technical verification programme, includ-
ing in-space tests using the space shuttle. The 
cost of this programme is modest in comparison 
with expenditures on other energy alternatives 
with the economic potential of solar power satel-
lites. The satellites would be located in geo-
synchronous orbit some 22,000 miles above the 
earth. In this orbit they remain in one position 
over the equator and provide direct line-of-sight 
transmission of energy by radio beam to receivers 
on the earth. In this orbit the satellites are nearly 
constantly illuminated (over 99% of the time). 
The source of this energy is solar rays converted 
to electricity by an array of solar cells. The 
satellites are very large, with areas of approxi-
mately 35 square miles. Their output is, however, 
proportionate to the size in that approximately 
10 million kilowatts of power are provided by 
each. The satellite would be equipped with two 
transmitters and serve two earth receiving sites 
(5 million kilowatts per site). Satellite sizes down 
to approximately 2.5 million kilowatts per 
receiver appear economically practical. The 
constancy of output of the ground receivers, 
without the effects of night and weather, provides 
baseload electrical power. 
145. Ideally we should have solar power satel-
lites today, but of course we cannot. A develop-
ment phase remains ahead. Studies have indicated 
however that expeditious development could lead 
to initial operation in the early 1990s ; if solar 
power satellites were then placed in serial produc-
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tion, by the year 2000 they could be contributing 
nearly half of our current electric energy con-
sumption. 
146. Recently Congress has been considering the 
appropriation of $25 million to test a solar power 
satellite. 
147. Apart from this type of solar energy, 
Boeing is experimenting with other forms such 
as industrial waste treatment facilities, a solid 
waste separation treatment pilot plant, windmills 
of 100 m diameter, terrestrial solar energy instal-
lations and diverse types of nuclear power sta-
tions. 
148. At the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Mr. H.M. 
Schurmeier, Assistant Laboratory Director for 
energy and technology applications, said that the 
laboratory had a ten-year project on low-cost 
solar cell arrays which converted sunlight to 
electricity. Its aim was to increase the commercial 
production of low-cost solar cell arrays for use 
in the home, farms and factories. This activity, 
together with studies on geothermal systems, 
concerned new energy sources. The laboratory 
had also started a study to improve the fossil 
energy supply and new methods of extraction in 
coal-mining; it also conducted research on energy 
conservation. 
149. The purpose of the study of solar energy 
was to find a system to reduce cost in such a 
way that the energy acquired would be econom-
ical. When the project started in 1975 the cost 
was $25 per kilowatt ; it is hoped that by 1986 
the price will be 50 cents per kilowatt. 
150. At TRW much attention is being paid to 
the better use of coal through gasification, the 
use of oil shale reserves, tar sands and ocean 
thermal energy. TRW considers that solar energy 
will never become a major source of energy but 
that, on the other hand, the gasification of coal 
is most promising for energy production. 
151. At the Scripps Institute, Professor John 
D. Isaacs is interested in the possibilities of 
harnessing the energy released when fresh water 
meets salt water at river mouths. Tidal and wave 
energy are also under consideration. 
152. Your Rapporteur has the impression that, 
both in government agencies and in private indus-
try, research and development in energy resources 
has a high priority. These activities show how 
much importance the Americans attach to 
research in conventional and alternative energy 
resources. Compared to the small European 
efforts this will inevitably lead again to total 
American domination in new energy technology. 
This could have the most vital consequences, both 
political and economic, for the future. A joint 
European effort matching that of the United 
States or joint projects with the United States 
is the principal recommendation of this report. 
153. It should be recalled that research into new 
sources of energy is designed to reduce the cost 
of such energy to twice that of energy from cur-
rent sources. The Departement of Energy is 
spending some $4 billion on research ; European 
expenditure is only one-tenth of this. Whether 
or not the result of this research is turned over 
to private industry makes no difference to the 
energy available. 
IV. Oceanography 
(submitted by Mr. Jessel, Rapporteur) 
154. In this chapter your Rapporteur will dis-
cuss two main questions : first the American 
attitude to the ongoing Law of the Sea Conference 
and second the Committee's visit to the Scripps 
Institution of Oceanography in San Diego. 
Law of the Sea Conference 
155. The Committee was briefed in the Depart-
ment of State on seabeds and law of the sea 
negotiations by Mr. Alan Berlind, Vice-Chairman 
of the National Security Council Inter-Agency 
Group for Law of the Sea. 
156. Mr. Berlind indicated an important dif-
ference of opinion between the so-called "group 
of 77" developing countries and the industrialised 
countries. The group of 77 considers the freedom 
of the high seas and the notion that the oceans 
are res wullius as a theory which sustains the 
interests of the industrialised countries. They 
believe the oceans are the common heritage of 
mankind and unless there is general agreement 
nobody can claim their resources. The United 
States and many other countries, even the Soviet 
Union, adhere to the system of the traditional 
freedom of the high seas. 
157. There are three areas of negotiation in 
which these concepts have led to serious disagree-
ment. First, the question of navigation : the 
industrialised countries say that no national 
maritime activities should be limited by coastal 
states or by an international ocean regime. 
National claims should be reconciled with tradi-
tional freedom. The 77 countries consider that 
in national economic zones, straits and coastal 
waters or archipelago states free international 
navigation can be allowed but permission should 
be granted by the coastal states. The two points 
of view were more or less reconciled during dis-
cussions at the sixth session of the Law of the 
Sea Conference and a text has been found which 
appears to safeguard traditional high sea free-
doms within the exclusive economic zone, with 
an exception however for specific resource-related 
rights. This text has not been finalised. 
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158. The second negotiating area where a clash 
has arisen between the 77 and the industrialised 
countries concerns maritime scientific research 
within the 200-mile zone which is not permitted 
unless the coastal stllltes give their explicit con-
sent. A large number of coastal states do not 
want a liberal research system and in this they 
are helped by the Soviet Union which also refuses 
free research in the exclusive economic zone. 
159. The third and greatest difficulty has how-
ever arisen over the question of deep-sea mining. 
The 77 countries will not allow deep-sea mining 
unless the international community gives its 
agreement. Eight years ago the United States 
declared that the seabed resources constitute the 
common heritage of mankind and it accepts that 
the international community would be given the 
chance to share in the profits that exploitation 
of deep-seabed resources may one day produce. 
Translating this into practical policies, the United 
States Government has proposed a double or 
parallel system through which half the resources 
of a certain area would go to the international 
community and the other half to the mining 
states or coiiJSOrtia. 
160. The 77 countries have now proposed that 
a single mining site should net $750 million for 
the international community. If this were adopted 
seabed mining would not be economically possible. 
This regulation would discourage economically-
rational exploitation of the seabed resources. At 
the present time only a few international con-
sortia are actively prepared to take the risk 
under reasonable conditions ; in these consortia 
American firms play a prominent part. 
161. Since October 1977 there has been a bill 
before Congress called the deep-seabed mineral 
resources act. This legislation might be of tempo-
rary validity if the Law of the Sea Conference 
were to meet with success. If it proves impossible 
to agree on an international treaty the United 
States will continue with its national legislation. 
The bill provides for revenue-sharing with an 
eventual international seabed authority. 
162. Another point of discontent, but of minor 
significance, concerns the access of landlocked 
states to deep-seabed resoure€8. 
163. The United States Government and many 
other governments are very discouraged that 
after seven sessions and many months of negotia-
ting the results have been so meagre. Unwilling 
to pay their expenses, several governments are 
already withdrawing their, delegations. The 
United States Government would very much 
prefer a law of the sea treaty to nothing at all. 
Without an international agreement, industry 
and marine scientists would run considerable risk 
in their activities. From all sides in the United 
States, therefore, the will exists to bring the Law 
of the Sea Conference to fruition. 
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Scripps Institution of Oceanography 
164. On 17th April 1978 the Committee visited 
the Scripps Institution of Oceanography where 
it was received by Mr. Charles Merdinger who 
explained the workings of the institution which 
is the oceanographic branch of the University of 
California, San Diego. The institution occupies 
sixty-four buildings on 230 acres, has a staff 
of 1,200 and a budget of $45 million a year. Ten 
per cent of the money comes from the State of 
California and some 90 % from the Federal 
Government through the intermediary of the 
National Science Foundation. 
165. The institution's mission is basic research 
and development. The research programme ori-
ginates with the scientists and not with outside 
interests, whether governmental or industrial. 
The institution has many sea-going operations 
and a fleet, the most important ship of which is 
the Glomar Challenger. The institution has some 
185 students who prepare their Ph.D. studying 
physical, chemical, geological and geophysical 
aspects of the ocean, as well as conducting bio-
logical research. 
166. The W oodshole Institution in Massachusetts 
is of the same type but smaller with a staff of 
some 800. 
167. The Director of the Scripps Institution, 
Mr. William A. Nierenberg, expressed his concern 
to the Committee about developments at the Law 
of the Sea Conference. He said the scientific 
community was very worried about the different 
zones which were now being created and which 
would be detrimental to the freedom of research 
on currents, climate or weather of the seas and 
oceans. Especially, the fact that the 200-mile 
economic zone now being adopted by nearly all 
coastal states would automaticaLly mean a serious 
reduction in the possibilities of conducting 
research in ocean resources. 
168. Professor John D. Isaacs, in charge of the 
Institute of Marine Resources, which is adminis-
tered from the Scripps Institution, said that this 
institute provided the basis for studies on organic 
and mineral materials. It also dealt with methods 
of harnessing energy from the sea such as ocean 
wave energy and sought to increase knowledge 
of other marine resource issues such as recrea-
tion, transportation, pollution and waste disposal 
at sea. 
169. During his studies he had come to the con-
clusion that in many respects knowledge of the 
oceans was extremely meagre. For instance, it 
had often been stated that the North Sea was 
seriously polluted by the waste disposal of coastal 
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states. Intensive study had shown that North 
Sea fish had never been so abundant. However, 
as fishermen catch only certain types of fish 
there might be shortages of these particular fish, 
but the overall population was apparently 
thriving on the organic waste dumped into the 
North Sea. There were many such instances and 
he thought it would be extremely dangerous if 
legislation were adopted which failed to take 
into account the fact that knowledge of oceans 
and seas was far from complete. Inorganic waste 
is a different problem. 
170. Your Rapporteur was happy to learn that 
the Scripps Institution has built a wave energy 
converter and tested it off Kaneohe Bay, Oahu 
(near Hawaii). The device called "wave pump", 
conceived by Professor Isaacs, can be used as a 
power source for instrumented weather buoys or 
research buoys and is considered to be economic-
wily competitive with other power sources. 
171. Mr. Ray F. Weiss said that the manganese 
nodules found on the seabed had great economic 
value. Scripps Institution was studying the 
characteristics of the nodules, their growth, the 
reasons why they were not buried by ocean sedi-
ment which grows 100 times as fast, etc. Moreover 
it was not at all clear why the chaTacteristics of 
the nodules differed from one area to another. 
To extend their knowledge, many geologists and 
chemists were studying the environment of the 
ocean; a so-called fixed ocean-bed chamber had 
been constructed in order to study the chemical 
substances of sediments. The structure had many 
features which were also used in spacecraft. 
172. The sediment study started in 1970 and 
is a ten-year programme. 
173. One of the most spectacular programmes 
of the Scripps Institution is the deep-sea drilling 
project which is managed Ly Scripps under 
contract to the National Science Foundation. 
Scientific planning and further financial support 
are provided through members of the joint 
oceanographic institutions for deep earth sampl-
ing ; this is an international organisation in 
which, in addition to the United States, parti-
cipate the Federal Republic of Germany, France, 
Japan, the USSR and the United Kingdom. 
174. On deep-sea drilling, Mr. Melvin N.F. 
Peterson stated that it started in 1968 with the 
purpose of increasing man's knowledge of the 
earth, its age, the history and process of develop-
ment of the ocean basins, and the structure and 
composition of the oceanic crust. The Glomar 
Challenger is drilling up to a depth of 23,000 ft. 
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APPENDIX I 
Programme of the visit to the United States by the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 
Monday, lOth April 
11.05 a.m. 
10th-21st JlprU 1918 
Arrival at Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 
Hotel: Wardman Towers (Sheraton Park) 
2660 Woodley Road 
(Tel. : 265.2000) 
2.30 p.m. - 4.30 p.m. Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) 
Old Executive Office Building 
Tuesday, 11th April 
17th and G Streets 
RMe of OSTP in advising the President on science and technology ; 
Science and technology concerns of the administration : 
Mr. Arthur Morrissey, Senior Policy Adviser; 
Mr. Phil Smith, Assistant Director for Natural Resources and Commercial 
Services. 
9.30 a.m. - 11.30 a.m. NASA 
2 p.m. - 4.15 p.m. 
400 Maryland Avenue 
Washington, S. W. 20546 
(Tel. : 755.2320) 
Moderator: 
Mr. Norman Terrel, Director of International Affairs. 
Welcome: 
Dr. Alan M. Lovelace, Deputy Administrator, NASA. 
NASA space transportation systems programmes: 
Mr. Edward P. Andrews, Deputy Director, Space Transportation Systems, 
Operations Office. 
NASA's communications, meteorology and oceanographic programmes: 
Dr. Lawrence R. Greenwood, Acting Director, Environmental Observa-
tions Division ; 
Mr. Donald K. Dement, Acting Director, Communications Programmes. 
Department of Energy 
J ames Forrestal Building 
lilO Independence Avenue, S. W. 
(Tel. : 252.5000) 
Introduction : 
Ms. Sarah Jackson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Policy 
Development. 
Department of Energy's approach to research problems; 
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Wednesday, 12th April 
9 a.m. - 12.30 p.m. 
12.30 p.m. 
2.30 p.m. 
APPENDIX I 
Alternative technologies : 
Dr. James S. Kane; Acting Associate Director for Basic Research Pro-
grammes, Office of Energy Research. 
A review on nuclear power : 
Dr. Harold Jaffe, Assistant Director, Office of International Programmes. 
A review on solar energy : 
Dr. Bennett Miller, Deputy Technology Programme Director for Solar, 
Geothermal and Electric Storage Systems. 
Department of State 
2201 C Street 
Washington, D.C. 20520 
(Tel. : 655.4000) 
United States relations with Europe: 
Mr. Robert E. Barbour, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European 
Affairs. 
Seabeds and law of the sea negotiations: 
Mr. Alan Berlind, Vice-Chairman of National Security Council Inter-
agency Group for Law of the Sea. 
United States international aviation issues and policies: 
Mr. Michael H. Styles, Director, Office of Aviation. 
United States foreign policy issues arising from science and technology: 
Mr. Philip J. Farley, Deputy United States Special Representative for 
Non-Proliferation. 
International collaboration in science and technology : United States preparations 
for the 1979 United Nations Conference on Science and Technology: 
Mr. James Stromayer, Deputy to Co-ordinator of United States prep-
arations for the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology ; 
Mr. Jack Blackburn, Director of the Office of Technology Policy. 
Lunch at the Foreign Service Club. 
United States Senate 
United States Capitol 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
Meeting with the following members of the Committee of Commerce, Science 
and Transportation's Sub-Committee on Science, Technology and Space: 
Senator Adlai Stevenson (Democrat, Illinois) - Chairman; 
Senator Harrison H. Schmitt (Republican, New Mexico) - Ranking 
Minority Member ; 
Senator Howard Cannon (Democrat, Nevada); 
Senator Russell Long (Democrat, Louisiana); 
Senator Barry Goldwater (Republican, Arizona); 
Senator Robert P. Griffin (Republican, Michigan); 
and with two members of the Committee on Science and Technology of the House 
of Representatives : 
Mr. Don Fuqua. (Democrat, Florida); 
Mr. Waiter Flowers (Democrat, Alabama). 
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8.08 p.m. 
Thursday, 13th .April 
Members of staff : 
Mr. Charles Mosher, Staff Director, House Committee; 
Mr. Jim Gehrig, Commerce, Science and Transportation. 
Arrival at Seattle Tacoma International Airport. 
Greeting: 
Mr. E. P. Molnar 
Boeing Aerospace Company 
International Plans and Operations. 
Hotel : The Sea.ttle Hilton 
Sixth & University 
Seattle 
Washington 98101 
(Tel. : 624.0500) 
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8.30 a.m. - 12 noon Boeing Aerospace Company 
Seattle. 
12.30 p.m. 
Arrival at Plan II Theatre. 
Greeting: 
Mr. M. R. Paisley, Ma.na.ger International Plans and Operations. 
Welcome: 
Mr. J. H. Goldie, Executive Vice-President. 
Army programme discussions : 
Mr. R. L. Brock, Vice-President, General Manager Army Systems Division. 
AWACS discussions : 
Mr. D. E. Graves, Vice-President Aircraft Armament. 
AMST discussions : 
Mr. J. E. Steiner, Vice-President Corporate Product Evaluation. 
Wind tunnel demonstration /tour : 
Mr. G. M. Bowes, Chief, Wind Tunnel Laboratories. 
Rola.nd discussion a.nd assembly area tour: 
Mr. L. D. Ha.gan, Deputy Manager Roland Programme. 
Lunch at the Kent Space Centre. 
1.45 p.m. - 4.30 p.m. Personnel rapid transit system tour : 
6.30 p.m. 
Mr. T. M. Davidson, Manager Downtown People Mover Programme. 
Interim upper stage laboratory tour : 
Mr. T. C. Carlin, IUS Manufacturing Engineer Manager. 
Space chamber facilities tour: 
Mr. E. T. Neal, Operations Manager. 
Sola.r power satellites briefing : 
Mr. D. L. Gregory, Senior Specialist Engineer. 
Energy briefing: 
Mr. D. D. Cox, Director of Energy System Development. 
Reception at the Seattle Athletic Club. 
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Friday, 14th April 
8.30 a.m. • 12 noon Boeing Aerospace Company 
Sea.ttle. 
Arrival at Renton Complex. 
BCAC briefing and airplane factory tour : 
APPENDIX I 
Mr. P. M. Condit, Director Programme Management 707,727,737 Division. 
Sunday, 16th April 
Monday, 17th April 
9 a.m. • 12 noon 
2 p.m. - 3.30 p.m. 
Arrival at Everett Complex. 
747 briefing and factory tour: 
Mr. W. E. Huston, 747 Tour Director 
Arrival at San Diego. 
Hotel : The San Diego Hilton 
1775 East Mission Bay Drive 
San Diego 
California 92109 
(Tel. : 276.4010) 
General Dynamics 
Convair Division 
P.O. Box 80847 
San Diego 
California 92138 
(Tel. : 277.8900) 
Host: Mr. D. L. Gillespie. 
Convair and its products : 
Mr. J. A. Robertson. 
Fort Worth and its products (F-16) : 
Mr. Oats Schwarzenberger. 
Pomona and its products (Cruise missile): 
Mr. J. Muse; 
Mr. J. McSweeney. 
Scripps Institution of Oceanography 
La Jolla 
California 
Welcome: 
Mr. William A. Nierenberg, Director. 
Future in the oceans : 
Mr. John D. Isa.acs. 
Manganese nodules : 
Mr. Ray F. Weiss; 
Mr. Kenneth H. Nealson. 
Deep sea drilling : 
Mr. Melvin N. F. Peterson. 
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Tour SIO /Aquarium : 
Mr. R. Nelson Fuller ; 
Mr. Jackie Janke. 
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5.30 p.m .• 7.30 p.m. Reception given by General Dynamics aboard the Reuben E. Lee at Harbour 
Island. 
Tuesday, 18th April 
9 a.m. . 12 noon 
4.45 p.m. 
Wedne&day, 19th April 
1.45 p.m. . 4 p.m. 
4.30 p.m. 
Thursday, 20th April 
9 a.m .. 11.30 a.m. 
Salk Institute for Biological Studies 
10010 W. Torrey Pines Road 
P.O. Box 1809 
La J olla, San Diego 
California 92112 
Briefing: 
Mr. John B. Pinto, Public Affairs Manager. 
Leave San Diego for Los Angeles International Airport by a Golden West Airlines' 
flight in a Shorts 330 30-passenger commuter liner. 
Hotel : Wilshire Hyatt House 
3515 Wilshire Boulevard 
Los Angeles 
California 90010 
(Tel. : 381. 7411) 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Pasadena 
California 91103 
Committee received at Main Gate by: 
Mr. G. Robillard, Assistant Laboratory Director for Planning and Review; 
Mr. V. L. Melikan, Manager, Legislative Affairs and Protocol. 
Greeting and general outline of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's work: 
General C. H. Terhune, Deputy Director. 
Current Space Projects : 
Mr. R. J. Parks, Assistant Laboratory Director for Flight Projects. 
View Viking orbiter and lander and Voyager spacecraft. 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory energy programme: 
Mr. H. M. Schurmeier, Assistant Laboratory Director for Energy and 
Technology Applications. 
Biomedical programme : 
Dr. D. A. O'Handley, Manager, Biomedical Technology. 
Environmental and waste water treatment : 
Dr. R. H. Green, Manager Environmental Technology. 
Reception given by the British Consul-General. 
TRW Systems and Energy 
One Space Park 
Redondo Beach 
California 90278 
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1.55 p.m. 
FriOOy, 21st April 
9 a.m. • 12.30 p.m. 
.A.l'PENDIX I 
Agenda review : 
Mr. J. N. Roos, Director, International. 
Welcome: 
Dr. Richard D. DeLauer, Executive Vice-President. 
General outline of TRW activities : 
Mr. G. T. Morton, Director, Customer Communications. 
General outline of the activ!ties of the Defence and Space Systems Group : 
Dr. G. E. Solomon, Vice-President and General Manager, Defence and 
Space Systems Group. 
Space systems division activities ; 
Systems engineering and integration division activities : 
Mr. R. G. Williams, Programme Development Manager, Space Systems 
Division, Defence and Space Systems Group. 
Electronics : 
Mr. M. Beere, Director, Telecommunications Planning, Communications 
Group. 
Leave for Huntsville, Alabama (Flight UA. 700). 
Hotel : The Holiday Inn 
3810 University Drive 
Huntsville 
Alabama 
(Tel.: 837.7171) 
George C. Ma.rshall Space Flight Centre 
NASA 
Huntsville, Alabama 35812 
Welcome: 
Mr. J. A. Betha.y, Director, Executive Staff. 
Space shuttle review : 
Mr. Lindstrom. 
Mated vertical ground vibration test : 
Mr. Cagle. 
Solid rocket booster short stack testing : 
Mr. Cagle. 
External tank LH2 tank testing : 
Mr. Cagle. 
External tank L01 tank testing : 
Mr. Cagle. 
Spacelab and Skylab mockups : 
Mr. Schorsten. 
Neutral buoyancy simulator: 
Mr. Ca.gle. 
END OF VISIT 
158 
APPENDIX II DOCUMENT 773 
APPENDIX II 
The Salk Institute for Biological Studies 
Brief description of the Salk Institute 
The Salk Institute, with a total staff of over 
300 and a professional staff which includes nearly 
100 Ph.D.s and M.D.s, is one of the world's largest 
independent centres of biological research, with 
much of its work focused on the areas underlying 
the health sciences. 
The smallest element of life, the cell, and its 
interaction with other cells and the environment 
is one of the Institute's major concerns. Better 
understanding of this interaction will provide 
answers to our many serious scientific and medical 
challenges : cancer, diabetes, growth and develop-
ment defects, immunology and the brain and 
nervous system. 
Visiting scientists from the United States 
and around the world come to the Institute to 
collaborate with resident researchers, or to use 
the Institute's unusually complete, modern and 
well-equipped facilities. 
To further this national and international 
cross-fertilisation of science, to keep in close 
contact with the scientific community and to 
assure that new research trends are recognised 
promptly, the Institute has a resident faculty 
and a group of non-resident fellows whose 
members include four Nobellaure,ates. 
Members of the Board of Trustees of the 
Institute and of its National Council include 
prominent figures in business, industry, govern-
ment, science and the arts, who provide guidance 
to the Institute. 
The Salk Institute is a free-standing institu-
tion which is a "public foundation". Its annual 
budget comes from many sources including grants 
from the federal government, support from major 
foundations including the National Foundation/ 
march of dimes which also provided the $20 mil-
lion buildings, voluntary health agencies, as well 
as research and health-oriented private indivi-
duals, private foundations and corporations. 
The Salk Institute strives to provide the 
intellectual climate which fosters new research 
ideas and collaboration between different scien-
tific groups. At any one time a number of pilot 
research projects are under way at the Institute 
which later mature into major laboratories and 
projects. 
Some current research at the Salk Institute 
How cancer starts and spreads 
At the root of all cancer research is the 
question : Why does a cell, going about its normal 
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business as a peaceful and productive member 
of the body's cellular community, suddenly turn 
renegade Y One way they do so in animals, but not 
necessarily in man, is to fall victim of a virus. 
By studying how such viruses make animal cells 
malignant, researchers in the Salk Institute's 
tumour virology laboratory hope to uncover at 
least one basic mechanism that leads to cancer -
and from it learn truths about the initiation of 
cancer in general. 
Sea,rch for cancer growth factors 
Normal ceLls growing in a culture dish filled 
with medium exhibit what scientists call "growth 
control". They will multiply in the dish -
rapidly at first - and then slow this process as 
the cells become crowded and the growth medium 
is depleted. Transformed cells, however, will con-
tinue to grow, reaching very high densities in 
the dish. They lack growth control. 
One difference between normal and trans-
formed cells seems to be a different requirement 
for certain growth factors contained in the 
medium. While normal cells need high levels of 
these chemicals to continue growing, transformed 
cells require a much lower concentration. The 
molecular biology laboratory is searching for 
further factors that control cell growth and is 
trying to understand the changes that take place 
when a cell becomes transformed. 
The surface membranes of cells play an 
important role in the control of cell growth. When 
normal cells are transformed to cancer cells, 
changes are known to occur in the cell membrane. 
Salk Institute researchers are giving cancer cells 
the "bends" inside a pressurised nitrogen flask 
in an attempt to discover chemical differences 
between the membranes of normal cells and cancer 
cells. The treatment ruptures the cells into 
thousands of minute bags of membrane. These 
are examined for chemical factors known to be 
involved in controlling the growth of cells. 
Understanding the nature of language 
To understand the nature of language is to 
begin to understand the nature of man. But how 
can one begin to study so complex and deeply 
rooted a phenomenon as language, which has 
evolved with man over millions of years Y One 
way is to look at a language which is still young 
and in the process of being formed. Such a lan-
guage exists, even though it cannot be heard. It 
is the sign language used by the deaf to corn-
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municate and now the subject of one of the most 
unusual of the Salk Institutes' research projects. 
Keys begin to fit microbial locks 
Genes are the blueprints of life, containing 
a coding for each one of the roughly 10,000 dif-
ferent proteins in our bodies. A microbe that is 
a common inhabitant of the human intestines and 
a valuable research organism can switch its genes 
on and off at wiJl, as must all living things. This 
ability, termed gene regulation, is shown most 
dramatically when a single set of genes carried 
in a fertilised egg grows to become a complete 
human being. Gene regulation is liable to be 
involved in cancer, too. At the genetic level, all 
living things work in much the same way. So, 
studying the microbe's ability to control its genes 
is leading Salk Institute scientists toward a 
detailed understanding o~ one of life's most basic 
processes. 
Immunity and auto-immunity 
When under attack by a foreign microbe the 
body can launch a counter-attack with its immune 
defences. New theories of the immune response 
are being tested in one laboratory. Other labora-
tories deal with instances when the body's counter-
attack can be too hasty and misdirected, against 
not a foreign invader but a component of the body 
itself. Multiple sclerosis may be such an "auto-
immune disease". Institute researchers are study-
ing a model disease in animals called EAE which 
may give clues about such "auto-immune 
diseases". 
Myasthenia gravis 
Myasthenia gravis is a little-known disease 
that afflicts thousands with a progressive fati-
guing of the muscles. Although some sc.ientists 
have suspected that myasthenia gravis might be 
an "auto-immune disease", no proof of the concept 
existed. Now Salk Institute researchers have 
successfully created a laboratory "model" of the 
disease. This model is lending new understanding 
to myasthenia gravis and to the auto-immune 
diseases in general. 
The cellular basis of breast cancer 
For women, breast cancer is the most com-
mon - and the most frequently fatal - form 
of cancer. A new laboratory at the Salk Institute 
has been established to study the disease at the 
cellular level. Using normal and cancer cells in 
culture and laboratory animals with chemically-
induced tumours, scientists will study the cell 
types found in the normal mammary gland, their 
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role in gland development and in cancer forma-
tion. Using this information from basic research, 
they hope to develop tools for more effective 
diagnosis and prognosis of breast cancer in 
women. 
DNA packing 
In an attempt to understand the method by 
which a two-metre strand of genetic code -
DNA - can fit into a single human cell, one 
Institute laboratory is invoking the aid of a 
computer to unravel this phenomenon. A complex 
of proteins now appears to be responsible for 
ordering the DNA molecule into a bundle one 
ten-thousandth of its original length. 
How did life begin 'I 
That is another of the fundamental questions 
being asked by Salk Institute scientists and one 
to which it is already possible to give some pre-
liminary answers. After showing how simple gases 
thought to be present in the primitive atmosphere 
of the earth could have formed the chemical basis 
of life, researchers are now turning toward the 
hub of the problem : how the first "living" 
molecules achieved their own duplication. 
H1tman reproductive agents 
One of the key brain hormones, LRF, is the 
chemical message that sets off the comp~ex inter-
actions of the body's sex hormones. As such, it 
plays a role in regulating fertility in both the 
female and the male. Salk Institute researchers 
are synthesising versions of LRF with slight 
chemical alterations, which, like misspelled words 
in a sentence, are useful in throwing off the sense 
of the message and thus blocking fertility. From 
such research could emerge new fertility control 
agents. 
New brain hormone 
It has become clear over the past few years 
that the brain is even more in control of our 
bodies than was once thought. Not only does the 
brain exert its powers through the nervous 
system, but it also has a direct role in regulating 
the body's hormones. It does so via hormones of 
its own. The very first of these to be discovered, 
TRF, is involved in the control of the thyroid 
gland, and was found by a research team at the 
Salk Institute. The latest such hormone, somatos-
tatin, discovered at the Salk Institute, is of great 
importance in the metabolic processes involved 
in diabetes. 
APPENDIX II 
The brain and nervous system 
For each of us, control of our thoughts and 
actions reside in the billions upon billions of 
connections made between the tens of billions of 
cells in our brain. Trying to learn something of 
that "wiring pattern" is one of the most daunting 
intellectual tasks left to modern science. A modest 
start on this staggering problem has been made 
by Salk Institute scientists who have persuaded 
brain and muscle cells to grow in the same 
laboratory dish and to form connections with one 
another. From this system, the researchers hope 
6 
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to learn some of the rules that govern the "wiring 
patterns" of the brain. 
Deep within the three-pound human brain 
lie two small bluish specks of tissue weighing less 
than a millionth of an ounce each. Reaching out 
from this region are connections to much of the 
rest of the brain. Researchers in the new Arthur 
Vining Davies Centre for Behaviouml Neuro-
biology at the Salk Institute are studying this 
system of connections for its role in such key 
functions as body movement, memory, and per-
haps most importantly, reward. Extension of the 
studies on reward may shed light on the nature 
of drug addiction and aLcoholism. 
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List of questions put during the visit to the United States 
Questions for the State Department 
The Soviet Union is engaged in a massive 
moderniSBition, expansion and character change 
in its land, sea and air power. Transformation 
of the eastern military forces from essentially 
defensively-equipped forces to expanded and 
offensively-equipped forces has been so dramatic 
and ominous that substantial increases in NATO 
forces is becoming a necessity. 
What repercussions will this have on the 
United States defence budget in relation to space, 
aviation and research and development in other 
fields of advanced technology ? 
What wiJl be the consequences for NASA's 
budget, especially with regard to research and 
development of new aircraft and space vehicles Y 
What is the role of the United Nations in 
space? 
Could the United Nations play a role, as 
suggested by the French President, by using 
satellites to verify the execution of disarmament 
plans y 
Would it be possible for the United Nations 
to have its own reconnaissance satellites? 
What is the State Department's attitude 
towards Soviet surveillance satellites with atomic 
power plants Y 
ShouJd the United Nations' Committee on 
the peaceful uses of outer space discuss this 
matter and, if so, what action might it be able 
to take? 
What is the position of the United States 
Government on the Outer Space Treaty and the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty with regard to military 
satellites ? 
The President's 1976 aeronautical and space 
report indicates that the defence advanced 
research projects agency is pursuing new techno-
logy for strategic surveillance from space. What 
is the purpose of this research Y 
What are the latest developments in artificial 
earth sateLlites for direct television broadcasting Y 
If the plans for Nordic co-operation materi-
alise how will this affect Intelsat ? 
What is the BJttitude of the State Depart-
ment towvds inter-Arab co-operation ? 
Which countries have agreements with the 
United States for receiving and processing Land-
sat data Y 
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Which countries are taking part in the inter-
national maritime satellite organisation ? 
When wi1:l this organisation become opera-
tional? 
What are the latest developments regarding 
further collaboration between the United States 
and the USSR in space matters Y 
Is further colilaboration foreseen after the 
Apollo-Soyuz test project ? 
What progress has been made in the United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea on 
the question of deep ocean mining Y 
Is there still a possibility that the United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea will 
reach agreement on a treaty ? 
What is the Department's opinion on the 
results of and follow-up to the fo1lowing treaties: 
(a) The 1958 Antarctic Treaty 1 
(b) The 1963 Moscow Test Ban Treaty Y 
(c) The 1966 Ourter Space Treaty? 
(d) The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty? 
(e) The 1970 Seabed Treaty Y 
In the framework of the Law of the Sea 
Conference, the seventh session of which began 
on 28th March in Geneva, would the Department 
give its opinion on high seas freedom, fishery 
conservation and the utilisBJtion of marine living 
resources, the resources of the continental shelf 
and sharing revenue with developing countries, 
the maximum flow of information on marine 
scientific research, and marine environmental 
protection ? 
If no agreement is reached on deep-sea 
mining, wiiJ the United States a1low private 
companies to start mining during the next 
decade? 
The question has been raised of whether a 
treaty would be preferable to the existing situa-
tion. Would a treaty be acceptable to all 150 
participating States in view of the differences of 
opinion which exist between the "77" developing 
countries and the industrialised countries ? 
Questions for the Science Adviser to the President 
How can the political aims of the new 
Administration's scientific and technological 
programmes be defined ? 
What general science and technology policy 
has been laid down by the new Administration ! 
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What is the role of the Science Adviser to 
the President in the overall development of 
research and technology ? 
What is the relationship between this office, 
the departments, the universities and other 
institutes of learning ? 
What is the role played by the National 
Science Foundation, the Institute for Funda-
mental Research and institutes particularly 
concerned with the well-being of the population~ 
How is the overall research budget estab-
lished and what course is set for it in the near 
future Y 
The Committee is particularly interested in 
energy problems, new sources of energy, nuclear 
energy, oceanography, space and aviation 
research. What are the trends of United States 
policies in these fields ? 
To which of the above sectors did your 
government give priority during the 1960s and 
to which will it give priority in the 1970s and 
1980s? 
What is the budget trend in the field of 
oceanology Y 
What percentage of the budget is spent on 
submarine research, experiments in fish ranching 
in shallow waters, basic research on the resources 
of the continental shelf, research ships and the 
operation of marine centres Y 
What part of the budget is devoted to new 
sources of energy, wave, tide, solar and geo-
thermal energy ? 
What is being done in the field of radio-
active chemistry and the utilisation of radio 
elements in order to fight air and water pollu-
tion Y 
Questions for NASA 
What specific guidelines are there regarding 
NASA's ,1ong-range planning Y 
What are its plans concerning the concept 
of suppLying solar energy to earth via satellites? 
If these plans are approved, how whll they 
affect the space shuttle programme ? 
What plans exist for scientific work and 
research in outer space ? 
Will there be a planetary m.ission to Venus Y 
As the emphasis is now on space appHcations 
which are of direct use on earth, is there not a 
danger that scientific efforts will be diminished ? 
Is the potential for inhabiting other planets 
in the soLar system being studied Y If so, which 
direction will this study take 1 
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Is it true that the United States has the 
technology and the tools to tap the resources of 
space but that for budgetary reasons it is not 
possible to execute this type of programme 7 
What are the possibilities of establishing a 
permanent manned space sta:tion in 1990 Y 
Wi11 manned military space stations be 
required as p8irt of future United States space 
operations Y 
How will the knowledge and data from earth 
resources sateLlites such as Landsat be distributed 
to countries requiring this information Y 
Should an international body be se:t up to 
transfer data to countries or other customers Y 
Will a commercial agency or organisation 
be established to provide the space services 
requested by countries or commercial organisa-
tions Y 
Have the oil companies asked for satellites 
capable of detecting oil deposits or minerals Y 
Will such requests be approved ? 
How many Seasa;t satellites wiLl be launched? 
Will an oper8!tional Seasat programme be 
supported by the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration or will a private company 
be set up to run this programme ? 
Questions for the Energy Department 
The commercial reprocessing and recycling 
of plutonium produced in the United States will 
be deferred indefinitely ; what viable and 
economic nuclear programme could be established 
without such reprocessing and recyclin-g ? 
How will the United States breeder reactor 
programme be restructured ? 
What will be the international consequences 
of American policy with regard to Europe, Latin 
America and the developing countries in Africa 
and Asia 1 
of: 
Could an indication be given on the future 
(a) the advanced gas-cooled reactor? 
(b) the liquid metal-cooled reactor? 
(c) the high temperature gas-cooled reactor? 
(d) the steam generating heayy water reactor? 
(e) the fusion process Y 
(f) safety studies ? 
(g) applied nuclear work Y 
(h) radio isotopes, radiation techniques Y 
What is the trend for electricity generating 
capacity in the United States, its growth rate 
and future? 
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What percentage of electricity is generated 
from nuclear sources ? 
What is the estimated generating capacity 
of electrical energy required in 1985 and 1990 
and what percentage of this will be provided by 
nuclear generating stations Y 
What is the annual nuclear research budget ? 
Is it true that the combined budgets of 
France, the United Kingdom and Germany for 
research on fast-breeder reactors represent a total 
smaller than the annual United States budget 
for research on this type of reactor ? 
Questions for the Senate Space Sub-Committee 
For what reasons did the Senate suppress 
its Space Committee and establish a Space Sub-
Committee within the framework of the Com-
mittee for Commerce ? 
What are the terms of reference of the Sub-
Committee ? 
Will parlia;mentary supervision of the aero-
space activities of NASA and the relationships 
between NASA and the aerospace industries be 
carried out by the Sub-Committee ? 
Can the Congress committees follow the rapid 
development of technology and what machinery 
has been established to assist the legislators in 
their ta;sk ? 
Is NASA space policy worked out together 
with the Congress committees Y 
What is the Sub-Committee's role in the 
supervision of public expenditure on space 
research and development Y 
How is the Sub-Committee informed of the 
specific subjects concerning research and develop-
ment being followed by NASA scientists ? 
Wha.t will be the consequences of a USSR 
space shuttle? 
How does the Sub-Committee follow research 
and development in military space applications ? 
ShouLd a.n international exchange of views on 
space science and technology be established at 
parliamentary level Y 
How is control exercised by the Sub-
Committee on environment problems related to 
aviation? 
Is the Sub-Committee studying the con-
sequences of supersonic aircraft, high perform-
ance VTOL aircraft and civil and military short-
haul technology ? 
NASA is carrying out importoot research 
in the field of solar energy. Is the Sub-Committee 
of the opinion that this might become cost com-
petitive and, if so, in what form ? 
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What are the results of the study undertaken 
by NASA on the feasibility of disposing of radio-
active nuclear waste in space ? 
Brief notes on spacelab (SL) 
1. The SL development in Europe is going 
ahead without particular difficulties. An impor-
tant milestone has been completed in March of 
this year : The critical design review of the pro-
gramme was considered highly satisfactory, and 
fohlowing this ESA has decided to authorise 
manufacture of the SL flight unit to be delivered 
to NASA. This review was the last one before 
the flight acceptance review which will take place 
in connection with the delivery of the SL. The 
next milestone wi1l be the delivery of the engineer-
ing model to NASA, pla.nned for mid-1979. The 
flight unit wi1l be shipped to NASA, in two sets, 
in autumn 1979 and early 1980, in readiness for 
the first two spacelab missions for December 1980 
and April1981. 
2. One of ESA's main concerns in connection 
with this development programme is the status 
of NASA's SL procurement order for the next 
SL unit. In fact, according to the SL memoran-
dum of understanding 1 con0luded between NASA 
and ESA, NASA should give an initial SL pro-
curement order for at least one SL unit at the 
latest two years before the delivery of the first 
SL unit. This means that such an order should 
have been received by ESA between September 
1977 and January 1978, if one takes into account 
the above delivery schedule for the first SL flight 
unit. 
Whilst the administrators of NASA have on 
several occasions confirmed NASA's willingness 
to purchase this additionaJ. SL unit (and perhaps 
more), a formaJ. order has not yet been received 
from NASA. It is hoped that an offset arrange-
ment between NASA and ESA may help to plac.e 
rapidly such an order, in that it may assist NASA 
to overcome a budgetary problem (they used the 
money earmarked for this purpose in order to 
keep the main development budget). Such an 
arrangement would offset payment for services 
or goods to be exchanged between the two 
agencies. Hence, we expect a NASA procurement 
order in October 1978, by which time an offset 
arrangement should have been concluded. We also 
1. Memorandum of understanding between the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration and the European 
Space Research Organisation for a co-operative progra=e 
concerning development, procurement and use of a space 
laboratory in conjunction with the space shuttle system 
signed on 14th August 1973-
APPENDIX III 
hope that appropriate long-term arrangements 
and provisions, on both sides, will be made for 
the subsequent procurement of further spacelab 
units, to which the provisions of the above 
memorandum equally refer. 
3. Beyond this, ESA and its member states 
expect that the United States authorities will 
fully reply to, and take into account, those pro-
visions of the agreement 1 concluded between the 
United States Government and certain member 
states of the agency, which have a direct bearing 
on their future co-operation in the so-called post-
Apollo programme. In particular, the United 
States undertook : 
- to keep their European partners informed 
of the United States future use of the 
space shuttle system, and of future con-
cepts which may lead to modifications of 
the present SL concept, with a view to 
1. Agreement between the Government of the United 
States of America and certain governments, members of 
the European Space Research Organisation, for a co-
operative programme concerning the development, procure-
ment and use of a space laboratory, in conjunction with 
the space shuttle system signed on 15th August 1973. 
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expanding and extending this co-operation 
beyond the agreement (Article 5) ; 
- to make the space shuttle available for 
SL missions of the European partners on 
either a co-operative or cost-reimbursable 
basis, consistent with international 
arrangements ; 
- to consult with their ElLI'opean partners 
with a view to facilitating a continuing 
and expanding co-operation in the use of 
outer space, and furthermore to associate 
them with mission definition planning for 
the use of the system and with planning 
and management of the overall develop-
ment of the system. 
It should be underlined that European states 
attach, on that basis, much importance to being 
continuously involved in United States or United 
States/Soviet post-Apollo activities and planning. 
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Appreciating the continuing dialogue between the Council and the Assembly on Europe's energy 
supplies, European aviation and space questions; 
Noting with anxiety however the increasing tendency in Europe to side-step the Community 
approach and make bilateral or trilateral arrangements; 
Considering the declaration of the heads of state or of government of the European Community 
at their meeting in Copenhagen on 7th and 8th April 1978 underlining the urgent need to make Western 
Europe less dependent on imported energy sources and acknowledging that high priority must be given 
to large-scale investments in this sector; 
Agreeing with the Council that there is an urgent need for a common energy policy for Western 
Europe; 
Regretting that the state of European aviation has not improved since last year and that an overall 
civil and military aeronautical policy has not been formulated ; 
Gratified that member countries' approach to ESA's programmes has been more positive recently ~ 
Gratified also at the Council's statement in its annual report that European nuclear fusion research 
must be pursued so that Europe can achieve a technological level comparable with that of the United 
States and the Soviet Union and that it wishes a. European civil and military aeronautical industry to be 
developed capable of co-operating, on an equal footing, with the United States, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Invite member countries : 
1. When defining their industrial policy, to take greater account of security requirements and in 
particular the need to: 
- ensure Europe's energy supplies even in time of crisis; 
- maintain the level of employment which is essential for social peace ; 
- guarantee the competitiveness of European advanced industries by a high level of research and 
investment and thus strengthen the industrial basis of European security ; 
2. (a) To continue to strive for a common European energy plan up to 1990; 
(b) To earmark a major part of their budgets for the development of conventional and new sources 
of energy and energy production as well as for energy conservation and environmental factors ; 
II. Invite the Governments of Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to seek the 
best means for the firms concerned in their countries to take part in the Airbus programme as full partners. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Adriaensens, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions appreciates the con-
tinuing dialogue between the Council and the 
Assembly on scientific, technical and space ques-
tions. It is still. worried however about the absence 
of effective decision-making machinery in Europe 
and even more about the increasing tendency to 
side-step the Community approach and make 
bilateral or trilateral arrangements, although 
some progress has been made such as the decision 
to insta1l the Joint European Torus (JET) at 
Culham in the United Kingdom. 
11. Nuclear energy 
2. Representatives of member states and of the 
Commission of the European Communities were 
among the forty countries participating in the 
international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation con-
ference held under the auspices of the United 
States. The results of the studies now being car-
ried out in specialised working groups will be 
known at the end of 1979. This is of the greatest 
importance for the Community's nuclear energy 
programme which has now practically come to 
a standstill. In 1977 the Community's nuclear 
capacity grew by only 3,300 MW e, not even half 
the figure put forward only a year ago. At the 
end of 1977, the Community's total nuclear 
capacity was 22,400 MW e. This slow growth needs 
to be examined in the context of its effect on 
future employment and on social and economic 
stability in the Community. 
3. On 8th Apri1 1978, during the summit con-
ference in Copenhagen, the heads of state or of 
government of the European Community coun-
tries declared that the increase in oil imports by 
the Community remained a source of great 
anxiety. If Western Europe is not able to reduce 
its oil imports between now and 1985 it will 
become more and more dependent on outside 
sources of energy. At its meeting on 25th October 
1977, the Council of Ministers agreed on certain 
measures such as the sharing of oil between 
member countries in case of supply difficuJties 
controls on coal imports, conservation of ener~ 
and aid for Community projects in the hydrogen 
sector. However, agreement proved impossible on 
a number of other points, especia11y on how to 
settle the Community's refinery problems, pro-
mote the use of coal in electric power stations 
and arrange for sufficient stocks of coal. 
4. The Commission in Brussels had submitted 
an energy plan with detailed programmes and 
goals for 1985, but the Council of Ministers was 
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unable to take the necessary decisions and a 
common energy plan for the period up to 1985-90 
could not therefore be adopted. 
5. Your Rapporteur particularly regrets this 
as a lopsided sitootion has now arisen in that no 
decisions have been taken on energy production 
and the development of conventional and new 
sources of energy, but important measures have 
been taken which apply only to energy conserva-
tion and to security and environmental problems. 
6. Your Rapporteur is of the opinion that policy 
with regard to technological research and develop-
ment in various sectors, but especially the energy 
sector, should take account of the following 
economic criteria : (i) growth of the gross national 
product; (ii) increased employment opportun- · 
ities ; (iii) the balance of payments situation · 
(iv) improved conditions of employment. ' 
7. Viewed in this light, it can be seen that 
energy conservation, although important is not 
sufficient to promote the well-being of th~ people 
of Europe. Your Rapporteur wishes to point out 
that the situation of relative abundance of oil 
:products. prevailing in 1977, and perhaps 1978, 
IS not gomg to last. This abundance was due only 
to the economic recession, which was accompanied 
by a high level of unemployment. Improvements 
in the economy will involve considerable demand 
for energy if the goal of the Copenhagen eon-
ference for a yearly growth rate of 4.5 % is to be 
attained. 
8. In its report the Council accepts that much 
still remains to be done both in defining a com-
mon European energy supply policy and in 
developing a nuclear industry with mastery of 
the fusion cycle and that European nuclear fusion 
research must be pursued so that Europe can 
achieve a technological level comparable with tllat 
of the United States and the Soviet Union. Your 
Rapporteur fully agrees with this opinion. The 
interest in nuclear energy, economic reasons 
apart, is due largely to the fact that the security 
of the free world, and of Western Europe in 
particular, depends on the availability of an 
adequate energy supply. A growing dependence 
for its oil supplies on outside sources would 
jeopardise Europe's security and freedom of 
action in foreign affairs. 
Ill. Aerospace 
9. Where aircraft construction is concerned 
your Rapporteur is sorry to say that no reai 
progress has been made. No decisions have yet 
been taken on the future of the Airbus B-10 and 
the joint European small passenger aircraft 
development. The United Kingdom Government 
and British Aerospace Corporation have not yet 
decided whether to participate in the future 
development of these European aircraft. 
10. Your Rapporteur considers it of great 
importance for all member countries to partici-
pate in the European Airbus \Tenture. 
11. Where space questions are concerned, a 
separate report has been submitted by Mr. Schef-
fler and your Rapporteur will therefore merely 
mention his satisfaction that since January 1978 
s· 
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all member countries have made real progress 
towards approving ESA's programmes. 
12. The Council finally stated that it shared 
the Assembly's wish for the development of a 
European civil and military aeronautical indus-
try, capable of co-operating, on an equal footing, 
with the United States. Here again Europe's 
independence would also be at stake if it aban-
doned its aeronautical and aerospace industrial 
activities. This would a1so be detrimental to the 
United States which, by ordering the Roland 
missile, has shown the usefulness of the European 
industry. 
Document 774 
Amendment No. 1 
Scientific, technological and aerospace questions -
Reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Jager 
19th June 1978 
At the end of the draft recommendation proper, a.dd a. pa.ra.gra.ph Ill a.s follows: 
"Ill. Invite the governments of the member countries to discuss the communication of 31st 
May last from the Commission of the European Communities on concerted action on aircraft 
programmes so that they ma.y take a. decision on this matter a.t the next meeting of het 
European Council." 
Signed : J ager 
1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment amended and agreed to). 
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Information Report 
(submitted by Mr. Reid, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments decided during its meeting in Rome on 
27th June to prepare reports on the broadcast-
ing of parliamentary debates and on the laws 
governing the election of the European Parlia-
ment. Your Rapporteur prepared an interim 
report dated 3rd November 1977 (Document 
752). 
2. Also in June 1977, consideration was being 
given to the possibility of rewriting the report<; 
by Mr. Peronnet on regional assemblies and the 
Assembly of WEU. Developments in the Nether· 
lands, Luxembourg, Belgium, Italy and the 
United Kingdom in recent years provide much 
additional material. This subject will be tackled 
when devolutionary bills for Scotland and Wales 
have completed their passage through the House 
of Commons, so allowing a pan-WEU review 
of the situation. It is hoped that this will be 
possible for the next part-session of the Assembly 
of WEU in November 1978. 
D. Activities of the Committee 
3. On 31st May and 1st June 1978 the Com-
mittee met in Paris. It was addressed by Mr. 
Douvry, Director-General of the public authority 
of the new town of Cergy-Pontoise, on French 
new towns, their problems and advantages, and 
then by Mr. Cabana, Secretary-General of the 
Paris City Hall, on the methods of work of the 
administration of the City of Paris. 
4. The Committee has selected five recommend-
ations for official transmission to the presidents 
of the national parliaments : 
- 307 on the application of the final act 
of the CSCE; 
- 308 on communications and crisis man-
agement in the Alliance ; 
- 309 on WEU's contribution to the 
development of European union ; 
- 310 on the spread of nuclear energy and 
defence problems ; 
- 311 on progress in aerospace. 
5. The number of interventions during the last 
six months has become more normal again : 38 as 
against 15 for the last six months of 1977. Taking 
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account of the fact that during the period con-
cerned the French Republic had general elec-
tions and the Italian Republic a long and 
difficult task in forming a new government, your 
Rapporteur feels it is not unjustified to hope that 
the number of interventions will rise again in the 
next six months. 
ID. Laws governing elections to the European 
Parliament 
A. Action by the European Communities 
6. Article 138 of the EEC Treaty of Rome 
commits member states to hold direct elections. 
At the European Communities heads of govern-
ment meeting in Paris in December 1974, seven 
of the nine set a target date for elections in 1978, 
the United Kingdom and Denmark reserving 
their position. Following the "yes" vote in the 
June 1975 referendum, a clear British commit-
ment to direct elections was given in December 
1975. 
7. Agreement among all member states was 
reached on 20th September 1976 with the signing 
of the convention "Act concerning election of 
the representatives of the assembly by direct 
universal suffrage" which provides, inter alia, 
for: 
- a European assembly of 410 representa-
tives, elected for a fixed term of five 
years; 
- elections to be held in all member states 
within an agreed Thursday-Monday 
period, designated in the first instance 
by the Council of Ministers. May-June 
1978 to be the chosen period ; 
- membership of national parliaments not 
to constitute incompatibility, and each 
legislature to be free to make its own 
choice about the dual mandate ; 
- the first directly-elected assembly to 
draw up a proposal for a uniform 
electoral procedure, and meanwhile 
governments can choose their own pro-
posals; 
- the 410 representatives to be divided 
among member states as follows : France, 
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and 
United Kingdom - 81 each; Nether-
lands - 25 ; Belgium - 24 ; Denmark 
- 16 ; Ireland - 15 ; Luxembourg - 6. 
8. The act does not come into force until all 
the member states have ratified it. In section B 
your Rapporteur gives a brief sketch of his 
understanding of what stage legislation has 
reached in WEU member countries. 
B. Action by WEU member countries 
( i) Belgium (24 seats) 
9. The bill approving the Community act of 
September 1976 was passed in both Chambers. 
The bill organising European elections in Bel-
gium was tabled on 2nd December 1977 and is 
under discussion in the three committees con-
cerned with foreign affairs, the interior, and 
European affairs. Amendments have already 
been tabled by the government, the majority and 
the opposition. 
10. All parties in Belgium are agreed on a 
system of proportional representation. There have 
been disagreements, however, on how the coun-
try's 24 seats are to be distributed between the 
French-speaking and Dutch-speaking commun-
ities, with Brussels also asking for separate 
treatment. The Prime Minister, Mr. Tindemans, 
has suggested national lists for the whole country, 
while the former Minister of the Interior, 
Mr. Michel, has proposed a repartitioning of the 
24 seats into three "regions": 12 for Flanders, 
8 for Wallonia and 4 for Brussels. The Egmont 
agreement of May 1977 provided for 13 seats to 
be allocated to the Dutch-speaking and 11 seats 
to the French-speaking list ; residents in the 
Brussels area would be able to designate which 
list they vote upon. 
11. The bill organising European elections 
provides for two electoral bodies, one French, 
the other Dutch, to be formed further to the 
decision reached in the Egmont agreement. 
However, the kingdom would be divided into 
three constituencies : one French-speaking, one 
Dutch-speaking and one for Brussels. 
12. In the Brussels constituency, all candidates 
would be listed on the ballot paper, which would 
be printed top to bottom, the Dutch-speaking 
candidates on one side and the French-speaking 
candidates on the other, so that electors in the 
Brussels constituency may choose between the 
two linguistic groups of candidates. 
13. However, the boundaries of the Brussels 
constituency still have to be fixed. 
(ii) Federal Republic of Germany (81 seats) 
14. The Community act was ratified by the 
Bundestag on 16th June and by the Bundesrat 
on 24th June 1977 and came into force on 11th 
August 1977. 
15. The electoral bill, however, has been facing 
certain difficulties. A bill was tabled by the 
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government on 30th March 1977 which provided 
for proportional representation through national 
lists with a minimum of 5 % of the votes needed 
for election. On 6th May, however, this was 
rejected by the Bundesrat in favour of Land 
(regional) lists. The latter proposal is intended 
to translate the federal nature of West Germany 
to the European assembly. On 16th March 1978 
the Bundestag unanimously adopted the electoral 
bill which now provides for the optional use of 
either national or Land lists. Bundesrat consent 
was given on 21st April 1978. An amendment 
by the christian democrats to allow eligibility of 
members of the Lander governments was rejected. 
The bill defining the status of German members 
of the European Parliament was introduced on 
30th March 1977. It is still under consideration 
in the competent committees. 
16. The Government of the Federal Republic has 
declared that, in view of the special situation of 
Berlin, the House of Deputies there will elect 
representatives to those seats (three) within the 
German quota which fall to Land Berlin. 
(iii) France (81 seats) 
17. At one time it was widely thought that 
France would face considerable difficulties in 
passing the necessary European elections legisla-
tion. In the event, France is the first country to 
complete both ratification and the passage of the 
electoral bill. In the face of possible opposition 
to the elections from both the communists and 
the Gaullists, President Giscard d'Estaing refer-
red the issue in 1976 to the French constitutional 
court. They ruled that no constitutional objections 
existed, since no increase in the European Par-
liament's powers was involved. In the spring, the 
communists declared support in principle for the 
elections. A large body of Gaullists, however, 
continued to have doubts. When the ratification 
bill was presented to the National Assembly on 
16th June, Article 49.3 of the French constitu-
tion was therefore invoked : the opponents of the 
measure declined to table a motion of no con-
fidence, and the act was ratified. On 24th June 
the Senate voted by 220 to 0 with 23 abstentions 
in favour of ratification. 
18. On 25th May an electoral bill was tabled by 
the government providing for proportional repre-
sentation by national lists (as opposed to the 
single-member seat system used for National 
Assembly elections). The plus forte moyenne 
system of proportionality will be used, with seats 
going 1to candidates in order of presentation on 
their party's list. This bill was passed with minor 
amendments by the Assembly on 21st June (474 
votes to 2) and by the Senate on 29th June 
(256 votes to 0) . 
19. French citizens resident in other countries 
will be able to vote for a French member if they 
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are inscribed in the national election lists. Also 
voting as part of France will be the five French 
overseas departments (Guyane, Guadeloupe, Mar-
tinique, Reunion, St. Pierre and Miquelon) and 
the French overseas territories (Polynesia, New 
Caledonia, Mayotte). 
(iv) Italy (81 seats) 
20. Italy was the first country to ratify the 
Community act. It was approved by the Chamber 
of Deputies on 17th February by 384 votes to 16, 
and by the Senate on 24th March, unanimously. 
21. There is general agreement on proportional 
representation by the list system, but so far no 
electoral bill has been published. 
22. Discussion in committee and among the 
parties has revealed support for national lists, 
for lists covering all twenty existing regions, and 
for a division of the country into three - north, 
centre south and islands. The government of the auton~mous region of Val d'Aosta has tabled its 
own bill in the Italian Senate, seeking its own 
representative in the European assembly. 
(v) Luxembourg (6 seats) 
23. The Luxembourg Parliament ratified the 
Community act on 5th July, by 54 votes to 5. A 
draft elections bill is currently being discussed 
between the parties. 
24. The system of election will be proportional 
representation, though it is not yet .decided 
whether there will be more than one constituency, 
there being support both for a single one and for 
two : Luxembourg city and the rest of the 
country. Whichever is decided, the outcome is 
not expected to be different. The return of two 
social christians, two socialists and two liberals 
is predicted. 
25. Three questions seem very important : the 
number of constituencies, the election of substi-
tutes and voting rights for Luxembourg nationals 
living outside the country. Incompatibilities and 
conditions for election will be the same as for 
national elections. Dual mandates will probably 
be accepted. 
(vi) Netherlands (25 seats) 
26. The Community act was ratified, by acclama-
tion, in the Tweede Kamer (lower house) on 23rd 
June; and by the Eerste Kamer (upper house) 
on 28th June. The elections bill will provide for 
proportional representation in a single national 
constituency. The elector will be able to vote 
for any given candidate on a list, but if this 
candidate collects less than 380,000 personal votes 
he will not be elected, and his votes will be 
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distributed in order of party preference (i.e. list 
order). "Left-over" votes and seats will be 
distributed according to the d'Hondt system. 
Immigrants from other EEC countries who do 
not have the vote at home will probably be able 
to vote in the Netherlands. 
(vii) United Kingdom (81 seats) 
27. The first European assembly elections bill 
was published on 24th June 1977 and given a 
second reading (a favourable vote on the prin-
ciple) by the House of Commons on 7th Jul:v 
by 394 votes to 147. The great majority of the 
Conservative Party, together with the Liberal 
and Scottish Nationalist Parties, were in favour, 
the Labour Party split (132 for, 124 against) 
and the majority of the illster Unionists 
opposed. 
28. The bill failed through lack of time and a 
virtually identical one was introduced on 9th 
November 1977. This bill received a second 
reading on 24th November by 381 votes to 98, 
the divided Labour Party again providing the 
bulk of the opposition (73 votes). It was hotly 
contested in the House of Commons, and it was 
found necessary to impose a time-table motion 
on its progress. It was substantially amended, 
and was agreed to in that House by 159 votes 
to 45 on 16th February 1978. No amendments 
were made by the House of Lords and the bill 
received Royal Assent on 5th May 1978. 
29. The act divides the United Kingdom into its 
constituent nations : of the total 81 seats, Eng-
land gets 66, Scotland 8, Wales 4 and Northern 
Ireland 3. The original bill was curious in format 
in that it proposed voting by the regional list 
system for Great Britain while allowing the 
Commons to replace this with single-member 
constituencies ("first past the post"). On 13th 
December 1977 the House of Commons rejected 
the government's recommendation of the list 
system by 319 votes to 222, and subsequently 
reaffirmed its preference for "first past the 
post". The proposal for Northern Ireland, that 
voting should be by single transferable vote, was 
left unchanged. 
30. The seats will be based on an amalgam of 
two or more parliamentary constituencies with 
an electorate as near as possible the area's elec-
toral quota (e.g. total Scottish electorate divided 
by eight). Boundary Commission reports are 
expected shortly. 
31. Candidates will be listed alphabetically and 
the "winner takes all" regardless of the percent-
age size of his vote. 
C. Impact on the WEU countries 
32. Before commenting on the detailed provisions 
of national legislation on direct elections, your 
Rapporteur feels that it may be helpful to set 
out a table showing the statistical effect of the 
Country Population 
Belgium 9,883,302 
France 52,655,802 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 61,832,000 
Italy 55,812,000 
Luxembourg 356,400 
Netherlands 14,000,000 
United Kingdom 56,042,000 
33. These figures show a substantial "weighting" 
in representation towards the smaller member 
states (and, in your Rapporteur's opinion, rightly 
so). They also conceal disparities within 
"national" totals. Within the British figures, for 
example, there is a similar "weighting" towards 
Scotland (population per representative 473,000 
compared to 514,000 for England), but Scotland 
is disadvantaged in seats per head of population 
in comparison to the Benelux countries. This is 
a subject on which your Rapporteur has had 
representations from groups in Belgium, France 
and Italy and to which he returns under 
section D. 
D. The disfranchised Europeans 
34 .. As direct elections to the European Parlia-
ment will take place at the same time threughout 
the whole Community, and as more and more 
nationals from one member country are now 
residing in another without changing their 
nationality, how widely can the EEC franchise 
be extended ? Such persons belong to one of the 
nations which will vote, live in one of the others, 
and have vested interest in the outcome of the 
election and the composition of the parliament. 
35. Your Rapporteur first attempted to establish 
the size of the problem, and requested an estimate 
from each WEU assembly of how many nationals 
are currently living in another EEC country. He 
received the :following information on the number 
of expatriates living elsewhere in the EEC : 
Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250,000 
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299,571 
Federal Republic o:f Germany 235,000 
Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,400,000 
Luxembourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Unknown 
Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300,000 
United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . 285,800 
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allocation of seats on the population of member 
countries: 
Voters 
Electorate Seats per 
representative 
6,416,662 24 267,000 
33,752,779 81 417,000 
41,600,000 81 514,000 
1 81 1 
205,817 6 34,000 
9,500,000 25 380,000 
40,960,843 81 507,000 
36. Given the :fact that over 2,500,000 Europeans 
fall into this category, he then attempted to 
establish what voting rights they currently have. 
37. In Luxembourg, citizens who reside in 
another Community country have no right to vote 
in home elections. In Belgium, citizens who are 
abroad for professional or military reasons, 
together with the members of their family and 
their household residing with them, have the right 
to vote by proxy, and their names are entered in 
the electoral roll o:f the commune where they last 
lived. In the Federal Republic of Germany, 
members of the public service and armed forces 
and their spouses who are posted to any country 
abroad are eligible to vote (Bundeswahlgesetz, 
Section 12). In France, all citizens resident 
abroad have the right to vote by proxy or by 
post. In the United Kingdom, members o:f the 
public service and armed forces and employees 
o:f the British Council, and their spouses, are 
eligible to vote by proxy. Similar provisions have 
recently been adopted in the Netherlands. In 
Italy, citizens living abroad can, if registered on 
the electoral roll there, vote in their home 
commune. 
38. In recent years certain immigrants' councils 
have obtained the right to be consulted at muni-
cipal level in Belgium, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Netherlands. There have also 
been proposals in the Belgian and Italian par-
liaments to extend voting rights to immigrants in 
local elections : they have not yet been discussed 
in committee however. 
39. The imminence and special nature of direct 
elections to the European Parliament have led all 
WEU member countries to take a fresh look at 
the problem. Broadly, their response falls into 
two categories : 
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- to extend the franchise to nationals living 
in another EEC state by giving them the 
vote in their home country, either by 
returning there to vote, by proxy or 
postal vote, or by voting in the nearest 
embassy or consulate ; 
- to allow such nationals voting rights in 
the host country. 
40. In France, citizens will have the right to 
vote provided they are inscribed on the national 
election lists ; no voting will be possible inside 
France for nationals of other EEC countries. In 
the Federal Republic of Germany, all citizens 
living within the European Communities will be 
enfranchised ; those who live outwith the EEC 
will not, nor will other EEC nationals living 
within the Federal Republic of Germany be 
allowed to vote there. In the United Kingdom, 
the Select Committee on Direct Elections (of 
which your Rapporteur was a member) recom-
mended that the right to vote at home in Com-
munity elections be extended world-wide to all 
nationals who satisfied the 1971 Immigration Act. 
This was subsequently refused by the government. 
41. In Italy, the permanent committee for 
emigration met on 12th July to consider the 
problem : reciprocity was suggested - if the 
franchise were extended to Italians in a host 
country, then similar rights might be given to 
citizens of that country in Italy. The matter of 
bilateral agreements, or of writing such a clause 
into the elections bill, will be considered later this 
year. 
42. No final decision has yet been taken in the 
Netherlands. Your Rapporteur is informed, how-
ever, that Dutch nationals resident in other EEC 
countries will probably be entitled to vote at 
home, provided they sign a declaration stating 
that they will not make use of any voting rights 
in their host country. Immigrants to the Nether-
lands from other EEC countries will probably be 
allowed to vote if they have no voting rights in 
their own country. 
43. There are three problems here : the first is 
to ensure that all citizens of EEC member states, 
resident within the Community, have the right to 
vote ; the second is to avoid double voting ; and 
the third is to avoid different practices being 
established in different states. 
44. Since this is a matter which falls within the 
competence of the national legislators of the 
EEC, your Rapporteur trusts that the Council 
of Ministers will take steps to co-ordinate 
proposals for enfranchisement. It is his personal 
view that all the potential 181,000,000 electors in 
the Community from the Shetland Isles to Sicily 
and from Brittany to Berlin should have the 
vote, and that if all member stat~ enabled their 
citizens resident abroad to vote in their home 
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country by one means or another, adequate con-
trol of double voting could be exercised. 
E. Regionalism and direct elections 
45. To what extent should the ancient nations, 
regions and provinces of Europe be represented 
through the agency of direct elections Y As power 
and decision-making are concentrated at the 
centre, to what extent should there be a cor-
responding growth of decision-making at the 
periphery 1 What can direct elections do for 
the cultural, linguistic and economic identities of 
Europe's "regions" Y When the elections are 
held, will candidates say "I am a Fleming -
and a European", "I am a Scot- and a Euro-
pean", leapfrogging their own "national" 
legislatures ? What links can be established 
between the European Parliament and regional 
assemblies in member states? 
46. As a Scot, it is inevitable that your 
Rapporteur should be interested in this area. But 
it is worth noting that the regional/national 
approach to direct elections has been part of 
the discussions leading to draft bills in most 
WEU countries. 
47. The question of the separate representation 
of the Dutch-speaking and French-speaking 
communities has dominated proposals in Belgium, 
and the solution will probably lie in the direction 
of regionalisation. The United Kingdom bill i<g 
openly regionalist in approach, in response to 
political developments in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland: no matter which voting system 
is chosen, a separate number of seats has been 
reserved to each of them. In Italy, pro-
posals to base direct elections on the twenty 
regions,. or on three super-regions have been 
steadily canvassed. On 20th June 1977 the govern-
ment of the Val d'Aosta region tabled a draft 
bill in the Italian Senate, seeking one locally-
elected European representative, and your 
Rapporteur understands that a similar proposal 
is under active consideration in the Trentino-
Alto Adige. The problem does not arise to the 
same extent in the Netherlands or in Luxembourg 
(though, in the latter case, there is a vigorous 
debate about separate constituencies for Luxem-
bourg city and the rest of the country). In 
France, the government has steadfastly followed 
a unitary approach to direct elections: Bretons 
and Corsicans for example are to vote on exactly 
the same kind of ballot paper as Alsatians and 
everyone else. 
48. Your Rapporteur is well aware that the 
issues of regional identity and the self-determina-
tion of national minorities is largely a matter 
for the legislatures of individual WEU countries. 
Nonetheless, he believes that these are important 
threads in the direct elections skein (and with 
the return of the Generalitad to Catalonia, they 
are likely to become more important still). He 
asks the Assembly to note the growing importance 
of regionalism, and to commission further work 
in this area. 
F. The dual mandate 
49. With minor modifications (in the United 
Kingdom, for example, peers and certain minis-
ters of religion will be able to stand), qualifica-
tions for candidature in direct elections are the 
same as for national elections. How possible, in 
reality, will it be for someone to be a member 
of both Y And what links are envisaged between 
representatives in the European Parliament and 
their national parliaments ? 
50. Article 5 of the Community act stipulates 
that "membership of the European Parliament 
shall be compatible with membership of a parlia-
ment of a member state". Individual members 
may therefore decide whether, in addition to their 
European mandate, they also wish to belong to 
their national legislatures. These legislatures 
may also lay down conditions and rules governing 
simultaneous membership, for example : 
- members of the European Parliament 
might also be members of national parlia-
ments with or without voting rights ; 
- members of the European Parliament 
might be released from active participa-
tion in national parliaments ; 
- members of the European Parliament 
might delegate their voting rights in their 
national parliament to another member. 
51. At the moment such rules are under active 
consideration in the member countries of WEU. 
From information available to your Rapporteur, 
there seems general agreement that - for a 
transitional period at least - the dual mandate 
must continue for a number of members. This 
argument is advanced on two grounds : the need 
for a personal link between the European Parlia-
ment and national parliaments, and the political 
unacceptability in certain countries of a substan-
tial number of members resigning to contest 
direct elections. In the opinion of your Rap-
porteur, however, the pressures of work, travel, 
voting (and in those countries with single-member 
seats, constituency interest) will in time force 
representatives to choose which mandate they 
hold. The dual mandate will wither away. 
52. It is already clear that a considerable number 
of candidates in direct elections will wish to 
stand for the European Parliament only. I£ in 
addition, as your Rapporteur suggests, the dual 
mandate in time "withers away", how are links 
to be maintained - and, possibly, institutional-
ised - between European representatives and 
their national legislatures ? It should be obvious 
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that reams of documentation and published deci-
sions will not be enough. There will need to be 
face-to-face meetings and discussions. 
53. This is a matter which has provoked some 
discussion in WEU parliamentary circles. In 
most countries it is forbidden to speak in national 
assemblies, let alone vote, if one is a non-member. 
Constitutions and standing orders would have 
to be re-written. 
54. Preliminary talks between the parties in the 
United Kingdom are indicative of the general 
approach being adopted. Some members have 
advocated that European representatives should 
become members of a reformed House of Lords ; 
others have suggested that they should have 
speaking, but not voting rights, in the Commons ; 
another grouping is resolutely opposed to Euro-
pean representatives having any right to sit in 
the national parliament, and propose instead a 
joint standing committee of national and Euro-
pean members. 
55. Since such talks are at a preliminary stage 
throughout WEU, it is too early for your 
Rapporteur to draw any conclusions. He does, 
however, advocate further study of this area. 
G. Electoral procedures 
56. In the absence of published bills in some 
WEU countries, your Rapporteur can only pin-
point subjects on which the subsequent publica-
tion of comparative tables might prove helpful. 
(i) Deposits: No deposit is foreseen in the 
Belgian bill, but candidates must be presented 
by a minimum of ten parliamentarians, or by 
a minimum of 5,000 electors. Candidates will have 
to furnish a deposit of £500 each in the United 
Kingdom, "sufficient to deter frivolous candida-
ture without unreasonably inhibiting candidates", 
as the government put it. In France the sum is 
100,000 French francs per list. In the Nether-
lands 18,000 Dutch guilders per list. In the 
Federal Republic of Germany, no deposits are 
required. The deposit will be forfeited in the 
Netherlands if a list collects less than 75 % of the 
votes corresponding to the electorate per repre-
sentative, i.e. about 285,000 votes. In France, the 
deposit will be returned only to those lists which 
obtain more than 5 % of the votes cast. In the 
United Kingdom. the deposit is forfeit from the 
individual candidate who polls less than 25 % 
of the electoral quota or from the group candidate 
where none of the group has been elected and 
the group has polled less than 25 % of the 
electoral quota. 
(ii) Ballot papers: In the majority of WEU 
countries, these will be familiar in form to the 
elector. The main difference lies between those 
countries where the electorate chooses simply 
between lists drawn up by the parties, where 
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the precedence of candidates has already been 
determined, and those countries (e.g. the Nether-
lands) where the electorate can choose between 
candidates of the same party. In the United 
Kingdom, the choice will of course be simply 
between individual candidates. In Northern 
Ireland, the parties will field teams of three 
candidates (but standing as individuals rather 
than as a list) ; electors will number their 
candidates in order of preference (1, 2, 3, 4, 
etc.) and the seats will be allocated according to 
the "droop quota" method of single transferable 
vote. 
(iii) Returning officers: Once all the bills have 
been published, it will be possible to issue a 
comparative table. 
(iv) Decisions yet to be taken: In most countries, 
the power is given to make adaptations to national 
electoral rules by order: registration rules and 
election expenses being mentioned specifically. 
Governments will also have to decide on a 
formula for limiting campaign expenses and on 
the possible use of public funds to assist 
candidates. Likewise, rules will have to be drawn 
up for the premature resignation of represent-
atives from the European Parliament. 
(v) Cost of elections: Your Rapporteur has 
sought to calculate a total estimated cost for 
direct elections. From financial memoranda 
published by WEU governments, he has obtained 
the following estimates : Federal Republic of 
Germany - 40 million DM; Netherlands -
16 million guilders ; United Kingdom - £10 mil-
lion. If your Rapporteur be permitted to extra-
polate these figures to other WEU countries, 
the following table results : 
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Belgium 
France 
Federal Republic 
of Germany (DM 40m) 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands (G 16m) 
United Kingdom (£10m) 
F. frs 
(million) 
31 
85 
86 
85 
1 
32 
85 
405 
for 379 representatives 
57. The estimated cost to national governments, 
per elected member of the European Parliament, 
is therefore of the order of 1,068,600 French 
francs, 497,000 Deutschmarks, 503,500 Dutch 
guilders, £125,720, 194,300,000 Italian lires, and 
7,828,600 Belgian francs. 
58. As the Federal German Government will 
reimburse the political parties a sum of 3.50 
Deutschmarks per elector a further 147,204,000 
Deutschmarks should be added, making a grand 
total of 187 million Deutschmarks. The estimated 
cost for each of the 81 German members would 
therefore be 2,309,000 Deutschmarks. 
59. On 8th April 1978, the EEC heads of state 
or of government noted with satisfaction that 
the legislative procedures in the member coun-
tries for holding direct elections to the European 
Parliament were now nearing completion. After 
examining dates suitable for the elections, they 
agreed that they be held from 7th to lOth June 
1979. 
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APPENDIX I 
Table of action in the parliaments of member countries 
(TotalB by country for each aeaion) 
Member countries 
:8 
Recommendations ~~ ~ 1 adopted in l CD g J i 0 1 1:: <G~ CD 'i ~ IXl ~~ j ~ 
"" 
1956 0 0 3 0 0 0 
1957 4 0 1 0 0 5 
I958 2 0 3 0 0 4 
1959 0 0 9 0 0 0 
I960 3 I2 2 8 0 3 
I96I 0 2 0 3 0 6 
I962 2 4 4 6 2 3 
I963 0 0 I3 22 I 2 
1964 4 I4 9 ll I 5 
I965 0 ll I2 24 0 5 
I966 2 I2 I2 49 I 4 
I967 I4 9 22 29 2 6 
I968 6 I4 20 22 I I6 
I969 ll I5 17 8 0 4 
1970 3 15 15 7 2 3 
I97I 0 4 19 9 0 6 
1972 0 6 2 1 0 1 
I973 0 4 2 6 1 0 
1974 0 1 3 13 2 0 
1975 10 28 8 I9 3 11 
1976 16 40 13 14 2 3 
I977 4 I6 4 7 I I 
I978 2 2 0 0 0 0 
Total 83 209 I93 258 I9 88 
Annual average 3.77 9.4I 8.77 II.73 0.86 4.00 
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a 
i 
ia Total 
., 
-~ p 
0 3 
2 I2 
3 I2 
0 9 
I 29 
0 ll 
10 3I 
3 4I 
2 46 
28 80 
I8 98 
I6 98 
47 I26 
36 91 
10 55 
10 48 
0 10 
0 13 
0 19 
3 82 
8 96 
I4 47 
0 4 
21l I,06I 
9.I4 6.87 
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APPENDIX 11 
Table of interventions (debata, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since December 1915 
.~ 0 ! I ,g.! ;:::; ..= ~ .C;., ~ ~ i 8 
·I 11 -! OD tl ~ ! OD·• R ~ >. 0 I .si ~ "lt 'i ] 1~ ~ ~ 'i 1'<1 1-1 "CC Ji Ill j:Q .8 0 OD ... ~ "CCO ·a E-4 &: p 
---
273 X 2 1 3 6 
274 X 2 2 1 5 
275 4 4 
276 X 2 1 3 
277 
-278 
-Dec. 279 
-
1975 280 
-281 
- 54 282 
-283 
-Res. 55 2 1 3 2 8 
Res. 56 
-Res. 57 
-Res. 58 
-
Other action 2 17 4 1 1 2 1 28 
Res. 59 2 4 2 8 
284 
-
285 X 2 5 2 2 11 
June 286 
-1976 287 2 2 1 1 2 8 49 
288 X 
-289 X 4 5 2 3 14 
290 X 4 2 2 8 
---- ---
291 
-292 
-Nov. 293 X 2 2 2 6 
1976 294 
-
295 X 2 1 2 5 47 
296 2 2 4 
Res. 60 
-
Other action 5 15 5 1 6 32 
297 
-298 X 1 1 
299 X I 2 3 
300 1 2 3 
June 301 1 2 3 
1977 302 1 1 2 4 20 
303 
-304 1 2 3 
305 1 2 3 
306 
-
307 X 
-
308 X 1 1 
Nov. 309 X 1 1 
1977 310 X 
-
27 
311 X 1 1 
Other action 4 14 4 2 24 
1978 l l 2 2 4 4 
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31st May 1918 
1. Adopted in Committee by 14 votes to 2 with 0 
abstentions. 
2. Members of the Committee : Mr. Jloper (Chairman) ; 
MM. de Koster, Pawelczyk (Alternate : Buchner) (Vice-
Chairmen) ; MM . ..J.hrens, Beauguitte, van den Bergh, 
Boldrini, Bonnel, Boucheny (Alternate : Jung), Critchley 
(Alternate: Grieve), Dejardin, Fosson, tkant, Handlos, 
Hardy, Konen, Lemmrich (Alternate: Vohrer), Maggioni, 
Menard, Nessler, Pecchioli, Biviere, Boberti, Schmidt 
Hermann, Seholten (Alternate : van Hulst), Tanghe, 
Whitehead. 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report, the Rapporteur had interviews as follows : 
London, 12th January 19 7 8 
Ministry of Defence 
Mr. Charles Henn, Head DS 12 ; 
Commodore Richard Hill, Director Defence Policy C ; 
Mr. Prest, DS 13 (Arms Sales) ; 
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Mr. Leycester Coltman (Southern Europe Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office); 
Miss Kate Mollins, DS 12. 
TJ()ndon, 17th January 1978 
H.E. Mr. Zivan Berisavljevic, Ambassador, Yugoslav Embassy, and Colonel Surlan, Defence Attache. 
Athens, 8th - 9th March 1978 
Mr. Hawthorne Mills, Minister, United States Embassy, Athens, and Mr. Morton Dworken, (Politica 
and Military Affairs) ; 
H.E. Mr. Anghelos Chorofas, Ambassador, Director for NATO, CSCE and MBFR Affairs, Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs ; · 
Mr. Oliver Miles, Counsellor (Political) British Embassy, Athens, and Mr. Tim Everard, Counsellor 
(Economic); 
Admiral John Mineos (Rtd)., (New Democracy), Chairman of the Defence Committee, Member of 
the Greek National Assembly; 
Mr. Kosta Gondikas (New Democracy), Member of the Greek National Assembly; 
Mr. Katsadimas, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defence, and Major-General Simon 
Vimblis. 
Ankara, 12th - 14th March 1978 
H.E. Sir Derek Dodson, British Ambassador ; 
Air Marshal Sir Frederick Sowry, United Kingdom Permanent Military Deputy to CENTO; 
H.E. Mr. Hamit Batu, Ambassador, Secretary-General in charge of International Security Affairs, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
Mr. Gunduz tlk9iin, Minister for Foreign Affairs; 
Mr. Ali Hikmet Alp, Director, International Security Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs; 
Mr. Hasan Isik, Minister of Defence ; 
Major-General G.A. Young, CENTO Chief of Staff, and Air Commodore Scannell; 
Mr. Ekrem Esat Giivendiren, Director, Greece and Cyprus Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; 
Lt.-General Giineral, General Staff. 
Belgrade, 11th - 13th April 1978 
Mr. Mikhaila Javorski, Chairman, International Committee, Federal Assembly; H.E. Mr. Lazar Latinovic, 
Ambassador, Adviser; Mr. Bosko Srdanov, Adviser; Professor Vidosova Jankovic; 
Mr. B. Franges, Director, Institute for International Affairs, and Professor Acimovic; 
Mr. Dragan Bernardic, Assistant Federal Secretary in the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, and H.E. 
Mr. Djuro Vukolic, Ambassador ; 
H.E. Mr. R.A. Farquharson, British Ambassador, and Wing Commander Armstrong, Air and Naval Attache; 
H.E. Mr. L.S. Eagleburger, United States Ambassador. 
The Committee as a whole met in Rome on 15th March 1978, where it was addressed by Mr. 
Attilio Ruffini, Italian Minister of Defence, and met with members of the Defence Committees of the 
Italian Parliament. On 16th March, the Committee visited Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe, 
Naples, where it was briefed by Admiral Shear, United States Navy, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces 
Southern Europe; Major-General di Lorenzo, Italian Army, Deputy Chief of Staff; Major-General Pirozzi, 
Italian Air Force, Deputy Commander. Allied Air Forces Southern Europe; Vice-Admiral R.D. Macdonald, 
Chief of Staff, Headquarters Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe, and members of their staffs. On 17th 
March the Committee visited the Italian helicopter carrier "Vittorio Veneto" in Taranto, and was received 
by Vice-Admiral Fantoni, Chief of Staff Italian Fleet, and by Admiral Mario Bini, Commander-in-Chief 
Naval Department, Taranto. It was briefed by Captain Vandini, commanding the "Vittorio Veneto". 
The Committee met again in The Hague on 8th and 9th May 1978, and was addressed by Dr. W.F. 
van Eekelen, Netherlands Secretary of State for Defence. It visited the SHAPE Technical Centre on 
9th May and was briefed by the Director, Dr. Wiekhorst and his staff. The Committee also met with 
members of the Defence Committees of the Netherlands Parliament. 
At the Committee meeting on 31st May 1978 held at the seat of the Assembly in Paris, the Com-
mittee discussed and adopted the present report. 
The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials and senior offi-
cers who received the R~pporteur or addressed the Committee and replied to questions. The views expres-
sed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the Committee. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on security in the Mediterranean 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalling at the present time of economic difficulties that security will always be a condition of the 
political freedoms and economic well-being of the allied countries, and that accordingly an adequate 
defence effort must be maintained ; 
(ii) Believing that the Soviet Union through its continued quest for military bases in the Mediterranean, 
its interventionist policy in Africa and its reiteration of the dangerously ambiguous "Brezhnev doctrine" 
presents the greatest military threat in the region ; 
(iii) Aware that one of the greatest risks of major conflict through miscalculation arises in the Mediter-
ranean area where the opposing interests of East and West merge with those of North and South ; 
(iv) Believing therefore that every effort should be made through diplomatic channels to foster: a 
settlement of the conflict in the Middle East and the differences between allied countries in the area ; the 
continued independence and integrity of Yugoslavia and the continued denial of military bases to forces 
of the Soviet Union ; 
(v) Believing that NATO provides for the foreseeable future the principal credible basis for the secu-
rity of its members in the Mediterranean area and that its effectiveness depends on the full support 
and participation of all member countries ; 
(vi) Believing in particular that the full and equal participation in NATO of both Greece and Turkey 
is vital to the security of each and to that of the Alliance as a whole ; 
(vii) Reiterating its view that security in the Mediterranean would be greatly enhanced by the accession 
of a democratic Spain to NATO, but stressing that such a decision is for a parliamentary majority in that 
country after the adoption of the new constitution ; 
(viii) Aware of the many conflicting considerations that must be reconciled in any policy on arms supply 
to non-NATO countries, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS 
Take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the following objects in view : 
1. To strengthen the collective position of the Atlantic Alliance in the Mediterranean : 
(a) by the more public identification of all member countries with NATO arrangements in the area; 
(b) through the participation of forces of as many member countries as possible in exercises and 
contingency planning ; 
(c) by adjusting NATO command arrangements to reflect the reality of national contributions to 
NATO in the Mediterranean area; 
(d) by taking full account of the respective special requirements of Greece, Portugal and Turkey 
for the supply of necessary defence equipment and assistance, and by calling on the United 
States to eliminate its discrimination against Turkey ; · 
(e) by considering what joint armaments production projects can usefully be established in Turkey 
in the NATO framework ; 
2. (a) To encourage Greece and Turkey to continue negotiations to settle their remaining differencelil; 
(b) To urge the two Cypriot communities to resume their direct negotiations in the presence of the 
United Nations Secretary-General without further delay ; 
3. To arrange closer links between the integrated military structure of NATO and the Spanish armed 
forces, and their participation in NATO exercises, while leaving a decision on the accession of Spain to 
NATO to democratic discussion in the Spanish parliament; 
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4. To ensure that non-NATO countries in the Mediterranean continue to see their interests best served 
by denying base rights or facilities to the Soviet armed forces ; 
5. To proclaim the unequivocal support of the West for the independence, territorial integrity and 
unity of Yugoslavia and its continued non-aligned status; 
6. To ensure that all aspects of policy on arms exports by NATO countries to any non-NATO country 
are fully reviewed in the appropriate allied forum. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Grant, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1 The Rapporteur was asked to study the 
security problems of the Mediterranean area as 
a whole, following previous reports of the Com-
mittee on this subject. In particular the report 
is to study the relationship of Yugoslavia to the 
NATO Warsaw Pact and non-aligned European 
' . 
countries, and the consequences for the security 
of Europe of various scenarios that could arise 
in the event of a change in the country's leader-
ship. The report was also to follow developments 
in the Iberian peninsula. 
1.2 The Committee has regularly reported on 
the security situation in the Mediterranean in 
its various aspects, most recently in May 1976 1 
- a report that dealt in particular with the 
Soviet navy, and the situation in Spain and 
Portugal. The Rapporteur has accordingly 
devoted more attention to the Eastern Mediter-
ranean in the present report. 
1.3 Since the previous report was adopted there 
have boon a number of changes in the Mediter-
ranean area, but more significantly many out-
standing problems remain unsolved. The Soviet 
presence in the Mediterranean itself has not 
changed greatly but, since the opening of the 
Suez Canal in 1975, the Soviet Union has been 
the second most important user, and the projec-
tion of Soviet military power, both directly and 
through its proxy, Cuba, has had a decisive effect 
in the Horn of Africa. The consequential increase 
in Soviet air and naval activities in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, coupled with the still unsolved 
problems of the Middle East and Cyprus, provide 
ever-present sources of potential conflict. The 
unsettled differences of Greece and Turkey which 
have a debilitating effect on the Alliance, and 
the crucial importance of the continued non-
aligned status of Yugoslavia, decided your Rap-
porteur to concentrate in particular on these last 
three countries, a:ll of which he has been able 
to visit through the courtesy of the national 
authorities. The Committee as a whole visited 
Italy for briefings both by the national autho-
rities and by the NATO military command at 
Naples. At the other end of the Mediterranean 
the political scene in Spain has been transformed 
since the last report was adopted, with the 
holding in June 1977 of the first parliamentary 
elections for forty-one years, opening the way for 
Spanish membership of the western organisations. 
1.4 These are the topics chiefly covered in the 
Committee's report. 
1. Document 708, 19th May 1976, Rapporteur Mr. Buck. 
186 
11. The Soviet presence in the Mediterranean 
(a) Soviet military effort 
2.1 Although the economic resources of the 
Soviet Union (GNP in 1976 $856 billion- United 
States State Department estimates) do not match 
those of the United States (GNP in 1976 $1,692 
billion), and are considerably less than the total 
of the NATO countries combined, the Soviet 
Union has consistently devoted a far higher pro-
portion of its national product to military 
expenditure - current estimates by western 
sources range between 11% and 13% (over 
15 % according to a Chinese estimate). A com-
parable figure for the United States is 5.5 %, 
while for the WEU countries it ranges from 1.1 % 
(Luxembourg) to 4.9% (United Kingdom) 1 • 
2.2 The conclusions of experts of the NATO 
countries at the spring 1978 meeting was that, 
although since 1972 the Soviet GNP has risen 
by less than 4 % each year, Soviet defence 
expenditure, to NATO definition, grew in real 
terms by 4 % to 5 % each year from $53 billion 
in 1970 to almost $73 billion in 1976, 50% being 
devoted to capital expenditure including weapons 
procurement, 20 % to research and development 
and only 30 % to personnel and operating costs. 
If space research and civil defence is included 
the 1976 defence budget would be $80 billion. 
2.3 In recent years the Soviet Union has in-
creased its armed forces to the present level of 
3. 7 million. Since the 1960s Soviet forces along 
the Sino-Soviet border have been built up to 
about forty divisions without any reduction in 
forces facing the NATO countries. 
2.4 A particularly disturbing trend of the last 
five years has been the steady introduction of 
more modern and sophisticated equipment by 
the Soviet Union which has steadily eroded a 
technical superiority on which NATO forces had 
previously relied to offset the overwhelming 
superiority of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces 
in numbers of tanks and tactical aircraft. 
2.5 In this report, concerned with the Me<liter-
ranean area, the potential threat from Warsaw 
Pact forces to the countries of the Mediterranean 
area, is described. In view of the general mobility 
of forces, and the extreme mobility of the Soviet 
air forces which benefit from the central position 
of the Soviet Union in this respect, it has to be 
borne in mind that any measure of force ratios 
in the Mediterranean region cannot be divorced 
1. See Appendix I. On a per capita basis comparable 
figures would be Soviet Union $ 492; United Stat(>s 
$ 481; while WEU countries range from $ 82 (Luxem· 
bourg) to $ 296 (Germany). 
from the overall ratio between NATO and 
Warsaw Pact forces. 
2.6 While the Soviet Union shows no sign of 
relaxing its relentless defence effort, it would 
however be misleading to suggest that all trends 
in recent years have been to the military advan-
tage of that country. A long land frontier with 
China and still unsettled border disputes must be 
a continuing cause of concern to the Soviet 
military command. Mr. Brezhnev's surprise visit 
to Soviet military forces in the area of the 
Chinese border in early April has drawn atten-
tion to this aspect of the Soviet defence posture. 
(b) Warsaw Pact land forces in the 
Mediterranean area 
2.7 In considering Warsaw Pact land forces in 
the area covered by the report, the Committee 
is concerned with those which can be considered 
a potential threat to the NATO countries of the 
region, and to non-aligned countries - chiefly 
Yugoslavia- whose continued non-alignment is 
as vital to the peace and security of the area as 
is the active participation of the NATO countries 
in the collective security system of the Alliance. 
For these purpOS€8 the report considers force 
lev~ls in Hungary, Romania and Bulgari·a, as 
well as the Odessa, North Caucasus and Trans-
Caucasus military districts of the Soviet Union. 
Not surprisingly the unclassified sources of 
information on which a1one this report will draw 
are not in full agreement : there is some discrep-
ancy between unclassified briefings in different 
NATO headquarters; the authoritative "Military 
Balance" of the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies quotes slightly lower figures 
than those used in unclassified NATO briefings. 
The divergencies are no doubt accounted for by 
the differing strengths of military formations of 
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the Warsaw Pact which range from category one, 
combat-ready, formatiollB to third category cadre 
formations. The following figures are derived 
from all sources, using NATO briefings to 
complete blanks in "Military Balance" figures 
where these are insufficiently detailed. 
2.8 In Hungary there are five Soviet divisions 
(including two tank divisions) and six Hungarian 
divisions (including one tank division) making a 
total of eleven divisions (including three tank 
divisions). No Soviet formations are stationed in 
either Bulgaria or Romania. Romanian ground 
forces amount to the equivalent of eleven divisions 
(including two tank divisions), and the Bulgarian 
forces to the equivalent of ten divisions (including 
two tank divisions). In the Odessa military 
district of the Soviet Union there are six divisions, 
of which only four or five may be combat-ready 
and in the North Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus 
military district there are twelve divisions and 
one airborne division with a further six divisions 
available at a later stage. 
2.9 From the point of view of North-Eastern 
Italy the divisions in Hungary represent a pri-
mary threat. From the point of view of Greek 
and Turkish Thrace and the Turkish Straits, the 
divisions in Romania, Bulgaria, and the Odessa 
military district of the Soviet Union have to be 
taken into account. The divisions in the Caucasus 
military districts are a threat to E·astern Turkey 
where the Turkish third army is deployed, but 
it must also be remembered that Syria and Iraq 
together possess some eighteen divisions, many 
of which are well-equipped - better equipped 
than those of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. 
Iraq has AMX-30 tanks in its inventory; Syria 
is due to receive Milan anti-tank missiles. The 
Turkish second army is · deployed in South-
Eastern Turkey. 
Balance of land forces in Southern Europe 1 
(from "Military Balance") 
NATO Warsaw (of which Derived Pact USSR) ratio 
Ground forces Armoured 4 6 (2) 1 : 1.5 
available in Mechanised 7 24 (7) 1 : 3.4 
peacetime (division Infantry and 
equivalents) airborne 26 3 (2) 1 : 0.1 
Total 37 33 (11) 1 : 0.9 
Combat manpower 
all formations 560 390 (145) 1 : 0.7 
(thousands) 
Operational main 4,000 6,700 (2,500) 1 : 1.7 ba:ttle tanks 
1. Stated to include Italian, Greek and Turkish land iorces ; United Kingdom and United 
States forces co=itted to the Mediterranean, and land forces of Hungary, Romania and 
Bulgaria and Soviet units stationed in Hungary and South-Western USSR that might be 
co=itted to the Mediterranean theatre. [Understood to exclude many Soviet divisions in 
the Trans-Caucasus region.] 
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2.10 When the ratios between NATO and 
Warsaw Pact forces are considered, the discrep-
ancies between unclassified briefings in NATO 
military headquarters, and the "Military 
Balance" are greater. The following table shows 
the information made availabie to the Committee. 
Area land force ratios 
(from NATO military headquarters unclassified 
briefings) 
ItalyjSoviet Union, Hungary 
Greek and Turkish Thrace/Soviet 
Union, Romania, Bulgaria 
Eastern Turkey /Soviet Union 
1:1.4 
1 : 1.5 
1:3.6 
2.11 The discrepancy is accounted for in part 
by the particular military districts in the Soviet 
Union which are included in the force balance, 
and the importance which is attached to cadre 
divisions which may be below one-third of their 
official strength. There is little doubt in the 
Committee's mind that the NATO forces enjoy 
a manpower advantage in the southern region 
as a whole ; this advantage however is more than 
offset by the overwhelming superiority of the 
Warsaw Pact forces in both tanks and in 
mechanised divisions. Moreover much equipment 
of some NATO countries in the region - espe-
cially Turkey - is obsolete. 
(c) Warsaw Pact air forces in the southern region 
2.12 The "forward aviation" is concerned with 
close support ground attack local air defence and 
reconnaissance. In addition there is the long-range 
aviation, the medium bombers of which must also 
be assumed to be assigned to tactical military 
targets. The long-range strategic air threat is not 
discussed here, in the context of the Mediter-
ranean area, as it can obviously be brought to 
bear on any large military or civilian target 
anywhere in the NATO area. Soviet air defence 
aircraft in the Soviet Union are organised in a 
special command (PVO) which is entirely 
separate from the foregoing. 
2.13 A Soviet tactical air army, possibly amount-
ing to two hundred and fifty combat aircraft and 
one hundred transports, is stationed in Hungary, 
to which must be added the Hungarian air force 
of some sixty tactical fighters (excluding air 
defence aircraft). There are no Soviet air force 
units stationed in Romania or Bulgaria, but the 
indigenous Romanian tactical air force amounts 
to some seventy-five tactical fighters, many 
obsolescent, and some fifteen reconnaissance air-
craft. Bulgaria has about one hundred tactical 
fighters, less ancient than those of Romania, and 
some thirty reconnaissance aircraft. One Soviet 
air army is understood to be deployed in each 
of the military districts of the Soviet Union, 
but unclassified figures concerning numbers of 
aircraft are not available. 
2.14 The extreme mobility of air power in any 
case makes the precise location of aircraft at any 
time largely irrelevant. Of more importance is 
the number of aircraft which the Warsaw Pact 
command might be able to assign to hostilities 
in the southern region, and here NATO military 
headquarters expect to be confronted with a total 
of some 1,200 Warsaw Pact tactical aircraft, 
including about 270 medium bombers, but exclud-
ing air defence interceptors, of which about 60 % 
might be a serious threat. About two-thirds of 
the total threat might be concentrated against 
Greek and Turkish Thrace and the Turkish 
Straits and the remainder against Eastern 
Turkey. Soviet surface-to-surface missiles based 
in the Crimea are in range of the whole of 
Turkey. Soviet strategic rocket forces dominate 
the whole area. 
2.15 Again in considering the south-eastern 
flank of the NATO area the air forces of Syria 
and Iraq have to be taken into account. Exclusive 
of air defence interceptors, the Syrian air force 
possesses some 170 tactical attack fighters and 
that of Iraq about 180. Attention was particularly 
drawn to the build-up of the Libyan air force 
which includes 30 MiG-23, 30 Mirage IIIE and 
50 Mirage V. 
2.16 As far as the balance of force m the area 
is concerned the following table is presented from 
the same sources as those used above for ground 
forces. 
Balance of air forces in Southern Europe 
(from "Military Balance") 
NATO Warsaw (of which Derived Pact USSR) ratio 
Light bombers - 50 (50) 1:0.5 
Fighter/ground attack 625 325 (125) 1: 0.5 
Interceptors 200 1,000 (425) 1: 5 
Reconnaissance 125 200 (150) 1: 1.6 
Total 950 1,575 (750) 1: 1.7 
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Area air force ratios 
(from NATO military headquarters unclassified 
briefings) 
Italy /Soviet Union, Hungary 
Greek and Turkish Thrace/Soviet 
Urnion, Romania, Bulgaria 
Eastern Turkey /Soviet Union 
1: 1.1 
1: 1.8 
1:3.5 
(d) Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean 
2.17 The historical pattern of Soviet naval 
deployment in the Mediterranean has varied 
considerably over the last twenty years. In 1958, 
when the Soviet fleet had no significant air pro-
tection, only Soviet submarines, based at Vlone 
in Albania, were to be seen in the Mediterranean 
but were withdrawn in 1961 when Albania with-
drew from the Warsaw Pact. By 1964 the Soviet 
fleet was equipped with surface-tO-air missiles and 
surface vessels began to be deployed systematic-
ally, making use of bases in Egypt, formalised in 
an agreement in March 1968, which permitted a 
dramatic increase in the Soviet naval presence. 
Alexandria was the headquarters of the Soviet 
Mediterranean squadron, and the main repair 
base especially for submarines. Use was also made 
of Mersa Matruh where the Soviet Union built 
naval and air facilities, of Sollum, and of Port 
Said where Soviet amphibious units were based. 
From 1970 to the middle of 1972 the Soviet air 
force had virtually exclusive use of some seven 
airfields in Egypt, basing some 150 aircraft for 
the defence of the Nile delta area while smaller 
numbers of reconnaissance aircraft and maritime 
patrol aircraft operated from Cairo West and 
Mersa Matruh airfields, from which they fol-
lowed closely movements of NATO navies in the 
Eastel"n Mediterranean. 
2.18 In July 1972, President Sadat expelled his 
Soviet military advisers and the bulk of the 
Soviet air force units. Surface-to-air missiles and 
airfields were taken over by Egyptian forces. 
Port facilities for the Soviet fleet continued to 
be available however until May 1975 when access 
to Mersa Matruh and Sollum was curtailed. 
Maintenance of submarines in Alexandria was 
permitted until 15th March 1976 when President 
Sadat abrogated the Egypt-Soviet Union friend-
ship treaty since when the Soviet Union has 
enjoyed no naval or air force facilities in Egypt. 
· 2.19 At the present time the only port facilities 
available to the Soviet Union in the Mediter-
ranean are limited ones or under restricted con-
ditions of demilitarisation, repair facilities in 
Tivat in Yugoslavia - facilities which are 
equally available to (if little used by) NATO 
navies as is mentioned in the section on Yugo-
slavia below. From its heyday in 1972 and 1973 
when the average daily strength of the Soviet 
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fleet in the Mediterranean reached fifty-six 
vessels (the peak on any one day was ninety-
eight at the height of the 1973 Middle East 
war) the average has declined to about forty-six 
in 1977. The following tables show the historical 
trend. 
1. Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean : 
1964-1977 
Annual Average 
ship days daily strength 
1964 1,500 5 
1965 2,800 8 
1966 4,400 12 
1967 8,100 22 
1968 11,000 30 
1969 15,000 41 
1970 16,500 45 
1971 19,000 52 
1972 18,000 49 
1973 20,600 56 
1974 20,200 55 
1975 20,000 55 
1976 18,600 50 
1977 n. a. 43 
--
2. Soviet naval transits of the Turkish Straits : 
1964-1975 
Auxiliary Surface Total 
combatant transits transits transits 
1964 56 39 95 
1965 80 49 129 
1966 71 82 153 
1967 149 93 242 
1968 113 117 230 
1969 142 121 263 
1970 149 122 271 
1971 154 123 277 
1972 140 114 254 
1973 159 126 285 
1974 145 93 238 
1975 146 79 225 
Source: Robert G. Weinland : "Land support for 
naval forces- Egypt and the Soviet escadre 1962-1976", 
Survival, March/April1978 (updated). 
2.20 The Soviet squa.dron in the Mediterranean 
is rotated largely from the Black Sea fleet, 
so that it is this fleet as a whole which has to be 
taken into account when assessing potential Soviet 
naval power in the Mediterranean. Although the 
Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits 
limits the number of vessels that may be in 
transit through them at any one time, and 
requires prior notification of passage to be given, 
in practice it is understood that the. Soviet Union 
as a matter of routine gives block advance notifi-
DOCUMENT 776 
cati'OOl to Turkey of large numbers of transits, 
most of which are not taken up - so that while 
technically respecting the terms of the conven-
tion as far as notification is concerned, the Soviet 
fleet is in fact free to transit the straits at will, 
subject only to the limitation on total numbers 
of vessels in transit in the straits at any one 
time. Under the terms of the convention however 
submarines are not ·allowed to pass through the 
straits except for repair, and the Soviet Union is 
understood to respect this provision, hence Soviet 
submarines operating in the Mediterranean make 
the relatively long transit from the northern 
fleet bases together with escort vessels which 
account for most of the surface combatants to be 
found in the Mediterranean from the Soviet 
northern and Baltic fleets. 
2.21 Largely deprived of port facilities the 
Soviet naval presence, concentrated chiefly in 
the Eastern Mediterranean, represents a consider-
able feat of afloat support. The Soviet navy has 
been forced to make greater use of sheltered 
anchorages in international waters beyond the 
territorial sea of various Mediterranean coun-
tries. The average daily strength of the Soviet 
Mediterranean squadron in 1977 was made up as 
follows: 
8-9 submarines 
10-12 surface combatants 
15-20 auxiliary \Tessels 
5-7 intelligence and special-purpose 
vessels 
43 average total 
and on ·a typical day Soviet vessels might be 
found distributed between the anchorages in 
international waters as follows : 
Soviet fleet anchorages- typical day 
Gulf of Cadiz 1 AG 1 (intelligence) 
(Spanish AtLantic 
coast) 
Melilla 
(Spooish enclave in 
Morocco) 
Hammamet (Tunisia) 
(chief anchorage) 
Kithira (Greece) 
Bunbah (Libya) 
(Sollum anchorage) 
1 AO (tanker) 
1 auxiliary 
3 DE (destroyer) 
1 AO 
1 auxiliary (submarine 
support) 
1 SS (submarine) 
1 CCG (guided missile 
cruiser) 
2 DG (destroyer, 
guided missile) 
1 AO 
1 auxiliary 
1 CLG 
3 DE 
1 MGF 
6 auxiliaries (supply) 
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Cape Andreas (Cyprus) 
and 
Port of Tartus (Syria) 
2 LSM 
1 floating dock 
1 MSF 
4 auxiliaries 
1 ss 
1 submarine 
supply ship 
2.22 While total numbers of Soviet vessels 
operating in the Mediterranean have declined 
since the heyday of 1972-73, the Soviet Medi-
terranean squadron remains a modern formidable 
force which has recently compensated to some 
extent for its previous lack of ai:r support with 
the entry into service of the Kiev aircraft carrier 
to be followed by the Minsk (commissioned in 
1977) and the Sharkov to be launched shortly in 
the Black Sea. At the end of March Western 
sources announced the keel had been laid of the 
first of three new aircraft carriers, and speaking 
at Devonport on 21st April, Mr. CalJaghan, the 
British P.rime Minister, claimed that a total of 
ten Kiev-class carriers were to be bui1t. 
2.23 The Soviet Kiev-claBS aircraft carrier is a 
formidable acquisition for the Soviet navy. 273 
metres overall and 50 metres beam, it has a 
183 metre f1ight deck angled at 4° and displaces 
40,000 tons. It is equipped with surface-to-surface 
missile launchers for the SSN-12 missile, having 
a range of 500 km at mach 2 to 5. Surface-to-air 
missile SAM-3 has been sighted on board the 
vessel which is also fitted with muLtiple anti-
submarine warfare rockets. The Kiev carried 
about twelve vertical take-off interceptor air-
craft Forger and can carry some twenty-four 
anti-submarine warfare helicopters Hormone. 
2.24 The Soviet Blook Sea fleet as a whole 
comprises some twenty-five submarines and 
seventy major surface combatants which include 
the two helicopter carriers Moskva and Lenin-
grad, some eight cruisers, thirty destroyers and 
thirty frigates. 
2.25 Soviet diplomatic pressure continues on 
various Mediterranean riparian states, obviously 
incLuding Yugoslavia, Malta, Libya, Tunisia and 
Algeria in search for permanent naval bases, 
particularly for submarines the operation of 
which is hampered by the long transit passage 
from the northern fleet. These pressures have 
so far been generally unsuccessful ; it is in the 
interests of security that non-aligned countries in 
the Mediterranean should continue to see their 
interests as best served by excluding Soviet naval · 
vessels except for courtesy visits. There are also 
reports of Soviet approaches to Turkey for fuel-
ling and other port facilities at ports such as 
Iskenderun. 
(e) The Soviet navy in the Indian Ocean 
2.26 Following its entry into the Mediterranean 
in 1964, units of the Soviet fleet began to operate 
permanently in the Indian Ocean in 1968, as the 
Committee has previously reported. Until June 
1975 when the Suez Canal was reopened, these 
vessels came largely from the Pacific fleet as 
well as occasional transitting units from the 
northern and Baltic fleets. From the start in 
1968 the level of activity in the Indian Ocean 
built up steadily to a peak in 1973 of about 
2,800 ship days and then declined steadily to 
about 2,000 ship days in 1976. Typically, the 
Soviet presence amounts to an average of some 
sixteen to twenty vessels at any one time, com-
prising occasional cruisers, about two destroyers, 
several escorts, one or two minesweepers, an LST, 
one submarine, one or two submarine supply 
ships and about five auxiliary and supply vessels. 
During and since the Somali-Ethiopian conflict, 
this force has been considerably expanded, par-
ticularly in amphibious ships, but numbers are 
now declining. 
2.27 The Soviet Union had constructed extensive 
naval and air facilities at Berbera in Somalia 
for the support of its activities in the Indian 
Ocean, but in November 1977 these were lost to 
the Soviet Union following the change of al1iances 
and the Soviet Union's full support for the 
regime in Ethiopia. Naval facilities still available 
to the Soviet Union are Umm Qasr and AI Basrah 
in Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and Aden. As in the 
Mediterranean, extensive use is made of anchor-
ages in international waters, particularly off 
Aden, Massawa, Assab (Ethiopia), off the island 
of Socotra at the mouth of the Red Sea and 
infrequently off the Seychelles (Mahe island) 
and the Chagos is}ands. 
2.28 The United States presence in the Indian 
Ocean has been much smaller, amounting to about 
three surface ships on a permanent basis with 
visits by carriers or other major vessels from the 
Pacific Seventh Fleet every three months or so. 
The United States will rely on facilities which 
are now being constructed on the island of Diego 
Garcia, but also has facilities at Manama in 
Bahrein in the Persian Gulf. 
2.29 Of the WEU countries France has the most 
substantial permanent presence in the Indian 
Ocean 1 ; the United Kirngdom sends naval ships 
into the area occasionally on exercises and visits. 
2.30 Non-aligned countries in the United Nations 
General Assembly succeeded in having Resolution 
2832 "Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a zone 
of peace" adopted on 16th December 1971, which 
was supplemented by Resolution 2992, adopted on 
15th December 1972, establishing an ad hoc com-
mittee on the Indian Ocean. Resolution 2832 
called on the great powers to consu1t immediately 
with the littoral powers to halt escalation of 
their military position in the ocean and to 
1. See Document 708, 19th May 1976, paragraph 36. 
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eliminate all military bases and manifestation 
of great power military presence there "conceived 
in the context of great power rivalry". The 
NATO and Warsaw Pact countries (except Ice-
land and Romania) did not support the resolu-
tion, some claiming that it would limit their legal 
rights and the coastal states of the area have 
not been in a position to enforce it - nor would 
all of them necessarily prefer domination of the 
sea by the major powers of the region rather than 
the present situation. Saudi Arabia, although 
possessing negligible naval forces itself, has been 
an instigator of proposals for a permanent Arab 
naval :fiorce to control the Red Sea and Persian 
Gulf; while Iran has a major naval programme 
including the construction of a naval base and 
shipyard at Bandar Abbas. 
2.31 In September 1976 there was an indication 
that the Soviet Union was interested in control-
ling the level of naval presences in the Indian 
Ocean when it introduced a working document 
in the United Nations claiming that it would 
"be prepared to seek, together with other powers, 
for ways to reduce, on a reciprocal basis, the 
military activities of non-littoral states on the 
Indian Ocean and directly adjacent regions". 
With the advent of the Carter Administration 
in the United States, a joint Soviet-American 
working group was established in March 1977 
which meets periodically in Bern to discuss ways 
to limit the military activities of the countries 
in the Indian Ocean. At the end of the third 
round of these ,talks on 12th December 1977, a 
joint statement was issued describing the talks 
as "positive" and expressing the view that an 
agreement to curb their military activities in the 
ocean "would be in their mutual interests". At 
the conclusion of the fourth round on 17th Feb-
ruary 1978, however, it was stated merely that 
the date for resumption would be fixed by mutual 
agreement - further progress does not appear 
to have been made since the escalation of Soviet 
and Cuban involvement in Ethiopia. 
(f) Soviet intervention in Africa 
2.32 In its report on strategic mobility 1 the 
Committee reported on the Soviet and Cuban 
intervention in Angola, noting in particular the 
scale of this demonstration of strategic mobility 
concerned chiefly with moving Soviet equipment 
and ammunition and Cu,ban forces to Angola. 
2.33 In May 1977, the Soviet Union signed a 
treaty of friendship with the Ethiopian regime 
then battling with Somali insurgents, later 
reinforced with regular Somali army units, in 
the Ogaden. 
2.34 By September 1977, there were reports of 
a build-up of Soviet equipment and Cuban forces 
1. Document 748, 4th November 1977, Rapporteur 
Mr. Tanghe. 
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in Ethiopia which continued at least until mid-
March 1978. The March 1977 agreement was later 
reported to provide for the supply of 48 MiG-21 
aircraft, some 200 T-54/55 tanks, and surface-
to-air missiles SAM-3 and SAM-7, to a total value 
of $380 million. Ethiopian pilots are now trained 
in the Soviet Union. From various reports it 
appears however that the total of equipment 
known to western sources to have been delivered 
amounted to 400 T-34, T-54 and 55 tanks, 250 
other armoured vehicles, 400 artillery pieces 
including 28 multiple rocket. launchers, about 
50 MiG-21 aircraft and three fast pllitrol boats 
including one missile-armed. Most of this was 
delivered by Soviet merchant ships to the Ethio-
pian part of Assab on the Eritrean coast. A large-
scale airlift directly from the Soviet Union was 
reported to have been operating between Novem-
ber 1977 and April 1978, involving some 100 
flights. Various press reports have referred to 
overflight of Turkey and the Suez Canal ; of 
Pakistan and the Indian Ocean (a long detour) ; 
a very few flights are reported to have overflown 
Yugoslavia, Libya and the Sudan. 
2.35 The airlift of Cuban military personnel 
from Angola was undertaken by Ethiopian air-
lines flying at night, presumably overflying Zaire 
and the Sudan. It involved a total of forty-eight 
flights from November up to the 1ast flight on 
12th March 1978 by which time 12,000 Cuban 
troops were reported to be in Ethiopia, as well 
as 1,000 Soviet military advisers. In a speech 
on 5th April Dr. Owen, the British Secretary of 
S1Jate for Foreign Mfairs, claimed that there 
were 16,000 Cuban military in Ethiopia and more 
th:an 46,000 Cubans in Mrica as a whole, most 
of them military personnel. United States sources 
in February had claimed only 3,000 Cubans in 
Ethiopia, 23,000 Cuban soldiers in Africa as a 
whole - but the call-up of 5,000 reservists had 
been ordered to increase the forces in Ethiopia. 
2.36 Unlike the reaction of the previous United 
States Administration to the situation in Angola, 
the Cllirter Administration and other western 
powers have not as a reflex immediately sup-
ported the local opponents of the regime backed 
by the Soviet Union- which in this case would 
have been Somalia. It was made clear that arma-
ments would not be supplied so long as Somali 
regular forces remlliined on Ethiopian territory. 
Strong representations made to the Soviet Union 
to the effect that the atmosphere of detente could 
not remain unaffected by opportunist Soviet 
intervention in Mrica may still succeed in 
imposing some restraint on the Soviet Union, but 
indications are sti'll contradictory. On lOth Feb-
ruary Mr. Vance, the United States Secretary 
of State, said he had received assurooces from 
the USSR that Ethiopian forces would not cross 
the frontier into Somalia. On 13th March the 
Soviet Union is reported to have notified the 
United States that Cuban military forces would 
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be substantially reduced in Ethiopia once Somali 
troops had withdrawn from Ethiopian territocy 
- and the l.a.st Somali regular troops left on 
15th March. 
2.37 On 26th April however President Castro 
said in Havana during the vist of Colonel Men-
gistu, the Ethiopian leader, that Cuban forces 
would stay in Ethiopia indefinitely. It was 
reported that 500 Cuban military had been moved 
from the Ogaden to Asmara, the capital of 
Eritrea, but it is not yet clear however whether 
or not Cuban forces will be engaged in the Ethio-
pian offensive against the Eritreans announced 
by Colonel Mengistu on 15th May. The Eritreans 
themselves in the past received assistance from 
Cuban military advisers. Having lost significant 
naval and air facilities in Berbera, the Soviet 
Union will no doubt be tempted to seek alter-
native arrangements in the Eritrean port of 
Massawa or Assab. A Pravda commentary on 
15th March said that western and Arab support 
for the separatists was aimed at depriving Ethio-
pia of outlets to the Red Sea. 
2.38 Certainly the Soviet commitment to inter-
vention in Mrica is unimpaired. Just before the 
arrival in Moscow of Mr. Vance, the United 
States Secretary of State, Mr. Brezhnev received 
President Agostinho Neto of Angola and prom-
ised "all-out support", adding that the Soviet 
Union would continue to help national liberation 
forces in their effort to liquidate colonialism and 
national oppression. All-out support has always 
meant military assistance. 
2.39 The Committee again draws attention to the 
serious threat to detente and stability caused by 
the projection of Soviet military power into 
various parts of Mrica. Through its opportunist 
support first of Somalia and then of Ethiopia, 
the Soviet Union has fostered and increased the 
intensity of the Somali-Ethiopian hostilities and 
with its current support of the Ethiopian drive 
to reassert its authority in Eritrea, virtually 
ensured that the writ of the pro-Soviet regime in 
Addis Ababa runs throughout the former 
imperiaL territories. 
2.40 In a welcome display of their military 
capabiLity outside the NATO area, naval vessels 
from France, the United Kingdom and the United 
States conducted an exercise in the Red Sea off 
the coast of Ethiopia in the early days of April. 
The forces involved were two Prench frigates, 
a British cruiser, five frigates and four auxiliary 
support ships, and two American destroyers. The 
Committee stresses the import·ance of NATO 
countries with the appropriate resources being 
able to deploy naval forces outside the NATO 
area. The Committee notes that the Central 
Treaty Organisation (CENTO) also carried out 
small-scale exercises in the Indian Ocean area 
involving the five member states (Iran, Pakis-
tan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United 
States) ; and whilst co-operation in both the 
political and military fields between NATO and 
CENTO is inhibited at present because of objec-
tions from Pakistan, nevertheless the Committee 
consider this aspect of the overall situation needs 
to be recorded, with a view to further exam-
ination of the problems affecting NATO/CENTO 
co-operation being undertaken at an appropriate 
time. (See further comments in paragraphs 3.96-
3.99.) In an interview with Newsweek at the 
beginning of January 1978, General Haig, 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, suggested 
that NATO should have regional military capa-
bilities which could be employed aB deterrent 
forces to prevent the escalation of third world 
dynamics into major world conflict. Europe in 
this way shou1d display its determination to resist 
threats on the flanks or peciphery of NATO. 
Ill. The Alliance 
(a) Validity of the Alliance 
3.1 The great economic importance of the 
Mediterranean Sea to the NATO countries has 
been impressed on the Committee on many 
occasions by those who have addressed it. 
According to NATO there are 1,500 ocean-going 
ships at sea in the Mediterranean every day 
(excluding coastal vessels) and other sources 
suggest that 1,200 of these belong to NATO 
countries. Italy, Greece and Turkey are almost 
entirely dependent on the sea for their supplies, 
and France is to a large extent. Italy in fact 
imports 90 % of its requirements and exports 
65 % of its produce through the Mediterranean 
Sea. It is estimated that some 150 million tons 
of goods pass through the sea each year of which 
some 120 to 140 million tons represent fuel, and 
includes one-quarter of all European petroleum 
requirements. 
3.2 NATO estimates that to sustain the NATO 
Mediterranean countries in war 1.5 million tons 
of supplies would be required each week, amount-
ing to a convoy of twenty ships every day. 
3.3 Apart from France, the NATO countries 
in the area- Italy, Greece and Turkey- are 
largely isolated peninsulas with slender or no 
land links between them. The indigenous 
resources of these countries would not permit 
them alone to provide a defensive structure 
capable of balancing the mHitary might of the 
Soviet Union and Warsaw PaCit countries with 
which Greece ·and Turkey have common frontiers. 
3.4 The Committee believes that by associating 
the other NATO countries and their armed forces 
with the defence of the Mediterranean NATO 
provides the only credible basis for security in 
the area, and its effectiveness depends on the 
cohesion of the Alliance in political terms, and 
on the full support and participation of all mem-
ber countries in defence arrangements. 
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3.5 While the preponderant contribution by 
NATO countries outside the Mediterranean comes 
from the United States, there are still significant 
contributions of forces to NATO exercises and 
to reinforcement capabilities in war by many 
other NATO countries, including all WEU coun-
tries. The NATO common infrastructure projects 
provide essential military installations which 
would be beyond the resources of the local coun-
tries and all NATO countries (with the exception 
of Iceland which has no armed forces) contribute 
to these through the agreed cost-sharing formula. 
(b) NATO structure 
(i) Command structure 
3.6 The NATO command structure in the 
Mediterranean, with the location of the various 
headquarters, is shown at Appendix II and on 
the map at Appendix Ill "Naval striking and 
support forces Southern Europe" is the title 
assumed by the United States Sixth Fleet when 
under NATO command. With the exception of 
the maritime air surveillance headquarters 
MARAIRMED which is an integrated NATO 
headquarters in peacetime, the bottom row of 
subordinate navrul commands in that diagram-
i.e. all others subordinate to COMNA VSOUTH 
- are in reality national commands which would 
only be activated as NATO headquarters at an 
advanced st·age of alert. The remaining head-
quarters are permanently manned by staff offi-
cers drawn from all NATO countries contributing 
forces to the area of the command including 
those that might provide reinforcements in the 
event of hostilities. 
3.7 Problems affecting the LANDSOUTHEAST 
and Sixth ATAF Commands are discussed under 
Greek-Turkish relations in paragraphs 3.46 et 
seq. The present situation of two of the subor-
dinaJte naval commands is anomalous, being 
directly exercised "temporarily" by the superior 
headquarters NAVSOUTH: the Western Medi-
terranean Command was originally the respon-
sibility of a French admiral in Toulon ; the 
South-Eastern Command that of a British admi-
ral in Malta. The former command lapsed on 
the withdrawal of French Mediterranean naval 
forces in 1965, the latter on the withdrawal of 
permanent British naval presence in the Mediter-
ranean in 1974 and the closure of the last NATO 
headquarters in Malta (see paragraph 3.82). 
3.8 The Committee feels that to be effective 
command arrangements have to reflect the reality 
of national force contributions to NATO in the 
area. If Spain accedes to NATO (see paragraph 
3.92) and French forces do not return to the 
integrated military structure of NATO as a 
majority of the Committee urges (paragraph 
3.78), there cOUild be a case for the Western 
Mediterranean Command being exercised by a 
Spanish admiral. 
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3.9 In previous reports 1 the Committee has 
recommended that the subordinate naval com-
mand "Gibraltar Mediterranean area" should be 
transferred to become the responsibility of 
SACLANT, the Atlantic commander- it would 
then come directly under IBERLANT at Oeiras 
near Lisbon. Following the Committee's briefing 
at Headquarters AFSOUTH and the Rappor-
teur's visit to IBERLANT, the Committee does 
not renew this recommendation. The essential 
point is that the GIBMED area is the point at 
which the Mediterranean command has to liaise 
with the Atlantic command. Much of GIBMED's 
day-to-day business is with IBERLANT, partly 
because of the withdrawal of French naval forces 
from NATO command in the Mediterranean. 
Direct communications between IBERLANT and 
GIBMED are being improved and satisfactory 
liaison with both IBERLANT and NA VSOUTH 
appears to be assured with the present command 
structure. 
3.10 In normaJ circumstances the air defence 
forces of the NATO countries are permanently 
assigned to NATO in peacetime and NATO com-
manders are responsible for the operation of the 
NADGE radar early-warning and control system, 
and have the authority to order take-off of air 
defence aircraft to intercept unidentified air-
craft overflying the territory of NATO countries. 
3.11 Otherwise in peacetime national forces are 
not permanently under the command of NATO 
headquarters. They may be "assigned to" NATO 
in which case their peacetime location is deter-
mined by NATO defence plans negotiated with 
the national authorities, and the forces come 
under command automatically when the appro-
priate state of alert is declared by the North 
.AJtlantic Council. Forces which are "earmarked 
for assignment" come under command and have 
to be able to reach agreed locations within a 
specified time of alert being declared (M + 3, 
etc.). Forces do however come under NATO com-
mands for exercise purposes during manoeuvres, 
and the standing naval forces STANAVFOR-
CHAN and STANAVFORLANT operate per-
manently under NATO command. Apart from air 
defence therefore, and maritime surveillance, the 
primary function of NATO headquarters in 
peacetime is planning, preparation, training and 
operation of communications. NATO commanders 
visit assigned national forces in peacetime and 
are responsible for reporting on the extent to 
which their training and equipment meets the 
agreed requirements of NATO air defence plans. 
( ii) Infrastructure 
3.12 A large number of military installations in 
the Mediterranean area have been jointly 
financed by aB. the NATO countries through the 
1. Documents 682, 708. 
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NATO infrastructure programme which incor-
porates a cost-sharing formula whereby the contri-
butions of the different countries are calculated 
pavtly according to the ability of the country to 
pay, and partly according to the value of a 
particular project to its own forces. In the case 
of the NATO Mediterranean countries- France, 
Italy, Greece and Turkey - and Portugal the 
value of NATO infrastructure projects con-
structed in the country exceeds the contribution 
of that country to the infrastructure programme, 
thus resulting in net economic benefits to the 
host country. Rough secretariat estimates of the 
infrastructure programme to the end of 1971 
show the ratio of value to contribution to be 
nearly 2:1 for Italy and 10:1 for Greece and 
Turkey. 
NATO infrastructure programmes 
Cumulative expenditure to 1971 - £ million 
pre-deoaluation 
(Rough secretariat estimates) 
Country Value of 
Country contributions projects to constructed 
programmes in country 
Belgium 76 53 
France 215 255 
FederaJ: Republic of 
Germany 142 307 
Italy 87 150 
Luxembourg 2 • 
Netherlands 62 38 
United Kingdom 178 68 
TOTAL WEU 762 880 
Canada 83 • 
Denmark 42 38 
Greece 10 105 
Norway 34 105 
Portugal 3 15 
Turkey 18 195 
United States 548 38 1 
Miscellaneous - 120 
ToTAL Non-WEU 738 620 
TOTAL NATO 1,500 1,500 
* Small, not estimated. 
1. Not necessarily on United States territory. 
3.13 Infrastructure projects constructed in the 
Mediterranean NATO countries include many 
airfields, the early-warning radar system 
(NADGE), the various communications systems 
now being integrated into the NATO Integrated 
Communications System (NICS), storage for fuel 
and ammunition including nuclear ammunition, 
and nava:l facilities. There is a requirement for 
up-dating the communications system and the 
early-warning system would be greatly enhanced 
if AWACS aircraft were available in the Medi-
terranean area. 
(iii) Combined NATO forces 
3.14 In addition to the national forces assigned 
or earmarked for NATO command, there are a 
number of combined forces that can operate 
under NATO command, which contain elements 
contributed by several different member coun-
tries. In 1969 the Naval On-Call Force in the 
Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) was set up, 
with a ship from each of the powers contributing 
forces to the southern region - Greece, Italy, 
Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. 
This force is activated twice each year through 
the period of a month and during that time 
operates under the command of NA VSOUTH. 
3.15 Directly under the command of SACEUR, 
as a political deterrent force which can be 
deployed in a period of tension to provide an 
immediate demonstration of allied solidarity, is 
the mobile force of Allied Command Europe 
(AMF). The land component of this force when 
deployed is a brigade group in size, constituted 
from specially trained and equipped battalions 
made ·available from Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, each with an associated artillery battery, 
and together with a headquarters logistics sup-
port element provided by the United Kingdom. 
The air component comprises squadrons of tac-
tical aircraft supplied also by Canada and the 
Netherlands. This force is frequently and very 
successfully deployed on exercises in .the Mediter-
ranean area in North-East Italy, Greek and 
Turkish Thrace and Eastern Turkey, and is 
practised in working in liaison with national 
forces of all these countries. 
(iv) NATO exercises 
3.16 NATO exercises during which forces from 
several NATO countries come together for joint 
manoeuvres under command of NATO head-
quarters for periods of a week or two are the 
essential means of proving the effectiveness of 
NATO defence plans as well as the state of 
training and maintenance of equipment of the 
assigned forces. Your Rapporteur is grateful for 
the oppor:tunity extended by General Haig, the 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, which 
enabled him and certain other members of the 
Committee to observe various exercises in the 
Mediterranean area in the course of the last 
year. Exercise Display Determination from 25th 
September to 4th October 1977 brought together 
land, sea and air fm-ces of Italy, Portugal, Greece, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United 
States for operations in the area of !truly and 
Turkey, in the course of which the Rapporteur 
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and another member were able to visit an aircraft 
carrier at sea. 
3.17 Exercise Open Gate from 3rd to 8th May 
1978 was a naval exercise involving ships from 
Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
the United Kingdom and the United States 
conducted off the coast of Portugal and Spain. 
Your Rapporteur in the course of it was briefed 
both at IBERLANT headquarters and on board 
the United States nuclear-propelled aircraft 
carrier Nimitz. 
3.18 Lastly, exercise Dawn Patrol from 16th to 
29th May, conducted under the command of 
CINCSOUTH, brought together air, naval and 
amphibious forces from France, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, the United King-
dom and the United States. The Committee parti-
cularly welcomes the participation of French 
and Greek naval forces in this exercise, since 
these countries are not at present part of the 
integrated mi[itary structure of NATO. It regrets 
to note however that when the naval operations 
moved into the Aegean, Greek and Turkish 
forces were obliged to operate outside each other's 
territorial waters and air space. The exercise 
included amphibious operations in Sardinia, 
Southern Greece and Western Turkey, as well as 
operations in the Aegean. One phase of this 
operation was also observed by a member of the 
Committee. 
3.19 Members attending these exercises have been 
impressed by the good standard of training of 
NATO forces, and the ability of forces from 
many countries to operate together. The Com-
mittee welcomes the present policy of SACEUR 
to attract more attention to joint exercises and 
stresses their importance as a means not only 
for improving the training of NATO forces, but 
for demonstrating the political solidarity of the 
whole Alliance, particulal"ly in areas of potential 
conflict. 
(c) The countries of the Alliance 
(i) Greece 
3.20 Greece, with common frontiers with Alba-
nia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Turkey, is strate-
gically and delicately situated. Apart from the 
narrow Greek-Turkish frontier in Thrace it has 
no other land links with countries of the 
AUiance. The narrow band of territory thllit is 
Greek Thrace, only 28 kilometres at its narrowest 
point, is all that separates Bulgaria from the 
Aegean. 
3.21 The Greek armed forces total 200,000 men, 
160,000 in the army organised in some thirteen 
divisional equivalents, including one armoured 
division. Tanks include 275 M-47, 650 M-48 and 
75 mol'e modern French AMX-30 (95 more on 
order). The air force includes 6 attack squadrons 
comprising 37 Phantoms, 60 Corsairs and 15 
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F-104 Starfighters, with a further 18 Phantoms 
on order from the United States. There are 
5 interceptor air defence squadrons with 
40 Tigers, 15 Starfighters and 40 Mirage F-1. 
The navy comprises 6 submarines, 11 destroyers, 
4 escorts and 9 fast patrol boats including 7 with 
the Exocet surface-to-surface missile. Six more 
patrol boats are on order from France together 
with 20 Exocet missiles. Seven destroyers and 
2 landing ships are also on order from the United 
States. 
3.22 Whi1le the defence co-operation agreement 
with the United States, referred to below, has 
not yet entered into force, the Greek economy 
having suffered less than that of its neighbours 
from the economic downturn since 1973, the 
country has been in a position to procure military 
equipment from various allied countries includ-
ing France (Mirage aircraft and AMX-30 
tanks), West Germany (submarines) and Belgium 
(FN machine gun), and other tank orders from 
European countries are pending. Some commu-
nications equipment and small arms are under-
stood to have been procured from Israel. 
3.23 Mr. Karamanlis's New Democracy Party 
won the November 1977 elections with 172 seats 
in the Chamber compared with 93 seats for 
Mr. Papandreou's Pasok Party, the Democratic 
Centre of Mr. Mavros having been reduced to 
15 seats. Mr. Papandreou campaigned for the 
withdrawal of Greece from NATO, the abolition 
of western bases in the country, no membership 
of the European Community and a policy of 
non-alignment. Thus while Mr. Karamanlis has 
substantial parliamentary support for his policy, 
the bipartisan support for NATO that is to be 
found in most member countries is at present 
lacking in Greece. 
3.24 The previous reports of the Committee 1 
have described the reaction of Greece in 1974 
in withdrawing its forces from NATO commands. 
The Committee stresses that, unlike France, 
Greece has not completely withdrawn from the 
integrated military structure of NATO. Greece, 
like France, remains represented on the North 
Atlantic Council, but has withdrawn its repre-
sentative from the NATO Defence Planning 
Committee. Unlike France, Greece remains 
represented on the Military Committee (compris-
ing the Chiefs of Staff of the NATO countries 
or their representative) and Greek officers 
continue to serve in the integrated military 
headquarters of NATO- SHAPE, AFSOUTH 
and its subordinate commands - where they 
were previously present except for the two 
headquarters located at Imnir in Turkey (Head-
quarters Allied Land Forces South-East Europe 
1. Document 708, 19th May 1976, Rapporteur Mr. 
Buck; Document 651, 14th November 1974, Rapporteur 
Mr. Critchley. 
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and Headquarters Sixth Allied Tactical Air 
Force) from which it should be noted Greek 
officers had been withdrawn on a number of 
occasions prior to 1974, when Greek-Turkish 
relations were strained. 
3.25 Greek forces have resumed participation in 
NATO exercises since autumn 1977 but NATO 
installations on Greek territory (communications, 
five NADGE early-warning stations, firing 
ranges in Crete, etc.), although functioning, con-
tinue to be available to NATO only on a limited 
basis, and early-warning data is not transmitted 
to NATO. 
3.26 Prior to 1974 Greek army, navy and air 
force units (other than air defence) were "ear-
marked for assignment" to NATO -i.e. at the 
latest they would come under command of NATO 
headquarters at the stage of "reinforced alert" 
when declared by the North Atlantic Council. 
Only Greek air defence forces were "assigned" 
to NATO command in peacetime, coming under 
the effective operational command of Commander 
Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, in Naples, 
through Headquarters Sixth AT AF in Izmir. 
NATO air defences operate under NATO com-
mand twenty-four hours a day. As Mr. Kara-
manlis in withdrawing Greek forces in 1974 
asserted among other things that there would 
be total defenee co-operation with NATO in a 
general conflict, it is possible to minimise the 
Greek action by saying that it amounted in prac-
tice to the withdrawal of the air defence forces, 
since only these forces had previously been under 
NATO command in peacetime. This withdrawal 
of air defence forces does however in itself leave 
a serious breach in the collective NATO air 
defences. The withdrawal of remaining air forces, 
and of ground and naval forces from their pre-
vious "earmarked for assignment" status has also 
had a debilitating effect on all allied defence 
arrangements in the area. It is understood that 
Greek army deployments no longer correspond 
with alilied defence plaiDB, and there have been no 
joint Greek-Turkish exercises since 1974 (although 
forces from both countries have individually 
participated in NATO exercises). 
3.27 Mr. Averoff, the Greek Minister of Defence, 
visited Belgrade in the fa;ll of 1976 (a visit which 
has not yet been returned) and the service chiefs 
of each country have made reciprocal visits. 
There was some speculation at the time that a 
secret defence agreement had been reached with 
Yugoslavia. The Committee understands that no 
such agreement exists. The closer Greek-Yugu-
slav relations, which the Committee can only 
welcome, have however permitted a reduction in 
the number of Yugoslav troops stationed in the 
vicinity of the Greek frontier, and a correspond-
ing reduction of Greek forces on the other side. 
Greek Thrace opposite Bulgaria has not been 
denuded of forces. 
3.28 Following the 1974 withdrawal of Greek 
forces from NATO command, Greece sought to 
negotiate a special relationship for its forces with 
NATO. It put forward proposals in October 1975 
suggesting : 
( i) in peace, Greek armed forces would 
be under exclusively national com-
mand; 
( ii) there would be total defence co-
operation in general conflict ; 
( iii) arrangements for co-operation in a 
crisis to be worked out at once ; 
( iv) large-scale operations on Greek terri-
tory in peace or war would require 
prior agreement with the Greek 
Government ; 
( v) the Greek Government would retain 
the right to decide when its forces 
would participate in NATO man-
oeuvres; 
(vi) NATO would continue to enjoy three 
advantages : 
- control and use of early-warning, 
communications and other defence 
infrastructure built on Greek 
territory with NATO funds ; 
- continued exchange of informa-
tion; 
- nuclear weapons could remain on 
Greek territory. 
3.29 Negotiations have proceeded slowly in a 
NATO open-ended group of thirteen members 
for the last two years ; Turkey in particular 
has objected to any "special status" being granted 
to Greece. An attempt now is being made to 
speed up the negotiations. 
3.30 Mr. Karamanlis called on Mr. Luns, the 
NATO Secretary-General, in Brussels on 19th 
January when the press was given to understand 
that the Greek Prime Minister supported even-
tually "the complete reintegration of Greece into 
the military wing of NATO" but that "a re-
examination of the Greek position on NATO 
depends on developments in the Cyprus solu-
tion ... " and that "a complete solution to Cyprus" 
would be required. Greek-NATO negotiations, it 
was hoped, could be concluded by June 1978. 
3.31 Your Rapporteur during his visit to Greece 
was given to understand that Greece put forward 
detailed proposals to the NATO military 
authorities in February 1977 for what would 
amount to an "interim" arrangement to cover 
Greek relations with NATO until such time as a 
complete solution to the Cyprus problem would 
make the reintegration of Greek forces politi-
cally acceptable to the country ; Greece is no 
longer seeking a "special" relationship with 
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NATO. These proposals have to be discussed both 
by the NATO military authorities and by the 
open-ended group and the Defence Planning Com-
mittee. The particular problems of command 
structure are discussed below under Greek-
Turkish relations. 
3.32 Greek relations with the United States have 
also suffered with the events of 1974, but the 
important United States defence installations in 
Greece function normally. These include the 
important naval and air force base in Suda Bay 
in Crete which also houses NATO fuel and ammu-
nition storage, an electronic surveillance station 
at Iraklion in Crete, a communications centre at 
Nea Makri and air force facilities at Athens 
airport. There are a number of other communica-
tions facilities. The United States completed 
negotiations on a new defence co-operation agree-
ment with Greece which was initialled in 1977 
and is now referred to the governments ; this 
will provide military assistance to the extent of 
$700 million over four years for Greece (80 % 
as credit sales, 20 % as grant aid). It is probably 
for domestic political reasons that the United 
States has wished to maintain parallelism 
between its defence co-operation agreement with 
Greece and Turkey; certainly the provision of 
defence equipment is less urgent in the case of 
Greece than in that of Turkey. Greece now con-
siders the new co-operation agreement to be an 
integral part of its relationship with NATO and 
is unlikely to proceed to its ratification until 
agreement has been reached on its new interim 
relationship which Greece is now eager to con-
clude with NATO as rapidly as possible. 
3.33 Your Rapporteur left Athens with the clear 
impression that Greece sees the role of NATO as 
essential to ensure stability in the area which 
would inevitably be dominated by the Soviet 
Union if the Alliance did not exist. Greece is 
anxious that its importance to the Alliance should 
be clearly understood, and wishes to normalise 
its relationship with NATO as rapidly as possible. 
It is clearly the policy of the present government 
to seek eventually the reintegration of Greek 
forces into NATO. At the same time the over-
whelming preoccupation of the Greek leadership, 
in addition to its application for membership of 
the European Community, is with relations with 
Turkey and the Cyprus problem. 
(ii) Turkey 
3.34 Following the defection of some ten mem-
bers of parliament from Mr. Demirel's Justice 
Party, Mr. E<;evit, leader of the Republican 
People's Party, formed a government which 
secured a vote of confidence by 229 to 218 on 
19th January. Ten government posts in the new 
administration went to the defectors from the 
Justice Party and three to two small parties that 
supported Mr. E<;evit, but all important port-
folios including defence and foreign affairs 
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remain with the Republican People's Party. The 
Defence Minister, Mr. Isik, held the same position 
in Mr. E~evit's previous government in 1974, and 
Mr. Isik, a former ambassador, is one of the few 
civilians to have held the post of defence minister 
in Turkey. Compared to Mr. Karamanlis in 
Greece therefore Mr. E~evit's parliamentary 
position is less strong ; on the other hand there 
is bipartisan support from both the Republican 
People's Party and the Justice Party for member-
ship of NATO, although NATO is no longer seen 
by Mr. E~evit's administration as a necessarily 
sufficient basis for Turkish security. 
3.35 Unlike Greece, the very severe economic 
depresSion in Turkey makes external assistance 
for the supply of modern defence equipment 
essential, and the United States embargo on 
supplies imposed since 1975 has generated uni-
versal bitterness in Turkey which considers itself 
to have been betrayed by an ally. Speaking in 
the Senate on 23rd March, Mr. E~evit said 
Turkey "has reached the point where it would 
no longer fully depend on the United States and 
NATO for its security" because Turkey "could 
no longer trust the United States in certain 
situations". Turkey occupies an extremely impor-
tant strategical position for the Alliance. Turkish 
territory lies astride the Turkish straits which 
provide the only exit from the Black Sea for the 
Soviet fleet. It has a common frontier with 
Bulgaria in Turkish Thrace the flat terrain of 
which would provide very good going for an 
armoured thrust from Bulgaria to seize the 
straits, or an outlet to the Aegean. Turkey has a 
long Black Sea coast and in the east a long land 
frontier with the Soviet Union, with Iraq and 
Syria. 
3.36 Despite its difficult economic situation 
Turkey devoted 5.7% of its GNP to defence based 
on 1977-78 figures. The armed forces total 
465,000, of which the army amounts to 375,000 
organised in some 23 divisional equivalents 
including one armoured division and some three 
mechanised infantry divisions. Tanks include 
2,800 obsolescent M-47 and M-48. The air force 
includes 14 fighter attack squadrons including 
40 Phantoms and 70 F-5As. The navy includes 
fourteen submarines, twelve destroyers, two 
frigates and twenty fast patrol boats ; two sub-
marines and six fast patrol boats are on order. 
3.37 Turkey's relations with NATO were 
theoretically unaffected by the events of 1974, 
as Turkey has not sought to withdraw from 
the NATO command. The thirteen NATO 
NADGE early-warning stations remain fully 
operational as does the NATO headquarters 
at Izmir, although the Greek officers have 
been withdrawn. In practice however the 
deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations after 
1974 have inevitably reduced the effectiveness 
both of the Greek contribution to NATO -
through the dePision of that country to withdraw 
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from NATO command - and of the Turkish 
contribution because Turkish reporting to NATO, 
whether of intelligence or the status or move-
ments of its own forces, has been virtually 
suspended at any level where it is thought that 
Greek officers might have access to the informa-
tion. The new arrangements for the Izmir com-
mand are mentioned below. 
3.38 Under a number of agreements concluded 
from 1952 to 1969 the United States was able 
to install a considerable number of important 
defence facilities in Turkey. There are electronic 
intelligence-gathering stations in the Sea of 
Marmara, along the Black Sea coast and in South-
East Turkey ; there are numerous communica-
tions facilities, three airfields and four naval 
facilities. In July 1975, following the imposition 
of the United States arms embargo on Turkey 
by Congress, the Turkish Government said the 
1969 and other agreements had "lost their legal 
validity", the four intelligence-collecting centres 
were closed down and the Incirlik air base could 
be used only for direct NATO purposes. These 
United States facilities are currently stated to 
have a "provisional status", which amounts to 
a virtual, although possibly not a total, closure. 
A new four-year defence co-operation agreement 
between the United States and Turkey was signed 
on 26th March 1976 providing for closer Turkish 
control over United States facilities than hitherto, 
and for Turkey to provide up to half of all 
personnel on the facilities if it so wished. The 
agreement covered a total of twenty-six United 
States defence installations. At the same time 
the United States was to provide defence 
assistance to Turkey of $1 billion over four years 
- or $250 m a year of which $800 m ($200 m a 
year) were to be credit sales and $200 m ($50 m 
a year) grant aid. The limited relaxation of the 
embargo agreed by Congress in March 1976 -
authorisation for $175 m a year of cash sales, i.e. 
sales involving immediate payment - falls far 
short of the provisions of the defence co-operation 
agreement because of the present economic 
situation in Turkey. As a consequence of the 
embargo the effectiveness of Turkish forces, 
particularly of the air force, has been jeopard-
ised. 
3.39 The United States Secretary of State, 
Mr. Vance, irked the Turkish Government by 
saying prior to the E~evit-Karamanlis meeting 
that the United States Administration was 
awaiting the outcome before deciding whether 
to submit the Defence Co-operation Agreement 
to Congress for ratification. But on 3rd April 
1978 the State Department announced that the 
agreement would be re-negotiated "in order 
further to strengthen our bilateral relations 
with Turkey and the NATO defence posture in 
the East Mediterranean. President Carter will 
ask the Congress to take action to repeal Section 
620(X) of the Foreign Assistance Act which 
imposes restrictions on military transfers . to 
Turkey ... ". The Administration at the same tlme 
requested foreign military sales credits for 
Turkey of $175 million for fiscal year 1979, the 
same as provided as an emergency in each of 
the previous two years, with a further $50 mill.ion 
security assistance loan. At the same time 
Congress was asked to provide $5 million refugee 
assistance for Cyprus and was informed that a 
request would be made for $150 million ~n 
foreign military sales credits for Greece m 
financial year 1979 (which begins on 1st October 
1978). 
3.40 The United States Administration thus 
demonstrated that its request to Congress for 
a removal of the embargo was not linked to the 
submission of new proposals for a solution of the 
Cyprus problem by the Turkish Cypriot com-
munity. At the same time it was obviously known 
that these proposals would be forthcoming some 
days later. The urgency of providing military 
assistance to Turkey had been made clear by the 
Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, 
General Zeiner Gundersen, addressing the NATO 
Defence Ministers in Brussels on 6th December 
1977. There were some signs of support in 
Congress for raising the embargo in a letter 
in early March from the Chairman, Mr. Zabl_ocki, 
and eighteen members of the House InternatiOnal 
Relations Committee addressed to the Secretary 
of State which said : "You can be assured 
that the undersigned will give sympathetic 
consideration to a request for assistance to 
both [Greece and Turkey] providing the Presi-
dent gives his unequivocal support to such 
action." On 4th April Mr. E<:evit welcomed the 
administration's approach to Congress, saying: 
"We are on the verge of a new and positive 
development in Turkish-American relations" but 
that negotiations on re-opening United States 
bases in Turkey would begin only after "a 
positive result emerges from Cong~ess". The 
administration's request of 3rd April for the 
restri<ltions on military transfers to Turkey to 
be repealed was approved in the United States 
House of Representatives International Relations 
Committee by 18 votes to 17 on 3rd May, but 
on 11th May the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee rejected the request by 8 votes to 4. It 
did however approve the $175 million foreign 
military sales credits and $50 million security 
supporting assistance loan for fiscal year 1979. 
3.41 The United States arms embargo on Turkey 
has been heavily criticised in NATO as damaging 
to both Turkey and the Alliance. On 19th May 
the communique of the ministerial meeting of 
the NATO Defence Planning Committee stated: 
"In this connection, Ministers noted the 
initiative under way for the complete 
removal of existing United States restric-
tions on the procurement of defence equip-
ment by Turkey and emphasised the impor-
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tance for the security and solidarity of the 
Alliance of a speedy and positive outcome 
to these initiatives." 
and Mr. Simonet, the Belgian Foreign Minister, 
and Mr. Apel, the German Minister of Defence, 
both voiced their concern. 
3.42 Your Rapporteur left Turkey with the 
strong impression that Turkey considers itself a 
loyal ally of NATO that has been let down over 
the supply of armaments and totally misunder-
stood by most members of the Alliance w~en 
forced to take action to protect the Turkish 
Cypriot population in 1974. As in Greece there 
is considerable preoccupation with the problems 
that divide the two countries, as well as with 
Cyprus. Turkey has need to diversify its so~r~es 
of armaments but it is in no economic positiOn 
to make large purchases in foreign currency. It 
has received some defence assistance from 
Germany, and there is the poss~bility of .193 
Leopard tanks and Milan anti-tank gmded 
weapons as well as Italian helicopters and the 
Franco-German Alpha-Jet training aircraft being 
supplied but the economic situation in Turkey 
makes c~sh purchases difficult or impossible. 
Turkey is anxious to build its own industrial 
strength and to become more self-sufficient in 
arms production by the creation in co-operation 
with its allies of its own defence industry, with 
eo-production projects on its own territory. 
3.43 There is perhaps in certain circles close 
to the present administration a tendency to 
believe that a non-aligned status for Turkey may 
be more attractive if the two superpowers were 
not present in the region, but as Turkey shares 
a common frontier with the Soviet Union as 
well as the Black Sea occupied by the powerful 
Soviet Black Sea Fleet, the precondition of such 
a change of policy cannot arise. There is certainly 
no disposition to envisage a change in alliances, 
but Turkey is concerned to maintain correct 
relations with the Soviet Union. It is reliably 
reported that much of the Soviet air supply to 
Ethiopia in November 1977 overflew Turkey, but 
Turkey was later successful in securing some 
reduction in the size of this airlift. General 
Ogarkov, the Soviet Chief of Staff, paid a? 
official visit to Turkey from 25th to 28th April 
1978, the first such visit for forty-five years. 
After his meeting with Mr. E<:evit, General 
Ogarkov said to the press that the two countries 
should "benefit from the possibilities offered by 
a military relationship". Commenting on the visit 
on 1st May Mr. Isik, the Defence Minister, quoted 
the General as having said that "Russia does not 
harbour any ambitions over Turkey except th?se 
of mutual friendship... should Turkey reqmre 
arms Russia could examine ways and means for 
giving aid". 
3.44 Mr. E<:evit has let it be known that Turk.ey 
does not intend to leave NATO or to accept Soviet 
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arms. On the other hand the failure of the United 
States to raise the arms embargo has naturally 
embittered Turkey's attitude - both to the 
United States and to Greece. In London on 15th 
May Mr. E~evit said Greece had "obviously for 
years been arming against her ally, Turkey", 
and that he saw no progress on the Cyprus 
problem if the United States embargo continued. 
At the NATO summit in Washington on 30th 
May Mr. E<;evit said that NATO "should seek 
to replace alienation with increasing dialogue 
with the Warsaw Pact". In an interview with 
the New York Times, Mr. E<;evit revealed that 
he intends to sign a political document in Moscow 
that will stress the friendship between the two 
countries. Turkey felt "no threat" from Russia 
and there had been "no indications in recent 
years of Soviet ambitions on Turkey or Soviet 
intent to interfere in Turkey". Turkey's defence 
policy dated to the time of the cold war, he 
said. "We ought to have a new defence concept 
that fits the period of detente better." The 
Committee recommends that the Council and 
member governments call on the United States 
to remove the embargo, and consider the pos-
sibility of establishing certain joint production 
programmes in Turkey to prevent the present 
unfair discrimination against the country over 
access to defence equipment. 
(iii) Greek-Turkish relations 
3.45 The previous reports of the Committee have 
documented the events of 197 4, and the Greek-
Turkish dispute which involves in effect the 
status of the Aegean Sea as well as Cyprus. 
There is of course a long and tragic history of 
Greek-Turkish conflict which has inevitably left 
a popular tradition of mutual suspicion in both 
peoples and indeed in many political circles. 
Fortunately in more recent times through 
courageous political leadership in both Greece 
and Turkey, starting with the historical meeting 
between Ataturk and Venizelos, and repeated a 
number of times since, most recently with the 
meeting between Mr. E<;evit and Mr. Karamanlis 
on lOth March 1978, direct conflict between these 
two peoples has been avoided. The Committee 
welcomes the improved atmosphere that followed 
that meeting, but regrets that the better relations 
that it heralded have not materialised - largely 
because of the failure of the United States to 
raise its arms embargo on Turkey, and because 
of the failure of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
communities to resume negotiations. The Com-
mittee applauds the determination of the leader-
ship of both countries to settle their disagreements 
by negotiation and notes that talks will be 
resumed in Ankara on 4th and 5th July. The 
Committee draws attention to some aspects of the 
dispute that affect directly the relationship of 
the two countries to NATO. 
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3.46 Except insofar as the movements of aircraft 
and control of air space are concerned, the Izmir 
NATO command is not of course a matter of 
dispute between the two countries, but new 
arrangements have been announced by NATO 
with a view to facilitating new and better defence 
arrangements in the area. The two NATO head-
quarters at Izmir are Land Forces South-East 
Europe - under an American general with 
Greek and Turkish deputies. In the event of 
hostilities this headquarters commands the land 
forces assigned to NATO in Greece (First Hel-
lenic Army with headquarters at Larissa, 
concentrated chiefly along the Bulgarian and 
Albanian borders), the Turkish First Army 
(headquarters in Istanbul, deployed in Thrace 
and across the Turkish straits) ; the Turkish 
Third Army (headquarters Erzincan) defending 
the eastern frontier with Turkey) ; and the 
Turkish Second Army (headquarters at Konya, 
defending the south-eastern border). The other 
NATO headquarters at Izmir - Sixth Allied 
Tactical Air Force - again commanded by a 
United States general with a Turkish and Greek 
deputy, commands the Greek and Turkish air 
forces - the Hellenic Twenty-Eighth Tactical 
Air Force with headquarters in Larissa ; the Tur-
kish First Tactical Air Force with headquarters 
at Eskisehir, south-east of Istanbul and the Tur-
kish Second Tactical Air Force with headquarters 
at Diyarbakir in south-eastern Turkey. In the 
event of hostilities the NATO land and air head-
quarters form a joint operations centre in a pro-
tected war headquarters which would include a 
liaison officer from the United States Sixth Fleet. 
3.47 With the withdrawal of all Greek forces 
from NATO command in 1974 and the subsequent 
cessation of any Turkish reporting of force status 
or location to headquarters at this level, Izmir 
ceased to be an effective headquarters, and indeed 
the morale of the military staff which includes 
United States, Italian and British officers as 
well as those of Turkey and (before their with-
drawal) Greece, has been undermined. On 30th 
December 1977 General Haig, Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe, announced that from 1st July 
1978 the two commands - LANDSOUTHEAST 
and Sixth AT AF - would be taken over by 
Turkish generals, who would hav,e United States 
deputies. With the withdrawal of the Greek 
forces it had become anomalous that American 
commanders should be commanding only Turkish 
forces. The two commands in Izmir will thus 
become in July "Turkish-NATO" headquarters 
- the land commander being directly subordinate 
to Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern 
Europe (CINCSOUTH) in Naples, and the air 
commander coming under CINCSOUTH's 
principal subordinate Commander Allied Air 
Forces Southern Europe, also located in Naples. 
3.48 The inevitable corollary to the reorganisa-
tion of the Izmir headquarters is the establish-
ment of a "Greek-NATO" headquarters on Greek 
territory, possibly at Larissa where there is 
already a NATO-financed airfield and where 
Greek army and air force commands are located, 
and these arrangements will be negotiated in the 
context of the Greek-NATO negotiations which 
are now proceeding. It is obviously unfortunate 
that in an area where the closest co-ordination 
is necessary, an integrated command should in 
effect have had to be split in two, but the 
arrangement only recognises the political facts 
of life. As far as the land commands are con-
cerned, insuperable difficulties should not arise 
with the establishment of two land headquarters, 
but the same is not true of the problems of the 
air command. If new headquarters are established 
in Greece (which for the purposes of this report 
might be referred to as Seventh ATAF and Land-
South-Centre) it will be essential that the closest 
possible relationship be established between Sixth 
and Seventh ATAFs, with the exchange of liaison 
officers and arrangements for "cross-tasking" of 
sorties which will not have to take account of 
any theoretical geographical boundary between 
Sixth and Seventh ATAFs. Naval liaison through 
a joint operations centre in wartime must also 
be ensured. 
3.49 One of the Greek-Turkish differences has 
arisen over civilian as well as military airspace 
in the Aegean. Under ICAO agreements, the 
civilian airspace is divided into "flight 
information regions" (FIRs) ; the diagram 1 
shows the international boundary under ICAO 
regulations between the Athens and Istanbul 
FIR. While Sixth ATAF exerted operational 
control over an area embracing both the FIRs 
there was no particular problem for the operation 
of the two national air forces. As it happens until 
about 1964 the boundary between the Hellenic 
Twenty-Eighth Tactical Air Force and the 
Turkish First Tactical Air Force was drawn 
down the Aegean Sea along a line to the west 
of the FIR boundary. In 1964 it was agreed 
however for reasons of air control convenience 
to adjust the boundary between the two tactical 
air forces to coincide with the FIR line 1 • 
"Crosstell" (the reporting of aircraft locations) 
between sector operations centres located in 
Turkey and Greece broke down in the heat of 
the 197 4 events, and at the same time the Aegean 
air space became closed to civilian traffic. Turkey 
issued a Notam requiring any aircraft flying in 
the Eastern Aegean (although within the Athens 
FIR) to report their locations to Turkish air 
traffic control. Greece refused to allow this 
arrangement unless the movements of Turkish 
aircraft on the eastern side of the FIR boundary 
were reported to Greek air control, and this the 
Turkish authorities refused. It is understood 
1. Appendix IV. 
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that in the course of Greek-Turkish negotiations 
on Aegean air space one proposal advanced was 
for all aircraft within thirty nautical miles east 
or west of the FIR line to report their movements 
to both Athens and Istanbul air control. 
3.50 Turkey has not sought a modification of 
the internationally agreed civil air space 
boundary, the Athens/Istanbul FIR line - but 
with the establishment of new air command 
arrangements, presumably involving the creation 
of a new Headquarters Seventh ATAF, a geo-
graphical boundary will have to be agreed 
between Sixth and Seventh AT AF - i.e. in 
reality between the Greek and Turkish air forces 
- which may not coincide with the purely 
civilian FIR line. From an operational air force 
standpoint the important point will not be the 
location of the boundary, but detailed arrange-
ments for liaison, co-operation and cross-tasking 
as stressed in paragraph 3.48 above. 
3.51 At present the local naval commands under 
NAVSOUTH in Naples are COMEDEAST - a 
Greek command with headquarters in Athens 
covering part of the Ionian Sea ; the Sea of Crete 
and the Aegean - and COMEDNOREAST -
a Turkish command with headquarters in Ankara 
covering the Black Sea and the Turkish Mediter-
ranean seabord. 
3.52 Mutual suspicion has persisted between 
Greece and Turkey over the possible military 
intentions of the other country in the general 
area of the Aegean. With the exception of the 
two islands at the entrance to the Turkish Straits, 
virtually all islands off the Turkish Aegean coast 
are Greek territory; under the Lausanne Agree-
ment of 1928 those close to the Turkish coast are 
demilitarised. In 1974 Turkey created a fourth 
national army command - the Fourth Turkish 
Army, known as the "Aegean" Army, which 
Greek military authorities regarded as a threat 
to Greek islands in the Aegean. The Turkish 
authorities point out that this army is purely a 
planning headquarters with only administrative 
units, but no operational troops, under its com-
mand. There are now military installations on 
certain of the demilitarised Greek islands and 
radar stations which, taken together with the 
modernisation of the Greek air force, which has 
outstripped that of the Turkish air force, are 
regarded by the Turkish military authorities as 
a threat to the Turkish mainland. 
3.53 The delimitation of rights to the Aegean 
seabed is a separate issue which should not have 
defence connotations. Given goodwill, a solution 
can be found through negotiations between Greece 
and Turkey, recognising the high seas status of 
the Aegean, and an equitable zone for each 
country. 
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(iv) Cyprus 
3.54 The Committee reported at the time 1 on 
1974 events in Cyprus. In its last report 2 the 
Committee noted that : 
"Unfortunately little or no real progress 
can be reported towards normalising the 
situation in Cyprus. The February round 
of talks between representatives of the two 
communities in Vienna under the aegis of 
the United Nations Secretary-General 
proved abortive and on 17th April, follow-
ing an exchange of proposals for the basis 
of the next round to be held in May, the 
Greek Cypriot Government stated that the 
Turkish proposals were 'unacceptable', 
containing 'no concrete territorial offer'." 
That was 1976. 
3.55 Two years later the situation at first sight 
seems little different. Strictly speaking the 
Cyprus problem is not a direct matter of Greek-
Turkish relations. President Kyprianou has 
himself stressed recently in Athens that a 
constitutional solution on the island has to be 
negotiated by the two communities concerned. 
Greece and Turkey are however there to advise 
the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot com-
munities respectively 3, and there is no doubt 
that the two communities look to the two countries 
for moral and material support - especially the 
Turkish community which for ten years prior 
to 197 4 led for the most part a permanent 
minority existence in a number of scattered 
enclaves. In its advisory role the Turkish Govern-
ment has appointed Professor Miimtaz Soysa1 as 
adviser to the Turkish Cypriot negotiators. 
Professor Soysal has an international reputation 
as a member of "Amnesty". 
3.56 The de facto situation in Cyprus is 
unchanged since the Committee last reported two 
years ago, except that the two independent 
administrations have consolidated their positions 
and the level of Turkish troops in the Turkish 
part of the island has been reduced to 29,000. 
The Turkish Cypriot population amounts to some 
18% of the total on the island and the Turkish 
Federated State of Cyprus was proclaimed uni-
laterally in 1975 and held parliamentary elections 
in May 1976. It administers the approximately 
36% of the territory into which the Turkish 
Cypriot community was consolidated in 1974. 
The Turkish Cypriot administration has not of 
course received any international recognition as 
1. Document 651, 14th November 1974 Rapporteur 
Mr. Critchley. ' 
2. Document 708, 19th May 1976, Rapporteur Mr. Buck. 
3. And Mr. E~evit in fact said in London on 15th May 
that he saw no progress being made on the Cyprus prob-
lem if the United States embargo continued. 
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an independent state, nor has it sought to claim 
such recognition although it is a.Ssiduous in 
attending some international conferences such as 
Islamic meetings. 
3.57 Some progress was made at a meeting in 
Nicosia between President Makarios and 
Mr. Denktash, in the presence of Mr. Waldheim, 
on 13th February 1977 when the following 
guidelines for resumed talks in Vienna were 
agreed: 
- The aim was to establish an independent, 
non-aligned, hi-communal federal repub-
lic. 
- The size of the territory under the 
administration of each community would 
be negotiated in the light of economic 
viability, productivity and property 
rights. 
- Questions of principle such as freedom 
of movement, freedom of settlement and 
property rights would be open to 
discussion, taking into account the 
fundamental principle of a hi-communal 
federal system and certain practical 
difficulties which might arise for the 
Turkish Cypriot community. 
- The powers and functions of the central 
federal government would be such as 
to safeguard the unity of the country, 
having regard to the hi-communal 
character of the state. 
3.58 The Greek Cypriot administration, having 
accepted the concept of a federation of two states, 
is pressing for a strong federal government and 
significant territorial concessions to permit the 
re-establishment of the Greek Cypriots which it 
claims are refugees from territory now adminis-
tered by the Turkish Cypriot community. The 
Greek Cypriots recognise that 1,200 of the 
refugees come from an area within the immediate 
vicinity of the present dividing line. 
3.59 It is hoped that negotiations in Vienna 
between the two communities under the auspices 
of the Uni·ted Nations Secretary-General can be 
resumed as soon as possible. The Turkish com-
munity submitted detailed proposals to Mr. W ald-
heim on 15th April 1978 which have already 
been rejected by President Kiprianou as a basis 
for talks. The Turkish Cypriot proposals offered 
certain small territorial concessions, and provided 
weaker powers for a federal government of 
Cyprus than are to be found in other contem-
porary federal systems in the world. But the 
issue is not an exercise in political science ; the 
fundamental issue is one of mutual trust between 
two communities, and the Turkish Cypriot 
proposal contained provisions to "ensure the 
progressive integration of economic and financial 
functions of banking, foreign exchange, monetary 
affairs, imposition of federal charges and fees, 
customs duties and tariffs" ... and of securing 
"with the growth of mutual trust, co-operation 
and confidence, the progressive transfer to the 
Federal Republic of the above powers and func-
tions". Whatever form of federation can be agreed 
at the outset, it can only function through mutual 
trust and confidence, which once established can 
lead progressively to a strengthening of the 
federal government as experhmce of its func-
tioning grows. Mr. Denktash submitted certain 
new proposals to Mr. W aldheim on 22nd May 
1978 which the United States State Department 
publicly welcomed as "very constructive and 
forthcoming". 
3.60 Union with Greece or "Enosis" is no longer 
advocated by any responsible elements of the 
Greek Cypriot community, but the Turkish 
Cypriot proposals would permit each community 
to enter into agreements in particular with their 
respective motherlands. The Republic of Cyprus 
will remain an independent non-aligned state, 
and there are no proposals to change that status. 
3.61 The existence of two British sovereign base 
areas on the island, which do not form part of 
the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, is not 
an issue with either community or with Greece 
or Turkey. From time to time there is newspaper 
speculation in Turkey that if Britain were to 
give up Dhekelia, the eastern sovereign base 
areas, the Turkish Cypriots would be prepared 
to see it occupied by the Greek Cypriots. In these 
areas Britain at present maintains an infantry 
battalion, two infantry companies, an armoured 
reconnaissance squadron and a flight of Alouette 
helicopters. In addition Britain contributes to 
the United Nations force in Cyprus (UNIFCYP) 
one infantry battalion (less two companies), an 
armoured reconnaissance squadron, a flight of 
Alouette helicopters and logistic support. A 
squadron of Whirlwind helicopters in Cyprus 
provides both support for UNIFCYP and 
operates in the search and rescue role. A squadron 
of the RAF regiment is deployed at the Akrotiri 
airfield. British Vulcan bombers were stationed 
on the island until 1975 and Headquarters British 
Forces Near East and British Near East Air 
Force were located there - all in support of 
CENTO. These were withdrawn in 1975 and 1976, 
the British 1975 white paper on defence making 
it clear that the membership of CENTO would 
be retained, but forces would no longer be 
declared to the organisation. 
3.62 Addressing the British House of Commons 
Sub-Committee on Cyprus in February 1976, 
Mr. Callaghan, then Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said that 
although it was not the time to strengthen the 
sovereign base areas, Britain had no intention 
of leaving them. They were still a British base, 
not a NATO base, but it was "more of a NATO 
interest today than it was when we went there". 
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The Akrotiri airfield in fact provides one of the 
most easterly airfields available to a NATO 
country in the Mediterranean. The high mobility 
of air power means that aircraft to provide air 
support for naval forces in the area, or maritime 
reconnaissance, or longer-range strike functions, 
could be flown in with very little notice as long 
as the airfield remains operational. 
3.63 The Committee has previously noted the 
changing attitude of the Soviet Union to events 
in Cyprus ; it swung from tacit support of the 
Turkish intervention in 197 4 to support for the 
Greek Cypriot position after the fall of the 
colonels' regime. The Soviet Union has consis-
tently sought, so far without success, to transfer 
the constitutional talks to the Security Council 
framework, where the Soviet Union would 
participate directly. In an article in Pravda in 
December· 1977 the commentator Vladislav 
Drobkov criticised discussion of the Cyprus issue 
in the NATO framework, claiming that "progres-
sive circles on Athens" thought they were 
designed to circumvent the withdrawal of foreign 
forces "from the territory of Cyprus". United 
Nations resolutions have in fact of course referred 
to the withdrawal of forces from the territory of 
the "Republic of Cyprus". The Pravda com-
mentator claimed that "big NATO military units 
and their bases remain on Cypriot soil". Worded 
this way the article appears to be an attack on 
the presence of Turkish forces and on forces in 
the British sovereign base areas. It can be 
compared with the opportunist Soviet Govern-
ment statement of July 1974 which claimed that 
"the Greek military are seeking to turn the 
island into a NATO military base". 
(v) United States 
3.64 The United Statesmaintainsimportantnaval 
and air force units in the Mediterranean which 
because of their nuclear capability and modern 
equipment must be considered the single most 
powerful force in the Mediterranean area. The 
United States Sixth Fleet normally comprises 
two aircraft carrier groups, and totals, in addition 
to the two carriers, some fifteen surface comba-
tants ranging from cruisers down to escorts and 
one marine amphibious unit of about six amphi-
bious craft carrying one embarked marine 
battalion. The aircraft carriers will each carry 
some eighty to ninety aircraft, most assigned to 
a nuclear strike role with a combat radius of 
600 or 800 kilometres bringing land targets in 
the southern part of the Soviet Union well within 
range. The carriers provide air superiority 
fighters and anti-submarine warfare aircraft as 
well. 
3.65 The United States Sixteenth Tactical Air 
Force is concentrated at Torrejon air base in 
Spain and is capable of executing attack missions 
staging through forward air bases at Incirlik 
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in Turkey and A viano in Italy among others. As 
well as some important electronic intelligence 
gathering facilities, particularly in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, the United States maintains a 
dense communications network throughout the 
area with numerous terminals in Morocco, Spain, 
Italy, Greece and Turkey- the system provides 
in practice an important back-up to the interna-
tionally-financed NATO communications system. 
The United States air force also provides the 
most substantial reinforcement capability with 
units that can be flown in to the NATO Mediter-
ranean countries at an early stage of an alert. 
3.66 The United States also provides tactical 
nuclear warheads stockpiled in Italy, Greece and 
Turkey for both its own air force units and the 
air forces and tactical army weapons of its NATO 
allies. 
3.67 The bilateral arrangements under which 
United States forces are based in the NATO 
countries and in Spain have been described under 
the countries concerned. 
(vi) Italy 
3.68 The Italian peninsula and the islands of 
Sardinia and Sicily occupy a central place in 
the Mediterranean, effectively dividing it into 
the eastern and western basins. While it has no 
common frontier with the Warsaw Pact powers, 
it has with Yugoslavia, and the Hungarian 
frontier is only some 250 kilometres away through 
the Ljubljana gap. To the north neutral Austria, 
although offering more mountainous terrain, 
might, because of its indifferent defence 
capability, provide a tempting route for any 
Warsaw Pact aggression. 
3.69 In 1977 Italy devoted 2.4% of its GDP to 
defence - the lowest percentage of any WEU 
country except Luxembourg (1.1%) or of any 
other NATO country except Canada (2 %). A 
restructuring plan of the Italian armed forces 
initiated in 1976 has led to a reduction in the 
size of the army by about 22,000 men in an 
attempt to make more finance available for 
modernisation of equipment, which has been 
provided for in special promotional laws for 
each of the three services voted by parliament 
in addition to the normal defence budget. 
3.70 Normal consultations on the restructuring 
of the armed forces were undertaken within 
NATO and in December 1977 the NATO Defence 
Planning Committee issued a communique wel-
coming the efforts undertaken, and concluding : 
"The allies have nevertheless expressed their 
disquiet at the scale of the reductions in the 
size of the Italian armed forces, particularly 
with regard to manpower in the army ... The 
allies consider it of vital importance that the 
Italian Government should take all possible steps 
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to achieve early completion of the outstanding 
equipment modernisation programmes for the 
Italian armed forces. They have therefore urged 
the Italian authorities to maintain in real terms 
the levels of defence expenditure under the 
normal budget and also to ensure that the funds 
initially allocated to the restructuring plan for 
the three services will be adequately adjusted in 
order to compensate for price increases." 
3.71 The Italian army, deployed in particular 
in the north-eastern part of the country, now 
amounts to 218,000 men organised in some sixteen 
divisional equivalents including three armoured 
divisions and the equivalent of some ten 
mechanised or motorised divisions. There are 
some 700 M-47 tanks, 200 M-60s and 600 modern 
Leopards. The air force comprises some 336 
combat aircraft including 140 F-104s and 54 
G-91s. Italy participates in the MRCA Tornado 
programme with Britain and Germany, first 
deliveries of which are expected in 1979. Accord-
ing to the annual report of the WEU Council 
the Lance tactical nuclear missile became opera-
tional with the Italian army in 1977- it replaces 
the Sergeant and aging Honest John and in the 
course of 1978 is scheduled to enter service with 
the Belgian, German, Netherlands and British 
armies. 
3.72 The Italian navy is the largest navy 
assigned to NATO in the Mediterranean and has 
a reasonable proportion of modern ships. The 
Committee was particularly impressed by the new 
helicopter carrier Vittorio Veneto which through 
the courtesy of the Italian authorities it was able 
to visit in Taranto. In addition the Italian navy 
comprises some eight submarines, six guided-
weapon destroyers, twelve destroyers and escorts 
and eight coastal escorts. 
3. 73 Italy plays an important role as host to 
the main NATO headquarters in the Mediter-
ranean - Allied Forces Southern Europe -
and to four of its five subordinate commands. It 
is located, together with its subordinate air, naval 
and maritime air headquarters, in Naples. There 
are many NATO-financed infrastructure instal-
lations in Italy including airfields and ten 
NADGE early-warning stations. Under the terms 
of the North Atlantic Treaty, and a specific 
bilateral agreement of 20th October 1954 together 
with later annexes, the United States has & 
number of defence facilities in Italy which 
include airfields at Aviano in the north-east 
and Sigonella in Sicily - the latter being an 
important maritime reconnaissance airfield. 
There are naval facilities in Naples and Catania, 
an intelligence-gathering facility at San Vito 
near Taranto and numerous defence communica-
tions sites. The United States army provides 
defence support functions of various kinds 
through the Southern European task force 
(SETAF), which operates a base complex at 
Vicenza and Livorno. 
(vii) United Kingdom 
3.74 Since the 1974 defence review the United 
Kingdom has significantly reduced its permanent 
forces in the Mediterranean area, the Vulcan 
bombers having been withdrawn from Cyprus. 
There is today a destroyer or frigate stationed as 
guard-ship at Gibraltar together with one 
infantry battalion and a detachment of two 
Hunter aircraft. In Malta a Royal Marine 
company group and army elements will remain 
during the withdrawal period. Canberra bombers 
and Nimrod maritime reconnaissance squadrons 
will have withdrawn by the end of 1978, and all 
British forces will leave the island when the 
present military facilities agreement with the 
Maltese Government expires on 31st March 1979. 
The army and air force units stationed on Cyprus 
have been mentioned above. British naval forces 
continue to exercise with NATO forces in the 
Mediterranean from time to time and maritime 
patrol aircraft may in turn participate in such 
exercises. Normally a helicopter carrier or equi-
valent vessel exercises in the Mediterranean each 
year. 
3.75 Britain retains the following reinforcement 
capabilities for assignment to NATO in the 
Mediterranean area : 
( i) a land force which can be deployed 
to North-East Italy, probably of two 
or three battalions ; 
( ii) two offensive support squadrons of 
aircraft for North-East It8!ly ; 
( iii) reinforcement options of the special 
air service regiment ; 
( iv) the United Kingdom component of 
Ace Mobile Force compr1smg a 
battalion group, support troops, 12 
Harrier aircraft and four Wessex 
helicopters. 
( viii) France 
3.76 France remains in a special position as a 
member of NATO in having withdrawn from the 
integrated military structure in 1966. France 
nevertheless remains fully represented on the 
North Atlantic Council and on various NATO 
bodies such as the Conference of National Arma-
ments Directors concerned with the joint produc-
tion of equipment. French liaison officers are 
maintained at all major NATO military head-
quarters, although French officers no longer 
serve on the integrated staffs. 
3.77 France makes an important naval contribu-
tion to security in the Mediterranean, having 
increased the proportion of its naval forces which 
are based in the Mediterranean compared with 
the Atlantic in recent years. These forces now 
amount to two ai:reraft carriers, two cruisers, 
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twenty destroyers, twenty-two frigates and 
twenty-one submarines and an important naval 
air fo:ree including thirty-five maritime patrol 
aircraft. French naval forces regularly parti-
cipate in allied manoeuvres, normally on a 
bilateral basis and there is close co-operation with 
the NATO maritime air surveillance headquarters 
in Naples which notably in 1977 continuously 
tailed the Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev throughout 
its voyage in the Mediterranean. The Committee 
was informed that France also has an interven-
tion force consisting of one parachute division 
and one airborne marine infantry division ready 
to move into action on very short notice after 
an alert in areas far removed from France as 
was recently the case when units were sent to 
Lebanon under the auspices of the United Nations 
and to Za'ire. But in the present state of relations 
between France and NATO the intervention of 
this force depends on the decision of the French 
Government alone. Moreover, a major part of the 
French air force can intervene in the Western 
Mediterranean from bases in metropolitan France 
or even Corsica, and under a bilateral agreement 
French and Spanish forces have, largely through 
joint manoeuvres, laid the foundations for close 
co-operation. The Committee noted in its previous 
report that French naval co-operation with NATO 
in the Mediterranean area was closer than 
normally understood. The welcome French parti-
cipation in joint allied manoeuvres in the Red 
Sea has been noted above. Some Committet 
members c1aimed that France's absence from the 
integrated command in no way diminished the 
effectiveness of its contribution to security in the 
Mediterranean and that further theoretical quar-
rels should be avoided. 
3.78. The majority of the Committee neverthe-
less regrets the continued French absence from 
the integrated command structure - previously 
the subordinate naval command of the Western 
Mediterranean (COMEDOC) was a French 
responsibility, but is now exercised directly by 
the Italian admiral, Commander Naval Forces 
Southern Europe in Naples. 
(ix) Portugal 
3.79 Portugal, not strictly a Mediterranean 
country, contributes more directly to the NATO 
Atlantic command, but it is convenient to refer 
to this allied country in a report on the Mediter-
ranean partly because the subordinate NATO 
headquarters at Lisbon - IBERLANT - has 
to maintain close liaison with the Mediterranean 
command, in particular with the subordinate 
command GIBMED located at Gibraltar. 
Portuguese defence links with Spain will become 
more important as that country moves closer to 
NATO as mentioned below. 
3.80 In its previous report the Committee drew 
attention to the need to provide defence assistance 
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to Portugal to help with the modernisation of its 
defence equipment, which the critical state of 
the Portuguese economy makes it impossible to 
modernise from national resources. In particular 
an air mobile armoured brigade is being formed 
in the Portuguese army, to be equipped with 
German or United States tanks, and which can 
form part of the mobile reserves immediately 
available to SACEUR in periods of tension. 
3.81 Your Rapporteur visited Portugal for 
briefings at IBERLANT prior to observing 
Exercise "Open Gate" (see paragraph 3.17). 
(x) Malta 
3.82 Although not a NATO country, Malta was 
a NATO headquarters from 1952 until1971 when 
the Malta Labour Party under Mr. Mintoff won 
the elections. The headquarters at that time -
Allied Naval Force& Southern Europe, the naval 
command subordinate to AFSOUTH in Naples 
- was moved to Naples leaving only the 
remaining British NATO naval command -
COMEDSOUEAST - based in Malta. This 
command, subordinate to NA VSOUTH, was 
responsibLe for the Mediterranean area from the 
Straits of Sicily to Suez ; with the reduction in 
British naval presence in the Mediterranean 
following the 197 4 defence review this command 
was transferred to the direct responsibility of 
the Italian admiraL who is Commander Allied 
Naval Forces Southern Europe. 
3.83 In March 1972 a seven-year defence agree-
ment between Malta and the United Kingdom, 
underwritten by NATO, was concluded to provide 
continuing use of the military facilities for NATO 
purposes in exchange for annual payments of 
some £14 million - 5.25 million provided by 
Britain and 8.75 million by NATO. Under the 
terms of this agreement Malta further undertook 
not to permit the forces of any party to the 
Warsaw Pact to be stationed in Malta or to use 
military facilities there. This agreement expires 
on 31st March 1979, and there is no British or 
NATO intention to renew it. 
3.84 Mr. Mintoff, the Maltese Prime Minister, 
has in public sought to pursue a non-aligned 
policy, claiming that on the expiry of the defence 
agreement in 1979 there will be no more military 
bases on the island. The Maltese economy remains 
strongly dependent on external trade and assist-
ance, and Mr. Mintoff has actively sought foreign 
investment from all quarters including in 
particular China and Libya. Diplomatic relations 
have not however been established with the Soviet 
Union and it is understood that Soviet approaches 
concerning possible naval facilities after 1979 
have been rebuffed by Malta. Despite Mr. Miu-
toff's expressed desire to form a bridge between 
the Arab world and Europe, typified by his 
quest for closer relations with Libya, the Maltese 
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population identifies itself with Europe, and it 
is understood that supplies of Libyan oil have 
recently been suspended pending settlement of 
the demarcation line for the seabed rights of the 
two countries. 
3.85 Despite the publicity given to assistance 
and trade links with China, Czechoslovakia and 
Libya, it is understood that British commercial 
investment provides three times as many jobs 
as any other nation, and that the Federal 
Republic of Germany comes second in this respect. 
The Maltese tourist trade still relies on British 
tourists for 65% of its customers. 
3.86 While the possibility of a special associate 
status for Malta within NATO was explored at 
one time in the past, it is clear that Mr. Mintoff's 
non-aligned policy now rules out that possibility. 
It is no part of NATO's policy to seek to include 
any countries in the Alliance against the wishes 
of their own population. NATO is not lacking 
in naval, communications or air base facilities in 
this part of the Mediterranean ; Sicily is only 
forty nautical miles away. The strategic interests 
of NATO are limited to ensuring that Warsaw 
Pact forces are excluded from the island, while 
Malta's interests lie in securing external assist-
ance for its economy. It is likely that the current 
defence agreement on its expiry on 31st March 
1979 can be replaced by an economic assistance 
agreement being tentatively discussed between 
Malta, Italy, Germany and France to which 
Malta wishes to link Algeria and Libya ; a non-
aligned clause in such an agreement, it is hoped, 
would specifically exclude the stationing of any 
external armed forces. 
(xi) Gibraltar 
3.87 The rock of Gibraltar has been a British 
naval base since the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, the status being confirmed by the Treaty 
of Utrecht in 1713. Under NATO naval plans 
for the Mediterranean the resident British naval 
and air commanders assume regional command 
under AFSOUTH in the event of hostilities, the 
admiral becoming Commander Gibraltar Mediter-
ranean Area (COMGIBMED). This command is 
responsible for the sea area from about 20 miles 
west of the straits to some 150 nautical miles 
east which bridges the boundary between NATO's 
Southern Europe Command at Naples and the 
IBERLANT Command near Lisbon, a subordi-
nate command of Supreme Allied Commander 
Atlantic (SACLANT). The Gibraltar command is 
involved in any naval movements into or out of 
the Mediterranean and the closest possible liaison 
and good communications between Gibraltar and 
Naples on the one hand and Gibraltar and Lisbon 
on the other are obviously essential. It is under-
stood that the Gibraltar-Lisbon communications 
hitherto deficient are being improved. SACLANT 
has proposed in the past that GIBMED should 
beeome a subordinate oommand of IBERLANT, 
but this proposal has been strongly resisted by 
the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern 
Europe. It is one of several outstanding command 
problems in the Mediterranean referred to in 
paragraph 3.9. 
3.88 Administratively Gibraltar, with a popula-
tion of about 30,000, is a British colony with 
internal autonomy, but Spanish claims to the 
territory are of long standing. In the past the 
Committee has expressed the view that from a 
NATO standpoint the usefulness of Gibraltar 
would be enhanced if the dispute with Spain 
were settled, and the Committee welcomes the 
improved atmosphere at the talks between the 
British and Spanish Foreign Secretaries held in 
Paris on 15th March 1978, which were attended 
also by Sir Joshua Hassan, the Chief Minister 
of Gibraltar, and Mr. Maurice Xiberras, the 
Leader of the Opposition. Gibraltar's economic 
future must certainly lie in closer links with 
Spain; if Spain were a full member of NATO, 
the issue of sovereignty would not be relevant 
from a NATO point of view. The situation at 
the present time is less clear and the Committee 
has previously drawn attention to the advantage 
of diversity in the sovereign status of territories 
on which NATO military facilities are installed. 
(d) Other allied countries - Spain 
3.89 Spain is not a NATO country, but because 
of its defence arrangements with three NATO 
countries - France, Portugal and the United 
States - it must rank as an alJied country. 
Spain spends 1.7% of its GNP on defence and 
has significant armed forces totalling 309,000 of 
which 220,000 are in the army. There is some 
modern equipment including 200 AMX-30 tanks 
(more are being produced inside the country), 
a navy with a helicopter-carrier and Harrier 
vertical take-off aircraft, thirteen destroyers and 
some frigates equipped with surface-to-air mis-
siles. The air force includes some Phantoms. 
3.90 The Committee has followed for some five 
years the evolution of the situation in Spain and 
the possible contribution that Spain could make 
to European security in the framework of NATO. 
Three Rapporteurs have visited Madrid from 
1973 to 1976 and been courteously reeeived by 
the Spanish authorities. The previous report of 
the Committee 1 described the very close defence 
links established with the United States, consi-
derably strengthened by the conclusion of the 
bilateral treaty of friendship and co-operation 
signed on 24th January 1976. 
3.91 The United States has extensive military 
facilities in Spain including major air bases at 
Zaragossa (with a fuel pipeline crossing Spain to 
1. Document 708, 19th May 1976, Rapporteur Mr. Buck. 
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Cadiz), Torrejon, Moron and Rota near Cadiz; 
and naval facilities at Rota although the Polaris 
submarine squadron currently operating from 
there is to be withdrawn between 1st January 
and 1st July 1979 (by which time the longer-
range Trident submarines will be operational). 
Nuclear weapons are not now stockpiled on 
Spanish territory. There are also a number of 
important United States communications facilities 
in Spain that complete the Mediterranean-wide 
communications network, and link in with the 
two communications stations at Bouknadel and 
Kenitra in Morocco due to close by 30th Septem-
ber 1978. 
3.92 General Haig, Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe, in his other capacity as Commander of 
United States forces in Europe, participates 
directly in the planning arrangements established 
under the United States-Spanish treaty, and 
direet links with NATO to arrange co-ordinated 
defence planning were discussed when the 
Spanish Foreign Minister, then Mr. Areilza, 
called on Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO, 
on 16th February 1976. In its previous report 
the Committee recommended that the Council : 
"call on the North Atlantic Council to 
broaden and strengthen the basis of the 
Alliance: 
(a) by negotiating with the Government of 
Spain that emerges from free eleetions 
the accession of that country to the 
North Atlantic Treaty, and an appro-
priate role for the Spanish armed 
forces in the integrated military struc-
ture." 
3.93 Since that report was adopted Spain has 
held free parliamentary elections on 15th 'June 
1977 and was admitted as a member of the Coun-
cil of Europe on 24th November 1977, with the 
approval of that body's parliamentary assembly 
which was voted on 12th October that year. At 
the same time Spain acceded to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. A new constitution 
for the country is now being elaborated by the 
parliamentary authorities ; its adoption is 
expected in the autumn. 
3.94 While Spain's priority in foreign relations 
now is membership of the European Community, 
the present government is giving secondary consi-
deration to accession to NATO and the proposal 
is under active debate in Spanish political circles. 
Although the Spanish Defence Minister, Mr. 
Gutierrez Mellado, was reported as saying in 
early February that the issue was not an imme-
diate problem, "considering that we have 
remained outside the organisation for so many 
years, one can wait a little longer before solving 
this problem", the Spanish Foreign Minister, 
Mr. Oreja Aguirre, in the most positive statement 
so far, said on 7th April that "Spain is a country 
firmly installed within the Atlantic system. Its 
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government corudders favourably moreover the 
possibility of joining NATO soon", adding that 
a decision could be taken only after "a national 
debate which will begin only after the adoption 
of the constitution" - i.e. in autumn 1978. The 
Spanish Socialist Party, PSOE, and the Com-
munist Party, have not supported proposals for 
joining NATO ; the Communist Party has called 
for the dismantlement of the two military blocs 
- 1\Ir. Carillo, its Secretary-General, speaking at 
Yale University on 16th November 1977 added 
however that his party would not call for the 
removal of American military bases from Spain 
if Soviet bases in Eastern European countries 
were not also evacuated. Dr. Luns, the Secretary-
General of NATO, answering a question in the 
North Atlantic Assembly at its meeting in Paris 
on 21st September 1977 said that the matter 
of Spanish accession to NATO was one for Spain, 
to be decided after the constitution has been 
adopted ; he believed however that if the request 
was made the other members of NATO would 
welcome Spanish accession. Eleven members of 
the Cortes - ten from the UCD (Democratic 
Centrist Union) and one from the AP (Popular 
Alliance) - attended as observers at Committee 
meetings of the North Atlantic Assembly in 
Brussels on 25th and 26th May. 
3.95 The Committee recommends that active 
encouragement should be given to the accession 
of Spain to NATO after the adoption of the 
new constitution, provided that such accession 
has majority support in the Spanish parliament. 
Meanwhile it calls for the establishment of closer 
co-ordination between the Spanish military forces 
and the NATO military commands, and the par-
ticipation of Spanish naval and air forces in 
NATO exercises. It is recalled that Spain has 
defence ,}inks with France through the protocol 
of collaboration which provides for staff talks 
and joint exercises, and with Portugal through 
the bilateral Iberian Pact which is due for 
renegotiation - a bilateral treaty of friendship 
was signed on 5th May 1978. 
(e) Extra-NATO activities 
3.96 During his visit to Ankara the Rapporteur 
was briefed at the headquarters of the Central 
Treaty Organisation (CENTO) which is located 
there. The present members of CENTO are Iran, 
Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom ; the 
United States, technically an associated member, 
is in practice a full participant. The twenty-fifth 
annual ministerial meeting of the CENTO Coun-
cil was held in London on 19th-20th April with 
the participation of the five foreign ministers, 
when the continuing usefulness of the organ-
isation was stressed. 
3.97 CENTO has inevitably been a tenuous 
organisation, lacking the political cohesion neces-
sary to a functioning mutual defence organisa-
tion. The foreign policy of Pakistan at times has 
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led to differences between that country and other 
members of the organisation ; nevertheless Pakis-
tan remains a member. The disparity of the 
political systems of some member countries 
inhibits close co-operation. CENTO does not have 
a permanent command structure, nor does it have 
forces assigned to it. Nevertheless there is a 
Permanent Military Deputies' Group, composed 
of representatives of the five chiefs-of-staff, 
which can meet in Ankara in permanent session, 
and a small military staff under a United States 
general who acts as chief-of-staff. Contingency 
defence planning is possible and exercises are 
organised about four times a year, the most 
important of which are the Midlink naval exer-
cise, in which substantial naval forces from the 
five countries participate in the Persian Gulf or 
Indian Ocean, and co-ordinated air exercises. 
Arrangements have been made for certain NATO 
operational procedures to be communicated to 
CENTO forces which would permit co-ordinated 
naval operations if the necessity arose. 
3.98 The Committee has previously welcomed 
arrangements for crosstell of air defence inform-
ation between CENTO and NATO- an arrange-
ment which in practice would provide for early-
warning information from air defence radars to 
be exchanged between Iran and the NATO 
NADGE system installed in Turkey. Iran is 
rapidly acquiring a highly sophisticated early 
warning system, which will include A W ACs 
aircraft. The Committee believes that arrange-
ments should be made for tracks to be reported 
directly to NATO Sector Operations Centres in 
Turkey, and vice versa, and calls for the early 
implementation of the crosstell agreement. 
Warning time of air movements beyond the 
eastern borders of Turkey could be considerably 
increased at no extra cost to military budgets, 
and no pol1tical significance need attach to 
such a purely technical arrangement. The 
usefulness of pragmatic defence arrangements 
with Iran is heightened with the present 
uncertainty surrounding the policy of its 
eastern neighbour, Afghanistan, where a new 
government under Mr. Taraki was installed by 
a military coup in May 1978. The Soviet Union 
has built the strategic road tunnel 3,400 metres 
above sea level through the Salang Pass, at a cost 
of $640 million, to provide a permanent road 
south from the Soviet frontier to the capital, 
Kabul. 
3.99 Reference has been made in paragraph 
2.40 above to the combined naval manoeuvres of 
French, British and United States warships in 
the Red Sea which the Committee has welcomed. 
IV. Non-NATO countries 
(a) Yugoslavia 
4.1 On a number of occasions in the P'ast the 
Committee has reported in general terms on the 
situation in Yugoslavia - a communist but non-
aligned country since President Tito broke from 
Moscow in 1948. The continuance of the non-
aligned status of Yugoslavia is vital to NATO 
- any realignment with Moscow could provide 
the Soviet navy with much sought-after port 
facilities on the Adriatic, and place Warsaw Pact 
land forces in direct contact with Italy, separ-
ating that country from its next NATO neigh-
bour, Greece. Anxious to report on the situation 
in the country at first hand, the Rapporteur 
accordingly asked to visit Belgrade, and is happy 
to report that he was courteously received there 
by the Yugoslav authorities in April- the first 
time that a Rapporteur of the Committee had 
been able to visit the country - although it did 
not prove possible to meet any representative 
of the Ministry of Defence or the armed forces. 
4.2 The foreign policy of Yugoslavia - to 
demonstrate to all the world its non-aligned 
status by maintaining active relations with both 
superpowers, all its neighbours, and particularly 
the non-aligned countries in the world - is very 
closely linked with the person of President Tito 
who was 86 in May this year. This remarkable 
statesman who is a political contemporary of 
Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, and who founded 
the Third World Movement with Nasser and 
Nehru, all long departed from the political scene, 
has in the last nine months visited Peking, 
Moscow, Paris, Washington and London. There is 
every reason to believe that there will be conti-
nuity in his foreign policy when President Tito 
eventually hands over to his successors. A brief 
description of the domestic scene is relevant when 
considering present arrangements for the succes-
siOn. 
(i) Domestic scene 
4.3 Yugoslav·ia is a federation of six republics 
and two autonomous provinces ; the population 
of 21.7 million is composed of six different 
nations and eighteen different nationalities. In 
various parts of the country there are up to five 
official languages and at least six others are spoken 
in certain districts. The constitution has been 
amended and adjusted on a number of occasions 
to ensure a proper representation of all the 
republics and nations at federal level, and a 
balance between them. It has been said that 
Yugoslavia is more like an international organisa-
tion in this respect than a country. The latest 
constitution, introduced jn 1974, carefully institu-
tionalises this balance and provides for consul-
tation and discussion of policy at many different 
levels within the republics and at federal level, 
the system being described as "democratic cen-
tralism". 
4.4 The constitution also provides for the 
succession to the President of the Republic to 
be assumed by the State Presidency - a body 
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compnsmg nine members, eight elected by the 
assemblies of the six constituent republics and 
two autonomous provinces, and President Tito 
who combines the offices of President of the 
Republic, President of the Presidency, President 
of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and 
Supreme Commander of the armed forces. Under 
the constitution the State Presidency is to act 
as the collective leadership when the succession 
to President Tito arises, and the chai.rmanship of 
the presidency will rotate among the eight other 
members, as the vice-chairmanship does at the 
present time. 
4.5 Current policy is thus discussed in three 
main bodies : the State Presidency which Presi-
dent Tito himself has claimed has already 
assumed many of his duties ; the Federal Execu-
tive Council composed of the government min-
isters ; and the Praesidium of the Communist 
Party ("League of Yugoslav Communists"). But 
it is understood that the Presidency meets only 
at some six-weekly intervals, and the forty-eight-
member Party Praesidium only infrequently. The 
1974 constitution is still in its infancy, the 
elective bodies are only now coming to the end 
of the first term of their existence and already 
certain changes are being discussed in the light 
of experience. The forty-eight-member Praesi-
dium of the Communist Party is expected to be 
reduced to twenty-four members in June with 
a view to making it a more effective and authori-
tative body. As there is no precedent for presi-
dential succession in the post-war history of 
Yugoslavia it is hardly possible to predict how 
the constitutional arrangements wiU be found to 
work in practice. 
4.6 The 1974 constitution provides an increased 
role for the armed forces, compared with the 
previous situation. They are under the direct 
authority of the Defence Minister, General 
Ljubicic, who is responsible directly to the State 
Presidency. There are three generals in the Party 
Praesidium and Executive, and military repre-
sentatives make up 12% of the Central Com-
mittee of 166 members. President Tito has 
described the army as the force for unity and 
continuity in Yugoslavia, but at the same time 
has made it clear that it could not take over the 
administration of the country. The Communist 
Party is to remain the ideological guiding force, 
and most senior army officers are members of 
the Communist Party. Yugoslavia remains a com-
munist country, but a communist country that is 
unlike the members of the Warsaw Pact. "Self 
management" is the much-publicised basis of the 
economic system which delegates management 
decisions and supposedly permits the operation 
of market forces. Ideologically there is strict 
insistence on Marxism and the single-party 
system, and deviation from the prevailing "demo-
cratic centralism" whether in the direction of 
closer links with Moscow ("centralism" tout court) 
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or political pluralism ("anarcho-liberalism") 
is no more tolerated than are independence 
movements in the constituent republics. Western 
sources believe there to be some 550 political 
prisoners at the present time, and Belgrade 
remains very sensitive to the activities of dis-
senting emigres from abroad. On 13th April 1978 
Mileta Perovic, a "cominformist" who was 
reportedly enticed from Paris to Switzerland 
where he was kidnapped in July 1977 to stand 
trial in Yugoslavia, was sentenced to twenty 
years' imprisonment after a trial tn camera 
lasting three weeks. 
4.7 At the same time Yugoslavia remains an 
open country ; its people are free to travel and 
work abroad, and western publications are freely 
on sale. Popular cultural identity today, P'arti-
cularly of the younger generation, is unmistak-
ably \V estern European. In all these respects 
Yugoslavia is totally unlike the Warsaw Pact 
countries. 
(ii) Relations with the Soviet Union 
4.8 While President Tito broke with Stalinist 
Russia in 1948 he probably retains sentimental 
attachments to the country that was the first to 
practise communism - attachments that are 
unlikely to be shared by a younger generation of 
Yugoslavs. With the enunciation of the Brezhnev 
doctrine following the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
in 1968, with its ambiguous reference to "any 
socialist country" and its revendication of the 
right to use armed force in the interests of "the 
security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole" 
Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union became 
severely strained. The communique issued after 
the visit of Mr. Brezhnev to Belgrade on 25th 
September 1971 did not in retrospect clarify the 
situation to the satisfaction of Yugoslavia, but 
the authorities consider that in the communiques 
issued after the subsequent visit to Belgrade by 
Mr. Brezhnev on 17th November 1976, and that 
issued after President Tito's visit to Moscow on 
19th August 1977, the Soviet authorities have 
recognised the non-aligned status of Yugoslavia. 
Mr. Brezhnev on his 1976 visit to Belgrade is 
said to have demanded port facilities for Soviet 
nayal forces, in particular for submarines at 
Kotor, a very sheltered inlet some sixty kilo-
metres south of Dubrovnik, and unlimited over-
flying rights for Soviet military aircraft. Both 
of these requests were reportedly refused by the 
Yugoslav authorities. 
4.9 Yugoslavia is prepared to undertake repairs 
to Soviet naval vessels, but only under restrictive 
conditions- vessels have to enter Yugoslav ports 
without their principal armaments and remain 
without most of their crews. Conscious of its non-
aligned status Yugoslavia's ship law allows for 
similar repair facilities to be available to other 
countries including NATO countries and it is 
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possible that the United States will endeavour 
to take up this facility. A good deal of Yugoslav 
military equipment is still supplied by the Soviet 
Union, and some Yugoslav officers still receive 
training in that country. 
4.10 The deliberately ambiguous Brezhnev doc-
trine is still however very much alive. General 
Yevgeni Ivanovski, commander of the group of 
Soviet forces in Germany, in an article in the 
East German newspaper N eues Deutschland of 
20th February 1978 said : "The USSR is still 
prepared to intervene on a military level in 
Eastern Europe when it is a matter of defending 
socialism in this part of the world." Where does 
Eastern Europe end ~ 
(iii) Soviet overflight of Yugoslav territory 
4.11 From the Soviet main air transport base at 
Odessa on the Black Sea the only convenient 
routes to the Mediterranean involve overflight of 
Turkey, Greece or Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia being 
a communist and non-NATO country is in many 
cases the preferred route. It is understood that 
Yugoslav policy in this respect is to refuse blanket 
clearance for overflight, but to consider requests 
on an ad hoc individual basis, and to authorise 
them only if Yugoslavia considers the request 
justified by the situation, and if it is made by 
the country of destination as well as by the Soviet 
Union. Thus Yugoslavia permitted overflight of 
arms-carrying Czechoslovak aircraft to the 
Haganah in Israel at the beginning of the 1948-
49 war. It authorised overflight from the Soviet 
Union to the Middle East in 1973. The airlift 
of Soviet arms to Angola in 1976 is also under-
stood to have involved overflight of Yugoslavia. 
Unhappy with Soviet intervention and Cuban 
presence in Ethiopia, Yugoslavia is understood 
to have refused most Soviet requests for over-
flight for supplies to that country - fewer than 
five have been reported. As the Committee records 
above supplies to the country in November 1977 
are understood to have overflown Turkey. It can 
be concluded that Yugoslavia exercises its own 
judgment in this very sensitive area and can at 
times be very resistant to Soviet requests. 
(iv) Relations with the United States 
4.12 While the United States supplied some 
armaments in the early 1950s after the break 
with the Soviet Union, relations became difficult 
during the Nixon and Ford Administrations. 
Yugoslavia interpreted Dr. Kissinger's policy as 
too concerned to keep the world divided into two 
blocs. The remarks by Dr. Kissinger's principal 
adviser, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, to a meeting of United 
States ambassadors in London in late 1976, 
whether inaccurately reported or misinterpreted, 
caused some offence, the official Yugoslav paper 
Borba on 14th April 1976 describing the Sonnen-
fe1dt doctrine as another attempt to revive the 
spirit of the 1945 Yalta conference to impose rela-
tions based on spheres of influence. Negotiations 
with the United States at that time for the supply 
of armaments were broken off by Yugoslavia, 
partly perhaps because of the Sonnenfeldt inci-
dent and partly because it became known that 
supply of the Tow anti-tank missile was under 
discussion. The United States at that time had 
included $1.5 million for cash sales in the security 
assistance programme from 1st October 1976. 
Relations with the present Democratic Adminis-
tration have improved significantly. United States 
policy to Africa as manifested in recent repre-
sentations to Somalia and Ethiopia, for example, 
are considered a great impvovement on Dr. Kis-
singer's reflex support of any indigenous African 
movements opposed to those supported by the 
Soviet Union in Angola. 
4.13 Mr. Harold Brown, United States Secre-
tary of Defence, visited Belgrade on 13th October 
1977 to discuss "a modest extension of military 
relations", in the words of a United States offi-
cial. Weapons sales, training exchanges and port 
visits were discussed. Following President Tito's 
visit to Washington the official communique 
issued on lOth March 1978 said that President 
Carter informed him of "continuing United 
States support for the independence, territorial 
integrity and unity of Yugoslavia". References 
to "unity" were particularly welcome in Belgrade. 
(v) Other aspects of foreign policy 
4.14 For its size Yugoslavia probably conducts 
its foreign relations more intensely than any other 
country, seeing its continued existence as an 
independent state made possible by the widest 
possible international recogn,ition of its non-
aligned status. It encourages foreign visitors and 
tourism on which its economy partly depends and 
has no-visa agreements with more than sixty 
countries. It endeavours to maintain good rela-
tions with all its neighbours. There are no prob-
lems with the two NATO countries Greece and 
Italy - with the latter there is a completely 
open frontier around Trieste with many daily 
Italian visitors who require only an identity card 
to enter Yugoslavia. 
4.15 With the Warsaw Pact countries relations 
are closest with Romania with which there are 
joint arms production projects. Bulgaria, which 
maintains the closest links to Moscow of any 
·warsaw Pact country, presents Yugoslavia with 
some problems. Bulgaria does not recognise the 
significant Macedonian minority in Bulgaria as 
a distinct entity, and Yugoslavia interprets this 
non-recognition as implying renewed Bulgarian 
claims to territory of the Macedonian Republic 
of Yugoslavia which for a few brief months after 
liberation from the Turks in 1878 was once the 
territory of a greater Bulgaria. While the Soviet 
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Union has not overtly encouraged Bulgarian 
claims, Yugoslav officials are suspicious at the 
failure of the Soviet Union to prevent them 
being made - all other aspects of Bulgarian 
foreign policy are closely dictated by Moscow. 
Relations with Albania are in many ways dis-
appointing to Yugoslavia, which might have 
expected closer cultural relations particularly in 
view of the Albanian-speaking popuJation of the 
Yugoslav province of Kosovo. But Albania 
remains a closed country, its population cannot 
travel abroad nor are visitors welcomed and visas 
are still required for travel in that country. The 
Stalinist regime of Mr. Hoxha in Albania has 
been highly critical of the present Yugoslav 
version of communism. However, these ideolo-
gical differences do not prevent correct relations 
between the two countries. Although Belgrade 
would probably hope that there will eventually be 
a process of "democratisation" in Albania, but in 
the Yugoslav sense of that word, such a develop-
ment, it is thought, will be faster without external 
pressure. It is Yugoslav policy to ensure the 
permanent independence of Albania which it 
believes could not remain independent were it 
not for Yugoslavia whose territory separates 
Albania from the Warsaw Pact countries. Presi-
dent Hoxha is on record in 1968 as saying that 
he would regard an attack on Yugoslavia as an 
attack on Albania and would not permit Albanian 
territory to be used for an attack on Yugoslavia. 
4.16 Yugoslavia continues to be a leader of the 
non-aligned movement which President Tito was 
instrumental in establishing together with Pandit 
Nehru of India and President Nasser of Egypt 
in 1961. But co-operation with those two countries 
is no longer as close as when the movement was 
founded and Yugoslavia's closest non-aligned 
partners change from time to time. Cuba played 
an important role in President Castro's earlier 
days, but Yugoslav circles now appear sceptical 
to say the least of Cuban claims to non-aligned 
status. Within the non-aligned movement Yugo-
slavia is now closer to Algeria, Libya, Zambia and 
Nigeria, and has established closer relations than 
most countries with the present regime in Ethiopia. 
President Tito has been a voice for moderation in 
the affairs of that country and Somalia : "I have 
advised [the Ethiopians], in the spirit of the 
decisions of the United Nations, to grant auton-
omy to Eritrea, that is a federated status. Besides 
it should not be permitted that Ethiopia be 
isolated from the sea. I discussed this also with 
the President of Somalia, Siad Barre, when he 
visited our country ... [he} must withdraw his 
troops if he wishes a lasting resolution of the 
conflict ... " 1 • Yugoslavia remains unhappy with 
the trend of Soviet and Cuban intervention in 
1. Interview with James Reston, International Herald 
Tribune, 6th March 19i8. 
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Ethiopia which does not conform to a policy of 
non-alignment for Ethiopia. 
4.17 As far as trade is concerned Yugoslavia is 
anxious to establish a proper balance with the 
European Community ; with imports of 
$3.8 billion against exports to them of $1.4 billion, 
it has a deficit of $2.4 billion - 70 to 80 % of 
the total trade deficit - with the EEC countries 
of which Yugoslavia is the eighth most important 
trading partner. Except for Romania with which 
it has agreements on mutually advantageous joint 
ventures, Yugoslavia is concerned, because of the 
political implications, with the pattern of its 
trade with the remaining Warsaw Pact countries 
involving as it does the export of consumer goods 
against the import of important raw materials. 
Yugoslavia's aim in trade relations is to establish 
long-term mutually-beneficial agreements on a 
sector-by-sector basis. It is interested in under-
taking joint development projects in third world 
countries using Yugoslav engineers and Yugoslav 
political entree as a non-aligned country, in 
partnership with the technological expertise of 
Western European countries. While Yugoslavia 
has no wish to apply for membership of the Euro-
pean Community, which it is felt would be incom-
patible \vith its non-aligned status, and which in 
any case would be ruled out by the Copenhagen 
declaration of 8th April 1978 defining the Com-
munity's philosophy as "a political system of 
pluralist democracy", nevertheless Yugoslavia 
feels it is entitled to special consideration by the 
Community, with long-term sector-by-sector trade 
agreements defining a division of labour which 
would provide guaranteed outlets for Yugoslav 
products in the Common Market. 
(vi) Yugoslav views on security 
4.18 Yugoslavia bases its security on a policy 
of non-alignment, and proclaims its opposition 
to the manifestation of two opposing military 
blocs dominated by the superpowers. Yugoslavia 
was largely instrumental in having the 1971 
Resolution ~832 "Declaration on the Indian 
Ocean as a zone of peace" adopted in the United 
Nations General Assembly\ and maintains that 
a similar status for the Mediterranean should 
be sought. 
4.19 The Yugoslav authorities nevertheless 
regard it as unrealistic to call for the departure, 
for example, of United States and Soviet naval 
forces from the Mediterranean in the short term. 
It is recognised that a true military balance is 
an clement of stability, and Yugoslavia's most 
immediate preoccupation is with the incipient 
sources of conflict both in the Middle East and 
in the Greek-Turkish dispUJte ; in both areas 
Yugoslavia has sought to help in finding a solu-
1. See paragraph 2.29. 
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tion. In the Middle East it believes that there 
must be a joint Arab approach and a home 
for the Palestinians in any valid solution ; 
President Sadat's personal peace initiative on 
which Yugoslavia was not consulted is viewed 
with some scepticism. Yugoslav endeavours to 
reduce tension in the Greece-Turkey dispute are 
felt in Yugoslavia to have had some success. In 
the framework of the CSCE Yugoslavia has 
played an active role and is particularly inter-
ested in the confidence-building measures 
included in the Helsinki final act. It has made 
proposals for strengthening existing CBMs, 
proposing in particular that the movements of 
navaL forces should be subject to compulsory 
notification. 
(vii) Yugoslav defence policy 
4.20 The complement to non-alignment is self-
defence, and Yugoslavia has frequently made it 
clear that the country is fully determined to 
resist by force any attempt to occupy it, from 
whatever direction it might come. It is felt that 
it is well understood in the Soviet Union that 
there would be no "tourist occupation" of the 
country as occurred in Czechoslovakia. There is 
certainly no wish to dramatise the situation or 
to speak of any threat from the Soviet Union 
which is now believed to have accepted the non-
aligned status of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless 
defence arrangements are carefully publicised, 
and have recently been described by President 
Tito: "When we speak about the army, we are 
not thinkri.ng about the regular army only, but 
about all the people, which is encompassed by 
the system of all-people's defence, which has 
become law in our country and covers several 
millions of persons. 'foday we already have close 
to a million armed men and women, within the 
framework of that system, who are engaged in 
military exercises together with the regular army 
units. In a word, all the people, all the able-
bodied persons, will be in the battlefield in case 
of need ... within the framework of the aH-people's 
defence and within our available possibilities, 
the people are constantly being armed... even 
faetories have been procuring anti-aircraft guns 
and other weapons for possible defence, the all-
people's defence will be supplied with all types 
of weapons, of course under the command of the 
regular army." 1 
4.21 The 1974 constitution specifically prohibits 
capitulation in the event of an invasion of 
Yugoslavia and provides that no one is authorised 
to sign an instrument of capitulation. 
4.22 Yugoslavia spends between 5 and 6 % of 
its GDP on defence and its regular armed forces 
1. Interview with James Reston, International Heralll 
Tribune, 6th March 1978. 
total 260,000, including 193,000 in the army. 
There is a mixture of largely obsolescent Soviet 
and American tanks including the T-34 and 
T-54/55 and the American M-47. Aircraft include 
the obsolescent American F-84G and the Soviet 
MiG-21. There are some SA-2 and SA-3 Soviet 
surface-to-air missiles. The navy comprises one 
destroyer, five submarines (two building) and 
ten Soviet OSA-class missile-equipped fast patrol 
boats. 
4.23 The organisation of people's defence is 
realistically undertaken. An exercise in Croatia 
in April 1976 was reported to have mobilised one 
million people. Smaller-scale exercises and 
regular training of factory units, etc., is regu-
larly undertaken. 
(viii) Arms supply 
4.24 Yugoslavia claims to produce some 80% 
of its own arms requirements, but these are 
essentially in the less sophisticated areas. The 
country is particularly interested in diversifying 
its sources of supply. A strike aircraft is being 
developed jointly with Romania, using British 
aircraft engines, and there are plans to construct 
a second-generation aircraft in Yugoslavia. 
4.25 Yugoslavia is very mll!Ch in the market for 
the procurement of the most sophisticated equip-
ment from western countries, but its military 
authorities are particularly sensiti;ve about any 
publicity being given to particular projects. It 
is not of course normally possible for a western 
country to supply armaments to a third country 
without details becoming known, a;t least once 
manufacture has commenced. The level of sophis-
tication sought by the Yugoslav authorities 
undoubtedly poses certain security problems to 
western countries. The consultative co-ordinating 
committee (COCOM) exists to harmonise the 
views of NATO countries and Japan on security 
criteria when exports to Warsaw Pact countries 
or China are under consideration ; it has recently 
relaxed its strategic criteria in favour of China 
in order to reflect current political and economic 
realities. There is certainly a case for harmon-
ising attitudes of the Alliance countries for 
supplies to countries such as Yugoslavia as well. 
But the vital importance of ensuring alternative 
sources of military equipment and military 
training for Yugoslavia must be the over-riding 
consideration in this connection. 
(ix) The future of Yugoslavia 
4.26 Qualified observers believe that the unity 
of the country is now better assured than at times 
in the past. The younger generation, or certainly 
the urban younger generation, identifies with 
Yugoslavia as a country, and the two main 
themes of Yugoslav policy - sel:f-Jlla;nagement 
at home and non-alignment abroad - have wide 
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support among the population that will ensure 
continuity after a succession to the presidency 
(constitutional provisions for which are described 
in paragraph 4.4). In terms of popular culture 
and trends of consumer goods the country can be 
said to be western-oriented and this tendency is 
unlikely to be less marked in the future. Indeed 
any temptation for the Soviet Union to seek 
to interfere in the internal policy of the country 
might arise not from a desire to influence the 
succession, but at a later stage if the present 
trends of internal Yugoslav economic policy were 
to prove too attractive to neighbouring Warsaw 
Pact countries. 
4.27 The continued non-aligned status, inde-
pendence and unity of the country is vital to the 
West. For that reason a strategic factor must 
be taken into consideration in trade relaJtions, 
especially as far as negotiations with the Euro-
pean Community are concerned, to ensure that 
Yugoslavia has always the genuine option of 
substantial balanced trade with the West. The 
leadership of the country believes that its non-
aligned status is accepted by the Soviet Union 
as well as by the world at large, and would not 
welcome provocative military contingency plans 
from any side. The Committee calls for an 
unequivocal statement of western concern for 
the continued non-alignment, independence and 
unity of the country as the best means of 
securing the interests both of Yugoslavia and the 
western alliance. 
4.28 If at any time present expectations of 
Soviet policy should not be fulfilled, at any 
signs of Warsaw Pact military concentrations on 
Yugoslav frontiers such as occurred on the 
Czechoslovak frontiers in 1968, the NATO crisis 
management machinery would necessarily come 
into play. Reference has been made in paragraphs 
3.14, 3.15 and 3.75 above to various NATO 
reinforcement capabilities in the area of North-
East Italy - this capability could readily be 
deployed for example in Italian territory in the 
area of Trieste. 
(b) Albania 
4.29 Under Mr. Enver Hoxha, a French-edu-
ca;ted man of bourgeois origins, Albania is the 
most Stalinist of any communist country and the 
most closed to outside influence. As recently 
as 1973 and 1974 there were drastic purges of 
the Politburo and Defence Ministry to remove 
possible rivals to the leadership. With Mr. 
Hoxha's continued and outspoken criticism of 
"revisionism" in the Soviet Union there is little 
likelihood of any rapprochement in that direction, 
even now that the change of regime in China 
has reduced to a trickle the assistance Albania 
previously received from its only friend abroad. 
Mr. Hoxha is 68 and again a succession must 
seem in prospect, but in Albania there is no 
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provision to ensure it. If relations with Yugo-
slavia have been described as disappointing but 
correct (despite Albanian criticism of the status 
of the Albanian-speaking minority in the Mace-
donian Republic of Yugoslavia), there has 
recently been some improvement in Greek-
Albanian relations, with the opening of a new 
air route from Athens to Tirana - the only 
scheduled service to any western capital other 
than Belgrade. The Greek Trade Minister in 
March signed an agreement for some $30 million 
trade in 1978. The Albanian declaration of sup-
port for Yugoslav independence has been noted 
above. 
4.30 Albania may now be forced to seek better 
relations with western countries, but is inhibited 
from doing so because of the danger of wider 
contacts with the West for its population which 
can only give rise to dissatisfaction with present 
internal conditions. The past policies of Albania 
seem to indicate little danger of any restoration 
of port facilities for Soviet submarines in Valona 
which were available in the 1950s. 
(c) The Middle East 
4.31 The Middle East is not discussed in this 
report in any detail. The 1973 conflict has been 
examined in previous reports. The Committee 
stresses the danger of any renewed hostilities 
spreading beyond the immediate area of the 
countries directly involved, and endangering the 
security of the Alliance as a whole. If attainable, 
a lasting settlement acceptable to the principal 
parties concerned is obviously in the interests 
of those parties ; it would also be the greatest 
single contribution that could be made at the 
present time to security in the Mediterranean. 
Diplomatic means only are available to the 
member countries here. 
4.32 The Committee notes the implicit approval 
by a vote of 55 to 44 in the United States Senate 
on 15th May of President Carter's proposal to 
supply 60 F-15 tactical fighter aircraft to Saudi 
Arabia and 50 F-5Es to Egypt at the same time 
as supplying 15 F-15s and 75 F-16s to Israel. 
It has been noted in paragraph 2.9 above that 
European allied countries have supplied certain 
armaments to the less moderate Arab countries 
Syria and Iraq. Clearly in this region the supply 
of armaments by allied countries raises issues 
of policy affecting military balance as well as 
that of technological security mentioned in para-
graph 4.25. 
(d) The Maghreb 
4.33 Libya and the Maghreb countries are not 
discussed in the present report 1 beyond a refer-
ence to the build-up of the Libyan air force in 
I. See the previous report, Document 708. 
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paragraph 2.15. Despite permanent speculation, 
particularly in the case of Libya, there are no 
Soviet military bases in this area. Morocco, as 
mentioned in paragraph 3.91, provided communi-
cations facilities for the United States. 
V. Conclusions 
5.1 The Committee's principal conclusions are 
set forth in the draft recommendation (the follow-
ing paragraph numbers refer to those of the draft 
recommendation) : 
Preamble 
(i) The Committee makes the general but vital 
point that security will always be a condition of 
the way of life of the western democracies, and 
that the price of security is an adequate defence 
effort. 
(ii) The situation concerning Soviet military 
bases in the Mediterranean is reported in this 
explanatory memorandum in paragraphs 2.17 to 
2.25; Soviet military intervention in Africa in 
paragraphs 2.30 to 2.39 ; the Brezhnev doctrine 
and its recent reiteration in paragraphs 4.8 and 
4.10. 
(iii) and (iv) The Committee is acutely aware 
of the dangers of local conflicts spreading and 
involving countries external to the area of the 
original conflict. The Middle East is not discussed 
in any detail in the present report but clearly 
remains the most unstable area in the Mediter-
ranean at the present time and a lasting settle-
ment, acceptable to all the countries directly 
involved, must accordingly be a priority objective 
of allied diplomacy - in the interests both of 
the looal populations and of the security of the 
Alliance. The Greek-Turkish differences, the 
Cyprus problem, and their impact on the Alliance 
are described in paragraphs 3.20 to 3.63. The 
importance of ensuring the future independence 
and non-alignment of Yugoslavia is discussed in 
paragraphs 4.1 to 4.30 ; the questiQll of Soviet 
bases in paragraphs 2.17 to 2.25. 
(v) The NATO structure in the Mediterranean 
area is described in paragraphs 3.60 et seq., the 
participation of member countries under the 
corresponding heading from paragraphs 3.20 to 
3.81. The Committee welcomes the present extent 
of French participation ; a majority regrets how-
ever that France is still absent from the inte-
grated command structure (paragraphs 3.76 to 
3.78). 
(vi) The Committee stresses the need for full 
and equal Greek and Turkish participation in 
NATO (paragraphs 3.20 to 3.53). 
(vii) The position of Spain is referred to in 
paragraphs 3.89 to 3.91, and the advantages of 
Spanish accession to NATO have been explored 
in earlier reports 1. 
(viii) The problems of arms supply to Yugoslavia 
for instance are mentioned in paragraphs 4.24 
and 4.25. There are many conflicting interests 
to be considered where exports of armaments by 
allied countries to third countries are concerned. 
There are strategic interests in making arma-
ments available from a western source rather 
than the Soviet Union, but a danger that techno-
logical secrecy may be breached if the latest 
weapons are supplied. There is the problem of 
regional military balance - particularly in the 
Middle East (paragraphs 4.32 and 2.9) where 
both Israel and many Arab countries receive 
armaments from western sources. There is a 
danger that the interests of the Alliance as a 
whole may be overlooked in the straight com-
mercial competition between western countries 
seeking export orders in those countries that 
can afford to pay for their armaments. The 
Committee recommends that all aspects of arms 
exports be reviewed in the North Atlantic 
Council and in the co-ordinating committee 
referred to in paragraph 4.25. 
Operative text of the draft recommendation 
The continuing need for NATO is stressed 
',gTaphs 3.1 et seq. 
'b) The NATO structure in the Medi-
·nd the extent of participation in 
'ing and exercises, is described in 
et seq. and under the country 
l.s a political danger in the 
to collective defence in the 
Mediterranean appearing 
., bilateral United States-
' b. in the eyes of the 
·uations of the NATO 
1mittee calls for the 
as many NATO 
'0 arrangements 
participation 
Force and 
l visits by 
'l.e North 
'al or 
et seq. and 3.79 fA 
the elimination t 
embargo on Turkey 
fied, detrimental to 
ranean, ·and disastrou~. 
Alliance. 
1. (e) Turkey is anxious to 
established on its territory 1:. 
ing its own defence industry 
technology ; the Committee bt-. 
ment of such projects in the l 
could reduce the unfortunate of 
present dependence on the Unitt A as a 
single source (paragraphs 3.34 to 3.4_,. 
2. The problems of Greece, Turkey and 
Cyprus are discussed in paragraphs 3.45 and 
3.54 et seq. respectively. 
3. The position of Spain is discussed in para-
graphs 3.89 to 3.95. 
4. The situation concerning Soviet bases in the 
Mediterranean is reported in paragraphs 2.17 to 
2.25. 
5. The importance of the future independence 
and non-aligned status of Yugoslavia is discussed 
in paragraphs 4.1 to 4.30. 
6. The policy aspects of arms exports is 
referred to above in these conclusions in the 
reference to paragraph (viii) of the preamble. 
VI. Opinion of the minority 
6.1 The report as a whole was adopted by 14 
votes to 2 with 0 abstentions. Two members of 
the Committee would have deleted the expression 
of regret at the continued absence of France from 
the integrated command structure of NATO in 
paragraph 3. 78 of the explanatory memorandum. 
In the draft recommendation two members would 
have deleted the reference to the Soviet Union 
in paragraph (ii) of the preamble; two members 
objected to the word "principle" in paragraph 
( v) ; three members would have deleted para-
graph (vii) and two would have deleted therein 
the word "greatly". In the operative text one 
member would have replaced the words "in the 
Mediterranean" with the words "of the Mediter-
ranean countries" in paragraph 1 (c) and had 
objections to paragraphs 1 (d) and 1 (e) ; three 
members would have deleted paragraph 3 ; in 
"""aragraph 4 one member would have replaced 
~ words "the Soviet armed .forces" with the 
'ts "foreign armed forces" and two would have 
"<l at the beginning the words "with respect 
·,. sovereignty". One member objected to 
,....d of the report as a whole as favouring 
... ments more than disarmament. 
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Country N atione.l currency unit 
(0) (I) 
Belgium ..•................ Million Frs. 
France .................... Million Frs. 
Federal Republic of Germany Million DM 
Italy ........ -............ Million Lire 
Luxembourg •...•.•••...... Million Frs. 
Netherlands ....•.......... Million Guilders 
United Kingdom .•..••..... Million £ 
TOTAL WEU •·••···. 
Canada ................... Million $ 
Denmark .................. Million Kr. 
Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Million Drachmas 
Norway .................. Million Kr. 
Portugal .................. Million Escudos 
Turke[ ................... Million L. 
Unite States ............. Million $ 
TOTAL NON·WEU b .. 
TOTAL NATO b •••••. 
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1973-77 
FINANCIAL EFFORT 
Defence expenditure (national currency) current prices Defence expenditure (US $ million) a GDP in purchasers' values (US $ million) a Population (thousand) Defence expenditure as % of GDP in purchasers' values a 
1973 1974 1975 
(-5) (-4) (-3) 
48,941 57,395 69,936 
42,284 47,878 55,873 
31,908 35,644 37,589 
2,392 2,852 3,104 
601 710 836 
5,465 6,254 7,246 
3,512 4,160 5,165 
2,405 2,862 3,127 
3,520 4,439 5,281 
19,866 24,126 43,917 
3,505 3,938 4,771 
16,736 25,108 19,898 
12,192 15,831 . . 
78,358 85,906 90,948 
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1976 1977! 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977/ 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 e 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 e 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 e/ 
------(-2) (-1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (ll) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
81,055 91,350 1,258 1,474 1,902 2,100 2,549 45,604 53,409 62,250 65,909 77,863 9,742 9,772 9,801 9,818 9,847 2.8 2.8 3.1 3.2 3.3 
63,899 71,830 9,466 9,944 13,035 13,369 14,619 249,438 264,158 335,294 346,757 379,581 52,120 52,460 52,700 52,890 53,120 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.9 
38,922 40,890 11,928 13,775 15,267 15,457 17,612 343,402 381,499 418,032 445,473 513,912 59,922 60,020 59,825 59,564 59,455 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.4 
3,608 4,199 4,106 4,391 4,756 4,335 4,759 141,616 155,355 174,957 170,768 194,688 54,913 55,413 55,812 56,156 56,446 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.4 
983 1,044 15 18 23 26 29 1,869 2,184 2,197 2,241 2,596 353 357 359 356 355 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1 
7,817 8,588 1,954 2,324 2,865 2,957 3,499 60,093 70,718 82,608 89,524 105,780 13,439 13,545 13,654 13,770 13,853 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.3 
6,162 6,823 8,611 9,736 11,476 11,131 11,909 176,455 191,727 229,162 220,317 243,874 56,023 56,066 56,031 55,959 55,959 4.9 5.1 5.0 5.1 4.9 
----
------
37,338 41,662 49,324 49,375 54,976 1,018,477 1,119,050 1,304,500 1,340,989 1,518,294 246,512 247,633 248,182 248,513 249,035 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.6 
--
--------
3,589 4,133 2,403 2,926 3,075 3,640 3,886 124,438 151,856 163,914 194,598 196,943 22,125 22,479 22,831 23,025 23,316 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 
5,680 6,255 582 728 918 940 1,042 27,251 30,166 35,441 38,526 42,267 5,022 5,045 5,060 5,073 5,089 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.5 
. . . . 670 804 1,363 . . . . 16,329 18,970 20,894 22,053 25,770 8,929 8,962 9,046 9,167 9,231 4.1 4.2 6.5 . . . . 
5,333 6,076 602 713 910 977 1,141 19,191 23,566 28,274 31,304 36,126 3,961 3,985 4,007 4,027 4,044 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.1 3.2 
18,845 21,094 651 985 780 624 551 10,931 13,255 14,774 15,737 16,727 8,978 9,218 9,633 9,694 9,733 6.0 7.4 5.3 4.0 3.3 
. . . . 870 1,140 . . . . . . 21,077 29,496 35,717 41,051 46,211 38,072 39,036 40,025 41,039 41,983 4.1 3.9 . . . . .. 
91,008 104,226 78,358 85,906 90,948 91,008 104,226 1,302,135 1,406,777 1,526,457 1,702,023 1,880,906 210,410 211,901 213,559 215,142 216,817 6.0 6.1 6.0 5.4 5.5 
--
----
----
82,596 91,258 96,631 97,189 110,846 1,483,946 1,625,620 1,768,860 1,982,188 2,172,969 250,496 252,628 255,090 256,961 258,999 5.6 5.6 5.5 4.9 5.1 
--------
119,934 132,920 145,955 146,564 165,822 2,502,423 2,744,670 3,073,360 3,323,177 3,691,263 497,008 500,261 503,272 505,474 508,034 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.4 
Note a: GDP and defence expenditures are calculated m na.twnal currency and converted to Umted States $ at the rates shown below. Figures m columns (l) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by 
change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures aa % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency 
conversion. 
Prior to 1977 tables of defence statistics published in reports of the Committee used gross national product (GNP) as a measure of national wealth. In lut" with the practice of other international 
organisations, the tables are now given in terms of GDP which is somewhat higher than GNP. Consequently, the figures for defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP are slightly lower 
than the percentages of GNP previously published. 
For the period 1973-77, the following rates of exchange have been applied: 
Country Unit US $per uwit Unita per US $ Country Unit US $ per uwit Unita per US $ 
Belgium & L=embourg Franc Italy 1,000 .Lire 
- 1973 0.02571 38.90 - 1973 1.71649 0.58258 
- 1974 0.02567 38.95 - 1974 1.53952 0.64950 
- 1975 0.02719 36.78 - 1975 1.53183 0.65282 
- 1976 0.02590 38.60 - 1976 1.20151 0.83229 
- 1977 0.02790 35.84 - 1977 1.13329 0.88239 
Oanada Canadian Dollar N etkerla'/Ul,a Guilder 
- 1973 0.99945 1.00055 
- 197a 0.35746 2.80 
- 1974 1.02248 0.97802 
- 1974 0.37163 2.69 
- 1975 0.98313 1.01716 
- 1975 0.39539 2.53 
- 1976 1.01416 0.98604 
- 1976 0.37822 2.64 
- 1977 0.94034 1.06345 
- 1977 0.40745 2.45 
Denmark D. Kroner Norway 
- 1973 0.16523 6.0522 
- 1973 
N. Kroner 
0.17169 5.82 
- 1974 0.16408 6.0947 
- 1974 0.18106 5.52 
- 1975 0.17392 5.7499 
- 1975 0.19073 5.24 
- 1976 0.16543 6.0450 
- 1976 0.18327 5.46 
- 1977 0.16658 6.0032 
- 1977 0.18785 5.32 
France Franc Portugal 
- 1973 0.22387 4.467 
- 1974 0.20770 4.815 - 1973 
- 1975 0.23331 4.286 - 1974, 1975 
- 1976 0.20922 4.780 - 1976 
- 1977 0.20352 4.913 - 1977 
Escudo 
0.03889 25.71 
0.03922 25.50 
0.03309 30.22 
0.02613 38.28 
Fed. Rep. of Germany Deutschmark Turkey 
- 1973 0.37383 2.68 - 1973 
T. Lira 
0.07133 14.02 
- 1974 0.38647 2.59 - 1974 0.07199 13.89 
- 1975 0.40616 2.46 - 1975 0.06936 14.42 
-1976 0.39714 2.52 -1976 0.06229 16.05 
- 1977 0.43070 2.32 - 1977 0.00555 18.00 
Greece Drachma United Kingdom £ 
- 1973 0.03373 29.65 - 1973 2.4520 0.408 
- 1974 0.03333 30.00 - 1974 2.3401 0.427 
- 1975 0.03103 32.23 - 1975 2.2219 0.450 
- 1976 0.02734 36.58 - 1976 1.8062 0.554 
- 1977 0.02714 36.84 - 1977 1.7455 0.573 
Note b: Defence expenditure figures for Greece and Turkey are not available for the most recent years ; for purposes of comparison aJl data relating to these two countries have been therefore excluded 
throughout from Total non-WEU and Total NATO. 
~ = Preliminary estimate. 
I = Forecast. 
GDP (p.v.) = GroBB domestic product in purchasers' values, current prices. 
Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M fDPC /3(7 7)18. 
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APPENDIX I 
Defence expenditure per head a Defence expenditure as % of total WEU (US$) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 e/ 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 I 
------(21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
129 151 194 214 259 3.37 3.54 3.86 4.25 4.64 
182 190 247 253 275 25.35 23.87 26.43 27.08 26.59 
199 230 255 260 296 31.95 33.06 30.95 31.31 32.04 
75 79 85 77 84 11.00 10.54 9.64 8.78 8.66 
42 51 64 73 82 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
145 172 210 215 253 5.23 5.58 5.81 5.99 6.36 
154 174 205 199 213 23.06 23.37 23.26 22.54 21.66 
--------
151 168 199 199 221 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
--------
109 130 135 158 167 6.44 7.02 6.23 7.37 7.07 
116 144 181 185 205 1.56 1.75 1.86 1.90 1.90 
75 90 151 . . . . 1.79 1.93 2.76 . . .. 
152 179 227 243 282 1.61 1.71 1.84 1.98 2.08 
73 107 81 64 57 1.74 2.36 1.58 1.26 1.00 
23 29 . . . . . . 2.33 2.74 . . . . . . 
372 405 426 423 481 209.86 206.20 184.39 189.32 189.58 
--------
330 361 379 378 428 . . .. . . . . . . 
--
------
241 266 290 290 326 . . . . . . . . . . 
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I I I I 
APPENDIX II 
NATO military command structure -Elements in the Mediterranean and adjoining area 
North Atlantic Council (Brussels) and Defence Planning Committee 
I 
Military Committee and International Military Staff (Brussels) 
I 
I I I I 
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, 
SACLANT (Norfolk, Virginia) 
I I 
I 
Commander Iberian Commander Allied Naval Atlantic Area, 
COMIBERLANT Forces Southern Europe, 
(Oeiras, Portup;al) COMNAVSOUTH (Naples) 
Island Commander 
Madeira Commander Naval 
Striking and 
Support Forces 
Southern Europe 
(Naples) 
Gibraltar 
Mediterranean Area, Western Mediterranean GIB MED Area, MEDOC (formerly (Gibraltar) Tou.lon, now temporarily 
exercised by 
NAVSOUTH directly) 
Key: chain of command 
------- possible new commands 
adumbrated in this report 
.., _____ eo-located headquarters 
I 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 
SACEUR (Casteau, Belgium) 
Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces 
Southern Europe, 
CINCSOUTH (Naples, Italy) 
I I I ------------------.-------
·-------
-., 
I 
_.J. ______ , 
I Commander Land Commander Air Forces Commander Lanu I Comm ander Land ~ 
South-Central I Forces Southern Southern Europe Forces South-Eastern I Forces 
Europe (Verona) COMAIRSOUTH Europe,· I E 
COMLANDSOUTH (Naples) COMLANDSOUTHEAST lcOMLAN 
(Izmir) I (L I ; ; L--r--I I I i 
---------., I I i I I I ! I I I I r~o~:::i:~~-~~;1.----J Commander 5th ATAF Commander 6th A'llAF ________ ,., 
(Vil'..enza) (lzmir) I (L~m) l ._ _____________ ., 
urope 1 
DSOUTHCENTI 
arissa) ; 
________ .J 
I I I 
North Eastern Maritime Air Central Mediterranean Mediterranean Area, Mediterranean, Area, MEDCENT MEDNOREAST MARAIRMED (Naples) (Ankara) (Naples) 
Eastern Mediterranean. Submarines 
Area, MEDEAST South Eastern Mediterranean 
(Athens) Mediterranean Area, SUBMED (Naples) 
MEDSOUEAST 
(formerly Malta, now 
temporarily exercised 
by NAVSOUTH directly) 
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Document 776 
Amendment No. I 
Security in the Mediterranean 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Druon 
In the draft recommendation proper : 
19th June 1978 
I. In paragraph 1 (d), leave out "and by calling on the United States to eliminate its discri-
mination against Turkey". 
2. In paragraph 1 (e), leave out "in Turkey in the NATO framework" and insert "with countries 
bordering on the Mediterranean in a European framework". 
3. In paragraph 2 (a), after "remaining" insert "bilateral". 
4. Leave out paragraph 2 (b) and insert the following: 
8 
"Ensure that no outside interference, in particular from neighbouring countries, jeopardises 
the resumption of the desirable negotiations between the two communities in Cyprus with 
a view to furthering the Cypriot state's full exercise of its independence and the unitary and 
harmonious coexistence of its communities." 
Signed : Druon 
1. See 3rd Sitting, 20th June 1978 (Parts 1, 2 and 4 negatived; part 3 agreed to). 
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Document 776 
Amendment No. 2 
Security in the Mediterranean 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Ferretti 
19th June 1978 
l. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "the principal 
credible basis" and insert "an essential guarantee" ; leave out "full". 
2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraphs (a) and (b). 
3. In sub-paragraph (c) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "by adjusting NATO 
command arrangements to reflect" and insert "by taking full account of". 
4. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "all aspects of"; leave out 
"NATO countries" and insert "WEU countries"; leave out "in the appropriate allied forum". 
Signed : Ferretti 
I. See 3rd Sitting, 20th June 1978 (Amendment negatived). 
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Document 776 
Amendment No. 3 
Security in the Mediterranean · 
AMENDMENT No. 31 
tabled by Mr. Gratat · 
20th June 1978 
In paragraph 1 (e) of the draft recommendation proper, before "Turkey" insert "Greece and". 
Signed : Gram 
1. See 3rd Sitting, 20th June 1978 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Document 776 
Amendment No. 4 
Security in the Mediterranean 
AMENDMENT No. 4 1 
tabled by Mr. Peridier 
20th June 1978 
In paragraph I (d) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "and by calling on the 
United States to eliminate its discrimination against Turkey". 
.Signed: Peridier 
1. See 3rd Sitting, 20th June 1978 (Amendment negatived). 
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Document 777 
Application of the Brussels Treaty 
Reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
31st May 1978 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty- reply to the twenty-third annual 
report of the Council 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur 
Introduction 
Report of the Council 
Chapter I : Relations between the Council and the Assembly 
Chapter II : Activities of the Council 
(a) United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe 
(b) Amendments to the list of prohibited weapons 
Chapter Ill : Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(a) Non-application of controls 
(b) Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
Chapter IV : Standing Armaments Committee 
Conclusions 
Opinion of the minority 
1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 3 with 0 
abstentions. 
2. Members of the Committee : Mr. Boper (Chairman) ; 
MM. de Koster, Pawelczyk (Alternate : Biichner) (Vice-
Chairmen) ; MM. ..dhrens, Beauguitte, van den Bergh, 
Boldrini, Bonnel, Boucheny (Alternate : Jung), Critchley 
(Alternate : Grieve), Dejardin, Fosson, Grant, Handlos, 
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Hardy, Konen, Lemmrich (Alternate: Vohrer), Maggioni, 
Menard, Nessler, Pecchioli, .Riviere, .Ro'berti, Schmidt 
Hermann, Scholten (Alternate: van Hulst), Tanghe, 
Whitehead. 
N.B. The names of those taking part i·n the vote are 
printed in ttaz.ics. 
DOCUMENT 777 
Draft Recommendation 
on the application of the BrU88els Treaty - reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council 
The .Assembly, 
Congratulating the Council on the content of its replies to Assembly recommendations and recalling 
the procedure whereby NATO may in appropriate cases provide material for replies to recommendations ; 
Noting that the annual report of the Council still makes no mention of the level of British land forces 
on the mainland of Europe assigned to SACEUR although the basic figures are given in the British white 
paper on defence ; 
Noting that the armaments control provisions of the Brussels Treaty are incompletely applied and 
that the usefulness of those that are applied is contested ; 
Anxious to maintain and make the best use of the expert knowledge of the Agency for the Control 
of Armaments and of the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Indicate in future annual reports the number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe 
assigned to SACEUR in accordance with the commitment contained in Article VI of Protocol No. II to the 
modified Brussels Treaty ; 
2. Set up a European centre for defence studies at the disposal of intergovernmental defence bodies and 
the .Assembly ; 
3. Delete the reference to naval auxiliary vessels from the list of conventional armaments which may 
not be produced on German territory. 
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DOCUMENT 777 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. Broadly speaking, the twenty-third annual 
report of the Council, covering 1977, follows 
the same lines as other recent reports. Once 
again, the Council's own activities were relatively 
limited, as ·they have been in fact since the 
United Kingdom joined the European Com-
munity in 1973. Insofar as this cutback in activity 
merely reflects the strengthening of European 
cohesion in a wider framework, the Committee 
can but welcome the fact, provided however that 
the fundamental commitments of the Brussels 
Treaty are not jeopardised. 
2. But the Committee has to note that so far 
the enlargement of the EEC has unfortunately 
not been accompanied by greater cohesion. It 
therefore seems particularly necessary to maintain 
in force the undertakings entered into by the 
seven signatories of the Paris Agreements, and 
the Al!lsembly must continue to play its role 
of ensuring that the treaty is respected and 
encouraging governments to overcome their 
differences in order to be able to express a Euro-
pean will in all fields covered by the modified 
Brussels Treaty. 
3. The present report replying to the Council's 
report is therefore mainly devoted to the statutory 
activities which the Council has retained in 
defence matters - control of the level of forces 
and armaments, Standing Armaments Commit-
tee- the others having been entrusted to NATO 
in accordance with Article IV of the modified 
Brussels Treaty and the earlier decision of the 
Council. 
4. The Committee notes that the Council's 
report did not reach the Assembly until the end 
of March and regrets that it was communicated 
late. The chapter numbers in the present report 
correspond to those in the Council's report. 
CHAPTER I 
Relations between the Council 
and the Assembly 
5. The Committee finds the Council's replies to 
Assembly recommendaJtions in 1977 very 
satisfactory. In particular, in answering Recom-
mendation 299 the Council affirmed that "in 
reply to Assembly recommendations the Council 
will continue to take account of the work in hand 
in other international organisations to which the 
member states of WEU belong, endeavouring to 
ensure that whatever information is provided to 
the Assembly is as precise as possible". Answering 
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Recommendation 309, the Council again con-
firmed that "there could be no doubt as to the 
binding character of this provision [Article V 
of the Brussels Treaty]. In the same reply, the 
Council noted that "the consultations whit>h take 
place within these bodies [nine-power political 
co-operation and the North Atlantic Councill 
are complete and thorough and have sufficient 
continuity to make it unnecessary, in present 
circumstances, to repeat such contacts in the 
more limited framework of WEU". The Com-
mittee for its part agrees with the Council about 
the efficiency of this division of work ; at the 
present jullC'ture, the Council's princip~l rOle 
is in fact to stress the validity of the commitment 
in Article V of the Brussels Treaty and to 
demonstrate its existence - which it does for 
example by maintaining its relations with the 
Assembly - so that it may immediately resume 
the tasks now exercised in other international 
organisations should one of them, for one reason 
or another, stop effectively dealing with the 
responsibilities defined in the Brussels Treaty. 
6. The Committee registers its satisfaction with 
the Council's decision to accede to its request to 
organise an informal joint meeting - planned 
for 5th June 1978 - and a meeting of the 
Liaison Sub-Committee on the joint production 
of armaments - a meeting which in principle 
should be held in about October 1978. 
7. The Committee notes that in 1977 the 
Council when answering recommendations and 
written' questions on defence matters, did not 
avail itself of the procedure whereby it may 
send NATO a text to obtain additional informa-
tion when the matters concerned are actually 
dealt with by NATO. The Committee conside!s 
that in appropriate cases recourse should still 
be had to this procedure, however cumbersome, 
which demonstrates the application of Article IV 
of the Brussels Treaty which provides that in 
order to avoid duplication "... the Council and 
its Agency will rely on t~e appro:priate mili~ry 
authorities of NATO for mformatmn and adVIce 
on military matters". 
CHAPTER II 
Activities of the Council 
8. The Committee is gratified to find the 
following statement in the Council's annual 
report: 
"They [the Council] recalled that the clause 
in Article V providing for automatic mutual 
assistance made the treaty a vital element 
DOOUMENT 777 
in the security of WEU member countries. 
The Council continued to pay close attention 
to the implementation of the modified 
Brussels Treaty and its protocols. They were 
also concerned to avoid any duplication 
between their activities and those in which 
the governments of WEU member countries 
participate elsewhere. In this context, they 
took particular account of work in the 
framework of political co-operation between 
the Nine and within the independent Euro-
pean programme group", 
and that 
"the governments of the WEU member 
countries co-ordinated their position closely, 
in the framework of nine-power political 
co-operation, in advance of the Belgrade 
meeting. They played an active part in the 
work of the North Atlantic Council which 
prepared for this meeting very thoroughly." 
9. With regard to relations with Greece and 
Turkey, the Council's report asserts that : 
"they felt it was too soon to consider the 
possibility of associating the Greek and 
Turkish Governments with the work of the 
WEU Standing Armaments Committee." 
The Rapporteur preparing the report on security 
in the Mediterranean 1, who has had talks with 
government circles in both Athens and Ankara, 
saw no signs of interest in these countries in 
being associated with WEU or its organs in any 
way ; the matter was not raised with the people 
he met. 
(a) United Kingdom forcetl stationed on the continent 
of Europe 
10. Under Protocol No. II to the modified 
Brussels Treaty, the United Kingdom undertook 
to maintain on the mainland of Europe, "assigned 
to SACEUR", a number of troops which the 
Council has now fix,~d at 55,000 men plus the 
Second Tactical Air .Force. This duty to fix the 
level of the British commitment is undeniably 
one of the most important parts of the Council's 
present activities. 
11. In its reply to Recommendation 213 2, the 
Council stated that the United Kingdom under-
took to state in the annual report each year the 
current level of British forces on the continent. 
The Committee notes thalt the level duly reported 
at 31st December 1977 was 61,474 men plus the 
Second Tactical Air Force. But in its reply 
1. Mr. Grant, Document 776. 
2. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1971 
on the report of the Co=ittee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, Document 558, Rapporteur Mr. Vedovato. 
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to Written Question 170 1 and Recommendation 
284 2 , the Council recognised that "the United 
Kingdom's commitment (under Article VI of 
Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty) 
to maintain a certain level of forces on the 
mainland of Europe relates not to the total level 
of United Kingdom forces on the mainland 
(which includes personnel in Berlin and Gibral-
tar) but only to those which are assigned to 
SACEUR. For the purpose of this commitment 
the level approved by the Council is still 55,000 
men plus the Second Tactical Air Force" and 
that "the figure of 60,066 men on the continent 
of Europe is, as stated in the twenty-first annual 
report, the total level of ground forces manpower. 
It therefore includes personnel in Berlin and 
Gibraltar, which are not reckoned in the commit-
ment to maintain 55,000 men 'assigned to 
SACEUR' ". The same remark applies to the 
figure of 61,4 7 4 men on 31st December 1977 
reported in the twenty-third annual report. 
12. The Assembly has twice recommended 3 that 
future annual reports indicate not only the total 
troop strengths of British land forces on the 
mainland but also the level of British land forces 
included in the definition of the commitment : 
"The figure of 55,000 includes not only BAOR 
but those United Kingdom personnel in the 
various allied headquarters and command organ-
isations such as HQ NORTHAG and HQ 
AFCENT who may properly be reckoned as 
·being 'assigned to SACEUR'." 
13. Yet in reply to Recommendation 299 the 
Council stated in this connection that "in view 
of the security requirements of the governments 
concerned, however, the Council consider that 
such additional information would not be suitable 
for inclusion in future annual reports to the 
Assembly". The Committee notes however that 
the figures in question are to be found in the 
British white paper on defence, a public 
document. According to the February 1978 
edition, the British garrison in Berlin totals 
3,100 men, the Gibraltar garrison one battalion 
- probably between 500 and 700 men - i.e. a 
total of some 3,700 not assigned to SACEUR 
to be deducted from the total of 61,474, which 
leaves some 57,800 to be included in the frame-
work of the definition of the commitment to 
maintain 55,000 men on the mainland assigned 
to SACEUR. The Committee renews its insistence 
that this figure be given correctly in the Council's 
annual report. 
1. Put by Mr. Haase on 15th April1976. 
2. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1976 on 
the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, Document 700, Rapporteur Mr. Haase. 
3. Reco=endations 284, 15th June 1976, and 299, 
21st June 1977. 
14. The present annual report adds: "The 
continued need for the presence of troops in 
Northern Ireland made it necessary for units 
of the British Army of the Rhine to be 
redeployed for short tours of duty there. At 
31st December 1977, there were some 4,096 men 
from BAOR in Northern Ireland. As has been 
previously stated, these units could be speedily 
returned from their duty stations in an 
emergency affecting NATO." The Committee 
notes that the corresponding figure for last year 
was 4,419. 
(b) Amendments to the list of prohibited weapons 
15. On some twelve occasions since the con-
clusion of the modified Brussels Treaty in 1954 
the Council has amended the list at Annex Ill 
to Protocol No. HI which specifies the weapons 
which the Federal Republic of Germany under-
takes not to manufacture on its territory. No 
amendments to this list have been reported by 
the Council during 1977, the year covered by the 
annual report. This question is considered 
hereafter (Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments). 
CHAPTER Ill 
Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(a) Non-application of controls 
16. Regarding the control of armaments in 
member states in accordance with the treaty, 
the present annual report shows no change in 
the situation. The Committee has always under-
lined the inadequate application of Protocols 
Nos. Ill and IV of the modified Brussels Treat.v-
on the control of armaments. It is surprising to 
read in the same report of the Council that : 
"The Council continued to pay close atten-
tion to the implementation of the modified 
Brussels Treaty and its protocols 1 ••• The 
different aspects and stages of implementa· 
tion of the Paris Agreements appeared on 
the agenda for Council meetings thirty-one 
times", 
whereas the same report mentions fields where 
the Agency does not exercise these activities : 
a• 
"The situation described in previous annual 
reports, regarding certain armaments, 
remained unchanged in 1977. 
In present circumstances, the Agency's 
activities do not extend to atomic weapons 
or, in one member state, to what -that state 
calls "strategic forces". 
1. Rapporteur's italies. 
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Nor does the Agency apply any controls to 
biological weapons. 
The control activities dealt with in this 
chapter do not, therefore, concern these 
categories of armaments. 
In the case of chemical weapons, only non-
production controls take place ; no quan-
titative controls are made since none of the 
member states have declared possessing such 
armaments." 
17. The annual report subsequently adds: 
"(d) As the Convention for the due process 
of law 1 has not yet entered into force, the 
control measures carried out by the Agency 
a:t private concerns had, in 1977, as in 
previous years, to take the form of 'agreed 
control measures'. 
One consequence of this situation is that, 
in order to obtain the agreement of the firms 
concerned, the Agency must give some six 
weeks' notice. This agreement has never 
been withheld." 
18. The Committee has noted many cases of 
shortcomings in the application of controls 
referred to in earlier reports by the Council 2, 
two of which are worthy of mention : the 
"strategic" forces not covered by the Agency's 
work include not only the nuclear warheads of 
French strategic forces but also their means of 
delivery - nuclear submarines, strategic missiles, 
Mirage IV aircraft. With regard to the control 
of the non-production of chemical weapons in 
Germany, in the absence of the guarantees 
provided for in the convention mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, the Agency is not authorised 
to take samples, essential for any control worthy 
of the name. 
(b) Activities of the Agency for the Control 
of Armaments 
19. Although the attitude of governments, or of 
some of them, limits the Agency's scope, it is 
active and efficient in the fields open to it and 
deserves the Committee's praise. The number 
of inspections carried out each year by the 
Agency shows no reduction in its activities, as 
shown in the following table : 
1. Convention eoneerning measures to be taken by 
member states of Western European Union in order to 
enable the Ageney for the Control of Armaments to earry 
out its eontrol effectively and making provision for due 
proeess of law, in aeeordanee with Protoeol No. IV of 
the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protoeols signed 
in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th 
December 1957, but ratified by only six states : Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom). 
2. Document 700, paragraph 20 et seq. 
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Numbers and types of inspections 
carried out oy the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
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--
1961 29 15 12 66 7 63 
2 26 20 ll 57 7 65 
3 35 13 13 61 10 74 
4 39 19 13 71 9 80 
5 26 16 ll 53 7 60 
--
6 * * * * * 78 7 * * * * * 70 8 * * * * * 79 9 * * * * * 77 
a b a b a b a b a b a b 
1970 * * * * * * * * * * 82 72 
I * * * • * * * * * * 82 72 2 • * * * * 66 3 * * * * * 66 
4 * • * • * 71 
5 • * * * • 72 6 • * * * * 71 1977 * * * * * 70 
Note a, b : from 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its sum-
mary table of inspections, thenceforth counting inspections of several small grouped ammu-
nition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of inspections in fact 
reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported 
both sets of figures (old and new style -a and b) for the years 1970 and 1971. 
Sowrcea : Figures for 1961-65 are derived from the published annual reports of the Council. 
Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the Committee. Those for 1970 
to 1977 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommen-
dation 213 of the Assembly, but permission to publish them has been withheld. Minor dis-
crepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are without 
significance. 
• Confidential information available to the Committee deleted from the published report. 
20. The Committee finds particularly interesting 
the lists of armaments currently being produced 
given in Section E : "State and problems of 
control in certain particular fields." 
21. It may be asserted that controls are applied 
on the mainland in respect of aircraft and non-
strategic missiles capable of carrying nuclear 
bombs and warheads. No controls are applied in 
respect of the French strategic force and the 
other European mainland countries have no 
strategic forces. The bombs and warheads, being 
in United States custody, are not subject to 
control by the Agency. The Council partly con-
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firmed this situation in reply to Written Question 
142, put by the Rapporteur on 27th May 1974. 
As stated in the annual repol"t : 
"The Agency again worked on the basic 
assumption, which is supported by the 
observations of previous years, that the 
undertakings and declarations of member 
countries are being honoured." 
The previous annual report added : 
"Clearly, if any doubt existed on this point, 
control measures would have to be 
increased." 
22. The Committee notes that the usefulness of 
the few controls now applied is disputed, 
particularly in the case of the non-production 
of certain conventional armaments on German 
territory. It is not by chance that the present 
annual report does not state that non-production 
controls are the Agency's "primary task" as was 
the case in earlier annual reports. 
23. In the past year, there have been press 
reports 1 of the supposed production and testing 
in Zaire by a West German firm of medium-
range ballistic cruise-type missiles with a nuclear 
warhead capability. In fact, these would appear 
to have been cheap satellite launchers tested by 
the firm Orbital Transport and Rockets 2 which, 
in March 1978, announced thrut it had moved from 
Zaire to Brazil. The German Ministry of Defence 
described the supposed nuclear capability of 
these missiles as "absurd". Again according to 
press articles, such activities are forbidden under 
the Brussels Treaty. 
24. The Committee confirms the absurdity of 
these reports (a liquid-fuelled launcher could have 
no military application as a nuclear warhead 
carrier) and notes that under Protocol No. HI 
of the treaty Germany's renunciation of the 
production of certain conventional weapons 
applies only to its own territory. The controls 
and restrictions provided for in the treaty have 
no application outside the territory of member 
states. 
25. More important for Germany, because of its 
economic spin-off, is naval shipbuilding. Accord-
ing to press repor.ts on 2nd March, it is believed 
that an agreement has been concluded with Iran 
for the supply of six class 209 submarines (990 
tons on the surface; 1,290 submerged) and some 
fifty other warships. But on 26th September 
1973 the Council changed the list of conventionai 
armaments not to be produced on German 
territory, raising from 450 to 1,800 tons the 
upper limit for submarines. Previously, Germany 
had been authorised to build up to six submarines 
not exceeding 1,000 tons, a quota which had then 
been exported, four to Greece and two to Turkey. 
According to the treaty, any change of this 
nature must be made on the recommendation of 
a NATO supreme commander "in accordance 
with the needs of the armed forces assigned to 
him 3". The Council has been unable to confirm 
to the Assembly that the 1973 change was made 
to meet the needs of German armed forces 
assigned to NATO or whether it was intended 
1. December 1977 advance press reports of an article 
due to appear in Penthouse, American monthly, March 
1978. 
2. The Committee was informed that Orbital Transport 
and Rockets was no longer a German company, that its 
offices were leaving Germany, and that it had no link 
with the Government of the Federal Republic. 
3. The words in italics do not appear in the English 
text of the treaty. 
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rather to meet export requirements 1• Whatever 
may be the provisions of the treaty, the Com-
mittee sees no reason why Germany should be 
deprived of export possibili!ties available to other 
WEU countries. 
26. A greater handicap for Germany resides in 
the restrictions on "permanent auxiliary vessels 
of more than 6,000 tons displacement" 2 which 
may not be produced on German territory. 
According to the press (H andelsblatt, 24th October 
1977), the German navy, in order to procure two 
10,000-ton oil tankers, had to convert two former 
tankers rather than build new ones in German 
shipyards, which would have cost less. Informed 
of these fa<rts, the Ministries for Economic 
Affairs and Foreign Affairs found these restric-
tions most untoward and the Deputy Chairman 
of the Bundestag Defence Committee, Mr. 
Buchstaller, considered that it was very unfor-
tunate that the Federal Republic should still 
be subjected to the restrictions of the WEU 
treaty when the latter no longer corresponded 
to present-day realities or to the need for joint 
efforts in the defence field. 
27. The Committee recalls that the list of con-
ventional weapons whose production is banned 
on German territory may be amended by the 
Council by a two-thirds majority. The Commit-
tee recommends that the Council make greater 
use of this provision to delete "permanent 
auxiliary vessels of more than 6,000 tons displace-
ment" from the list of conventional armaments 
which may not be produced on German territory. 
It is recalled that the commitment entered into 
by Germany not to produce atomic, biological 
and chemical weapons on its territory cannot be 
amended by the Council. · 
European centre for defence studies 
28. In the draft recommendation submitted to 
the Assembly, the Committee proposes that better 
use be made of the considerable expel"t knowledge 
of the Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
While the application of the controls provided 
for in the treaty is necessarily being reduced, 
the governments might create, with the resources 
of the Agency, a centre for defence studies, an 
official centre on an intergovernmental level, to 
which the various intergovernmental defence 
bodies having at present no such resources of 
their own might have recourse. For instance, 
the independent programme group has no inter-
national secretariat and it might be to its 
advantage to call on a truly European body to 
conduct any specific studies it might need rather 
than use the services of a national delegation. 
1. See ilnteT alia Written Question 139 and the reply of 
the Council. 
2. The initial 1954 text placed no limitations on 
auxiliary vessels. This restriction was added by the 
Council on 24th May 1961 at the same time as the upper 
limit for certain warships was raised to 6,000 tons. 
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Moreover, unlike the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe, the WEU Assembly has 
no access to research facilities in the organisation 
outside the Office of the Clerk ; from time to 
time its committees call on the services of out-
side experts. A European study centre in the 
framework of WEU might very usefully meet tlie 
Assembly's own needs at the same time. However, 
in view of the independence of the Assembly, 
which is a parliamentary body independent of 
governments, and of the diversity of member 
countries of intergovernmental organisations 
likely to call on the study centre, it should be 
stipulated in the centre's statutes that the pol-
itical direction of any study undertaken would be 
the sole responsibility of the body requesting the 
study. 
CHAPTER IV 
Standing Armaments Committee 
29. The Committee notes that the primary task 
of the Standing Armaments Committee at the 
present time is the study of armaments industries 
in member countries. In this connection, the 
SAC has prepared a draft outline which was 
transmitted to the Council on 25th January 1977 
and approved by the Council of Ministers on 
26th April 1977. The Committee is pleased to 
note that the mandate given to the SAC is in 
the process of being implemented and it wishes to 
be regularly informed of the progress of the 
study undertaken. 
30. The Committee was satisfied to receive the 
note prepared at the request of the Council by 
the Head of the International Secretariat of the 
SAC on the division of work between the 
independent European programme group and the 
SAC on studies dealing with European co-opera-
tion in armaments matters. 
31. It appears from the note that in drawing 
up its outline study programme the SAC took 
into account the setting up of the IEPG, and 
in particular its Panel Ill (economic questions 
and procedures) under German chairmanship 
and its Sub-Groups 4 (study on industrial 
co-operation and rationalisation of the European 
defence industry) and 5 (collected legislation, 
regulations and agreements on the export of 
armaments) for which the pilot countries are 
France and Italy respectively. In authorising 
this study the Council recalled that overlapping, 
particularly with the IEPG, was to be avoided, 
and with this in mind asked that the SAC be 
informed of -the progress of work of the IEPG. 
The SAC therefore co-ordinated with Sub-Group 
4, receiving information from the two pilot 
countries, Germany and France. A common 
definition of armaments and the industrial sector 
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was drawn up and for the compilation of 
economic data the SAC is awai!ting the results of 
the questionnaire circulated by the IEPG. The 
repor.ts of the SAC are also being sent to the 
Chairman of the IEPG. 
32. The Council has agreed to the principle of a 
meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on the 
joint production of armaments (this will be a 
joint meeting between the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments of the Assembly and 
the Standing Armaments Committee) and notes 
that this would provide a suitable opportunity 
for informing the Assembly on the progress of 
the study of the armaments industries in member 
countries. The Committee trusts that it will be 
possible to hold this meeting in autumn 1978. 
33. The study on armaments industries is at 
present the main activity of the SAC to which 
governments have hesitated to entrust projects 
for the joint production of armaments. The 
Assembly has frequently asked that better use 
be made of the expert knowledge acquired by this 
body, which must in no circumstances be left 
without a constructive task to accomplish. The 
Committee therefore suggests that, once the study 
on armaments industries has been completed, 
the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee be associated with the creation of the 
European centre for defence studies referred to 
above. 
Conclusions 
34. The Committee's principal conclusions are 
set out in the draft recommendation. As far as 
the preamble is concerned, the Committee recalls 
in paragraph 7 above the procedure whereby 
NATO may supply information for replies to 
Assembly recommendations. The problem of 
publishing the level of forces of BAOR is 
mentioned in paragraph 13. The problem 
encountered by the application of controls is 
referred to in paragraphs 16 to 18. 
35. Regarding paragraph 1 of the operBitive text, 
the reference to publishing the level of forces of 
BAOR is mentioned in paragraph 13 ; the 
proposal in paragraph 3 to establish a European 
centre for defence studies is mentioned in 
paragraphs 28 and 33 of this explanatory 
memorandum. Paragraphs 25 to 27 explain the 
proposal to relax the restrictions on Germany's 
production of conventional armaments. 
Opinion of the minority 
36. Three members of the Committee would have 
deleted operative paragraph 3 of the draft 
recommendation ; one was unable to support the 
first paragraph of the preamble and would have 
replaced "Noting" by "Regretting" in the third. 
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Amendment No. 1 
Application of the Brussels Treaty -
Reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others 
19th June 1978 
In the draft recommendation proper, at the end of the second paragraph insert "making use 
of the resources of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments and its Standing Armaments 
Committee". 
Signed: Stoffelen, van den Bergh, Urwin, Mr8. von Botkmer 
1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment No. 2 
Application of the Brussels Treaty -
Reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Treu 
19th June 1978 
I. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out the beginning of the first paragraph 
up to "recommendations and". 
2. In the third paragraph of the preamble, leave out "and that the usefulness of those that 
are applied is contested". 
3. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 2 and insert: 
"2. Encourage the Standing Armaments Committee to pursue and develop the study it has 
undertaken to improve co-operation between European armaments industries and provide the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments with the means it needs to enable the modified Brussels 
Treaty to be applied in full;". 
Signed : Treu 
1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Parts 1 and 2 agreed to; part 3 negatived);. 
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Disarmament 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 11 
by Mr. Roper, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on disarmament 
EXPLANATORY :MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Roper, Rapporteur 
Introduction 
United Nations General Assembly special seBBion on disarmament 
General arrangements 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and United Kingdom 
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Denmark - and the Nine 
United Kingdom 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Italy 
France 
United States 
Soviet Union and its allies 
Fifteen non-aligned members of the CCD 
China 
Conclusions 
20th June 1978 
1. Adopted in Committee by 19 votes to 0 with 3 
abstentions. 
2. Members of the Committee : Mr. Boper (Chairman) ; 
MM. BonneZ, Boberti (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Ahrens 
(Alternate: Biiohner), BoomeZ, Beohter, van den Bergh, 
Boldrini (Alternate : .J.ntoni), Boucheny, Critchley (Alter-
nate: Banks), Dejardin (Alternate: Lambiotte), Fosson, 
Gmnt, HandZos, Hardy, Konen, de Koster, Lemmrioh, 
Maggioni, Mmard, PaweZosyk, Pecchioli, P~ronnet (Alter· 
nate: Bozsi), Hermann Sohmidt, Seholten, Tanghe, 
Whitehead (Alternate : Cook). 
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Draft Recommendation 
on disarmament 
The Assembly 
(i) Aware that world expenditure on armaments has now reached $400 billion per annum and 
that some of the poorest countries are devoting more than half of their public expenditure to 
defence; 
(ii) Noting that, apart from the biological warfare convention of 1972, no arms control agreement 
since the war has yet achieved any measure of disarmament ; 
(iii) Believing that new impetus must be given to negotiating certain urgent and concrete measures 
of arms control and disarmament but that the ultimate objective must remain general and complete 
disarmament under effective international control ; 
(iv) Recalling its proposals of 1972 and 1974 for a United Nations satellite observation capability; 
(v) Recalling further the expertise acquired by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments 
and urging that it be placed at the disposal of any international disarmament organisation ; 
(vi) Recalling the annual publications of the League of Nations: "Armaments Year Book" and 
"Statistical Year Book of the Trade in Arms ~md Ammunition"; 
(vii) Recalling the work under the diplomatic conference of 1975-77 of the ad hoc committee on 
inhumane weapons and the associated conferences of government experts, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS 
Take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the following objects in view: 
1. To secure universal agreement on a programme of immediate disarmament and arms control 
measures to be concluded in the next five years, including : 
(a) a comprehensive test ban; 
(b) a chemical weapons treaty; 
(c) a strengthened nuclear non-proliferation regime with rigorous safeguards at all stages of 
civil nuclear fuel cycles, linked with appropriate security assurances to non-nuclear coun-
tries; 
(d) a substantial reduction to restore the balance of forces and armaments in Europe; 
(e) agreements involving both supplier and recipient countries to restrict the international 
transfer of conventional arms ; 
(/) the extension to other areas of confidence-building measures of the type included in the 
CSCE final act ; 
(g) agreements to restrict the development of new generations of inhumane conventional 
weapons and incendiaries ; 
and, if possible concurrently with the first agreement providing for independent verification : 
(h) the establishment of an international disarmament agency under United Nations aegis 
equipped with its own means of verifying compliance with arms control agreements and 
peacekeeping arrangements, and responsible inter alia for publishing, on the basis of its 
own sources of information as well as mandatol'y reports by all countries, annual reports 
on the forces and armaments of all countries and arms transfers between countries ; 
2. To make such changes to the present principal disarmament negotiating forum as will secure 
the participation of all nuclear weapon powers without reducing its effectiveness ; 
3. To maintain the expectations of progress on concrete measures of disarmament engendered by 
the present special session of the United Nations General Assembly, by the convening of a further 
special disarmament session in 1981 to review progress. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Roper, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. World military expenditure in 1978 has been 
estimated at $400 billion, of which 70 % is 
accounted for by the NATO and Warsaw Pact 
countries, and 18 % by the countries of the third 
world including China 1 • The greatest increase 
in expenditure over the last decade has come 
from the third world countries - excluding 
China their share of total world txpenditure rose 
from 6% to 14%, whereas the expenditure of 
the two military blocs is estimated to have been 
roughly constant in real terms but to have 
decreased from 80 % to 70 % as a proportion of 
world expenditure. In 1976 total world military 
expenditure was estimated at $325 billion - as 
much as the world spent on health and more than 
was spent on education. In absolute terms at 
constant prices world military expenditure has 
increased by 13 % over the last ten years and 
by 77 % over the last twenty years. 
2. Thus the early hopes of the United Nations 
- Article XI of the Charter of which empowers 
the General Assembly to consider "the principles 
governing disarmament and the regulation of 
armaments" and to make "recommendations with 
regard to such principles" have not been fulfilled. 
Since the first meeting of the General Assembly 
in 1945 the level of armaments throughout the 
world has steadily increased and there has been 
no agreement on disarmament in the sense that 
none of the agreements so far concluded since the 
second world war (with the exception of the 1972 
biological warfare convention) provides for 
existing levels of armaments to be reduced or 
for weapons to be destroyed. It is true however 
that in the last twenty years a number of arms 
control measures have been agreed which have 
had the effect of codifying an existing situation, 
and some of which may have imposed restraints 
on some of the signatories in the sense that they 
may have been inhibited from developing or 
deploying certain weapons systems that they 
might otherwise have done - four agreements 
are probably significant in this respect : the 
antartic treaty ; the partial test ban treaty ; the 
treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons ; and the seabed treaty. 
3. The history of disarmament and arms control 
negotiations since the second world war can be 
considered in two phases - the first largely 
fruitless up to about 1958 when negotiations 
were conducted in subsidiary bodies of the United 
Nations Security Council - the Atomic Energy 
Commission and the Commission on Conventional 
1 World armaments and disarmament yearbook 1978 
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 
Armaments, later merged into the Disarmament 
Commission which had a sub-committee composed 
of the perm~nent members of the Security Coun-
cil and Canada. By 1958 the membership of the 
United Nations had increased from the original 
fifty-one to over eighty, and the voting power of 
the non-aligned countries in the General Assembly 
was becoming predominant. 'l'he Disarmament 
Commission in that year was enlarged to include 
the whole membership of the United Nations and, 
true to Parkinson's law on committees, ceased to 
be an effective negotiating forum - since then 
it has met only twice in 1960 and in 1965. 
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4. In the course of 1958 a number of exchanges 
of letters between President Eisenhower and 
Mr. Khrushchev led to a certain rapprochement 
between the views of the United States and the 
Soviet Union on approaches to disarmament which 
resulted in the setting up of the Ten-Nation 
Disarmament Committee (five NATO and five 
Warsaw Pact countries). This met for three 
months in 1960 and, with a year's interruption 
caused by the U-2 incident in 1960, led on 20th 
September 1961 to a joint statement by the 
Soviet Union and the United States on "agreed 
principles as a basis for multilateral negotiations 
on disarmament". While these stated that the 
goal of negotiations was a programme to ensure 
general and complete disarmament accompanied 
by procedures for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes they contained a reference to efforts 
to ensure early agreement on measures of dis-
armament - i.e. limited measures of disarmament 
or "collateral measures". In December that year 
the General Assembly endorsed the agreement 
reached between the Soviet Union and the United 
States to establish new negotiating machinery 
known as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee (ENDC) which met for the first time in 
Geneva in 1962. 
5. As originally constituted, the ENDC com-
prised five NATO countries:. Canada, Fran.ce, 
Italy, United Kingdom, Umted . States ; five 
Warsaw Pact countries: Bulgana, Czechoslo-
vakia Poland Romania and the Soviet Union ; 
' ' il B and eight non-aligned countries; Braz , urma, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria a~d 
Sweden (France however did not take ~p Its 
place in the conference). The membership h~ 
been progressively enlarged over the years, still 
maintaining roughly the same ~alance J;>etw~en 
aligned and non-aligned countries, and Its title 
was changed in 1969 to the Conference of the 
Committee on Disarmament (CCD). Its present 
membership is as follows: western-aligned coun-
tries : Canada Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy Japan ' Netherlands, United Kingdom, 
Unit;d State;; Warsaw Pact and Soviet-aligned 
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countries : Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German 
Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, 
Poland, Romania, Soviet Union ; non-aligned 
countries : Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, India, Iran, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Peru, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Zaire. 
6. The CCD which meets normally in two 
longish sessions each year in Geneva is not strictly 
speaking part of the United Nations machinery, 
but is in fact serviced by its secretariat, and a 
special representative of the United Nations 
Secretary-General participates in its sessions. The 
conference operates under the eo-chairmanship of 
the United States and the Soviet Union who 
reserve the right to determine the agenda and 
dates of sessions of the conference although in 
practice these are invariably settled through 
private negotiations with the other participants. 
The daily chairmanship of working sittings 
rotates among the membership. The CCD, like 
its predecessor the ENDC, reports on progress 
made each year to the General Assembly of the 
United Nations; they have been the forum where 
initial multilateral agreement has been reached 
on the partial test ban treaty, the non-
proliferation treaty, the treaty banning weapons 
of mass destruction on the seabed, the convention 
banning biological weapons, and the convention 
on the prohibition of environmental modification 
techniques for military purposes. 
7. Over the last eight years there have of course 
been important developments in strictly bilateral 
negotiations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union on arms control issues, in particular 
in the SALT talks, but also five others : limita-
tion of armaments in the Indian Ocean (Berne, 
from March 1977, latest meeting 17th February 
1978) ; agreement on radiological weapons- i.e. 
employing radiation from radioactive material in 
the absence of a nuclear explosion - (last meeting 
4th May 1978) ; limiting international transfers 
of conventional armaments (Helsinki, from 
December 1977, latest meeting 4th-8th May 
1978) ; a ban on anti-satellite satellites (Helsinki, 
8th June 1978), and an agreement on chemical 
weapons. There are also the trilateral Soviet 
Union, United Kingdom, United States talks on 
a comprehensive test ban in Geneva, and the 
negotiations between members of NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact in the MBFR talks in Vienna. 
Except as they affect the issues discussed at the 
United Nations special session, these "bloc to 
bloc" negotiations are not discussed in this report, 
nor are the broader confidence-building measures 
agreed in the CSCE framework which include 
also the European neutrals. 
8. There has always been a contradiction 
between the need for a restricted number of 
countries to participate in any forum where 
actual negotiations on disarmament can be con-
ducted, and the desire of all members of the 
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United Nations to discuss the subject- and the 
membership of the United Nations is now 149. 
There is also the often-expressed frustration of 
many non-aligned countries at the failure to reach 
any agreement at all on actual measures of 
disarmament as opposed t<>. measures of arms 
control ; moreover, since the non-proliferation 
treaty was concluded in 1968, in their view the 
agreements reached in the CCD framework have 
had little more than cosmetic value, meaningful 
negotiations on arms control have shifted to the 
restricted frameworks listed in the previous 
paragraph. 
9. At the 1976 ministerial s~ion of the non-
aligned countries' groupings, held in Colombo, 
proposals were made by Yugoslavia for a special 
session of the United Nations General Assembly 
to be devoted specially to disarmament and the 
proposal was agreed to unanimously at the thirty-
first session of the General Assembly in December 
1976. Drawing on the experience of the 1974 and 
1975 special sessions devoted to the "new inter-
national economic order" the special session is 
invited to agree on a declaration of principles and 
on a programme of action. A fifty-four-member 
preparatory committee has been discussing the 
agenda and other proposals for the special session 
since March 1977. While it is recognised that the 
special session will not be a negotiating forum for 
reaching an agreement on specific measures of 
disarmament, it is hoped by many of its principal 
sponsors that it will be able to re-orientate the 
general approach to disarmament as conducted 
in other fora. 
10. The special session opened in New York on 
23rd May and is to continue until 28th June. 
From 6th to 9th June your Rapporteur was able 
to discuss with the heads of various delegations 
in New York their initial impressions of the 
special session. The present report deals with the 
main proposals that have so far been presented 
to the special session or preparatory committee. 
United Nations General Assembly special 
session on disarmament 
General arrangements 
11. It was agreed in the preparatory committee 
that after a general debate and a review of the 
present disarmament situation work will con-
centrate on three main areas - the adoption of 
a declaration on disarmament, the adoption of a 
programme of action on disarmament and a 
review of international disarmament negotiating 
machinery including the role of the United 
Nations itself. This report will summarise pro-
posals already tabled in the preparatory com-
mittee, or so far presented to the special session, 
first by various WEU countries, and then by 
certain other significant countries or groups. 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom 
12. These five WEU countries, together with six 
other aligned countries - Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, Japan, Norway and Turkey- tabled 
a draft declaration on disarmament on 13th 
December 1977, and with the exception of Turkey, 
a draft programme of action on 1st February 
1978. 
13. The draft declaration stated in its general 
objectives that the ultimate goal of disarmament 
is to ensure the survival of mankind through 
strengthening peace, security and stability. An 
integrated disarmament programme should ensure 
that disarmament is general and complete under 
effective international control and accompanied 
by procedures for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes and arrangements for the maintenance 
of peace and security. Such disarmament would 
permit states to possess only those non-nuclear 
forces and armaments that are necessary to 
maintain internal order and provide agreed man-
power for a United Nations peace force. A further 
goal would be the release of resources a significant 
proportion of which should go to satisfying the 
economic and social needs of developing coun-
tries. 
14. Principles governing disarmament negotia-
tions should ensure the active participation and 
support of all states, particularly nuclear weapon 
states and militarily significant states, and for 
agreements to be effective it must be apparent to 
states that they serve their best interests, and 
agreements should be reached wherever possible 
on a basis of consensus. Disarmament measures 
must be balanced to provide undiminished secu-
rity at lower levels of armaments and forces and 
progress will depend upon agreement on effective 
methods of verification. Negotiations on limited 
measures of disarmament should not preclude 
negotiations on a treaty of general and complete 
disarmament. 
15. The draft declaration proposes by way of 
priorities that specific multilateral disarmament 
measures should contribute to progress towards 
the ultimate objective of general and complete 
disarmament. While the eventual elimination of 
all nuclear weapons is the most important 
challenge, partial agreements, in particular uni-
versal adherence to the non-proliferation treaty, 
would be a vital contribution accompanied by 
measures to prevent both horizontal and vertical 
proliferation 1 and the establishment where 
appropriate of nuclear-weapon-free zones. While 
recognising the right of all states to nuclear 
1. By "horizontal proliferation" is meant, in the dis-
armament negotiations, the spread of weapons systems to 
more countries ; by "vertical proliferation" is meant the 
acquisition of more and improved weapons by a country 
already possessing a weapons system. 
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energy for peaceful purposes there must be inter-
national nuclear safeguards in particular those 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
which as a minimum must apply to international 
transfers of nuclear ma:terial, equipment and 
technology. The elimination of chemical weapons 
and any new weapons of mass destruction are 
of great importance. Lastly the declaration points 
out that most of the wol'ld's military expenditure 
is devoted to conventional military power. All 
states should make efforts in parallel to those in 
the field of nuclear disarmament to halt the 
diversion of resources to conventional weapons, 
the international transfer of conventional arms 
should be brought under control and the reduc-
tion of military budgets in all countries could 
provide undiminished security at a lower level 
of armaments. 
16. The draft programme of action tabled by the 
same ten countries first reaffirms that the 
ultimate goal is general and complete disarma-
ment and then sets out priorities in negotiations 
for the next few years with proposals for con-
current studies to prepare future negotiations 
towards general and complete disarmament. The 
immediate measures proposed are the halting 
and reversal of the nuclear arms race especially 
through a second SALT between the United 
States and the Soviet Union to be followed by 
further negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons ; 
it calls for the earliest conclusion of the com-
prehensive test ban treaty banning all nuclear 
explosions to be adhered to by all states ; it calls 
for further measures to strengthen the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime based essentially on the 
non-proliferation treaty and IAEA safeguards ; 
it calls for the establishment of additional 
nuclear-weapon-free zones in suitable regions 
through agreement between all states in the region 
and the effective co-operation from nuclear 
weapon states. 
17. Secondly the programme calls for appro-
priate assurances by nuclear weapon states to 
increase the confidence of non-nuclear weapon 
states in their own sec-urity from nuclear attack. 
In this connection your Rapporteur notes that 
the so-called "negative security assurances", 
whereby non-nuclear weapon countries are to be 
assured that nuclear weapons will not be used 
against them will of course require special con-
ditions which exclude the present arrangements 
for ensuring the security of the allies and 
associates of nuclear weapon states. It is under-
stood that this particular proposal may secure 
support from both the Soviet Union and the 
United States. 
18. The third proposal dealing with other 
weapons of mass destruction calls for conventions 
to ban chemical weapons and radiological weapons 
and agreements to ban any new weapons of mass 
destruction that may be devised. 
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19. Fourthly in the field of conventional 
weapons there are proposals for bilateral, regional 
and multilateral agreements to restrict the pro-
duction, transfer and acquisition of conventional 
weapons ; conventions to prohibit or limit the use 
of certain indiscriminate conventional weapons; 
and lastly agreements on a regional basis to 
strengthen peace and security and urgent efforts 
to contribute to a more stable military relation-
ship in Europe. The concept of regional disarma-
ment is particularly favoured by Belgium. 
20. The programme next proposes various 
measures to strengthen international security and 
confidence to be undertaken in addition to the 
specific disarmament measures. These include 
proposals for all countries to publish detailed 
information about their armed forces, the total 
value of their arms production and of their 
transfers of arms to other countries ; to supply 
full information on military budgets in accord-
ance with the standardised scheme to be prepared 
by the Secretary-General on the basis of a present 
pilot study. This would be a step towards verified 
and balanced reductionsjn military expenditure. 
In this connection your Rapporteur understands 
that the United Kingdom has volunteered to 
participate. It is understood that in such a pilot 
study of national military budgets by the United 
Nations Secretary-General a representative 
sample of other countries would have to include 
both underdeveloped countries and "planned 
economy" - i.e. communist - countries. Lastly 
the section proposes that confidence-building 
measures of the type included in the Helsinki 
final act should be extended to other regions 
possibly with broader parameters - it proposes 
twenty-one days' advance notice of major military 
movements or manoeuvres ; invitations to 
observers from other countries to attend 
manoeuvres and improved communications 
between governments particularly in areas of 
tension by the establishment of "hot lines" and 
other methods to reduce the risk of conflict due 
to miscalculation. 
21. Among the studies proposed to facilitate 
future negotiations on further disarmament 
measures the proposals place emphasis on the 
need for the United Nations peace-keeping role 
and arrangements for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes to be regarded as complementary to 
disarmament. There should be studies of ways to 
limit the build-up of conventional weapons 
regionally taking into account the international 
transfer of conventional weapons and the pos-
sibility of a reciprocal limitation of the levels 
and types of conventional weapons ; and the 
establishment of a United Nations register of 
weapons transfers 1 • Your Rapporteur points out 
1. It is recalled that such a register of arlliB transfers 
was mantained by the League of Nations up to the out· 
break of the second world war. 
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that as a general rule recipient countries have 
been opposed to proposals for publicising or 
controlling in any way the international transfer 
of conventional weapons, but that India which 
has been among the opponents may now be taking 
a more favourable view of such proposals. Other 
studies would include the relationship between 
disarmament and development on the basis of 
the report of the present ad hoc group of 
governmental experts - a subject in which the 
Nordic countries are interested, to include the 
conversion of armaments industry to other pur-
poses - and studies of all regional aspects of 
disarmament designed to increase confidence and 
stability - an aspect in which Belgium is parti-
cularly interested. Lastly studies are proposed 
of various technical measures to contribute to 
confidence building such as demilitarised or 
limited force zones and early-warning systems. 
Such systems have been tried out effectively in 
the Sinai since the 1973 hostilities ; the United 
Kingdom proposes that the technical expertise 
should be acquired by a United Nations body 
and extended to other areas of the world. 
Belgium 
22. Speaking at the special session on 2nd June, 
Mr. Simonet, Belgian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, laid stress on regional aspects of 
disarmament. He said that parallel attention 
should be devoted to conventional weapons and 
to weapons of mass destruction. In the latter 
case, the non-proliferation regime should be 
strengthened by the accession to the non-
proliferation treaty of countries that were not 
yet parties and by strengthening the IAEA safe-
guards. But conventional weapons represented 
more than four-fifths of all world military 
expenditure and should be given equal attention ; 
here agreements between the countries of a parti-
cular region on desirable levels of armaments 
would have the effect of limiting transfers into 
the region, and Belgium would support consulta-
tions to control the transfer of weapons in the 
world. He also proposed a balanced and verifiable 
reduction in military budgets. 
Denmark - and the Nine 
23. Mrs. Ostergaard, Danish Minister without 
Portfolio, spoke in the special session on 25th 
May first on behalf of the nine European Com-
munity countries, by virtue of Denmark's chair-
manship. (The countries sponsoring the western 
proposals outlined in paragraph 12 et seq above 
include six of the Nine, but not France, Ireland 
or Luxembourg.) She pointed out that the Nine 
were particularly interested in the strengthening 
of security in Europe by establishing a more 
stable relationship at a lower level of military 
potential ; a principle which involved the inter-
relationship between disarmament and national 
security including the inherent and balanced 
right of states to individual and collective self 
defence which the Nine hoped to see included 
in the declaration to be agreeu by the special 
session. For the programme of action the Nine 
stressed that measures to curb and reverse the 
nuclear arms race and to prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons were of fundamental importance, 
while parallel action should be taken on a regional 
and multilateral basis to limit and reduce the 
world-wide build-up of conventional weapons and 
forces. The Nine supported an in-depth study of 
the relationship between disarmament and 
development and also suggested that confidence-
building measures of the type contained in the 
CSCE final act, including prior notification of 
military manoeuvres and invitations to observers 
to attend them, might be applied to other regions 
in the world. Finally, on behalf of the Nine, she 
mentioned further use of modern technology 
including observation satellites for the inter-
national verification of disarmament agreements, 
although she made no direct reference to the 
specific French proposal. 
24. Turning to machinery, she recognised the 
need for a negotiating body of limited size and 
a deliberative body open to the whole membership 
of the United Nations, but made no specific 
reference to French or other proposals in this 
connection. The Nine felt however that the role 
of the United Nations should be strengthened in 
the disarmament field and effective follow-up 
to the special session might take the form of a 
second special session to generate continuing 
pressure for productive negotiations. 
25. Speaking on behalf of Denmark, Mrs. 
Ostergaard noted the connection between inter-
national efforts to reduce military expenditure 
and the commitment to a new international econo-
mic order, and endorsed the Nordic proposal for 
an in-depth study of the relationship between 
disarmament and development. She gave very 
high priority to a strategy of nuclear non-
proliferation, and referring to conventional 
disarmament, endorsed the objective of limiting 
production and prorurement of conventional 
weapons and limiting international arms 
transfers. 
United Kingdom 
26. Mr. Callaghan, the British Prime Minister, 
addressed the special session on 2nd June when 
he mentioned in particular prospects of agree-
ment on a comprehensive test ban treaty, saying 
that the United Kingdom was about to put 
forward (unspecified) new proposals in the tri-
partite United Kingdom-United States-Soviet 
Union negotiations in Geneva with the aim of 
achieving a ban on all nuclear explosions in all 
environments. Inspection under agreed rules 
would be necessary and an inttrnational system 
of seismic stations was proposed which would 
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enable some non-nuclear weapon countries to 
participate directly in the ban. Referring to 
strategic nuclear weapons, Mr. Callaghan 
welcomed clear references by the United States 
and the Soviet Union to their readiness to 
negotiate on the significant reduction of the 
numbers of strategic weapons systems and to 
constrain improvements in such systems which 
he saw as the objective for a third round of 
negotia;tions to follow the yet-to-be-concluded 
SALT 11. But nuclear armouries in Europe 
would also have to be further restrained. He 
reiterated the western group's proposals for 
security assurances for non-nuclear states which 
the United Kingdom would be prepared to enter 
into with other nuclear powers, and would 
support the establishment of further nuclear-
weapon-free zones such as that established in 
Latin America by the Tlatelolco treaty. On the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons the United 
Kingdom hoped that more than the present one 
hundred states would adhere to the non-
proliferation treaty, but recognised that coun-
tries could renounce nuclear weapons in other 
ways, in particular by accepting the full-scope 
safeguards of the IAEA. 
27. On MBFRs the western powers were awaiting 
Warsaw Pact replies to the proposals put forward 
by the West in April, and the NATO countries 
had agreed with the United Kingdom that more 
impetus should be given to the negotiations by 
proposing a meeting at the level of foreign 
ministers. Recognising that MBFR covered a 
limited area in Europe, he welcomed and called 
for careful consideration of the F'rench proposal 
for extending the geographical scope of negotia-
tions on military forces in Europe. 
28. The United Kingdom had taken the lead 
in proposing that confidence-building measures 
of the type agreed at Helsinki - such as advance 
notific81tion of military movements and 
manoeuvres, exchanging observm'S at manoeuvres, 
and exchanging military visits - should be 
adopted in other regions, and modern technical 
means of surveillance such as those installed in 
the Sinai peninsula after the 1973 cease-fire could 
also be applied in other regions of the world. 
Verification of arms control agreements was seen 
as another confidence-building measure and the 
United Kingdom had accepted voluntarily inter-
national inspection of civil/nuclear facilities and 
would play a full part in verifying a compre-
hensive test ban and a chemical weapons conven-
tion in which case the United Kingdom would 
accept inspection of relevant chemical manufac-
turing plants in Britain. Mr. Callaghan pledged 
the United Kingdom to accept on its territory 
whatever further measures of verification, 
including international inspection, were needed. 
Turning to the conventional arms build-up, Mr. 
Callaghan recognised the special responsibility of 
countries which supplied arms and said that the 
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United Nations should consider ways of restric-
ting the sale of conventional arms, possibly on 
a regional and multilateral basis, with the involve-
ment on an equal footing of both suppliers and 
recipients. On military budgets, he said that some 
states published defence budgets which were 
known to be very incomplete anu urged that the 
system of measuring and reporting military 
budgets devised under the auspices of the United 
Nations Secretary-General should be tested by a 
representative sample of states. (In reply to a 
question by the Chairman, it was stated in the 
House of Commons on 26th May that eight 
states, including the United Kingdom, had so far 
indicated their willingness to participate in a 
private test of the United Nations reporting 
scheme. An agreed standardiseu United Nations 
system of reporting military budgets was seen as 
an essential prerequisite of international agree-
ment on the balanced and verified reduction of 
military budgets.) 
29. Mr. Callaghan commended the United States 
proposals for the establishment of a stand-by 
United Nations peace-keeping force which the 
United Kingdom was very ready to examine. He 
also mentioned negotiations to control chemical 
weapons and the relationship between disarma-
ment and development. 
30. Turning to disarmament machinery, Mr. 
Callaghan said that the negotiating role belonged 
to the CCD in Geneva but its eo-chairmanship 
system could be reformed and France and China, 
it was hoped, would participate. There might be 
a case for adding some more members to make 
the CCD more representative and there should 
be a close relationship with the United Nations 
and fuller arrangements for non-members to 
participate in the work of the CCD. He called 
for a more important role for the United Nations 
Secretariat, suggesting that the Disarmament 
Centre should be responsible for collecting data 
on disarmament. 
31. In conclusion, Mr. Callaghan reiterated his 
belief that agreement on disarmament had to be 
reached by consensus and proposed that there 
should be a further special session of the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1981 to review 
action that had been taken meanwhile. 
Germany 
32. The Federal Chancellor, Mr. Helmut 
Schmidt, addressed the special session on 26th 
May. He identified four elements for a more 
stable peace : a policy of political, strategic and 
military balance ; a policy of detente, conflict 
containment and reconciliation of interests ; a 
capacity for effective crisis management; and 
lastly pre~ictability of political and military 
conduct. Military balance implied parity over all 
in terms of security policy rather than arith-
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metical identity of all kinds of armed forces, but 
balamce could not be confined to the military 
sphere, it must also be sought in foreign policy 
and in economic and social fields. Discussing arms 
control proper he said the non-proliferation treaty 
had been valuable in limiting nuclear armaments 
but it must not be an obstacle to the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy, the growing use of which 
required strengthened international measures to 
prevent misuse, especially of plutonium. Broad 
international consensus was required to streng-
then the non-proliferation regime. As for arms 
limitation in Europe the aim of the MBFR 
negotiaJtions in Vienna was to establish parity by 
means of balanced reductions to result in com-
mon collective ceilings on both sides. The joint 
communique signed after Mr. Brezhnev's visit to 
Bonn on 6th May 1 stated for the first time that 
approximate equality and parity were sufficient 
to ensure defence - a statement that was also 
welcomed by Mr. Callaghan in his speech. 
33. Chancellor Schmidt described specific 
German contributions to international security, 
recalling, although without specific reference to 
the Brussels Treaty or WEU, that from 1954 
Germany had renounced the production of 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Ger-
many's experience of international control of the 
non-production of chemical weapons showed that 
it could be effective, without economic harm 
and at reasonable cost ; he invited interested 
states to visit the Federal Republic to see how it 
was possible to verify adequately a ban on the 
production of chemical weapons, an agreement on 
which he considered particularly urgent. Ger-
many was also prepared to make its institutions 
available for seismological verification of a 
comprehensive test ban. He proposed further 
that the confidence-building measures agreed at 
Helsinki should be made binding upon all states 
in Europe and welcomed the proposals of the 
French President. Measures such as the notifi-
cation of military exercises, exchange visits of 
members of the armed forces, invitations to 
observers to attend military exercises could be 
extended to other regions of the world and 
regional agreements could form the basis of a 
future world-wide convention on confidence-
building measures. But beyond the sphere of 
military security, mistrust between peoples had 
to be eliminated and Germany would contribute 
to a United Nations programme to foster under-
standing among the young generation of all 
nations, and would be presenting specific pro-
posals later. 
1. "The two sides consider it important that no one 
should seek military superiority. They proceed from the 
assumption that approximate equality and parity are 
sufficient to ensure defence. In their opinion, corre.~ond­
ing disarmament and arms limitation measures in the 
nuclear and conventional fields meeting that principle 
would be of great importance." 
34. The Chancellor mentioned the relationship 
between the limitation of armaments and develop-
ment and agreed with Vice-President Mondale 
that efforts should be made to regulate the 
international transfer of armaments to achieve 
which both suppliers and recipients must agree 
to exercise restraint. He called for all exporting 
countries to undertake to disclose their arms 
deliveries. In this field Germany's policy was to 
refuse on principle to grant aid for the export 
of weapons and only very exceptionally to export 
weapons to countries outside its own alliance. 
None were exported to areas of international 
tensions. At the same time Germany had mass-
ively increased its development aid budget. 
Netherlands 
35. On 5th April 1978 the Netherlands sub-
mitted a paper to the preparatory committee 
proposing specifically that in the final document 
of the special session all countries should be 
invited to give their views on the establishment 
of an international disarmament organisation. 
The paper acknowledges earlier proposals 
advanced both by Sweden and the Netherlands 
in 1973. 
36. The international disarmament organisation 
is envisaged as the operational framework for 
the implementa:tion of disarmament treaties, 
responsible mainly for verification but also 
acting as a clearing house for disarmament 
information and for organising review confer-
ences provided for in disarmament treaties. The 
paper notes that the pending conventions -
to ban chemical weapons and to ban nuclear tests 
in all environments - will both require their 
own type of inspection and verification machin-
ery, including seismic arrays in the latter case, 
and that the French proposal for a United 
Nations observation satellite capability is also 
relevant to the functions that could be incorpor-
ated into an international disarmament organis-
ation. Among data such an organisation might 
handle could be information on stockpile destruc-
tion, seismic data and the results of inspections. 
Such an organisation might be set up in the first 
place for the implementation of a particular 
disarmament treaty, its member countries being 
parties to that treaty, and then given more func-
tions to assume responsibilities provided for in 
further disarmament treaties as they are con-
cluded. Its membership would therefore be open-
ended. 
Italy 
37. In a paper presented to the preparatory 
committee on 18th April 1978 Italy made pro-
posals concerning disarmament machinery. The 
General Assembly would remain the forum for 
universal consideration of disarmament matters 
with prior consideration in its First Committee 
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but ad hoc committees could be set up for special 
issues. The role of the Security Council is recalled 
with the suggestion that it might establish a 
committee with regional sub-committees to con-
trol the international transfer of conventional 
weapons. The CCD is seen as the best forum 
for substantive negotiations but its role would 
be enhanced if the two absent nuclear weapon 
states (France and China) joined it. The follow-
ing proposals for improvements are made : 
- limited increase in membership to provide 
better geographical and political balance ; 
- participation of any country interested 
as an observer empowered to submit 
written proposals and take part in their 
discussion; 
- plenary meetings might be open to the 
public. 
The paper makes no recommendation about the 
present system of eo-chairmanship by the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The Italian paper 
also proposes the establishment of a permanent 
international organ for verification employing 
technological verification methods such as sens-
ing, sampling, recording, communicating and 
interpreting devices. 
France 
38. On 23rd February 1978 France submitted in 
the preparatory committee a paper containing 
outline proposals for the declaration, the pro-
gramme of action and the machinery for nego-
tiations. The proposals were elaborated in Presi-
dent Giscard d'Estaing's address to the General 
Assembly on 25th May and in four specific 
memoranda. The French Delegation to the special 
session included among its members Mr. Jules 
Moch who had been leader of French disarma-
ment delegations up to 1960 when France had 
participated fully in multilateral negotiations 
including the Ten-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee which met from 1959 to 1960. In 1961 
when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee was established, France decided not to 
take up its seat on that body, and has not since 
then participated in the multilateral disarma-
ment negotiations which led to the conclusion 
of the partial test ban and non-proliferation 
treaties among others. 
39. In his speech to the special session Presi-
dent Giscard d'Estaing described disarmament 
as having been a failure so far ; the world was 
over-armed - in reality at a level of wartime 
rather than peace. The ultimate objective of real 
disarmament, general and controlled, had to be 
based on reality and France approached it on 
the basis of three fundamental concepts : every 
state had the legitimate right to security ; dis-
armament was the affair of all countries, not the 
monopoly of the few ; approaches to disarma-
DOCUMENT 778 
ment must take account of special regional 
situations. Among concrete proposals for disarma-
ment France introduced detailed memoranda on 
a world institute of disarmament research and on 
a United Nations observation satellite agency, 
and is to circulate a third on a special disarma-
ment fund for development: 
40. President Giscard d'Estaing considered the 
world in two separate headings - the non-
nuclear regions where encouragement should be 
given to the conclusion of specific non-nuclear 
agreements such as that on the denuclearisation 
of Latin America (Tlatelolco treaty), and nuclear 
weapons powers should renounce the use or threat 
of the use of nuclear weapons against states 
party to nuclear-free-zone agreements. The con-
ventional arms race should then be controlled 
by agreements between the countries of the region 
fixing armaments ceilings or successive levels for 
reductions. France would be ready to facilitate 
such agreements by adapting its policy on the 
sale of armaments accordingly. The rest of the 
world, largely the northern hemisphere, was 
covered by the nuclear deterrent, and controlling 
the nuclear arms race depended in the first 
instance on the two superpowers because there 
was considerable disproportion between their 
nuclear forces and that of li.,rance. If after 
successive reductions the disproportion changed, 
France in its turn would comdder drawing its 
conclusions therefrom. But in the area covered 
by the nuclear deterrent the visible disproportion 
of conventional weapons was a hindrance to the 
reduction of nuclear weapons, and France was 
making specific proposals in a memorandum to 
the countries participating in the CSCE for a 
European disarmament conference covering the 
area from the Atlantic to the Urals. 
41. The French memorandum on an inter-
national observation satellite agency observes 
that at present only two countries have military 
observation satellites which they use to gather 
information from any point on the surface of the 
earth that they determine, and which play an 
important role in verification of their bilateral 
arms agreements. ]'ranee proposes that this 
method of verification should be made available 
to the international community as a whole. The 
agency would be responsible for collecting, pro-
cessing and disseminating information from earth 
observation satellites and would participate in the 
verification of existing and future international 
disarmament and security agreements ; inter-
national security organisations could also apply 
to the agency for its services ; the agency could 
also act at the request of a state to investigate 
an alleged infringement of an international 
agreement by another state provided the consent 
of that other state was obtained. The Security 
Council, it is suggested, could also make use 
of the agency under the terms of Article 34 of 
the United Nations Charter which empowers it 
to "investigate any dispute or any situation 
which might lead to international friction or give 
rise to a dispute ... ·•. The agency would be a 
specialised agency of the United Nations open 
to all members and specialised institutions. 
42. The agency's technical resources could be 
developed in three phases : in the first, be 
responsible for interpreting and disseminating 
?ata from existing nationally-owned satellites ; 
m the second phase, the agency would have its 
own ground terminals for collecting data directly 
from nationally-owned satellites ; in the third 
phase, the agency would own its own observation 
satellites as well as the ground terminals and 
the necessary processing capabil1ty. Three sources 
of finance are suggested - compulsory contri-
butions of members ; voluntary contributions 
including contributions in kind by way of techni-
cal services provided by states possessing obser-
vation satellites ; and finally, contributions for 
services rendered where states apply to the 
agency for verification of disarmament or secur-
ity agreements concluded by them. France pro-
poses that a committee of experts be established 
to submit to the thirty-fourth session of the 
General Assembly (i.e. opening in September 
1979) detailed proposals for the establishment of 
the agency. 
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43. It should be noted that France has recently 
earmarked Frs. 700 million for a military obser-
vation satellite programme to be operational by 
the end of 1983 or early 1984. These "satellites 
probatoires d'observation terrestre" (SPOTs) 
would be powered by solar panels and launched 
by the European Ariane launchers. It is no doubt 
envisaged that the satellite observation agency 
could draw on resources of these satellites as 
well as those of the superpowers. 
44. The concept of a United Nations satellite 
observation capability in order to provide strictly 
independent data for the verification of inter-
national disarmament agreements was originally 
put forward by the WEU Assembly in Recom-
mendation 227 adopted on 8th December 1972 
on the report of the Committee 1 which proposed 
the establishment of an arms limitation verifi-
cation agency under United Nations aegis- the 
report envisaged that such an agency might be 
equipped with i'ts own technical means of external 
verification such as observation satellites and 
seismic arrays. Subsequently in Recommendation 
254 adopted on 20th June 1974 on a further 
report of the Committee 2 the Assembly proposed 
a United Nations satellite observation capability 
as an adjunct to United Nations peace-keeping 
capability - a proposal made with particular 
1. Document 587, East·,Vest relations and dl'fence, 
Rapporteur Mr. Destremnu. 
2. Document 637, Security and the M~>diterrnnenn, 
Rapporteur Mr. Jung. 
reference to the need to verify positions of troops 
on particular dates when establishing the cease-
fire line in the 1973 Middle East conflict. 
45. In its memorandum on an International 
Disarmament Research Institute, France pro-
posed the establishment of an autonomous insti-
tute similar to the United Nations Institute for 
Training and Research (UNIT.AR). The institute 
would be independent under an executive 
director appointed by the governing body which, 
in turn, would be composed of independent 
persons known for their contribution to peace and 
disarmament or their expertise in security mat-
ters. They would be appointed by the Secretary-
General in consultation with the Presidents of the 
General Assembly and of the Disarmament Com-
mittee. Research conducted by the institute while 
being useful for current negotiations would not 
necessarily be directly linked to them, subjects 
suggested include: military technologies ; com-
parative analysis of different systems of verifi-
cation of disarmament agreements ; the concept 
of the right 'to security and its regional appli-
cation. Initially the institute might employ some 
ten experts and would be financed through a 
contribution from the United Nations budget and 
voluntary contributions from governments, inter-
governmental organisations, foundations and 
other private sources, provided the independence 
of the institute was conserved. 
46. The French proposals continue with the 
establishment of an international disarmament 
fund for development to be devoted in the first 
place to the economic and social development of 
the poorest countries. Initially a fund of 
$1 billion is proposed, through voluntary con-
tributions - 50 % from the nuclear weapon 
countries in proportion to the numbers of 
nuclear delivery systems they possess and 50 % 
from wealthy and heavily-armed countries in 
accordance with criteria to be agreed. Contri-
butions could be counted against the 0.7.% of 
GNP which has been fixed internationally as a 
target for industrial countries to devote to the 
development of the poorer countries. 
47. In its memorandum to the twenty-three 
countries participating in the OSCE (the Euro-
pean countries plus the United States and 
Canada) proposing a conference on disarmament 
in Europe, it is understood that France proposed 
a conference of the CSCE countries giving 
priority to increasing security through con-
fidence-building measures and the limitation and 
reduction of conventional weapons. The nego-
tiations would apply to the European territories 
of all participating countries - thus extending 
from the Atlantic to the Urals. Negotiations 
would cover major conventional air and land 
weapons with a high offensive capability, the 
forces servicing these weapons, and their logistic 
support when within the zone covered by the 
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negotiations. The definition excluded naval forces 
and nuclear weapons which could not be dealt 
with in a conference limited to European 
territory. 
48. The conference could proceed by stages, 
first drawing up anti-surprise and stabilisation 
measures based on mutual information corre-
sponding to the aims of the confidence-building 
measures agreed in the CSCE. In the second 
phase, when the first had made sufficient pro-
gress to increase confidence, the conference could 
turn to measures of limitation and actual reduc-
tion of conventional weapons and forces which 
would apply to all military powers attending 
the conference whether or not they were members 
of a collective defence organisation. Specifically 
the conference would not be an obstacle to more 
limited agreements with more far-reaching pro-
visions - presumably therefore it is intended to 
work in parallel with the MBFR. After an 
exchange of views with the countries to whom 
the memorandum is addressed, France envisages 
the convening of a preparatory committee for the 
conference on disarmament in Europe and is 
prepared to make concrete proposals for its 
organisation, but its procedure could be based 
on that of the CSCE. 
49. In annexes to the memorandum it is under-
stood that France proposed the following con-
fidence-building measures involving multilateral 
mutual information measures : the exchange of 
data on command structure and the location of 
forces limited to major formations ; exchange of 
data on military budgets using a Swedish pro-
posal as a basis - this data could be collected 
and disseminated by the executive secretariat 
of the conference. Bilateral mutual information 
measures based on reciprocity could be the 
exchange of observers for manoeuvres in accord-
ance with the rules agreed by the CSCE ; visits 
and calls ; the exchange of military instructors 
and lecturers ; the development of facilities 
accorded to military attaches including freedom 
of movement. Secondly, anti-surprise measures 
would be based on one month's advance notifi-
cation of manoeuvres and movements including 
air and land manoeuvres involving joint oper-
ations by land, air and amphibious forces, at a 
level of one to two divisions, notice to cover 
not only the forces involved but also the major 
equipment as defined in the second annex. Thirty 
days' notification could also be given of mobilis-
ation exercises and movements of land and air 
forces covering movements of one to two divisions 
over distances greater than 200 kilometres. 
Notification could be accompanied by the desig-
nation of principal points of passage, especially 
for the crossing of frontiers. Thirdly, stabilis-
ation measures more constraining than the fore-
going might involve a ceiling on land-air 
manoeuvres of, for example, 60,000 men within 
defined conditions of space and time ; and the 
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establishment of air or satellite surveillance 
systems which could be covered by a European 
agreement. 
50. In the second annex on the limitation and 
reduction of forces, it is understood that France 
suggested that they should apply to conventional 
equipment combining mobility with great fire 
power including medium and heavy battle tanks ; 
infantry armoured vehicles ; .field artillery and 
multiple rocket launchers ; combat aircraft 
(fighters, fighter bombers and reconnaissance 
aircraft) ; armed helicopters; and the forces 
associated with the foregoing equipment and 
their logistic support. Agreements on reduction 
should lead to the demobilisation of the units 
concerned. The verification measures necessary 
for such agreements could be carried out by the 
satellites of the international agency proposed 
by France, and by the system of air surveillance 
as well as observers for on-me inspections. 
51. In its proposals for disarmament negotiating 
machinery the French paper submitted to the 
preparatory committee observes that the United 
Nations remains the natural framework for 
debates on disarmament, and that in the deliberat-
ing body all member states should be able to 
participate on a basis of equality. France pro-
poses that the First Committee of the General 
Assembly (a committee of all members) should 
be enabled to sit as a disarmament commission 1 
and thus constitute the universal deliberating 
body. There should then be a new negotiating 
body replacing the present COD, which would 
be responsible directly to the Disarmament Com-
mission. The new body entitled the "Disarmament 
Committee" would have from thirty to forty 
members including states with a particular 
interest in disarmament, the members of the 
Security Council and would be representative of 
all regions of the world. The chairman would be 
elected for two years from among any partici-
pating state other than the permanent members 
of the Security Council. Decisions of the Dis-
armament Committee would be taken by con-
sensus and it would be the forum for disarma-
ment negotiations based on recommendations 
from the Disarmament Commission to which it 
would report. Countries not members of the 
Disarmament Committee would be free to attend 
its meetings as observers. 
United States 
52. Neither the United States nor the Soviet 
Union has played a prominent role in the special 
session on disarmament. President Carter did 
not attend the special session in person, but 
I. There is an existing United Nations body known as 
the Disarmament Commission which last met in 1965 
(see paragraph 3). 
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Vice-President Mondale addressed it on 24th May 
when he stressed the unprecedented communist 
military build-up in Europe and the increased 
nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union which 
required the western allies to make moderate 
increases in their defence budgets. On disarma-
ment, he forecast what he called two historic 
achievements : for the first time agreement could 
be reached between the United States and the 
Soviet Union to reduce the combined total of 
delivery vehicles for strategic nuclear weapons ; 
secondly, a comprehensive test ban would be 
produced controlling nuclear explosions by the 
United States, the United Kingdom and the 
Soviet Union. He proposed nine points for 
inclusion in the action programme to be adopted 
by the special session : reduction in the number 
of strategic weapons and increasingly stricter 
qualitative restrictions on their later develop-
ment ; a ban on nuclear tests ; international 
co-operation to ensure that no further nuclear 
powers emerged ; a ban on weapons of mass 
destruction other than nuclear weapons ; reduc-
tion in the constant rise in conventional weapons ; 
strengthening arms control agreements (and the 
United States offered to provide specialists for 
technological means of verification - what he 
called "the eyes and ears of peace" - understood 
to include aerial photography and early-warning 
devices) ; development of institutions and exper-
tise on arms control ; the creation of a United 
Nations reserve force for the maintenance of 
peace ; the release of new resources from arma-
ments to economic and social development. He 
proposed a new extraordinary session of the 
General Assembly in 1981 to review progress. 
Soviet Union and its allies 
53. On 7th September 1977 the Soviet Union, 
together with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Ger-
man Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia 
and Poland submitted a working paper to the 
preparatory committee outlining basic provisions 
for the programme of action. It appears to 
include no new ideas but lists eleven well-known 
disarmament topics on which, it is asserted, 
agreement is essential : cessation of the nuclear 
arms race and nuclear disarmament ; measures 
to avert the danger of nuclear war ; complete 
and general prohibition of nuclear weapon 
threats ; consolidation in every possible way of 
the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons ; prohibition and destruction of chemical 
weapons stockpiles ; prohibition of the develop-
ment of new types and systems of mass destruc-
tion; establishment of nuclear-free zones and 
zones of peace ; limitation and reduction of 
armed forces and conventional weapons ; reduc-
tion of military budgets; complete demilitaris-
ation of the seabed and the ocean floor ; and 
regional measures for military detente and dis-
armament. 
54. It is significant that in its comments on 
llegotiating machinery the Soviet paper says that 
the existing multilateral, bilateral and regional 
systems are suitable but continues its support 
for a world disarmament conference. Some coun-
tries feel that now that China has joined the 
United Nations and ·that indeed that organis-
ation's membership is virtually universal, a world 
disarmament conference holds little advantage 
over the present special session of the General 
Assembly. 
Fifteen non-aligned members of the CCD 
55. On 4th April 1978 the fifteen non-aligned 
members of the COD submitted a working paper 
on organisation and procedures of the COD which 
made the following succinct proposals. To 
strengthen the existing link with the General 
Assembly, all member countries of the United 
Nrutions would be free to submit proposals on any 
subject being negotiated in the COD and to par-
ticipate in the proceedings when those proposals 
were discussed. The role of the United Nations 
Secretary-General's special representative and the 
United Nations Centre for Disarmament should 
be enhanced ; the eo-chairmanship system should 
be replaced by a system "to be agreed upon" -
the following alternative proposals being listed 
- chairman by monthly rotation among all 
members of the COD ; monthly rotation among 
all non-nuclear members of the COD ; a bureau 
of four members comprising a chairman rotating 
either monthly or on a sessional basis and three 
vice-chairmen. Two members of the bureau would 
be selected from states belonging to the military 
blocs and two from non-aligned countries. 
China 
56. Mr. Huang Hua, Chinese Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, addressed the special session 
on 29th May when he implied that China was 
prepared to take part in future disarmament 
negotiations. The speech was otherwise devoted 
to criticism of the two superpowers for their 
"colossal military potential", but more particu-
larly of the Soviet Union: "social imperialism, a 
lately arrived superpower, is undertaking a 
threatening offensive... the Soviet Union by the 
scale of its uncontrolled expansion of armaments, 
puts the other superpower in the shade". He 
said that disarmament had made no progress 
because the two superpowers were not sincere, 
and he condemned the partial test ban treaty and 
the non-proliferation treaty as having tied the 
hands and feet of many non-nuclear countries ; 
the history of SAL'r was one of a strategic 
arms race. He called first for the prohibition 
and complete destruction of all nuclear weapons 
and the convening of a world summit conference 
for that purpose. He called for the two super-
powers to take the following measures : under-
take not to use or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear countries or 
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denuclearised zones ; repatriate all their armed 
forces and dismantle their foreign military 
bases ; stop the nuclear and conventional arms 
race and begin the progressive destruction of 
nuclear weapons and a massive reduction of con-
ventional weapons ; undertake not to station large 
forces or conduct military manoeuvres in areas 
close to the frontiers of other countries and 
undertake not to attack other countries ; under-
take not to export arms to any country for the 
purpose of exercising control, provoking war, or 
threatening war. 
57. China subsequently confirmed its commit-
ment to participating in a disarmament negoti-
ating forum and circulated a working paper 
calling for the abolition of the COD in favour 
of a new negotiating body to be truly free from 
superpower control, composed on a fair and 
equitable basis. 
Conclusions 
58. The Committee concludes that there is a good 
case for trying to reach agreement in the special 
session on a medium-term programme of four 
to five years on practical proposals, designed 
to give impetus to realistic measures of disarma-
ment, and possibly to modify slightly the existing 
negotiating machinery which at present is the 
COD. 
59. Unfortunately all desirable features of a 
negotiating (as opposed to deliberating) forum 
cannot be reconciled - it is significant that the 
Soviet Union and the United States have so 
far been publicly silent on or have opposed 
any modification to the COD. It is possible that 
these countries might now be prepared to give 
up the eo-chairmanship, and the susceptibilities 
of many countries, including Prance, would be 
soothed if the system were replaced, for example. 
by a chairmanship rotating among all members 
on a fairly short-term basis (one month) sup-
ported say by a four-nation balanced bureau as 
proposed in the non-aligned paper quoted above. 
Membership cannot however be much increased : 
with thirty participating membE:rs it is already 
less effective than originally when it had only 
eighteen. It is however important that France 
should take up the vacant seat that has always 
been reserved for it, and that China, the only 
other absent nuclear power, should join. Con-
sideration. might be given to permitting other 
countries to submit proposals to the COD, and 
possibly attend sessions as observers with the 
right of participation when their proposals are 
discussed. Such a body would be much the same 
as the "Disarmament Committee" proposed by 
France and a change of title and status would be 
a relatively small price to pay if the participation 
of France and China were thereby secured. It 
would however be important to maintain the 
consensus principle as far as decision-making is 
concern~d. 
Document 778 
Amendment No. 1 
Disarmament 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Cook and others 
21st June 1978 
At the end of paragraph I (e) of the draft recommendation proper, add "which recognises the 
special responsibility of the major arms-producing countries to exercise restraint in their sales policy". 
Signed: Oook, Sir John Rodgers, Fa'lil48, Schwencke, Oraigen, van den Bergh, Watkinson, Lewis, 
Whitehead, Mrs. von Bothmer, Stoffelen, Reid 
1. See 6th Sitting, 22nd June 1978 (Amendment withdrawn). 
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Amendment No. 2 
Disarmament 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Cook 
21st June 1978 
At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a paragraph (viii): 
"(viii) Accepting the responsibility shared by WEU members with other major arms suppliers 
to seek agreements to reduce the world trade in armaments,". 
Signed : Cook 
I. See 5th Sitting, 22nd June 1978 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment No. 3 
Disarmament 
AMENDMENT No. 3 1 
tabled by Mr. ValleiX 
22nd June 1978 
1. In the draft recommendation proper, paragraph 1 (d), leave out "restore" and insert "safe-
guard"; between paragraphs 1 (g) and 1 (h), leave out "if possible". 
2. In paragraph 2, leave out "without reducing its effectiveness" and insert "and of all states 
on an equal footing". 
3. Add a new paragraph 4 as follows: 
"4. To have a European conference convened grouping all the powers interested in disarmament 
on the continent, inter alia through appropriate consultations between the member states of WEU 
in the Council of this organisation ;". 
4. Add a new paragraph 5 as follows: 
"5. To institute in the framework of the United Nations an international development fund 
financed by contributions levied according to the level of armaments of the member states 
of the organisation". 
Signed : Valleix 
I. See 6th Sitting, 22nd June 1978 (Part 1 withdrawn ; parts 2, 3 and 4 negatived). 
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